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Abstract 
 
This study examines the development of theory of mind in children with Down’s syndrome 
between the ages of 2 and 9. Children were assessed in 3 age groups: group 1 = age 2/3 (n=15), 
group 2 = ages 4/5 (n=9) and group 3 = ages 7/9 (n=15). A range of assessments were used to 
examine the precursors of and development of theory of mind skills: semi-structured play tasks 
with groups 1 and 2 and a range of established and novel theory of mind tasks with group 3. 
Groups 2 and 3 also undertook a language comprehension assessment which has also been 
considered in terms of its reliability for this group of children. A mixed methods approach to 
data collection and analysis allowed for both quantitative and qualitative data to be reported. 
Results show that children with Down’s syndrome develop their theory of mind at a slow pace 
and through potentially different mechanisms than seen in the typically developing population. 
Development may be constrained by a range of factors; joint attention, inhibitory control, 
working memory, foundational knowledge schemas and representational ability. This study 
showed that children with Down’s syndrome display features of theory of mind development in 
social situations in advance of passing theory of mind tasks and they were likely to use 
increasingly sophisticated social means to reject or modify a task. The findings from this study 
are considered with attention to a neuroconstructivist approach and are framed within the 
discourse of disability rights. Particular consideration is given to the application of the findings 
in relation to building an equitable education system for individuals with cognitive variance. 
Practical suggestions are outlined to encourage practitioners to acknowledge and support this 
essential area of a child’s development and the application of findings are discussed in terms of 
other groups of children who may benefit from similar support.  
Key words: Down’s syndrome, theory of mind, cognitive development, disability, education  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In 2009 my daughter was born and soon after her birth she was diagnosed with Down’s 
syndrome. Not long after her diagnosis the questions started for me. First of all it was questions 
specifically related to my daughter; how is her heart, when will she smile, does she show signs 
of x, y or z, will she learn to sit up, to walk, to talk? Partly because I am a teacher and so 
interested in learning and development, these soon developed into questions about all children 
with Down’s syndrome; why is it that they find it difficult to learn to talk or to learn about 
numbers, what aspects of their cognition helps or hinders learning, how do their life experiences 
differ from those born without a disability? Whilst engaged as a practitioner  working with 
infants with Down’s syndrome on their early development skills, I was interested to note how 
the concrete aspects of learning in the very early years (such as learning to put an object ‘in’ or 
learning to match picture cards) was slow but consistent. However, as the children got older and 
learning was more abstract (learning about colour, numbers and categories for example), their 
learning appeared inconsistent and took much longer to consolidate.  
Initial ideas for this study were based around early development and particularly focused on 
how I could assess the effectiveness of the type of early intervention programmes I was involved 
in teaching. However as the initial themes developed, a focus on the perceived difficulty with 
abstract concepts took precedence along with an interest in the development of theory of mind 
and social cognition. Figure 1 shows an early sketch of my understanding of some developmental 
processes, the thick black line marking the point at which I felt there may be a difference in 
developmental progress for the child with Down’s syndrome. I hypothesized that children with 
Down’s syndrome may slow in their development when they reach this critical point where a 
number of skills diverge. Over the course of this thesis I show that these initial hunches were in 
many ways quite accurate and that the developments observed in the cohort studied are similar 
to the areas I originally highlighted. From this initial hypothesis two research questions emerged: 
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1. How does theory of mind, or social cognition, develop in children with Down’s 
syndrome? 
2. How might this developmental trajectory impact on learning? 
The first question will be answered in part by the study itself; I have been able to show when 
children with Down’s syndrome acquire certain skills which lead to the development of theory 
of mind. I have been able to use prior literature to suggest how this development takes place 
and what constraints may be placed on the development. Answering the second question has 
been more conjecture and will need further studies to deepen our understanding of how theory 
of mind skills impact on learning. From the results of the current study I am able to suggest what 
impact differences in theory of mind may have on the learning abilities of individuals with 
Down’s syndrome, but these suggestions remain to be tested.  
Being a parent of a child with Down’s syndrome and researching Down’s syndrome has in some 
ways been very difficult and in many ways very enlightening. During the initial stages of research 
it quickly became apparent that I would need to become hardened to discussions of ‘deviant’ 
and ‘delayed’ development and the discourse of ‘deficiency’ and ‘disorders’. What I felt was lost 
amongst all the data however, were the real people who were the subject of the papers; people 
who had lived experience above and beyond that which was being measured. My concern over 
the discourse of disability in research literature encouraged me to focus my research on 
becoming very person centred; at the heart of my work were to be the children I was working 
with and their families. I wanted the children and families to take positives away from the 
experience of being involved with research. The tasks were designed to be very child centred; it 
was essential that the children enjoyed and engaged with the tasks and felt comfortable with 
me as a researcher (see chapter 6). I also ensured the involvement of parents and teaching 
assistants in a number of ways (see chapter 6); an important aspect of this involvement is to 
revisit parent support groups and schools with the findings once they have been accepted. 
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Aside from the practical aspects of the study design I also made theoretical choices which were 
built on a person-centred approach. The decision to move away from a comparative study of 
typically developing children and children with Down’s syndrome was based on the belief that 
individuals with Down’s syndrome may have their own developmental trajectory and that this 
does not need to be compared to that of typically developing children. We should be able, 
eventually, to assess where a child is in their development against developmental milestones 
which are specific to individuals with Down’s syndrome. For example, it would be enlightening 
to one day be able to say this 4 year old child with Down’s syndrome ‘is working at the level of 
a 4 year old with Down’s syndrome’ instead of this 4 year old child with Down’s syndrome ‘is 
working at the level of a typically developing 2 year old’. An important reason for making this 
distinction is that a child of 4 with Down’s syndrome has had very different experiences to a 
typically developing child who is 2 (not least 2 extra years of experiences). So a child of 4 with 
Down’s syndrome is not working at the same level of a child of 2 because the child with Down’s 
syndrome brings from those 4 years a very different set of skills, knowledge and understanding 
of the world. Unless we make a conscious effort to move away from measuring those with 
disabilities against those without, we will be trapped in a cycle of describing disability as lesser 
and as lacking. And perhaps more importantly, we will perpetuate a notion of the superiority of 
typicality.  
One way in which we may be able to move away from this type of measurement is by utilising a 
neuroconstructivist approach to development, which is underpinned by recognising that small 
variations in brain morphology can affect developmental trajectories. This approach recognises 
that difference may stem from the very beginnings of development and supports an argument 
of specific patterns of development (as opposed to typical development which is then modified 
by disability). In chapter 2 I outline how a neuroconstructivist approach has been used to 
underpin the research and explain how it can help us to move away from models of deviance 
and delay.  
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My final commitment to a person-centred approach is the recognition of the limitations of 
terminology used in research about those with disabilities. In reading research dating back to 
the 1960’s I was unsurprised to encounter terminology which is dated and offensive. Although I 
recognise that there are no easy answers to the terminology debate, there are terms which 
advance ableism and demote diversity. Particularly problematic are  the terms ‘disabled’ and 
‘difference’, which for some should refer to the way society disables individuals and are not 
about the individual (Connors & Stalker, 2007). In 1976 The Union of the Physically Impaired 
Against Segregation suggested a distinction between impairment and disability: 
Thus we define impairment as lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, organ or 
mechanism of the body; and disability as the disadvantage or restriction of activity caused by a 
contemporary social organisation which takes no or little account of people who have physical 
impairments and thus excludes them from participation in the mainstream of social activities. 
Physical disability is therefore a particular form of social oppression. (UPIAS, 1976, pg. 14) 
This was later changed from the limitation of ‘physical’ impairments to include all impairments 
(Oliver & Barnes, 2012) and it is this definition of disability which I will use throughout this thesis.  
I will use the term ‘cognitive variance’ to describe the cognitive functional differences of 
individuals with Down’s syndrome. In using this term I recognise that there are cognitive 
differences which create different ways of and difficulties in learning. I have chosen cognitive 
variance over cognitive difficulty because I believe the label difficulty enhances a perception that 
people with learning disabilities suffer from hardship. Difficulty suggests something that must 
be struggled against and that can be overcome. Variance refers to the way the brain is differently 
constructed and therefore allows acceptance of difference rather than seeing difference as 
something which can be changed.  
The use of cognitive variance does not suggest however that we must just accept that people 
with Down’s syndrome ‘can’t do’ certain things. I suggest that we change our teaching styles 
and methods and our school and community inclusion practices in order to allow strengths to 
5 
 
support learning and to work alongside variance. I feel that it is an essential part of our work, as 
teachers, researchers and academics, to investigate, to create ideas and work towards societal 
solutions to make sure that a variance or impairment does not become a disability. These ideas 
are discussed more fully in Chapter 12.  
The next 5 chapters discuss the theoretical and practical underpinnings of this study. Chapter 2 
describes how a neuroconstructivist approach underpins this research. In Chapter 3 I describe 
how theory of mind develops in typically developing children and Chapters 4 and 5 link this with 
what is known about children with Down’s syndrome. This may seem a contradiction of the 
commitment to not comparing the two groups and in some ways it is. The use of a typical 
trajectory is to identify elements which are seen as important to a development of theory of 
mind and then attempt to identify if and how these elements emerge in a cohort of children 
with Down’s syndrome. I will be using typical development as a blue print, but I am not 
suggesting it is the only print. Chapter 6 explains the design of the study and discusses in detail 
some of my methodological choices. Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 describe the results and discuss 
what kind of a developmental trajectory the findings suggest. The final chapters focus on an 
important aspect of our study; what we do with the results. Because my background is in 
teaching it was not enough for me to just find results. It is important that the results can help 
teachers, teaching assistants and communities deliver a curriculum in a way that is meaningful 
for children with Down’s syndrome. Note here the focus on teachers; the results and discussion 
emphasise the internal variance, but my recommendations in chapters 12 and 13 are focussed 
on changing teaching styles and educational practices to support learners, not to try and 
ameliorate students’ impairment.   
Most students of a PhD begin with grandiose ideas about how their research may change the 
world. Unless one is lucky enough to be studying a science which interests the media, or happens 
upon a medical breakthrough, is it unlikely our research will be noticed very much. If we are very 
lucky our work may become recognised amongst similar scholars and may even have a little 
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impact. For me, this research is personal and my focus is very much about impact. Even though 
my study is complete, my commitment to the individuals I worked with will ensure the findings 
are disseminated and discussed amongst parents, practitioners and teachers and that this work 
has real impact on the lives of individuals with Down’s syndrome. In the end this research is 
about changing the world, just a little bit. 
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Figure 1. An early interpretation of an overview of child development 
The thick black line suggests where children with Down’s syndrome may have difficulties 
 
8 
 
Chapter 2: A Neuroconstructivist Approach  
 
To examine the development of children with Down’s syndrome this study is framed using a 
neuroconstructivist model (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995). The neuroconstructivist model considers the 
biological and genetic basis for development and explains how very small differences in brain 
morphology can create different developmental pathways for different genetic conditions 
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1995). It is beyond the scope of this study to detail the brain morphology and 
genetic basis of individuals with Down’s syndrome (although this is touched on in Chapter 4), 
and so this area of the theoretical construct of the neuroconstructivist model will not be 
discussed in detail.  What the model does offer however, is a move away from the ‘deviance or 
delay’ models of atypical development and instead considers what motivates a ‘delayed’ or 
‘deviant’ trajectory (Thomas et al., 2009).  
A difficulty with the ‘delay’ model, and this particularly relevant when considering individuals 
with Down’s syndrome, is that it supposes that development will continue until the same end 
point is reached for everyone (Martin, 2001). Therefore if language, for instance, is merely 
delayed, it may take longer but eventually the individual will have a fully developed linguistic 
profile. With regards to Down’s syndrome, very young infants are considered to be following the 
same cognitive developmental path as their typically developing peers, just at a much slower 
rate. They are able to smile, imitate and use looking and noises to communicate only weeks or 
months after their typically developing peers (Berger & Cunningham, 1981; Carvajal & Iglesias, 
2000). However much later in their development they show a cognitive profile which is not 
consistent with this ‘slow but same’ concept (Silverman, 2007), they are liable to overuse social 
skills (Abbeduto et al., 2001), they have poor number skills (Paterson, 2001) and speech is often 
poorly articulated (Kumin, 2006). So although they may appear to begin at the same place as 
their peers, their end point is not at all ‘normal’, even if we consider this end point to be far into 
adulthood.  
9 
 
A delay model can only account for global differences, and cannot account for differences in 
specific functions (or domains).  Consideration of the ‘deviance’ model offers little more to 
understanding development in Down’s syndrome. A deviance model suggests that individuals 
have either ‘intact’ or ‘faulty’ domains, modules or functions. This model suggests that children 
are able to function at the level of general cognitive delay in most areas, but they are specifically 
deficient in particular areas. An example of this is Baron-Cohen’s research into theory of mind 
in autistic children. Many of the autistic children in his studies failed the theory of mind false 
belief task, but showed average IQ scores. This conflict led to the conclusion that children with 
autism have a specific deficit in representational abilities (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) 
although see  Peterson, Slaughter, Peterson, and Premack (2013) for an alternative 
interpretation. Karmilloff-Smith however, suggests that this develops as a result of lack of infant 
‘preferential interest’ in faces, voices and movement (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995, pg. 121). She 
suggests that this sets up a developmental trajectory which moves them away from a typical 
developmental pathway and is shown through observable behaviours in their theory of mind 
abilities.  
The neuroconstructivist model offers an account of development which allows for a disjunction 
between starting place and developmental outcomes and is able to account for difference in a 
more intricate way than a deviance model allows. In essence it suggests that, because of tiny 
individual variations in brain morphology and gene expression, the starting points for individuals 
with cognitive variance may be very similar, but not the same as typically developing infants. As 
development takes place the tiny variations force learning through different routes (which may 
end up with the same outcomes, or not) and create pathways which are different than those in 
the typically developing brain. So what may look like ‘typical but slow’ development may actually 
have been achieved by a very untypical route (Karmiloff-Smith, 1998). In discussing the cognitive 
development of children with Down’s syndrome Fidler, Most and Philofsky sum up a 
neuroconstructivist approach: 
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While the existence of a genetic insult, such as trisomy 21 or a translocation involving chromosome 
21, does alter the early starting states of the developing, development still proceeds in the 
direction of greater complexity. But because of these variations in starting states, the self-
organisation process creates patterns and order out of different raw materials or ingredients, with 
the presence of different constraints on functioning. Over time, areas of pronounced strength 
become apparent, and areas of pronounced weakness begin to emerge as well. In this way (to 
paraphrase Annette Karmiloff-Smith), the dynamic process of development is what constructs the 
phenotypic outcomes that are observed cross-sectionally in middle childhood and beyond in this 
population. (Fidler, Most, & Philofsky, 2009, pg. 40)  
Karmiloff-Smith positions her theory between the nativist description of the infant who 
possesses innate domain specific modules which are essentially ‘switched on’ during 
development, (for example Fordor (1983)) and constructivism which theorises that the child’s 
mind is a blank slate which gradually develops with input from the environment and its senses 
(for example Piaget (1959)). Karmiloff-Smith (1998) joins the two theories by suggesting that the 
child is born with some processes which are domain relevant (as opposed to specific). Domain 
relevant processes become specific with use and with sensory and environmental influences. 
For individuals with non-typical development this could mean that the way their domain-
relevant processes become domain-specific could happen via a different developmental 
trajectory (Fidler et al., 2009; Karmiloff-Smith, 2013; Paterson, 2001).  
An essential element of this theory is to examine development using longitudinal rather than 
cross sectional data. This enables observation over time and is focussed on documenting the 
developmental trajectory of a group or a particular process (Thomas et al., 2009). In particular 
this approach allows for examination of typically developing groups and developmentally 
different groups over time, which may show at what points the two groups diverge or converge. 
The focus on ‘process’ rather than ‘module’ is also a key component of a neuroconstructivist 
approach. Karmiloff-Smith demonstrates that difficulties in underlying processes may present 
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as a damaged or deficient module if data is only taken from one time point examining one 
domain. If a longitudinal approach is taken and multiple domains are measured it may become 
clear that it is an underdeveloped process which is causing the difficulty, rather than a complete 
module (Ansari & Karmiloff-Smith, 2002). Although it has not been possible to take a longitudinal 
approach in the present study, some of the theory of ‘process’ versus ‘module damage’ will be 
used in analysis and discussion.  
A further element of neuroconstructivism which Karmiloff-Smith describes is the child’s 
understanding of representations and how they help the child organise knowledge. She posits 
that there are a number of levels of representation a child uses, beginning with a level of implicit 
representation (I)  and then 3 levels of explicit representation (E1, E2, E3) which she specifies 
are not age related but are part of a cycle she calls ‘representational redescription’ (RR). At the 
implicit level “representations are in the form of procedures for analysing and responding to 
stimuli in the external environment” (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995, pg. 20). These are not available 
across domains and cannot be linked. At the explicit level representations are initially reduced 
descriptions of the external environment which lose detail but are available across domains (E1), 
then representations which are available to conscious access but not to verbal report (E2) and 
finally conscious representations which are accessible to verbal report (E3). The process of 
representational redescription facilitates the integration of these representational levels and is 
an ongoing cyclical process. This aspect of the neuroconstructivist theory is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 3, alongside other theories of representation in relation to the child’s 
developing theory of mind.  
The neuroconstructivist approach is much more complex theory than can be described here. It  
links to computational modelling (Mareschal et al., 2007), deep descriptions of modelling 
developmental trajectories (Thomas et al., 2009), it has a complex and important relationship 
with brain morphology (Sirois et al., 2008) and is not a universally acclaimed concept (Ramus, 
2004). The focus here is on the elements of the theory which may help to explain and frame the 
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findings in this study. Areas which do not fit neatly, or are incompatible with the present study 
methodology may have been bypassed. However, as Wellman suggests in discussing using a 
framework theory to examine mental phenomena, “[…] framework theories define the ontology 
and the basic causal devices for their specific theories and even constrain some aspects of 
accepted methodology […]” (Wellman, 1990 pg. 125). Because of the focus on the typical child 
in many developmental theories there may not be the necessary room within these ontologies 
to describe non-typical development, other than by using delay and deviance terms. Using a 
neuroconstructivist approach to discuss the present findings will enable a wider description of 
the cognitive development of individuals with Down’s syndrome than delay or deviance models. 
It may allow for individuals with Down’s syndrome to be credited with their own distinctive 
developmental trajectory, away from comparisons with what is ‘normal’. 
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Chapter 3: Theory of Mind 
3. 1 Introduction 
An important aspect of children’s cognitive and social development is the growth in their 
understanding of others. What begins as a behavioural understanding of others (that others 
‘do’), develops into a desire understanding (that others ‘want’ and will act to fulfil their desires), 
and eventually, between the ages of 3 and 4 years, a belief/desire understanding (that people’s 
actions will be moderated by their beliefs and their desires) (Wellman, 1990). This development, 
called by many theorists a ‘theory of mind’ (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Bretherton & Beeghly, 
1982; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wellman, 1990) is a long process and its sophistication 
continues into late childhood. How the development happens, which aspects of functioning are 
relevant to its development and at what ages children acquire certain aspects is the debate of 
many years’ research. This chapter will outline these debates and call attention to aspects 
relevant for this study.  
Premack and Woodruff (1978) devised a series of novel experiments to explore the extent of 
apes’ understanding of an actor’s knowledge and purpose. The chimpanzee in the study, Sarah, 
was able to successfully choose how an actor might solve a problem, using an increasingly 
complex set of problems and outcomes, suggesting she could empathise and use her own 
knowledge to work out a solution to a problem. For example, she was able to choose a picture 
of a lit taper as a solution to the problem of a man standing by an unlit fire and shivering. This 
implies she understood the motivation of the actor: that he wanted to be warm. However, this 
does not necessarily imply attribution of a mental state. Being cold is a physical and observable 
state, not an unobservable mental state. In their concluding remarks, which housed more 
speculation than conclusion, Premack and Woodruff made the suggestion that motivational 
understanding and (other peoples’) knowledge understanding are two points along a 
developmental trajectory; 
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Of all possible guesses, we find the most compelling one to be that inferences about motivation 
will precede those about knowledge, both across species and across developmental stages. 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978, pg. 526) 
Almost 40 years on this trajectory is still apparent in and relevant to research into theory of 
mind:  
“Theory of Mind understandings begin in infancy but also progress; earliest understandings of 
intentional action give way to later richer belief-desire systems of understanding.” (Wellman, 
2014, pg. 26)  
This trajectory may prove to be important when examining how children with Down’s syndrome 
respond to tasks which are designed to tap into their theory of mind skills. Analysis of 
performance may be able to suggest how far along the route from a motivational understanding 
of others to a mental state understanding of others children with Down’s syndrome are at 
different ages. 
3.2 What is theory of mind? 
To be able to accurately predict, explain and manipulate others’ behaviour requires us to have 
an understanding of others’ mental states, or a ‘theory of mind’. Our ability to comprehend 
fellow human beings as having separate, private minds allows us to be socially competent. With 
this understanding we can, for example, predict behavioural cause and effect, be empathetic 
and behave deceptively (Wellman, 1990). At the age of around 4 or 5 children are able to use 
these mentalising skills to predict others’ behaviour (Peskin & Ardino, 2003), understand others’ 
beliefs (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and comment on their own mental life (Bartsch & Wellman, 
1995). A key skill which has been used to quantify children’s understanding of the mind is that 
of ‘false belief’ understanding. This skill necessitates an understanding not only that others have 
beliefs, but also that these beliefs may not always be aligned with the true state of the world 
(for a more detailed description see Figure 4, this chapter). An understanding of false belief 
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marks a watershed in development which aligns with various other cognitive abilities. Children 
are able, at around 4 years, to understand the distinction between reality and appearance 
(Flavell, Green, Flavell, Watson, & Campione, 1986) and the notion of ambiguity (Ruffman, 
Olson, & Astington, 1991). They develop an ability to link their knowledge with the source of 
that knowledge (O'Neill & Gopnik, 1991) and we see changes in their understanding of language 
use, in particular propositional attitudes (phrases which suggest an agent holds a mental state 
towards a proposition)(de Villiers, 2005).  
3.3 Theories of theory of mind 
By using the term theory of mind an ontological commitment is made as to how children develop 
their understanding of mental states. Wellman (1990) suggests that children develop their 
theory of mind by testing and constraining their everyday understanding. He proposes that a 
theory of mind is like a theory because it contains three elements; it has coherence, an 
ontological distinction and a causal-explanatory framework. In order for children to understand 
the mind, they build a theory-like construction which relies on rules and orders to support 
learning. Theories are testable and children will ‘test’ their theory of mind in ordinary social 
situations, repositioning their theory as rules are confirmed or disproved. 
There is, of course, disagreement amongst scholars regarding the way theory of mind is 
constructed, or indeed if it is constructed at all. There are theorists who suggest that theory of 
mind, or folk psychology, is an innate skill and the development of this skill is wholly accounted 
for by maturation. Meltzoff (1985) suggests that precursors which are evident in infants, for 
example, being able to coordinate emotions with others, are examples of this innate ability. 
Leslie (1987) suggests that this innate module develops through a computational ‘information 
processing model’ in which changes in understanding are brought about by the growing capacity 
to process information, rather than by adding theories and concepts.  
Harris (1992) suggests that the innate module is developed by simulation, rather than by 
information. He argues that children learn to use their own experiences to simulate how others 
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would think or feel in a similar situation. In this model children learn through experience and 
their ability to understand others changes through this experience, rather than through 
maturation or through theory building.  
To frame present discussions about theory of mind I have focussed on ‘theory-theory’ (Gopnik 
& Wellman, 1992; Meltzoff, 1999; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990). Whilst alternatives are neither 
disproved nor ruled out, within this research it has been important to focus the analysis of the 
development of theory of mind in children with Down’s syndrome on one conceptual 
framework. Theory-theory rests on the assumption that children are, as Piaget (1959) suggested 
‘little scientists’ who test and construct theories about the world in order to understand it. In 
this conceptual framework children build on prior knowledge by testing out assumptions and 
reinterpreting evidence to form schemas of knowledge. For example, a child may have a ‘dog 
schema’ which includes information about their family pet: ‘short, white, pointy ears, barks’. 
When they encounter another dog they have to update their ‘dog’ schema to include ‘large, 
black, slobbery, floppy ears’. Schemas are built for all types of knowledge and actions; we may 
have a ‘party’ schema which allows us to anticipate what will happen at a party, or a ‘driving’ 
schema which allows us to drive a car. The advances that children make in the area of 
psychological understanding are supported in the development of physical and biological rules, 
laws and co-occurrences, suggesting that all three areas are theoretically linked (Flavell, 1988). 
Unlike Piaget’s thinking however, theory-theory is not bound by stages and relies very much on 
a child’s prior knowledge and learning to accelerate progress. Premack and Woodruff’s early 
description illustrates the theory-like construction of theory of mind skills: 
“A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as theory, first, because such states are 
not directly observable and, second, because the system can be used to make predictions, 
specifically about the behaviour of other organisms.” (Premack & Woodruff, 1978, pg. 515) 
The theory-theory concept frames the study presented here by allowing the child’s prior 
knowledge to determine where they are in terms of developing their theory of mind. Aspects of 
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the present analysis will focus on what elements of learning may have already taken place for 
the children and what impact this could have on their current state of knowledge acquisition 
and expression. As children with Down’s syndrome often have social, environmental and formal 
learning opportunities which are modified by their cognitive variance (this is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 4) it can be argued that their opportunities to create and test their theories of biology, 
physics and psychology may be qualitatively different. Theory-theory allows room for different 
patterns of development according to different experiences, a model compatible with a 
neuroconstructivist approach. The two models share similar groundings in a constructivist 
framework, allowing for external and internal contributions to cognitive development. They 
both allow for alternative pathways of development; neuroconstructivism by using the 
explanation of domain–specific growth, theory-theory by allowing for prior experience and 
hypothesis testing to impact on development. At the level of representational change theory 
the two models still find common ground; Wellman’s interpretation of theory-theory posits that 
children first develop a ‘direct copy’ representation (Wellman, 1990), in essence very similar to 
the initial Level I (implicit) internal representation suggested by Karmiloff-Smith (1995).  The two 
models work together sympathetically; neuroconstructivism gives an overarching model of 
development within which theory-theory can explain a particular aspect of change.   
The remainder of this chapter gives a general overview of how theory of mind develops in 
typically developing children, with a focus on the key areas which are to be examined in this 
study.  
3.4 Pre-cursors to theory of mind 
New-born and infant imitation provides one of the first forms of communication between the 
child and others in their world. When infants copy facial movements such as sticking a tongue 
out, and later on smiling, they are forming a communicative bond with another person. As 
babies mature their use of imitation in play and their ability to communicate develops in 
sophistication. Meltzoff suggests that not only does imitation provide children with an initial 
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starting point for theory of mind but that, “Reciprocal imitative games provide the infant with 
special information about how it is like another person and how another person is ‘like me’.” 
(Meltzoff, 1999, pg. 256)  
The development of non-verbal communication continues with the infant’s ability to share a 
referent, termed joint attention.  As a precursor to manual pointing (to point something out) 
joint attention happens when two people know they are both attending to the same thing. 
Before about 9 months infants are able to follow a gaze of an adult, however they are not 
actively seeking the adult’s attention. Joint attention requires a coordinated communication in 
which both parties are aware there are messages which are being sent and received 
(Butterworth, 1995b). To show they are aware of the effect their communication will have on 
their partner the infant must share a referent by looking to it then looking back to their partner 
to check they have also seen it. This suggests a simple understanding that other people are 
‘different’ and that as they do not automatically ‘see what I see’. A note which may be 
particularly important in the present study is the difference between alternating attention and 
joint attention. Infants are able to alternate attention between an adult and a referent, but this 
does not necessarily mean they are sharing a mental focus on the referent. In order for joint 
attention to be assumed the child/object focus and adult/object focus must all be coordinated 
(Bretherton, 1991).  
At around a year old children begin to develop a range of pro-social behaviours. Intentional 
communication, imitative learning and social referencing all form part of the child’s developing 
focus on other people (Butterworth, 1995b). By intentionally communicating with and copying 
adults children are beginning to explore the differences between themselves and others. Social 
referencing can occur when children are exposed to an unusual situation (in experimental 
sessions, usually an unfamiliar noisy/action toy). Children look to their caregiver for social cues 
as to how to react (should I be scared/excited?) and will base their own reaction on what they 
observe. This development shows that the child knows their caregiver has knowledge which the 
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child lacks, an indication of the child’s growing understanding of the difference between himself 
and others (Meltzoff, 1999).  
By 12 – 14 months children begin to more purposefully control their environment by using 
imperatives and declaratives in their actions and vocalisations. Imperatives are used to change 
an adult’s intention or to change their course of action. For example, the child points, looks and 
vocalises towards their drink to make the adult get the drink for them. Declaratives are used 
more to draw attention to something, to share a referent. Both of these behaviours suggest that 
the child is developing a sense that other people have different perspectives, but imperatives 
show the child is attempting to ‘change the adult’s intentions so that they become aligned with 
its own’ (Moore & Dunham, 1995, pg. 111).  
Evidence that children are beginning to develop an understanding of others’ intentions is seen 
at around a year and a half.  Meltzoff (1985) found that toddlers of 18 months were able to 
complete an incomplete act they had been shown by an adult. In his study of 40 children he 
showed his participants a number of novel incomplete actions, such as attempting to pull apart 
a toy bone, and then gave the participants the objects to use themselves. In 40 out of 50 trials 
the children were able to infer the researcher’s intention from watching his action. Meltzoff 
(1995) suggests these infant theories are based on an understanding of others drawn from 
behaviour and action, with little evidence that there is any recognition of people’s internal 
states. However, data collected through observation in naturalistic environments suggests 
utilising knowledge of others’ internal states is a skill which toddlers are able to employ when 
the need is imperative and personal. In observations of 2 year olds in conflict with their mothers 
and siblings Dunn (1988) found that they showed ‘[…]some practical understanding of others’ 
feelings and intentions.’ (Dunn, 1988, pg. 66). However, she is keen to point out that knowledge 
does not imply reflection and that 2 and 3 year olds were more likely to have an incomplete and 
intuitive understanding, than an explicit theory. The work by Clements and Perner (1994) 
supports this distinction. In a series of experiments designed to assess whether young children 
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could implicitly show an understanding of false belief they found that at 2 years and 11 months 
there was a sudden move from implicit to explicit understanding. Children were assessed using 
a looking paradigm which allowed them to show their understanding of false belief through their 
gaze behaviour. The authors suggest that implicit false belief understanding occurs much earlier 
than explicit understanding and much later still children are able to explain their false belief 
reasoning. Whilst the present study is not using such paradigms to assess implicit understanding, 
this research may be important to keep in mind when analysing the qualitative data; children’s 
gaze behaviour may give some indication of an implicit understanding of false belief.  
Between 18 months and 2 years typically developing children begin to take part in pretend play 
and symbolic play (Doherty, 2009). These types of play require the child to use their mental 
ability to imagine something is there which is not, or to imagine that they are someone they are 
not.   Astington and Jenkins’ (1995) research found links between aspects of pretend play, 
specifically role assignment and joint planning, and later development of false belief 
understanding. In their cross sectional study of thirty 3 to 5 year olds they compared 
performance on 4 standard false belief tasks and 10 minute sessions of pretend play. They 
suggest that the links between false belief and role assignment and joint planning are specific 
because in these aspects of pretend play it is crucial that you understand your partner doesn’t 
know what you are thinking. Unless you are explicit that you are ‘the train driver’ and they are 
‘the passenger’, your play partner may not know what play script they should follow. It is 
important then that children involved in pretend play are able not only to pretend themselves, 
but follow others’ pretence. Harris and Kavanaugh’s (1993) extensive studies examining 
pretence in young children found that two year old children were able to follow the pretend 
play of an adult.  The studies examined children from the ages of 18 months to 36 months on a 
range of pretend play tasks. The younger children were asked to complete or copy pretend play 
actions using a range of symbolic objects (for example, using a toy tea set, or bricks symbolising 
bananas and cake). The older children were tested using increasingly more complex pretend 
play actions whereby they were required to follow the researcher’s play when she introduced 
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an incongruent action (for example, pouring tea on the head of a toy). In the final study the 
children were asked to talk about these play sequences. To complete these tasks the children 
needed to recognise that the adult partner was engaged in pretence and that the adult’s 
pretence was different than their own; a clear understanding that other people have mental 
processes of their own. Dunn’s (1988) observations of children’s pretend play revealed their 
interest and excitement in understanding other people:  
 “What stands out from these observations is the delight with which the children explored social 
roles and rules […] their increasing interest in the how and why people behave as they do and in 
the ways of the world is evident […]” (Dunn, 1988,  pg. 125)  
Pretend play may be an important window for children to get a glimpse of what life is like as 
another, and to begin to explore the mental lives of others. 
The role of symbolic play has a slightly different significance in terms of the development of a 
theory of mind. Symbolic play requires the suspension of reality (much like pretend play) but 
crucially objects are able to take on different functions, they are able to be transformed. An 
often used example is that of a banana; in symbolic play the child can keep in mind the 
knowledge of the true identity of the object (a banana) and create an alternative identity (a 
telephone, for example) (Leslie, 1987). Thus the child can use the banana ‘as if’ it were a 
telephone whist retaining the knowledge that after the play it will go back to being a banana 
once again. Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) showed that not only were 2 year olds adept at using 
one object as a substitute for another, they also understood the boundaries of when the object 
returned to it’s actual identity and could assume a number of identities for the same object, 
depending on the play context.  
3.5 Understanding the mind 
Wellman (1990) suggests that at 3 years old children begin to make the important distinction 
between thoughts and things. In a series of studies of children aged between 3 and 5 Wellman 
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and Estes (In Wellman, 1990) found that children of 3 are not only able to separate mental and 
physical entities, they are also able to express an understanding of why they are different. 
Between the ages of 3 and 5 the children in their studies used more frequent mental entity 
explanations for question such as, why you couldn’t touch a cookie that someone was thinking 
of (it’s not real, it’s just in his head, for example). At the same time children are using their 
developing language abilities to discover more about the mental states of other people. Within 
the family environment there is a move from a concern over self, to an inquisitiveness about 
other people’s feeling states (Dunn, 1988). In an analysis of 10 children’s natural speech 
between the ages of 7 months and 7 years and 10 months (using samples from the CHILDES 
database)  Bartsch and Wellman (1995) also found that children of 3 years are able to use mental 
state terms such as ‘think’, ‘know’ and ‘believe’. Over the course of the child’s first 3 years then, 
there appears to be an imperative for the child to learn to acknowledge, communicate with and 
eventually mentally synchronise with those around them. Children use their world knowledge 
and conceptual knowledge to develop their pretend play sequences and, by the time they are 3, 
are using their sophisticated language ability to find out about and describe others’ thoughts 
and feelings.  These social, conceptual and cognitive developments, which are summed up in 
Figure 2, are supported by the child’s growing ability to use mental representations. These form 
the basis for humans’ ability to understand abstract concepts and are what sets us apart from 
even our closest animal relatives.  
 
 
 
23 
 
 
3.6 Mental representations 
 ‘Representations’ are mental states about the world which we form continuously and which 
inform our actions and behaviours. They are not consciously formed and many representations 
can be held at one time. Representations are psychological and take the form of thoughts, 
beliefs, dreams, ideas, imaginings, pretences and semantic concepts (Perner, 1991; Wellman, 
1990). If I ask you to think of an apple, you will think of an apple in your head, thus you have 
formed a representation of an apple. This representation may take a variety of forms, which are 
difficult to describe, some people may ‘see’ an apple in their mind, some may represent the 
word, and others may just have a sense of ‘appleness’. Olson and Campbell (1993) offer some 
 
Joint attention 
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communication
Pretend play
Symbolic play
Mental state terms
Implicit false belief 
understanding
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Figure 2. Summative timeline of the precursors to 
theory of mind 
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useful distinctions to help us describe representations. They separate out symbols from 
representations, suggesting that whereas a symbol stands for something, a representation is not 
caused by anything and is not bound to the thing it represents in any way. There is also the 
difficult question of how we learn to represent. Olson and Campbell offer some suggestion here 
too: 
“[…] since we can think about the future as well as the past, since - as was demonstrated long 
ago - thought can proceed without imagery, and since there can scarcely be any convention 
binding mental representations to their designata, either the mind must construct its own 
representational apparatus or the representational powers of the mind must somehow be 
derived from the ‘internalization’ of public symbols.” (Olson & Campbell, 1993 pg. 12)  
For all the consensus of the fact that people have a representational ability, and the numerous 
models of how representational ability changes with mental and chronological age (which will 
be covered later in this chapter), there are few explanations as to the underlying mechanisms 
of what allows representation to occur and change. In fact, the authors above resolve this issue 
by taking a stance which could be considered as consistent with a neuroconstructivist approach. 
They propose that “the appearance of thought mediated by external representations (public 
symbols) runs exactly parallel with the development of thought mediated by internal 
representations.” (Olson & Campbell, 1993, pg. 13). It seems sensible that the child will utilise 
its growing understanding of external symbols to support a developing internal system of 
thought. For example, understanding that words on a page are symbolic of an object or entity 
allows for the abstraction of the symbol away from the object. Thus the written word ‘dog’ is 
not a dog, does not resemble a dog, and is an entity in its own right. Similarly, the thought of 
‘dog’ (not ‘a’ dog) is not a dog and does not stand for a dog, but it remains a mental entity in its 
own right. It does not need to be tethered to the object it refers to in order to exist. 
It takes many years for children to develop initial mental representations, then to know they are 
forming them (termed meta-representation) and finally to know that others are forming them 
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(and that others’ representations are private and all different). The development of 
representational skill runs concurrent with the pre-cursors to theory of mind and is an essential 
component of how these pre-cursors are able to develop. There are a range of theories as to 
how representational ability develops through childhood; however there are similarities 
between them.  
It is thought that babies are able only to represent a static and simple model of the world ‘as it 
is’. This is alternatively termed as direct-copy understanding (Wellman, 1990), a single updating 
model of the world (Perner, 1991), a level I (Implicit) representation (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995) and 
a primary representation (Leslie, 1987). Although these models differ in the detail of the way 
this happens, they share an overarching consensus that, at this level children can only mentally 
represent what is directly observable at that time and are unable to mentally transform or reuse 
this information.  
Babies at this level of representation show surprise that objects appear and disappear and are 
unable to search for an object which has been hidden and then displaced out of sight (Doherty, 
2009). Piaget took this lack of ‘object permanence’ as a sign the infant ‘lacks the symbolic 
function; that is, he does not have the representations by which he can evoke persons or objects 
in their absence’ (Piaget, Inhelder, & Weaver, 1969, pg. 3). Whilst Piaget suggested that 
representational ability began to appear at about 2 years, more recent research suggests it is 
evident a little earlier. Infants at 18 months begin to develop representational ability which can 
accommodate prior information as well as present states (Perner, 1991). 
 Perner describes this as the child developing a ‘multiple model’ of representation. Wellman 
(1990) suggests this development happens through a slow shift from his ‘direct-copy’ model to 
an ‘interpretive’ model, and for Karmiloff-Smith (1995) this change occurs through movement 
to explicit E1 representations. Leslie (1987) uses the term meta-representation for this change, 
as he suggests that at the point that children begin to engage in pretend play they need to 
produce two representations of the world. One which is the primary representation, which must 
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be kept safe as it represents reality, and one which is a representation of the primary 
representation which can be changed to adapt to the pretend play scenario.  
Whist there is debate around the exact nature of how children do this there is some consensus 
that it requires an ability to create a number of representations (Astington, 1993; Karmiloff-
Smith, 1995; Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1991). In pretend play the initial primary or reality based 
representation; ‘I have a stick’ must be preserved as reality, but the secondary representation 
is able to include fabricated elements; ‘This stick is a magic wand’. Initially, children make 
supported representations; they use a miniature tea set to support pouring pretend tea, 
therefore only needing to represent some imaginary tea. But as children’s play develops they 
use layers of representations which are mutable and supported by non-analogous props; ‘I 
pretend that this stick is a wand and that this tree is a castle and that there is an invisible dragon 
in the garden’.  
At 2 years children are able to talk about their pretend play (Astington, 1993) and this 
understanding that ‘I am pretending’ shows the beginnings of a self-awareness and a recognition 
of their own mental abilities: ‘The emergence of pretence is seen as the beginnings of a capacity 
to understand cognition itself’ (Leslie, 1987 pg. 416). The term meta-representation is used 
rather differently by Perner (1991), who suggests that this doesn’t occur until children become 
‘representational theorists’ (Perner, 1991, pg. 9). He considers, in the same way as Wellman 
suggests an interpretive model, that at around 4 years old children become aware of 
misrepresentation and can consider that representations are subjective. Karmiloff-Smith also 
suggests a change at this age, from explicit E1 to explicit E2 representations, recognising the 
shift in children’s conceptualisation of belief.  
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Figure 3 shows the similarities between the four theories outlined above and from it it is possible 
to see that three of the four theorists agree that children undergo some representational 
changes at around 18 months and again at about 4 years. Wellman’s opinion differs somewhat 
in that a fundamental shift happens at 4 years, but until then a ‘direct copy’ representation is in 
place.  
Children’s representational ability develops alongside other cognitive processes and their 
acquisition of knowledge about the world. Without knowledge about the world children would 
not be able to understand object permanence (they need knowledge of simple physical states), 
and they would not be able to engage in pretend play (they need knowledge, for example, of 
liquid states in order to pretend pouring tea, or of how a telephone works in order to transform 
a banana into a telephone). Representational ability does not occur in isolation and it is these 
underlying knowledge schema which may allow for the development of representations (Olson 
& Campbell, 1993).  
Figure 3. Four models of the development of representational ability in children 
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3.7 False belief and metarepresentation 
The culmination of the theory building that children have been doing in their first 4 years is 
evident in their understanding of false belief. Children move, with evident consistency, from not 
passing a range of false belief tasks at age 3, to passing them at age 4 (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001). An understanding of false belief relies on the recognition that a person’s belief may not 
always align with reality. For example, I may believe there is milk in the fridge, but when I look, 
it has all gone. This mismatch between what I believe and what is actually real is seemingly an 
impossible incongruity for 3 year olds to comprehend. Even when tasks are modified, language 
simplified or paradigms changed, although there are slight downward shifts in passing age, still 
most 3 year olds are unable to pass tasks designed to address false belief understanding 
(Wellman et al., 2001). Figure 4 describes a number of classic paradigms which have been used 
to test for children’s understanding of the incongruity between belief and reality. The areas 
described appear to develop concurrently and are evident in most typically developing children 
at 4 years (Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993).  
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Figure 4. Description of tasks children aged 4 are able to pass using meta-representational 
ability 
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In order for children to pass these tasks, they must have some form of meta-representational 
ability (Astington, 1993). As we saw above, there is discussion over when meta-representation 
develops and the terminology used to describe this skill (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995; Leslie, 1987; 
Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990). Throughout this study the term meta-representation will be used 
to describe the ability to represent the content of another’s mind, or to represent one’s own 
representations, as it shows a clear progression in terminology from the initial use of the term 
‘representation’. Meta-representation is a similar construct to Karmiloff-Smith’s E2 and E3 levels 
of representation, in that they are representations which are available to consciousness and are 
accessible across domains (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995).  
The ability to meta-represent one’s own or another’s mental state brings with it an extraordinary 
range of developments. Children’s ability to empathise, to control their own learning, to take 
part in cooperative (or conversely competitive) games (Flavell et al., 1993), to lie and cheat 
(Peskin & Ardino, 2003), to tease (Dunn, 1988), to problem solve and to work collaboratively, all 
require an understanding of other peoples’ mental states; a theory of mind.  
 
3.8 Working memory, language, social understanding and theory of mind 
Implied at the beginning of this chapter are areas which ‘underpin’ the development of the 
child’s theory of mind; working memory, language and social development. Particularly 
implicated in the child’s ability to form a theory of mind are the three areas above which allow 
or constrain development through the complex interplays between environmental input and 
cognitive changes (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995; Wellman, 1990).  
3.8.1 Working memory  
 
The working memory system refers to the cognitive system which absorbs information, holds it 
for a very short while and then either transfers the information to longer term memory or 
‘forgets’ it.  For the purposes of this research the revised working memory model from Baddeley 
31 
 
(2000) has been used, since this model has been extensively used across research in working 
memory, in theory of mind and particularly in research into individuals with Down’s syndrome. 
Baddeley and Hitch’s model (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) proposes a multi component model of 
working memory which comprises of a phonological loop system for the short term storage of 
verbal input and a visuospatial sketchpad for immediate handling of visual and spatial cues, both 
of which feed information to the central executive which is a ‘limited capacity attentional control 
system’ (Jarrold & Baddeley, 1997, pg. 926) but which has no space for storage. Baddeley’s 
revision (Baddeley, 2000) added an episodic buffer to the model; this component stores and 
converts information from the phonological loop and the visuospatial sketchpad into ‘episodes’. 
This then feeds into both the central executive and the long term memory systems.   
The importance of the working memory system to the development of theory of mind is two-
fold. From the time the child is beginning to mentally represent the present they are using their 
working memory to momentarily hold in mind the representation. In order to pass the false-
belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983) outlined in Figure 4 above, the child must hold in mind two 
representations, the reality of the situation and the character’s false belief. This requires an 
efficient working memory in which material doesn’t deteriorate too rapidly. 
The second way the working memory system is implicated in theory of mind development is 
through the functions of the central executive. Executive functions are the complex set of 
processes which enable us to, for example, plan, control inhibition and task and rule switch. This 
purposefully vague description highlights the difficulty scholars have in trying to describe this 
‘ragbag into which could be stuffed all the complex strategy selection, planning, and retrieval 
checking that clearly goes on when subjects perform even the apparently simple digit span task.’ 
(Baddeley, 1996, pg. 6) 
It is suggested that inhibitory control in particular plays an important part in children’s ability to 
respond to the false belief tasks because the child has to inhibit their natural tendency to point 
to the actual whereabouts of the toy/chocolate. Carlson and Moses (2001) found that children 
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with better inhibitory control responses performed better on a range of theory of mind tasks. 
When examining the relationship between inhibitory control and performance of false belief 
tasks in particular, Carlson, Moses, and Breton (2002) found that delayed inhibitory control 
(where the subject has to delay answering) had no correlation with performance on false belief 
tasks and neither did performance on working memory tasks alone.  However, the combined 
effect of working memory performance and conflict inhibitory control performance (where the 
subject has to hold in mind two responses, the correct and incorrect and then select the 
response which conflicts with their prepotent response) were highly correlated with 
performance on false belief tasks. The authors suggest that a ‘combination of working memory 
and inhibition may be critical for mental state attribution’ (Carlson et al., 2002, pg. 82).  
Precisely how these areas combine is under debate. Using data from a range of other studies 
Perner and Lang (1999) explored the particular links between executive functions and theory of 
mind development and conclude that,  ‘The available evidence shows that the observed 
correlations go beyond common methodological features of the assessment tasks, and points to 
a functional interdependence of ToM [theory of mind] and EF [executive function]’ (Perner & 
Lang, 1999, pg. 343). 
3.8.2 Language development 
 
Language developments spanning from the pre-verbal stage to an ability to describe someone 
else’s false belief form a crucial part of the child’s developing theory of mind (Astington & Baird, 
2005). In the first instance, language is one type of initiation into the symbolic form; spoken 
words are not ‘things’, they stand for things. By learning to use language the child is learning to 
use a type of symbolic representation, it is an insight into the non-physical properties of symbols 
(Nelson, 2005). This ability to separate the ‘real’ from the linguistically symbolic may pave the 
way for children’s later separation of physical entities and mental entities. Children begin to 
label their own desires early on, however, Wellman and Estes (1987) found that although 
children talk about wants and desires around the age of 2, they don’t use terms which express 
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a mental states, such as ‘think’, ‘know’ and ‘believe’, in their proper context until around their 
3rd birthday. Dunn’s (1988) findings agree; from her observations of children between 14 and 36 
months she suggests that throughout their 3rd year children are increasingly interested in how 
others are feeling and others’ mental states.  
Studies into parent-child interactions show that exposure to mental state language in young 
children can influence theory of mind development in later years (Adrian, Clemente, Villanueva, 
& Rieffe, 2005; Ontai. L, 2008; Ruffman, Slade, & Crowe, 2002; Ruffman, Slade, Devitt, & Crowe, 
2006; Tingley, Gleason, & Hooshyar, 1994). In support of this idea research suggests that 
preschool deaf children in hearing families may miss out on important conversations relating to 
others’ thoughts, feelings and desires which has a later impact on their development of theory 
of mind (Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Peterson & Siegal, 2006; Woolfe, Want, & Siegal, 2002). As 
the majority of hearing families are not fluent signers, conversations about internal states are 
not translated for the hearing impaired child and so their exposure to such language is limited.  
The language to express non-physical entities gives children a symbolic entry into their own and 
others’ minds and a mechanism to begin to explore real world outcomes of mental states.  
3.8.1 Social understanding  
 
Since the development of a theory of mind has at its core a social purpose, (to understand self 
and others) it may be presumed that the child’s social development runs in conjunction with 
theory of mind (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, & Banerjee, 2012). Indeed we can see how the social child 
develops throughout the ‘precursors to theory of mind’ in section 3.4 above; imitation, joint 
attention and pretend play are all social acts. Social development has been explored in depth in 
literature regarding how theory of mind is expressed in individuals with Autistic Spectrum 
Conditions. An important piece of work was undertaken by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) in which 
they examined how individuals with Autistic Spectrum Conditions responded to false belief 
tasks. As most of the children with an Autistic Spectrum Condition were unable to pass the task 
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(but did answer the reality and memory questions correctly) they concluded that this group were 
unable to impute others’ mental states.  
 This study sparked huge interest in this research field and a number of studies have replicated 
this finding (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997; Happé, 1994). Others have 
suggested that theory of mind is not entirely absent in many individuals with Autistic Spectrum 
Conditions (Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Peterson et al., 2013) and some studies suggest that the 
difficulty in theory of mind is not restricted to those with Autistic Spectrum Conditions (Pilowsky, 
Yirmiya, Arbelle, & Mozes, 2000). Much of the discussion surrounding this debate relates to the 
interaction between theory of mind and the triad of social skill difficulties which those with 
Autistic Spectrum Conditions can show; social and emotional difficulties, language and 
communication impairments and difficulties with flexibility of thought.  Some studies tentatively 
suggest that difficulties with social interaction and communication may lead to poor theory of 
mind construction (Peterson & Siegal, 1999), which raises interesting questions as to whether 
this may also be happening in other groups of children, such as those presented in this study.  
Children’s development of understanding about themselves and others’ as social beings begins 
with an understanding of their own emotional selves and then of others. Children understand 
that they are, as others are, emotional beings much earlier than they can ascribe beliefs or 
thoughts to themselves or others (Dunn, 1988). Their emotional understanding of others 
develops into a desire-behaviour theory (she is sad because she wanted a biscuit but there 
weren’t any) and eventually into a belief theory (she believed there were biscuits but there 
weren’t, so now she is sad). Children’s understanding may be developed, in part, through asking 
questions about the world around them, specifically about others’ inner states (Dunn, 1988).  
However, there is a danger here in talking about ‘the mind’ and ‘mental entities’ that mental 
states become disembodied from the person when, of course, they are the person; 
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 “The child - and we ourselves - are less aware of the mind than of the self; it isn’t my mind, it’s 
me. Similarly, an awareness of others’ minds is more an awareness of other selves; it’s not his 
mind, it’s him” (Astington, 1993, pg. 160). 
When children talk about the mind, they say ‘I think’, not ‘my mind thinks’ and so their 
relationship with the mind is wholly personal, it is about their being. When they begin to ask 
about others’ mental states they do not ask ‘Why did her mind think that?’ they attribute the 
mind to the person; ‘Why did she think that?’. 
By the time the child is 4 years old, and they are able to pass the false belief tasks, a range of 
new social skills have also begun to emerge. Wellman (2014) suggests that ‘As children acquire 
an explicit preschool belief desire psychology, their social actions and interactions are changed’ 
(pg 58). In hide and seek games the child no longer hides in full view and says ‘Come and find 
me’ but is beginning to understand the rules and concepts that underlie such games (Peskin & 
Ardino, 2003). At the same time their ability to deceive another person has developed and their 
lies are more effective in controlling another person’s behaviour (Talwar & Lee, 2008). Pro-social 
behaviours also develop and children of 4 and 5 begin to show a greater understanding in social 
games  (Astington & Jenkins, 1995). 
 This link between theory of mind skills and social competence may well continue into later 
childhood, impacting on peer relationships throughout school (Caputi et al., 2012). What is not 
established is the causal link between social understanding and theory of mind, or indeed 
whether the links are concerned with ‘social understanding’ as a whole or with specific areas 
(Hughes & Leekam, 2004). Does a more socially aware baby develop theory of mind skills earlier, 
or does the early development of theory of mind allow for a more socially competent 4 year old? 
The acquisition of theory of mind is a crucial part of a child’s development; children who struggle 
to develop an initial understanding of others’ beliefs and desires could find the socially complex 
worlds of the community, the playground and the classroom inaccessible and incomprehensible 
(Repacholi, 2003). 
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“If you did not understand that minds hold beliefs, then you would probably be inclined to treat 
people as machines rather than as organisms that are striving to make sense of the world. You 
would not be oriented towards trying to help them to understand what is out there in the world 
or the meaning that lies behind the literal words of another person’s utterance. Evidently, the 
individual would experience serious difficulty in relating to others and communicating with them 
[…].” (Mitchell, 1997, pg. 72) 
This chapter has described the complex and multi-faceted development of a child’s theory of 
mind. Exactly how representational skill happens is still very much under debate and a number 
of theorists propose different ways in which our mind may achieve this ability (Fordor, 1983; 
Karmiloff-Smith, 1995; Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990). How language and theory of 
mind relate and which is the primary driver in understanding false belief is unclear, if indeed 
there is a primary driver (Astington & Baird, 2005). Emergence versus expression accounts of 
the complex relationship between executive functions and theory of mind highlight the ‘chicken 
and egg’ nature of these cognitive developments (Moses, Carlson, & Sabbagh, 2005; Wellman, 
2014) and how the complex interplay of social and cognitive developments work together to 
form a theory of mind is only just beginning to be fully explored. Not least amongst all these 
discussions should be the relevance of the combined effects of all these areas of development. 
Although some inroads are being made in this area by examining atypical development (Brown 
et al., 2003; Jarrold, Baddeley, & Hewes, 1999; Karmiloff-Smith, Klima, Bellugi, Grant, & Baron-
Cohen, 1995), it would take a study of some magnitude to attempt to pull together all the pieces 
of this complex and intricate subject. The present study will use what is known about typically 
developing children’s development of theory of mind to inform and extend our understanding 
of how this skill develops in children with Down’s syndrome.  
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Chapter 4: Behavioural and Cognitive 
Phenotypes of Down’s syndrome 
 
Down’s syndrome is a congenital disorder which arises from an extra arm on the 21st 
chromosome. Its prevalence in the UK is about 1:1000 live births, although the high termination 
rate (81%) (Irving, Basu, Richmond, Burn, & Wren, 2008), in antenatally diagnosed cases makes 
the occurrence of Down’s syndrome in pregnancy much higher.  Down’s syndrome causes a 
number of physical changes, described in Table 1, some of the more complex of these can cause 
infant mortality.  
As well as physical differences all individuals with Down’s syndrome have some limited range of 
cognitive function. The often quoted figures in current literature are that in adulthood most 
individuals with Down’s syndrome will have an IQ of between 25-55, rendering them 
‘moderately to severely retarded’ (original terms retained) (Pennington, Moon, Edgin, Stedron, 
& Nadel, 2003, pg. 52). This data appears to have come originally from (Gibson, 1978), which 
 
 
Not all individuals will have these features, some may have many, some may 
have few.  
Heart defects 
Hypertonia (Muscle weakness) 
Sandal gap (large gap between big toe and second toe) 
Palmar crease (striking crease across palm of hand) 
‘Almond’ eye shape with an epicanthic fold of upper eyelid 
Foreshortening of limbs 
Loose ligaments 
Poor gastro – intestinal mobility 
Weakened immune system 
Short and bent little finger 
Flattening of nose bridge 
Small hands and feet 
Increased likelihood of coeliac disease, hypothyroidism and childhood 
leukaemia 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Differences in physiology as a result of Down’s syndrome. 
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makes it rather out of date. It is perhaps not a reliable reflection of current adults with Down’s 
syndrome who may have had very different life experiences and educational opportunities and 
possibly a much more independent adult life than those living in the 1970’s. More recently 
collected data suggests a slightly higher IQ between 30 – 70 (Chapman & Hesketh, 2000), who 
importantly highlight ‘[…] broad individual differences in rate of development’ (pg. 87). 
Over the last 15 years much of the focus in understanding the development of individuals with 
Down’s syndrome has been on the identification of behavioural and cognitive phenotypes. The 
description of a phenotype aims to identify probabilistic characteristics in behaviour and 
development. The idea that this is a probabilistic outcome is an important factor when 
considering the developmental trajectory of individuals with Down’s syndrome. The variability 
in profiles for this group is wide and differences in motor (Vicari, 2006), speech (Fowler, 1990) 
and cognitive (Tsao & Kindelberger, 2009) development are observable at all ages.  
In much of the literature regarding phenotypes the terms behavioural and cognitive are 
interchanged (Chapman & Hesketh, 2000; Fidler et al., 2009; Fidler, 2005) and as such require 
definitions of use in this study. Cognitive phenotype will be used to describe the internal 
workings of the mind, much of which, without manipulation, is not easily outwardly 
unobservable: ‘[…] cognition includes those mental processes, both conscious and unconscious, 
that control virtually everything we do or think […]’ (Silverman, 2007, pg. 228). To observe a 
cognitive phenotype, outward behaviours must be manipulated in order to assume the presence 
or absence of a mental process. 
 For the purposes of this study the definition of a behavioural phenotype assumes that 
behaviour is generally outwardly observable and is as a consequence of cognitive functions. A 
cognitive phenotype is then responsible, in part, for the behavioural phenotypical features 
which are observable from infancy in children with Down’s syndrome.  
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4.1 Cognitive phenotype 
The cognitive phenotype in individuals with Down’s syndrome describes weaknesses in specific 
areas of functioning; working memory, executive functions (in particular attention and inhibitory 
responses, planning and problem solving) and processing speed (these are all covered further in 
chapter 5). These areas appear to be affected more than would be expected given individuals’ 
level of IQ, or mental age. Recent interest has been on understanding how physical differences 
in the morphology of the brain in individuals with Down’s syndrome creates a particular ‘path’ 
or pattern of learning which leads to the development of the cognitive phenotype (Fidler et al., 
2009). How much the complex interaction between differences in initial brain morphology, brain 
plasticity and environmental factors relate to the developing cognitive phenotype is still at the 
early stages of debate.  
Although there are clear differences between the structures of the brain in individuals with 
Down’s syndrome and typically developing individuals, how these differences relate to 
development is the matter of continuing research (Dierssen, 2012; Rondal, Perera, & Spiker, 
2011). It is possible that differences in the way the brain develops after the first few months sets 
up a complicated pattern of development influenced both by environmental and inherent 
cognitive factors (Fidler & Nadel, 2007). What is difficult to establish is how different domains 
of functioning impact upon one another to cause or affect areas of development; what may be 
an area of ‘weakness' at one stage of development, may not show as such at a different age. It 
is important to recognise that a phenotype is not set at birth: 
“Rather than considering outcomes as preserved or damaged modules that are wholly intact or 
impaired uniformly throughout development, Karmiloff-Smith (1998) argues that “tiny variations 
in the initial state” can become magnified throughout development into domains of relative 
strength and weakness. Early development may be a crucial window of opportunity for 
intervention, as these “tiny variations” have not yet snowballed into impairments in whole 
domains of processing.” (Fidler, 2005, pg. 87)  
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These initial states may influence cognitive development, mediated by social and environmental 
factors, to create a particular cognitive phenotype which is apparent in individuals with Down’s 
syndrome.  
4.2 Behavioural phenotype 
The behavioural phenotype often used to describe individuals with Down’s syndrome has a 
number of key features. A common difficulty for all individuals with Down’s syndrome is speech 
and language. Although in young children with Down’s syndrome receptive vocabulary can be 
almost on a par with peers, expressive vocabulary is often very much reduced (Næss, Lyster, 
Hulme, & Melby-Lervåg, 2011). A combination of difficulties with working memory, articulation 
and phonology can prevent clear and syntactically correct speech (Paterson, 2001). Issues with 
understanding conversational pragmatics and dealing with complex social situations can 
compound speech difficulties and prevent people with Down’s syndrome from being able to 
fully articulate their ideas (Abbeduto, Warren, & Conners, 2007). 
Young children with Down’s syndrome have also been found to have motivational deficits which 
may lead to unstable skill acquisition and an avoidant learning style (Wishart & Duffy, 1990). 
These strategies were observed in a variety of tasks which showed children were consistently 
unwilling to put effort into problem solving tasks, showed reversals in task competence and a 
refusal to complete tasks (Wishart, 2001).  Gilmore and Cuskelly (2009) examined how enduring 
motivational aspects were in children with Down’s syndrome and found that those children who 
showed good motivation at age 5 continued to do so into older childhood. Similarly a lack of 
motivation also prevailed in some children in to older childhood and the authors suggest that, 
for children with Down’s syndrome, motivational style may well be set at a young age, in contrast 
to the typically developing population.  
Social understanding and awareness is considered a strength for individuals with Down’s 
syndrome.  Some studies have suggested that, when compared to individuals with other 
intellectual disabilities, children with Down’s syndrome are more sociable and likable (Cuckle & 
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Wilson, 2002). However other research has found that children with Down’s syndrome may have 
some limits as to which areas of social functioning are working well and how they may use social 
strategies to avoid tasks. Fidler, Most, Booth-LaForce, and Kelly (2008) found that children with 
Down’s syndrome at 12 months developed social relatedness skills, but had less well developed 
emotion regulation, suggesting that the children’s development in these areas may be 
inconsistent. Similarly Wishart’s findings (Wishart, 1996; Wishart, 1993) suggest that children 
with Down’s syndrome may use their social strengths to avoid difficult learning situations. This 
is particularly important to consider when educationalists encourage children’s behavioural and 
cognitive phenotypical strengths to support other areas of learning (Jones, Neil, & Feeley, 2013).  
4.3 Other factors influencing the development of children with Down’s 
syndrome 
As well as cognitive and behavioural profiles, individuals with Down’s syndrome can also have a 
number of other challenges to their developmental progress. Some of these which are relevant 
to developmental issues are set out briefly here.  They are in brief as they are not the main focus 
of our study, but are of importance when considering how children with Down’s syndrome learn:  
Eyesight – individuals with Down’s syndrome are much more likely than the typically developing 
population to have significant eyesight difficulties. These range from squints, difficulties with 
controlling eye movements, refractive errors and accommodation difficulties.   
Hearing – a common cause of hearing difficulties in individuals with Down’s syndrome, and 
particularly children, is glue ear. Glue can be treated with grommets or hearing aids and may 
resolve as children grow older. Some individuals with Down’s syndrome have sensori-neural 
hearing loss which is a lifelong hearing condition.  
Physical weakness – muscle weakness can affect individuals with Down’s syndrome to different 
degrees. This can make early development such as rolling over, sitting and walking slower for 
some infants with Down’s syndrome.  Physical weakness can also make feeding and swallowing 
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more difficult. Older children may tire easily and have less stamina than typically developing 
peers.  
Heart problems – congenital heart problems are common in children with Down’s syndrome but 
are often corrected early in childhood through surgery. Heart problems can mean long stays in 
hospital over the first few years of a child’s life.  
Health problems – children with Down’s syndrome are much more prone to developing chest 
infections, have problems with their bowels and intestinal tracts and have more common colds. 
They are more likely to have prolonged bouts of illness and are slower to recover. 
Sleep apnoea – This condition prevents individuals with Down’s syndrome from sleeping 
properly and can cause concentration and focus difficulties if undiagnosed and untreated. 1 
4.4 Teaching and testing children with Down’s syndrome  
As a result of the behavioural and cognitive phenotypes and additional medical needs, 
individuals with Down syndrome are often attributed with a specific learning style and a range 
of measures are put in place in schools to aid learning. This study has used the ‘learning style’ of 
children with Down’s syndrome to motivate the modifications to individual tasks and to 
influence the study design as a whole.  
A visual learning style: Children with Down’s syndrome have phonological loop difficulties 
causing an inefficient verbal working memory, but a relatively efficient visual working memory 
(Jarrold, Nadel, & Vicari, 2008). Teachers are advised to use the stronger visual working memory 
to support learning and individuals with Down’s syndrome are attributed with a ‘visual learning 
style’. Modifications to teaching may come in the form of visual timetables, sign supported 
                                                          
1  Information taken from the Down syndrome Medical Interest group medical library: 
http://www.dsmig.org.uk/library/index.html. Accessed 12.38pm, 28/06/2015 
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speech, a physical ‘hands on’ approach to abstract tasks and using the written word to support 
idea construction (DSA, 2011a, 2011b).  
Pace and timing: Partly because of limitations with verbal short memory, and partly because of 
a general learning impairment children with Down’s syndrome can find the pace of everyday 
interactions fast and difficult to keep up with. Conversely, some children with Down’s syndrome 
are bored easily by repetitive tasks and this may result in inconsistent results on tasks or refusal 
to comply (Wishart & Duffy, 1990).  
Fine and gross motor difficulties: Many children with Down’s syndrome find that poor control 
and strength of their motor skills limits their ability to succeed in classroom activities. Holding a 
pencil with enough strength and precision to write clearly and activities which require an 
element of physical detail (for example craft type activities) can be a challenge. Gross motor 
difficulties can make children with Down’s syndrome appear clumsy and poor upper body 
strength can make sitting in chairs uncomfortable (DSA, 2011a, 2011b). 
Other modifications which are advised for children with Down’s syndrome are clear and distinct 
images and text due to sight difficulties, short and precise information chunking to help with 
weak working memory and repeated activities to help with consolidation of new learning (Miller, 
Morling, & Wong, 2004). 
Having detailed how individuals with Down’s syndrome are affected by their extra chromosome, 
Chapter 5 examines how these behavioural and cognitive phenotypes may affect the way 
children with Down’s syndrome may develop a theory of mind. 
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Chapter  5: Theory of mind development and 
Down’s syndrome 
Chapter 3 considered the developmental trajectory of theory of mind in the typically developing 
population, with reference to the vast literature on this topic. The literature on theory of mind 
in children with Down’s syndrome is much more scant and the net needs to be cast much further 
afield to find clues as to the developmental trajectory of theory of mind in this population. As 
such this chapter draws from important research in the areas of Autistic Spectrum Conditions, 
the cognitive development of deaf children and children with non-specific learning difficulties. 
Very often children with Down’s syndrome are used as control groups for studies of children in 
these other groups, so the reporting of their performance in tests is sometimes limited. 
Nonetheless there have been a few important studies which will be discussed in terms of 
methodology and outcomes.  
5.1 Precursors 
In their very first years, children with Down’s syndrome can hit some of the same developmental 
milestones as their typically developing peers, albeit it at a much slower rate. They can acquire 
looking, feeding and smiling skills in much the same way as typically developing children and 
follow a similar path of initial physical development (Buckley & Sacks, 2001). However, some 
specific differences may be apparent early on. From 3 months babies with Down’s syndrome are 
able to discriminate between looking at objects and looking at their mother’s face (Carvajal & 
Iglesias, 2000). However Berger and Cunningham (1981) found that children with Down’s 
syndrome continued to look more at their mothers at age 6 months whereas their typically 
developing counterparts began to look more at the world around them. At 10 months old, the 
authors suggest, the children with Down’s syndrome were between 8 and 10 weeks behind their 
typically developing peers in their pattern of eye contact and that the overall pattern of eye 
contact in the first 6 months was qualitatively different between the two groups. The authors 
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conclude that these early differences in eye contact may have implications for social as well as 
cognitive development.  
In studies of non-verbal requesting behaviours, children with Down’s syndrome have been 
found to produce fewer instrumental requests (the child's use of gestures and eye contact to 
elicit assistance from an adult in achieving a goal) than their typically developing peers (Mundy, 
Sigman, Kasari, & Yirmiya, 1988). Fidler, Philofsky, Hepburn, and Rogers (2005) also found they 
showed weaker problem solving behaviours linked to inefficient requesting behaviours. The 
children with Down’s syndrome in their study showed less frequent requesting gestures 
(requests to get someone to do something or change someone’s behaviour to be aligned with 
one’s own) than typically developing children, but there was no difference between groups in 
the level of joint attention gestures (gestures designed to draw another’s attention to an object). 
The authors suggest that the toddlers with Down’s syndrome were able to use gestures to draw 
attention to something, but were unable to use them to moderate another’s behaviour to get 
something. 
 Alongside the split between requesting gestures and joint attention gestures, Fidler et al. (2005) 
also found that that children with Down’s syndrome needed more help with problem solving 
tasks and had poorer quality reach strategies. They concluded that children with Down’s 
syndrome may have a particular deficit in the way they approach problem solving and this could 
be linked to poor instrumental requesting. However, they caution that this interaction could 
work in either direction. In the same study it was found there was no difference in the way 
children with Down’s syndrome and typically developing children used gesture to coordinate 
their focus with an adult (joint attention). This is an important indicator that, initially at least, 
toddlers with Down’s syndrome may have some of the emerging skills necessary for developing 
theory of mind skills. However, this must be caveated with the ages of the children in the study. 
The children with Down’s syndrome were on average 2 years and 10 months and in contrast the 
typically developing children were on average 18 months. So although there was joint attention 
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ability in the Down’s syndrome group, it appeared much later than we would see in typically 
developing children. 
 Legerstee and Fisher (2008) also found that children with Down’s syndrome produced co-
ordinated attention at a similar mental age to typically developing children, but this was in 
limited a ‘higher mental age’ group in their sample (as measured using the Bayley Scales of Infant 
Development (Bayley, 1969)). This group had a mental age of 16.6 months (chronological age 
22.8 months) compared to a ‘lower mental age group’ who had a mental age of 8.5 months 
(chronological age 17.6 months). All the children with Down’s syndrome went on to produce 
less declarative pointing than mental age matched typically developing groups. Declarative 
pointing, the authors suggest, is an indicator that the child is able to represent and influence 
another’s attentional state, therefore an important pre-cursor to developing a theory of mind.  
That children can align their mental or emotional state to another’s is an important skill in 
beginning to recognise own and others’ internal states, as discussed in chapter 2. Historically, 
individuals with Down’s syndrome have been widely misrepresented as having intact social 
understanding (Down, 1867) but recent research suggests that social behaviour differences are 
visible early on  (Cebula, Moore, & Wishart, 2010). When children with Down’s syndrome were 
presented with tasks to examine their social referencing (children presented with an unfamiliar 
and noisy toy, similar to tasks described in Chapter 2) they were found to look less to their carer 
in the room than typically developing children and they did not always match the emotion 
displayed by their carer (Knieps, Walden, & Baxter, 1994). For example if the carer looked 
anxious and scared of a toy, and made vocalisations to this effect, the child would show a 
positive response. This lack of coordination may prevent the sharing of experiences and set up 
a complicated carer-child dyad.   
Other research suggests that children with Down’s syndrome use a predisposition to focus on 
social aspects of tasks when problem solving. In a range of tests of object permanence and 
imitation Wright, Lewis, and Collis (2006) found that children with Down’s syndrome performed 
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significantly less well than their mental aged matched typically developing counterparts when 
the possibility to imitate to solve a problem was removed. When the strategy of copying the 
researcher’s actions in order to solve the trial was unavailable, the children with Down’s 
syndrome found it more difficult to successfully find a hidden toy. This was supported by a test 
of symbolic play where the children with Down’s syndrome were more likely to copy the 
incongruent actions of a researcher (for example, giving a truck a drink) than the typically 
developing control group. The authors suggest that children with Down’s syndrome may be 
more likely to use imitation as a response to tasks because they have an underlying 
representational difficulty. This is explored further in section 5.3 of this chapter.  
5.2 Pretend and Symbolic Play 
The way that play develops in children with Down’s syndrome is synchronous with that of 
typically developing children, albeit at a much slower pace (Beeghly & Cicchetti, 1987). 
Development of play can be confounded by physical and medical difficulties such as hearing, 
sight and poor mobility, but in general children with Down’s syndrome meet the same 
milestones in their first 3 to 4 years as typically developing children do in their first 2 years. As 
play becomes more complex and the relationships between language, play and cognitive 
development become ever more sophisticated, there may be some underlying differences in the 
way children with Down’s syndrome develop play skills. 
 The relationship between symbolic functioning and language development in children with 
Down’s syndrome was examined by O'Toole and Chiat (2006). The authors’ recognition of the 
participants’ possible use of imitation as a problem solving strategy led them to use a modified 
version of a task previously used by Bellagamba and Tomasello (1999). The original task showed 
children a series of toys which the experimenter asked for by either by using a small world 
version or by using a gesture. For example, a hairbrush was shown to the child with an 
accompanied gesture of brushing hair. The experimenter then requested the hairbrush from the 
child by either showing a tiny hairbrush or by repeating the gesture. Adaptations in the O'Toole 
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and Chiat (2006) study included reducing the number of items produced at one time to reduce 
memory load and using short, repeated sentences. The study concluded that the development 
of symbolic understanding in children with Down’s syndrome proceeds in a similar fashion to 
typically developing children, with gestures being the easiest to understand, then miniatures 
and then abstract substitutions.  Whilst they may follow the same developmental sequence, the 
age of the children in this study was 2 years 8 months to 7 years 11 months, much older than 
the original Bellagamba and Tomasello (1999) study whose cohort was between 1 year 6 months 
and 2 years 11 months. This may be an important distinction when considering the pretend and 
symbolic play abilities of school-aged children in comparison to their classmates.  
Although supporting an overall similarity in developmental progression to typically developing 
children, Beeghly and Cicchetti (1987) did find some differences in their studies of symbolic play 
in children with Down’s syndrome. They suggest that children with Down’s syndrome may 
repeat their play activities more, leading to less variation in their play, and that the level of 
maturity in their symbolic play was limited. This led the authors to suggest that the children in 
their study played more concretely and found the abstraction of artefacts more difficult. 
However, they conclude that the representational ability of children with Down’s syndrome 
remains intact and follows a coherent developmental path similar to that of typically developing 
children.  
5.3 Representations and meta-representation 
There is a limited amount of research on the way representation may develop in children with 
Down’s syndrome. There may be a presumption that, as precursors to theory of mind appear in 
a similar fashion to typically developing children, the way children with Down’s syndrome 
mentally represent also functions in the same way as in the typically developing population. 
Wright et al. (2006), however, suggest that this may not be an accurate picture and propose that 
children with Down’s syndrome may have a representation of tasks and situations which 
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focusses heavily on the social and imitable aspects, rather than on the non-social or pragmatic. 
Further, they hypothesise that:  
 
"If children with Down syndrome do possess an atypical representational repertoire, they may 
further compound their deficits by failing to exercise their weaker cognitive skills (Rast & 
Meltzoff, 1995). This may present as poor consolidation in children with Down syndrome (e.g. 
Wishart (1993)) or other anomalies in task performance (Morss, 1983; Rast & Meltzoff, 1995). 
Thus, the activity of children with Down syndrome is arguably driven by a distinct 
representational basis, which lead to different solutions to tasks, and, ultimately to a different 
developmental trajectory.” (Wright et al., 2006, pg. 447) 
The study they refer to (Rast & Meltzoff, 1995) examined deferred imitation and object 
permanence in children with Down’s syndrome aged between 20 to 48 months. Their 
conclusions describe a possible distinction between ‘Hypothetical’ and ‘Empirical’ 
representational ability. Hypothetical representations are representations of ‘might have been’, 
which consider alternatives and allow the child to problem solve. Empirical representations are 
merely representations of ‘what is observed’ and so allow no flexibility for problem solving. This 
could be an important distinction for children with Down’s syndrome; if they are unable to store 
flexible representations they may rely on imitation of the ‘empirical’ representation in order to 
problem solve.  
5.4 Testing theory of mind  
Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto, and Frye (1996) investigated the relationship between theory of 
mind and rule use in individuals with Down’s syndrome use using a range of well-established 
theory of mind tasks: appearance-reality, false belief, representational change, and a shape and 
colour card sorting task. The main purpose of the study was to test the specificity and 
uniqueness claims over the lack of theory of mind in individuals with Autistic Spectrum 
Conditions. The study included participants with Down’s syndrome who had a chronological age 
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range (CA) of 16 – 30.9 years and a mental age (MA) range of 3.9 – 6.3 years. The authors 
recognise that the mental age of this group is low and compounding this the typically developing 
children had a CA range of 5.2 – 6.8 and a MA range of 4 – 6.3. The difference in life experiences, 
interests and desires between these two groups would make finding a task to engage a ‘low’ 
functioning 30 year old with Down’s syndrome and a typically developing 5 year old in the same 
way very difficult.  
The study found that older individuals with Down’s syndrome have “pronounced difficulty with 
standard ToM [theory of mind] tasks.” (Zelazo et al., 1996, pg. 484) and that in the rule use card 
sort activity they either failed to learn both sets of rules or they learnt them but failed to apply 
them. The authors suggest that the study found much more severe difficulties for individuals 
with Down’s syndrome than previous studies (such as studies comparing those with an Autistic 
Spectrum Condition and those with Down’s syndrome: (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Baron-Cohen, 
Leslie, & Frith, 1986)) partly because of the older age range and difficulties with vocabulary 
matching using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test  (Dunn & Dunn, 1981). Nevertheless they 
suggest that their outcomes support the claim that difficulties with theory of mind tasks are not 
unique to those with an Autistic Spectrum Condition.  
The difficulty that the individuals with Down’s syndrome found however, must be considered 
alongside a number of other factors which are pertinent to the development of the present 
methodology. A range of vocabulary was used in the tests including nonconcrete constructs such 
as ‘think’ and no mention is given in the report as to how quickly the instructions were given, 
whether they were only given verbally or how complex they were. These factors may all affect 
how the participants were able to process and then respond to the tasks. On the card sort and 
rule switching activity it is possible that typically developing children would have had much more 
access to and practice of rule learning and switching.  Through their everyday experiences of 
school rules and expectations and they may be more able to switch between different rules for 
different situations (for example different expectations and rules at home and at school).  
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Further, the typically developing cohort was drawn from one public school, whereas the Down’s 
syndrome cohort were taken from a range of institutions. The typically developing children will 
have had some similar and shared experiences whereas the cohort with Down’s syndrome will 
have had a huge range of different supports, interventions and life experiences, across a much 
longer time.  In these respects the two groups are not at all comparable and since theory of mind 
tests are also using social-cognitive abilities these aspects must be taken into consideration. To 
draw conclusions from this study may be to prematurely judge the abilities of individuals with 
Down’s syndrome. Although the test scores are clear and the data produced from them supports 
the authors’ claims, there is little discussion in the report of what conditions created the 
outcomes.  
Theory of mind in individuals with Down’s syndrome was also considered in a study conducted 
by Cobos and Castro (2010).  The participants were again drawn from a very wide age range of 
between 5 and 35 years, but were all from one association (it is not clear whether this is an 
institution, residential or drop in for example) and no mental age is assessed in the study.  
Participants were presented with a range of cards (15cm x 20cm) of which they were required 
to make choices from by pointing. They were given a series of tests which measured their ability 
to remember and attribute their own and a character’s preferences in a number of activities 
(travel, sport, eating, for example). In all, participants were required to point, or make a choice, 
48 times in the testing session. A number of questions present here: after being asked to make 
a choice that many times, how can the testers be sure that the response was not just automatic 
repetition of an action? How could the testers be sure that a true ‘choice’ was being made rather 
than random pointing? In attributing a character’s preference, how could the testers know that 
the participant was not just remembering the picture on the card they had been shown, rather 
than attributing preference?  
The authors use the term ‘putting themselves in his [the character’s] place’ (Cobos & Castro, 
2010, pg. 381) throughout the article; a phrase which would suggest that the participants were 
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able to see the character on the card (Luis) as a real person and attribute thoughts and feelings 
to him. As Luis was shown only as a picture card, with no social or personal context, it is 
questionable that the participants would look upon him as a real person. 
 The conclusions drawn from this task have some limitations as they are based on the notion 
that being able to remember the preference of a character means ability in theory of mind. The 
authors argue that in order to know Luis’ choice the participants must suspend their own 
preference, thereby employing theory of mind skills. This rests on the further assumption that 
participants have made a ‘real’ personal choice in the first place and not just pointed to 
something they like at that moment, or a random answer. If their choice was an arbitrary rather 
than actual preference, they would not have to suspend their choice (as they hadn’t made one). 
The question asked in the study to determine choice was ‘Which do you like best?’; an 
experimenter’s understanding of this question may differ greatly to that of an individual with 
Down’s syndrome who is not familiar with the test situation or why the question has been asked 
(What if the participant didn’t like any of the choices? How would they have been able to 
communicate this?).  
The authors suggest that their results show that some training in understanding self and other 
is likely to improve the development of theory of mind skills in individuals with Down’s 
syndrome, and that explicit teaching of the kind used in their study would benefit this group of 
people. However it could be argued that training of this kind may merely reinforce the habitual 
use of imitation and repetition to answer questions and will not utilise the crucial social aspects 
of theory of mind.  
Although the participants with Down’s syndrome in the study by Yirmiya, SolomonicaLevi, 
Shulman, and Pilowsky (1996) are used as a control group, this study is of interest as another 
indication of the limitations of the matching process. The authors are conscious of these 
limitations and discuss at length their matching procedures. They matched in a variety of 
different ways: mental age, verbal mental age and performance mental age, the scores being 
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taken from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (WISC-R) (Wechsler, 1991). 
However, similar to that of the two studies discussed above, the chronological age of 
participants with Autistic Spectrum Conditions, Down’s syndrome and mental retardation of 
unknown etiology (original terminology retained) was between 10.9 and 40.2 years and the 
chronological age range of the ‘normal’ group was 5.4 to 11.7 years. Again this raises the 
question of appropriateness of the task; the deception task in this study used puppet dolls to 
act out a scene, would this be engaging to both 10 year olds and 40 year olds? 
 The participants with ‘mental retardation’ were recruited from ‘special schools, occupational 
centres and programs for people with handicaps’ (Yirmiya et al., 1996, pg. 1005) and the typically 
developing participants were from local schools. If participants are only selected from specialist 
institutions it is possible that this selects out any ‘higher functioning’ individuals who may not 
be part of these institutions. Further, if the participants are particularly ‘low functioning’, as their 
mental age suggests (6.2 – 10.5 years), the verbal presentation of the questions could affect 
those with weak auditory memory function. When tested on a range of theory of mind tasks the 
group with Down’s syndrome were found to fail more often than the group with mental 
retardation, but not more than the group with an Autistic Spectrum Condition.  
Of particular interest to the present study is the authors’ finding that for individuals with Down’s 
syndrome there was very little association between subtest scores on the WISC-R and theory of 
mind task performance and no cognitive difference between those who passed and failed the 
theory of mind tasks. This implies that either the measures used in the tests were not sensitive 
enough, or that the mental age associations which are usually seen in typically developing 
children’s theory of mind abilities may not be apparent in individuals with Down’s syndrome.  If 
the second suggestion is true then this raises the question as to whether individuals with Down’s 
syndrome attain theory of mind skills through similar or alternative pathways to typically 
developing children.  
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5.5 Working memory in people with Down’s syndrome  
Difficulties within the working memory (WM) system are a lifelong feature of many people with 
Down’s syndrome. To frame the differences in working memory found in individuals with 
Down’s syndrome this study has taken the revised working memory model from Baddeley (2000) 
as outlined in Chapter 3. This model has been extensively used across research in working 
memory and in research into people with Down’s syndrome. This model of working memory is 
particularly fitting to understanding working memory in people with Down’s syndrome because 
offers a clear distinction between the verbal and the visuospatial dimensions. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, people with Down’s syndrome appear to learn better with visually presented 
materials and visuospatial processing is consistent with general levels of cognitive function 
(Baddeley & Jarrold, 2007). Verbally presented materials, or that which can be labelled verbally, 
appear to be more difficult for those with Down’s syndrome to process or retain (Lanfranchi, 
Jerman, & Vianello, 2009). 
Jarrold and Baddeley (1997) suggest that an inability to retain and manipulate verbal 
information stems from problems with the phonological loop system. The limitations of the 
verbal aspect of WM in individuals with Down’s syndrome is shown through research finding 
typical digit spans ranging between 2 and 6 (E. K.-R. Bird & R. S. Chapman, 1994). Even when 
spoken numbers are supported with visual aids difficulties persist. Because items which can be 
verbally labelled are processed using the phonological loop system presenting the numbers 
visually does not enable improved performance in people with Down’s syndrome (Jarrold, 
Baddeley, & Phillips, 2002). 
In contrast, memory functions utilising the visuospatial sketchpad appear to be less affected in 
people with Down’s syndrome and have found to be consistent with other measures of general 
intelligence (Jarrold & Baddeley, 1997). However recent examinations of separate sub-systems 
of the visuospatial working memory have revealed dislocations in the way the visuospatial WM 
system may work in people with Down’s syndrome. Lanfranchi, Carretti, Spano, and Cornoldi 
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(2009) examined the distinction between spatial-simultaneous WM and spatial-sequential WM 
in children with Down’s syndrome. Spatial-simultaneous WM requires remembering spatial 
locations of more than one object at a time (in their study the starting positions of two frogs on 
a simple chess board). Whereas spatial-sequential WM requires sequentially ordered 
information to be remembered (in this case remembering a path taken by one frog on a simple 
chess board). They found that the children with Down’s syndrome performed similarly to their 
verbal age matched typically developing controls on the spatial-sequential tasks, but below the 
typically developing group in the spatial-simultaneous tasks. Whilst the reasons for this 
imbalance are still unclear it may be linked to the way representations are used or because of 
the dynamic nature of the spatial-simultaneous task process (Lecerf & De Ribaupierre, 2005; 
Pickering, Gathercole, & Peaker, 1998). It’s clear this area requires further research and it does 
suggest that the common conception that people with Down’s syndrome have an intact 
visuospatial WM function may not be entirely accurate.  
Other aspects of the working memory system in individuals with Down’s syndrome have also 
been of interest to researchers. Executive functions (EF), a group of control processes which 
regulate purposeful attentional systems such as planning, inhibitory control, reasoning, set-
shifting and rule use, have found to be impaired in adults and adolescents with Down’s 
syndrome (Rowe, Lavender, & Turk, 2006).  Some studies suggest a global impairment in EF in 
line with lowered cognitive functioning (Lanfranchi, Jerman, Dal Pont, Alberti, & Vianello, 2010), 
whilst others suggest more specific difficulties. Carney, Brown, and Henry (2013) found that their 
cohort of individuals with Down’s syndrome showed a poorer response than typically developing 
controls in tasks which measured Executive Load Working Memory and required concurrent 
processing and storage.  
A number of studies have further investigated the role of executive functions in people with 
Down’s syndrome. Borella, Carretti, and Lanfranchi (2013) examined how the inhibitory systems 
may be affected by poor executive functioning. A range of tasks were used to tap into three 
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areas of inhibitory control: 1) Prepotent response inhibition (being asked to subvert a ‘natural’ 
response), 2) Response to distracter inhibition (how well a more interesting or appealing item 
can be ignored) and, 3) Resistance to proactive interference (how well interference can be 
ignored). The children with Down’s syndrome (aged 10 – 19) performed less well in all the tasks 
than their typically developing counterparts and in particularly in the prepotent and distracter 
tasks. This group were unable to control distracting information and in particular found it 
difficult to forget words they had been asked not to remember. The authors suggests that this 
could lead to the words having a ‘’distracting’ effect, remaining in their working memory, 
cluttering up its limited capacity.’ (Borella et al., 2013, pg. 70) 
This research is important to the present study not only because children’s working memory 
efficiency may affect their ability to understand and act on the tasks set, but because of the 
potential specific links between WM and theory of mind development. As is explained in detail 
in chapter 3 children’s understanding of others’ mental states goes through a rapid change 
between the ages of 3 - 5 years and some of this may be down to changes in children’s EF and 
WM efficiency (Moses et al., 2005; Wellman, 2014). Young children typically fail the 
displacement false belief tasks by pointing to the place where the toy is currently hidden, not 
where it was originally hidden, implying that they are unable to supress their prepotent 
response. This suggests some involvement of their executive functions; as outlined above 
Carlson and Moses (2001) found that children with better inhibitory control responses 
performed better on theory of mind tasks. 
Given that there may be specific difficulties for individuals with Down’s syndrome in their 
executive functioning (Rowe et al., 2006), and in particular with their inhibitory control 
mechanisms (Borella et al., 2013) it can be hypothesized that theory of mind development and 
in particular false belief understanding may be affected. Whether this is in line with overall 
cognitive function and therefore a result of mental age or whether theory of mind develops 
differently than other areas of functioning has yet to be explored. That children with Down’s 
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syndrome were delayed in comparison to their typically developing counterparts in tasks 
measuring their visual-simultaneous WM (Lanfranchi, Carretti, et al., 2009) may also offer insight 
into why this group may not perform well on false belief tasks. False belief requires holding two 
representations in mind whilst choosing the correct (opposite to the prepotent) answer. It could 
be that the simultaneous nature of this task impacts on the children’s WM efficiency to such an 
extent they are unable to properly process the task. Compounding this may be an inefficient 
inhibitory response system which does not allow the child with Down’s syndrome to control 
their prepotent response.  
5.6 Language and Down’s syndrome 
Expressive and comprehensive language abilities are very well documented and researched 
areas of the Down’s syndrome phenotype. From the very first written observations of individuals 
with Down’s syndrome a significant difficulty with speech production has been noted: 
“They are usually able to speak; the speech is thick and indistinct, but may 
be improved very greatly by a well-directed scheme of tongue gymnastics.” 
(Down, 1867, pg.260) 
Speech production is generally found to be much weaker than speech comprehension in 
individuals with Down’s syndrome, falling behind expected levels compared to an individual’s 
mental age (Cunningham, Glenn, Wilkinson, & Sloper, 1985; Laws & Bishop, 2003), although 
some studies show contradictory results (Roberts, Price, & Malkin, 2007; Ypsilanti, Grouios, 
Alevriadou, & Tsapkini, 2005). Speech production difficulties develop for a number of reasons, 
both physical and cognitive. Physical differences such as a smaller oral cavity, a large and 
protruding tongue, large tonsils and poor muscle tone may all affect an individual’s range of 
motion and motor coordination (Abbeduto et al., 2007; Chapman, 1997; Roberts et al., 2007). 
Issues in production to do with cognition are complex and may be influenced by phonological 
awareness (Jarrold, Thorn, & Stephens, 2009), limited capacity in the verbal short term memory 
(Purser & Jarrold, 2005), difficulties in word finding, and speech apraxia (Kumin, 2006).  
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The development of individuals’ receptive vocabulary is of particular interest for the present 
study. What type of language children with Down’s syndrome learn and when they learn it may 
be of paramount importance for how they are able to develop their theory of mind. Children 
with Down’s syndrome acquire language at a slower rate than typically developing children 
partly because their speech production is slower and parents tend to match their own 
vocabulary use to children’s production. For children with poor expressive language this may 
hinder language development as parents may misjudge their child’s levels of understanding 
(Tingley et al., 1994).  A further difficulty for children with Down’s syndrome may be the way 
they are able to organise their linguistic systems.  
Abbeduto et al. (2003) tested adolescents with Down’s syndrome on their receptive language 
skills. The typically developing children in the study showed correlations between the different 
tests in word classes, grammar and the Test of Auditory Comprehension Language (Carrow-
Woolfolk, 1985). The authors suggest this shows that typically developing children have 
organised their language system to link up various components and that they are able to use 
information from one area of linguistic knowledge to progress in other areas. However the 
young people with Down’s syndrome showed no such correlation in their test scores, leading 
the authors to raise the possibility that ‘…their linguistic knowledge may be compromised of 
poorly organised sets of representations that are only loosely linked’ (Abbeduto et al., 2003, pg. 
157). Similarly Price, Roberts, Vandergrift, and Martin (2007) found that boys with Down’s 
syndrome had weaker receptive morphology and syntax skills than typically developing boys 
who were matched for non-verbal mental age. Although the overall impression is that 
individuals with Down’s syndrome have comprehension skills matched to their mental age, there 
appear to be particular areas of their linguistic understanding which do not follow this trend.  
As discussed in Chapter 3 knowledge of internal state language is implicated as an important 
element in children’s development of understanding the mind. Children learn this language 
through social means: conversations, storytelling and pretend play. As suggested above, parents 
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are one of the main catalysts in early language learning and the vocabulary the child hears in the 
home influences speech comprehension and expression (Dunn, 1988).  If parents are matching 
their child directed speech to their child’s production they will not necessarily be using age 
appropriate or comprehension appropriate language. 
 Beeghly, Bretherton, and Mervis (1986) studied five mothers of children with Down’s syndrome 
and three groups of controls matched on language ability, mental age and chronological age. 
They found that the mothers of children with Down’s syndrome used fewer internal state 
utterances and less variety of internal state words than any of the control groups. When the 
mothers of children with Down’s syndrome did use internal state language it was often 
attributed to the child rather than external sources and they used less cognitive state words. 
The authors suggest that the children with Down’s syndrome may ‘have fewer opportunities to 
acquire verbal labels for their own and others’ internal states than NH [non-handicapped] 
children at a similar level’ (Beeghly et al., 1986, pg. 258). 
 In a similar study Tingley et al. (1994) examined the lexicon of mothers’ internal state language 
to their children with Down’s syndrome. They found that, in their sample, typically developing 
children were exposed to a greater range of internal state words and that mothers of typically 
developing children use cognitive state terms more often than mothers of children with Down’s 
syndrome. Many of the differences they found could be accounted for by the child’s mean length 
of utterance (MLU), however qualitative differences persisted. For example they found that 
mothers of children with Down’s syndrome often used the term ‘good’ as an inner state label 
and used very few uncertain cognitive terms (don’t think, don’t know). The authors suggest that 
this may be because parents of children with Down’s syndrome have a more directive style of 
interaction (for example Marfo, 1990) and this leads them to interpret the children’s experience 
on the child’s behalf. Alternatively, they suggest that parents are tuning in to nonverbal cues of 
the child or, in the case of uncertain terms, that parents are choosing not to focus on areas of 
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difficulty for the child. Regardless of the reason behind the different use of inner state language, 
the authors’ concern is that if children are given less verbal inner state labels it: 
 “[…] has potential to impede their understanding of inner states and their appropriate behaviour 
in response to inner states. At the very least, children with Down syndrome are being socialised 
to think and to understand themselves in different ways than non-handicapped children.” 
(Tingley et al., 1994, pg. 152) 
Of interest here is the knock-on effect this may have for children‘s understanding of their own 
and others’ minds. If they are unable to correctly understand and label their own inner states 
they may find it difficult to attribute and label the inner states of others. The children in the 
Tingley et al. (1994) study were between the ages of 28 and 67 months (2 years 2 months and 5 
years 5 months). If children as old as five are not being exposed to internal state terms, 
particularly cognitive terms such as ‘think’ and ‘know’, they may have a limited repertoire with 
which to comprehend the types of questions asked in the false belief tasks.  
5.7 Social cognition and Down’s syndrome 
As previously highlighted a historical perspective of individuals with Down’s syndrome is that 
they have relatively intact social functions (Wishart, 2007). However, research into early 
developments in social cognition suggests a more complex interplay between social factors and 
cognitive development.  Moore, Oates, Hobson, and Goodwin (2002) suggest that differences in 
children’s social development may begin with a neurological basis which creates different 
looking and attentional behaviours and in turn provokes a particular style of maternal input from 
mothers.  They propose that a mother’s ‘forceful warmth’ (Moore et al., 2002, pg, 47) creates a 
transaction in which mothers are more likely to take the lead in dyads and triads and the child 
becomes ‘locked into’ the mother. The conclusion of this transaction is that the infant becomes 
reliant on the mother’s directional style and therefore makes fewer attentional bids, which 
affects later abilities in flexible thinking and expressive language. A key concern in their research 
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is the difficulty in developing tasks which capture either the social nature of development or the 
cognitive.  
In a series of studies (Duffy, 1990; Wishart, 1990; Wishart, 1991; Wishart & Duffy, 1990) Wishart 
and colleagues examined how children responded to traditional object permanence tasks, an 
emotion recognition task and a collaborative working task (Wishart, 1993, 2007). In 
collaborative working tasks children with Down’s syndrome took a less active role than their 
more able partners with a non-specific learning difficulty, made less contribution to the task and 
spoke less. This behaviour was contrary to the finding with typically developing children, who 
are better at the task after working with a more able partner. The authors suggest that ‘the 
sociability commonly attributed to children with DS may not necessarily extend to contexts in 
which it might facilitate their own or their partners’ learning’ (Wishart, 2007, pg. 1002).  
Similarly Fidler et al. (2008) found that children with Down’s syndrome appeared to have an 
uneven profile of social development. They used the Bayley Scales of Infant Development to 
examine infants at 12 and 30 months and compared them to a group of children with non-
specific developmental delay. The children with Down’s syndrome made large gains in 
comparison to the control group in the areas of orientation and social engagement. However 
this was not matched by progress in emotion regulation and in motor skills and overall mental 
age. The areas in which the most gains were made were to do with how well the child engaged 
with the experimenter, suggesting a link with Moore et al.’s (2002) work above which concludes 
that children with Down’s syndrome may be over reliant on adults around them and less task 
orientated. However Sigman and Ruskin (1999), in a wide ranging longitudinal study of children 
with Autistic Spectrum Conditions, developmental delays and Down’s syndrome suggest that 
this may not be to the detriment of the child’s development; ‘[…] the tendency to initiate social 
interactions with the experimenter is a strong predictor of the tendency to initiate social 
interactions with peers’ (Sigman & Ruskin, 1999, pg. 103).  
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Whilst some work has been undertaken on the social cognitive development of infants and 
young children with Down’s syndrome, the social cognitive development of older children is 
much less documented. Kasari, Freeman, and Bass (2003) examined empathy responses in 
children with Down’s syndrome aged, on average, 9 years old. The children were involved in two 
scenarios in which their responses were noted; in one the researcher pretended to bang her 
knee, and in the other they observed puppet show vignettes in which bad or good things 
happened to the puppets. In the first situation the children with Down’s syndrome showed 
prosocial behaviours such as comforting or patting the experimenter, but in the second situation 
the children were rarely able to match their own emotion to the emotional state of the 
protagonist; ‘Thus, children with Down syndrome displayed social aspects of empathy, but failed 
to show emotional/affective components’ (Kasari et al., 2003, pg. 249). The authors suggest that 
this could be because they were more focussed on the action in the puppet paradigm and they 
found it difficult to abstract their empathy response. This may be an important developmental 
issue for individuals with Down’s syndrome, particularly when tested using paradigms which call 
for an abstraction of emotional responses, such as false belief tasks. 
A difficulty with social relationships may persist for children with Down’s syndrome, particularly 
as they grow into young adults. Cuckle and Wilson (2002) report that the adolescents in their 
study of secondary school children with Down’s syndrome were unlikely to be involved in social 
activities at break times, they rarely initiated talk and did not choose to include themselves in 
groups. They also needed adult direction to help them join in with activities. Whilst this study 
was not looking at the reasons behind this situation, it illustrates that the ‘socially intact’ model 
of the individual with Down’s syndrome is not entirely accurate and, as the authors suggest, 
there is potentially a need for adolescents with Down’s syndrome to access specific social 
learning opportunities. 
This chapter has drawn a mixed profile of the theory of mind in individuals with Down’s 
syndrome. What it shows is that the behavioural and cognitive phenotypes associated with 
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Down’s syndrome may impact in a complex way on an already difficult to decipher process. It is 
clear that there are many functions which may differ in the individual with Down’s syndrome, 
potentially leading to a trajectory which is dissimilar to that which is typically seen.  
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Chapter 6: Study design  
6.1 Recruitment and parent/carer involvement 
Participants were recruited through contact with regional parent support groups. The support 
groups put out an initial call for participants through newsletters and email and those interested 
were asked to contact the researcher or the group for more information. I visited the parent 
support groups to outline the research proposal and opportunity was provided for carers to ask 
questions. A detailed Parent Information Pack was sent out to interested parents as hard copies 
and via email. Two information evenings were also scheduled to give a talk about the research; 
however these were not taken up by any parents. Most contact with carers was via email. Once 
written consent was obtained I made email or telephone contact with the school, support group 
or parent to arrange visits to assess the child. 
As part of the engagement of parents and practitioners a further visit to the support groups 
involved in the study to disseminate findings is scheduled. Local schools which have been 
involved in the testing process will also be invited (for all contact forms and parent information 
see Appendix 1). 
6.2 Participants 
The children, aged between 2 years and 9 years, were split into 3 groups for differentiated 
assessments. Group 1 was 2 & 3 year olds, n=15, group 2 was 4 & 5 year olds, n=9 and group 3 
was 6 to 9 year olds, n=14.  
The group 3 age band was much larger than the other two groups because of the nature of the 
task used.  In the original study by Wimmer and Perner (1983), where the false belief 
displacement task was used (as outlined in Chapter 3), children began to pass the task at around 
4 years old, but in very small numbers (only 4 out of 12 children aged 4-5 passed the task). The 
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task has since been replicated numerous times with very many different modifications. In a 
meta-analysis of 178 studies testing false belief, 60% of children at 4 years old were able to pass, 
and at 6 years over 80% were able to pass (Wellman et al., 2001). Since this task has not been 
used extensively with young children with Down’s syndrome it was important to ensure 
potential results at younger ages were not missed (and in fact some of the younger participants 
in this group produced some interesting results). Using a wide age range enabled examination 
of the development of passing the false belief tasks in this group, not just passes and fails. The 
call for participants did include children up to 11 years (the end of Primary school) however the 
oldest participant to come forward was 8 years and 11 months. 
Participant Age at first testing in 
years.months 
Male/female Seen at  
Laurie 2.2 m home 
Frank 2.3 m centre 
Sally 2.5 f centre 
Georgia 2.6 f centre 
Otto 2.7 m centre 
Aisha 2.11 f centre 
Cassian 3.1 m centre 
Annie 3.3 f centre 
Jake 3.3 m centre 
Nora 3.3 f centre 
Henry 3.4 m centre 
Muni 3.5 m nursery 
Gia 3.8 f home 
Hugo 3.11 m centre 
Tabitha 3.11 f home 
 mean= 3.5 m=8 f=7  
Table 2. Group 1 characteristics 
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Participant Age at first testing in 
years. months 
Male/Female Seen at 
Daisy 4.5 f home 
Freya 4.7 f school 
Theo 4.8 m school 
Connie 4.9 f school 
Ellie 4.9 f school 
Fabian 4.11 m group centre 
Maia 5.1 f school 
Joel 5.2 m home 
Ollie 5.11 m school 
 mean= 4.9 m=4  f=5  
Table 3. Group 2 characteristics 
 
Participant 
Age at first testing in 
years.months 
Male/Female Seen at 
Shana 6.0 f school 
Misha 6.0 f school 
Anna 6.0 f school 
Rose 6.5 f support group 
Morris 6.1 m school 
Pria 6.11 f home 
Alice 7.1 f school 
Laura 7.6 f support group 
Jake 7.7 m school 
Louis 7.11 m school 
Olivia 8.2 f school 
Barney 8.5 m school 
Scarlett 8.6 f school 
Thomas 8.11 m school 
Ruth 8.11 f school 
 mean = 7.5 m=5  f=10  
Table 4. Group 3 characteristics 
 
6.3 Tasks 
Group 1 and 2 tasks were chosen and designed to reflect the range of developmental precursors 
to theory of mind that have been observed in typically developing children. The tasks included 
have been used with typically developing infants and preschool children, but in the present 
study they were modified to be used with older children with Down’s syndrome. Group 3 were 
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tested on a range of established theory of mind tasks, some of which were modified. Because 
the overall cognitive development of children with Down’s syndrome is slower than that of their 
typically developing peers (Patterson, Rapsey, & Glue, 2013), to avoid floor effects in the tasks 
the age of the children attempting the tasks was raised. Tasks were administered to the 2 & 3 
year olds in group 1 which had originally been tested on typically developing children aged 
between 12-18 months. The 4 & 5 year olds in group 2 had tasks which have been used with 
typically developing 2 to 2 ½ year olds and the 6 to 9 year olds in group 3 had the standard false 
belief tasks which typically developing 4 and 5 year olds usually pass.  Each group had tasks 
ranging in difficulty to account for the wide range in cognitive profile of individuals with Down’s 
syndrome (IQ range of 30 – 70, Chapman and Hesketh (2000)). It was methodologically 
important to this study to obtain data from all of the participants, not just those with an 
‘average’ IQ of a person with Down’s syndrome, in order to reflect the whole of the Down’s 
syndrome community. It was important to be able work with any variation in abilities and to be 
sensitive to the fact that people with Down’s syndrome are not a homogenous group.  
6.4 Task support 
The task supports were designed to support the children in an unfamiliar environment and 
situation. For groups 2 and 3, prior to the session I sent a video to the children introducing myself 
and showing some of the objects which would be presented in the tasks. These are available to 
view at:  
Group 2 = http://youtu.be/QvubEuPSCx8 
Group 3 = http://youtu.be/zysMufCBHNs 
Group 1 did not have a video as the testing for this all took place within local support groups 
(with the exception of 2 children who were both in their own home). In these groups the children 
were used to working with a number of practitioners in their early intervention groups, so it was 
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considered that the ‘stranger’ effect would have less impact for this group. The effectiveness of 
these videos is discussed in chapter 10. 
It was important to gain ongoing consent from all the children in the study. A laminated stop 
card was produced (Figure 5) which I introduced at the beginning of each session. I explained, 
using spoken and signed language that if the child wanted to stop they could indicate this by 
tapping on, or picking up the ‘stop card’. An evaluation of this is included in chapter 10. 
 
The speed of presentation, the style of presentation and the way the tasks were conducted were 
tailored to the individual needs of each child. For instance, in group 1 the testing session took 
place on the floor sitting opposite one another in a typical adult/child play dyad. Some 
participants in the older groups preferred to sit on chairs, whilst some worked on the floor. In 
one instance Theo had been in his specialist chair for the first visit, but both the parent and I felt 
he might prefer working on the floor, which indeed did produce much more engagement with 
the tasks in the second session. 
 The tasks essentially followed the protocols (Appendix 2) but the speed of presentation was 
matched to the child’s focus and concentration, some tasks were abandoned and the order of 
 
Figure 5. Ongoing consent stop card 
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tasks was sometimes altered. For example, in Connie’s session when the BPVS was brought out 
she got off her chair and walked to the door to leave. She refused to come back to the table until 
a different task (the scarecrow) was presented (the BPVS was later re-presented with some 
success).  
6.5 Control group    
Early on in the design phase of this study the decision was made not to include any control 
groups; a number of factors influenced this choice. Of upmost importance was the focus on the 
development of those with Down’s syndrome. To introduce a control group would necessarily 
turn the research into a comparative study of what each group could and could not do. In 
previous research individuals with Down’s syndrome have been matched with a range of control 
groups: typically developing mental age matched groups, groups with learning disabilities of 
unknown aetiology, groups with syndrome specific learning difficulties, groups matched for 
verbal age, groups matched on visual spatial ability, and so on. In some studies one or more of 
these matches are made in an attempt to control for, for instance, age or general cognitive delay. 
Aside from the methodical issues of matching these control groups (Chapman & Hesketh, 2000; 
Shaked & Yirmiya, 2004), what this does is consider typical development as a standard to 
compare with. So comparisons are made as to what individuals with Down’s syndrome, or other 
cognitive impairment, can do as well as, or not as well as those with typical development 
(Wishart & Duffy, 1990).  
In this research it was important that the data was treated aside from any comparisons and that 
the developmental trajectories which could be suggested were considered particular or typical 
for this group. To illustrate this point, take a task from group 2: a pretend play task for the 3 and 
4 year olds in this study. If the child with Down’s syndrome were to fail this task, it could be 
concluded that they were working below the level of their 2 year old typically developing 
counterpart, matched on mental age (MA). However, they may be showing us a number of skills 
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that a typically developing MA matched peer is not; they may be signing, using specific 
vocalisations, they may use eye contact or body language (or they may not). They may be finding 
a different way of communicating what they know and what they don’t know. If comparisons 
are always made with typically developing children, it may prevent looking at non-typical 
children in the right way (Coles, 2001). It was important in this study to find a new ‘normal’ for 
these children and to assess them on scales which they, in a sense, create for themselves, similar 
to the profiling method suggested by Mervis and Robinson (1999). These authors suggest that 
by comparing within group measures, rather than cross syndrome measures we are less likely 
to consider a skill (or lack of) as unique and more able to look for within group similarities.  This 
idea also brings into question whether it is necessary to build hierarchies of ability (Goodley, 
2001) which have an implicit agreement on which skills are considered to be important.  
To be clear, there is no suggestion that this methodological choice is the correct one for all 
studies of individuals with a cognitive impairment, or indeed of all children. Without controls in 
studies and standardising we would not be in a position to make the generalisations needed to 
inform for example, educational policy (if indeed it is your stance that educational policy should 
be made that way). However the model of comparing ‘not like’ with ‘like’ sets up a medical 
model of learning difficulties which is not acceptable in other areas of disability research 
(Goodley, 2001). It would not be considered appropriate to compare how fast an able-bodied 
athlete and a wheelchair athlete could move around a track and then devise a training regime 
for the wheelchair athlete based on the able-bodied athlete’s abilities.   Perhaps a more useful 
experiment would be to look at how athletes similar to the wheelchair athlete move, and to 
create a new training regime based on that data. In this study the cognitive development of 
individuals with Down’s syndrome is viewed in the same way, this study will compare like with 
like and consider what is common and uncommon within this group. 
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However this research does refer to comparisons with typically developing children, and it is 
recognised that without the prior research of many other authors the position taken here would 
not be possible. It is only because of the extensive research of others on the development of 
typical children and the many studies of alternative development that this study can be framed 
in this way. It is hoped that this research will contribute to the ongoing discussions around child 
development by beginning to explore a new ‘normal’ pathway of development for individuals 
with Down’s syndrome and will raise questions about how we (as researchers and educators) 
consider ‘difference’.  
Further reasons to exclude a control group were more practical measures. In order to recruit 
suitable matches it  would have been necessary to pre-test all of our participants with Down’s 
syndrome on a battery of tests to measure ability on items such as mental age, verbal or/and 
non-verbal IQ and language comprehension. Since some children with Down’s syndrome have 
been shown to display avoidant learning styles when attempting difficult tasks (Wishart, 1996) 
it was important to avoid pre-testing in order to maintain the children’s interest in the testing 
sessions and with the researcher.  
To adequately match a control group of typically developing children, the educational and 
developmental input that the children with Down’s syndrome had had, many of them since soon 
after birth, would also need to be considered. Since the participants were recruited from parent 
support groups many of the children with Down’s syndrome had taken part in early intervention 
sessions, had home delivered portage or interventions through a hospital (such as physiotherapy 
and occupational health). These measures could be significant in contributing to individual 
development, not least because of the amount of 1:1 time with a carer or professional, and 
would be very difficult to find a match for in the typically developing population.  
The time scale of the project was also a consideration when deciding on the research design.  If  
both a control group and a group with Down’s syndrome were included each group would have 
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been smaller than in the current study in order to fit in all the testing.  Since this research was 
about the development of children with Down’s syndrome, it was felt that keeping a larger 
cohort of individuals with Down’s syndrome was most appropriate.  
The inclusion of a control group would however have had some benefits. As the tasks were 
modified from literature regarding typically developing children it would have been useful to 
see how the modifications affected a control groups’ response. It may have provided some 
interesting insight into typical development to see whether, for instance, signing the tasks 
improved performance in this group.  
6.6 Task design  
Tasks were mostly taken from literature regarding the development of typically developing 
children and some had also been used with groups with Down’s syndrome. By using tasks from 
other research it was possible to analyse their suitability for children with Down’s syndrome and 
have some reference to how other children had performed on the tasks. Most of the tasks were 
modified, as explained in the descriptions which follow. 
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6.6.1 Group 1 tasks 
 
Task  (in order of testing) Abbreviation Brief description  Purpose 
1a Object permanence 
1 box 
OP 1 R hides a toy under a box. Asks child ‘Where’s the toy?’ To assess child’s ability to create simple 
mental representations which show an 
object is still in existence even when it 
is out of sight. 
1b Object permanence 
2 boxes 
OP 2 R hides a toy under one of two boxes. Asks child ‘Where’s 
the toy?’ 
As above 
1c Object permanence 
displacement 
OP 3 R hides a toy under a box, takes the toy and moves it to the 
other box in full sight of child. Asks child ‘Where’s the toy?’ 
To assess child’s ability to create simple 
mental representations which can be 
updated.  
2 Joint attention - bird Bird task R shows the child a puppet bird which makes a loud noise. 
Waits for reaction of child before making noise again or 
putting puppet away. 
To assess child’s understanding of joint 
attention and their response to an 
unfamiliar object  
3a Others’ intentions – 
Doll  
Doll task  R acts out trying to pull apart a Russian doll toy. Puts the doll 
down to allow the child access to the doll. Child’s behaviours 
observed – do they copy R’s actions? 
To assess the child’s ability to 
determine another’s intent from their 
actions.  
3b Others’ intentions – 
Tin 
Tin task R acts out trying to put some discs in a tin but misses the tin 
each time. Places discs on floor to allow child access to the 
As above 
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discs and tin. Child’s behaviours observed – do they copy R’s 
actions? 
3c Others’ intentions – 
Teddy search 
Teddy search 
task 
R acts out looking for something in a variety of bags and 
boxes. She points to a picture card with a picture of a brown 
teddy on it and continues looking. She then stops looking 
and observes child’s behaviour – do they copy R’s actions? 
To assess the child’s ability to 
determine another’s intent from their 
actions. 
4 Others’ perspective 
– Book  
Book task Child sits with carer and looks through a book about baby 
animals, discussing the animals with the carer. The 
researcher requests to see an animal ‘Can I see the duck 
please?’ Does the child show R the picture? 
To assess the child’s ability to 
understand another person’s 
perspective.  
R = Researcher 
Table 5. Brief description of group 1 tasks
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Figure 6. Items used in group 1 OP tasks 
 
 
The object permanence (OP) tasks (tasks 1a, 1b & 1c) were used as they have formed the basis 
for many other studies on child development (Wellman, Cross, Bartsch, & Harris, 1986) and 
other studies examining the development of children with Down’s syndrome (Wishart & Duffy, 
1990; Wright et al., 2006). The OP tasks were included to assess each child’s fundamental ability 
in understanding that an object still exists even when it is unobservable. This is considered an 
important ability in early child development because it offers one of the earliest indications that 
a child has begun to move away from a single updating model of the world, to being able to use 
simple mental representations to represent unobservable objects. The OP 1c task was included 
to examine whether the children in the study could follow an object as it moved locations, 
thereby being able to modify their representation of where the object is (Wellman, Cross, & 
Bartsch, 1987; Wellman et al., 1986). 
A number of modifications were used to aid the children with Down’s syndrome access this task. 
Firstly there was only one trial of each OP task. It has been shown that children with Down’s 
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syndrome can revert to off task behaviours if not engaged with the task (Wishart & Duffy, 1990). 
The OP tasks can be repetitive and so it was decided that to keep the children on task each OP 
task would only have 1 trial. This does mean that the stability of the children’s responses cannot 
be measured in each session and children who fail on the OP tasks may be doing so because 
they have not yet adjusted to the task, rather than their lack of ability in the task.  
The occluders used in many OP tasks tend to be plastic cups or cloths. Both of these may have 
caused a difficulty for the present cohort. Plastic cups have an everyday function, which may 
have distracted from the task. Similarly the sensory nature of the cloths may have proved too 
distracting for the children.  This study used two small shoe boxes with different designs on each 
to aid the children’s visual representation.  The lids were removed from the boxes and the boxes 
turned upside down to hide the toy.  
The toys used were a sparkly ball, a red car and a toy dog. The ball was always used first as it 
was used as an icebreaker toy with the child, the other two were randomly chosen from a box. 
The objects were chosen as they have distinct and recognisable signs and verbal labels. Many of 
the children in group 1 regularly took part in early intervention groups which use sign as an early 
form of communication and were therefore familiar with the signs. Key words were signed 
throughout the session to aid children’s understanding and focus. Exact wordings, signs and 
timings are given in Group 1 Protocol, Appendix 2. 
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Figure 7. The ‘noisy bird’ puppet used in group 1, task 2. 
 
Task 2 was a modified version of a joint attention task by Butterworth and Adamson-Macedo 
(1987) cited in Charman et al. (2000). In their experiments a noisy mechanical toy was place 
between the experimenter and the child. Their toy was chosen to ‘provoke a mixture of 
attraction and uncertainty in the child’ (Charman et al., 2000, pg. 486) and the child’s gaze 
switching between either adult (parent or experimenter) and the toy was observed. The task 
was modified by using a noisy bird puppet rather than a mechanical toy (Figure 7). This enabled 
control of when the puppet made a noise which allowed enough time for the children’s 
potentially delayed reactions. If a toy had been used which made a constant noise, or only 
stopped for a limited time, the children with Down’s syndrome may not have had enough time 
to respond. A full protocol for this task is in Appendix 2.   
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Figure 8. Tin and Russian doll props used in group 1, tasks 3a & 3b. 
  
 
Tasks 3a and 3b were designed to assess the children’s understanding of another person’s goal 
from their incomplete action.  Task 3a was a modified version of an imitation task taken from 
Charman et al. (2000) and Rast and Meltzoff (1995). Both these studies used a range of 
unusual objects on which the experimenter produces an incomplete action. The child is 
observed using the objects to examine if he or she acts on the object in the same way, 
indicating an understanding of the target of the incomplete action. For example, a dumbbell 
which pulls apart is shown by the experimenter attempting but failing to pull it apart. The child 
is observed to see if she or he enacts the complete action, even though the end result wasn’t 
seen.  
 The present version of the task was essentially the same, however the objects differed. 
Because the children in this study may have had limited fine motor skills objects which were 
easy to manipulate were chosen (Figure 8). The items chosen were not as abstract at those in 
the Rast and Meltzoff (1995) study, and may have been familiar to some of the children. This 
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may have led to more success in the task than if completely novel objects had been used. 
However as some children with Down’s syndrome may be adverse to failure or unusual 
situations (Wishart, 1996), some familiarity with the objects may have helped the children feel 
confident in engaging with the task.  
 
Figure 9. Equipment used in group 1, task 3c. 
 
Task 3c was an extension of tasks 3a and b.  This task involved a collection of boxes and bags 
(Figure 9) one of which contained a teddy. The child was shown the picture of a teddy and the 
researcher play acted being confused. She looked between the picture of the teddy and the 
boxes, looked in 2 boxes, shook her head and looked disappointed. The researcher placed the 
teddy card in front of the child and waited (full timings are in the Protocol, Appendix 2). 
This task was designed to engage the children with a more complex goal task, which involved 
not only extrapolating the researcher’s intention (looking for something), but also projecting a 
more long term goal (trying to find a specific teddy). The children in group 1 found this task very 
difficult so it was included in the group 2 (4 and 5 year olds) tasks to address whether it was a 
task fault or a group/age difficulty. Most of the children in group 2 were able to access this task 
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which suggests it was more likely to be an age/developmental difficulty with the task not a task 
design fault (this is discussed in detail in chapter 8).  
Task 4 was designed to measure children’s understanding of other people’s perspectives. A 
simple task was devised which involved the carer and the child looking at a picture book 
together. The carer was instructed to keep the book upright so the researcher couldn’t see the 
pictures. The researcher sat opposite the carer and child. On a particular page the researcher 
asked ‘Can I see the ducks please?’  
In order to show an understanding that the researcher couldn’t see what the child was looking 
at the child needed to either hand the book to the researcher or turn the book around to show 
it to the researcher. The task was conceived to be familiar and social so that it was a readily 
comprehensible situation for the child. A key element of analysis coding of this task was to 
ensure the child was showing the researcher specifically, so pointing to the picture in the book 
was marked as an incorrect response. Also implicated in this task is the language component; a 
fail in this task may indicate a lack of linguistic competence.  
In addition to the tasks the child completed all parents and carers in this group were asked to 
complete a questionnaire about the language their child used with them and the language they 
used with their child. As the age group was wide the questionnaires asked about comprehension 
and sign language as well as any spoken language the child might have. A sample questionnaire 
is attached at Appendix 3. The words chosen for the children were early key words which 
referred to themselves or their own needs (for example holding something out to show a carer, 
or signing/saying ‘more’). Parents were asked to indicate whether the children were able to 
understand the terms, if the child used the terms in sign or in speech. The carers’ words were 
mental state terms which are commonly used, such as ‘think’ and ‘remember’. Parents were 
asked to indicate how often they used the terms and were given a choice of daily, weekly, 
monthly or never. Target words were taken from the Down Syndrome Education first 100 words 
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list2 which indicates the most common first words which children learn to comprehend, sign and 
say. 
                                                          
2 Used with kind permission. Available at http://store.dseenterprises.org/collections/types?q=Checklist 
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6.6.2 Group 2 tasks  
 
 
Task (in order of testing) Abbreviation Brief description Purpose 
BPVS British Picture 
Vocabulary Scales 
BPVS Administered as per author’s instructions. R says a 
word out loud and child is asked to point to the 
corresponding picture out of a choice of 4.  
To assess the child’s verbal comprehension level 
in comparison to a standardised score. 
1 Pretend play – Cats 
task  
Pretend play The child and R play with two toy cats, the child is 
asked to help give them a drink/food. R 
manipulates a puppet bird to cause an upset in 
the sequence of play (spill some milk for 
example). Child is asked to clean the specific area 
where the accident has occurred.  
To assess child’s ability to follow others’ pretend 
play sequences and comprehend a disrupted play 
sequence. This requires a representational ability 
which can pretend something is there when it is 
not. 
2 Others’ intentions – 
Teddy search  
Teddy search 
task 
R acts out looking for something in a variety of 
bags and boxes. She points to a picture card with 
a picture of a brown teddy on it, and continues 
looking. R stops looking and observes child. 
To assess the child’s ability to determine 
another’s intent from their actions. 
3 Symbolic 
representation – 
scarecrow task  
Symbolic 
representation  
R and child play with a toy scarecrow. R gives a 
choice of two non-connected objects (a ball and a 
To assess child’s ability to use an object to 
symbolically become something else. This 
requires a representational ability which is able 
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bowl for example) and asks child to ‘give the 
scarecrow a hat’ (for example).  
to mentally transform an object to be ‘something 
else’ which has no connection to its actual 
purpose.  
R = Researcher 
Table 6. Brief description of group 2 tasks 
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The British Picture Vocabulary Scales (BPVS) (Duun et al., 2009) was administered as per the 
instructions, but with modifications according to individual children’s interaction and focus.  
Choosing to use the BPVS was a difficult decision. Since language is intimately linked with the 
development of theory of mind (Astington & Baird, 2005) it was important to have a measure 
that the older children in the study could access which would assess their level of language 
comprehension. The BPVS has not been standardised in detail for children with learning 
difficulties, despite this it is regularly used with children with a range of clinical and learning 
needs and has been recommended by researchers for children with learning disabilities (Glenn 
& Cunningham, 2005). However a range of issues specific to testing those with Down’s syndrome 
were apparent before and during testing: 
a) Verbal instructions. It was a concern that the verbal instructions at the beginning of the 
test may put the children off from engaging with the task. Many of the children did 
engage with the test and appeared to understand the instructions. Some however did 
not, and these children’s comprehension abilities therefore do not appear in the present 
analysis. Some of the children who could not access the test showed levels of 
comprehension in the experimental tasks which could have been measured by the BPVS, 
had they been able to access it. (For example they were able to follow instructions such 
as, ‘Can you put the toy in the drawer?’). A further difficulty with the test is that the 
target word is always verbally presented. This may have presented difficulties for the 
children with a very low capacity working memory (no participant in the present study 
had a digit span of more than 3). If the child waited too long before responding, or was 
unable to use verbal rehearsal strategies they may have potentially lost the target word 
to working memory decay.    
b)  Fine motor skill access to the task. Difficulties with responding by pointing to the target 
word were anticipated. For some children this posed no problem, but for others pointing 
was vague, indecisive or sometimes completely absent. A lack of fine motor skills may 
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have excluded some children from responding and therefore their receptive language 
skills will not be accurately represented in the present data.  
c) Four picture choice. It was acknowledged that choosing from four pictures may be 
difficult for children with poor verbal working memory. The concern was that by the 
time the child had looked at all the images, the verbal prompt may have been lost. 
Indeed the looking time before pointing across participants and within participants 
varied enormously. Children’s choice making also varied across and within participants, 
sometimes a clear choice was made, sometimes they self-corrected and sometimes they 
pointed to all the pictures on the page (a detailed discussion of this is made in both 
group 2 and group 3 analyses, Chapters 8 and 9). 
d) Picture discrimination. Many children with Down’s syndrome have poor vision, 
particularly in the area of visual acuity (Woodhouse et al., 1996). A concern from the 
outset was that some of the distractor items (pictures which look visually similar to the 
target, for example a belt and a bracelet) were too visually similar for the children to 
accurately distinguish between. Similarly pictures which showed action (for example 
dancing versus walking) may not have enough clarity for the children to pick up on the 
salient features. For example the dancing picture has small lines near the hands and feet 
to display movement; the lines are faint and small so potentially not easily seen. In 
addition these lines are symbolic representations which need to be understood to make 
the distinction between movement and stillness. 
e) Salient images. A further difficulty with the picture choice is the occurrence of pictures 
which are particularly appealing or engaging. Children with Down’s syndrome can find 
it difficult to maintain attention on challenging tasks and may opt to repeat things they 
know rather than attempt a difficult task (Kasari & Freeman, 2001). Many of the children 
in this study chose to engage with the researcher about an appealing picture rather than 
focus on the target word. For example a picture of a child with an ice cream was very 
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often pointed to or commented on, as was an image of a very upset, crying child (neither 
of these were target words).   
 
In an attempt to limit the effect of some of these potential difficulties modifications were made 
to the administration of the test. Some words needed to be repeated a number of times before 
the child would respond and on a few occasions the researcher signed words to aid 
comprehension. This was usually done to help the child progress through the first few stages of 
the test. For example, in group 3 one child was unable to point to a ball (which is in the first set 
of words) and was struggling to focus on the pictures. The researcher asked the child to look at 
her then repeated the word ball with the sign for ball. The child was then able to point to the 
correct picture. This was only done where the researcher felt the child was losing focus or was 
finding the test’s practical elements prohibitive to succeeding. The test was also administered 
on two separate occasions to enable an examination of the stability of the children’s 
performance. A discussion of the children’s scores at the two time points is in chapter 8. 
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Figure 10. Equipment used in group 2, task 1. 
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Task 1 was taken directly from the Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) battery of tests used to examine 
the growing understanding of pretence in 18 – 36 month old typically developing children. The 
task, termed by the original authors ‘understanding make-believe transformations’ (Harris & 
Kavanaugh, 1993, pg. 34), was designed to tap into children’s understanding of unexpected 
make-believe events. To extrapolate the difference between pretend play which uses 
representational ability and pretend play which merely ‘stands for’, Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) 
devised this task in which the child must follow the pretend actions of an adult which deviates 
from standard expectations or scripts. For example: 
“Episode A. – The props were a teapot and a small towel. The experimenter makes Teddy pour 
make-believe tea over the pig situated to the right of the child and says, “Oh dear! Can you dry 
the pig who’s all wet?” The child is then given the towel.” (Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993, pg. 35)  
This sequence was repeated with different substances (tea, toothpaste, cereal and milk) and 
each time a different area was targeted so that the child had to be specific about where the 
substance had spilled. The tasks in the present study followed a very similar design with only 
minor modifications (see Appendix 2 for the protocol). The pigs were replaced with cats which 
meowed when activated; this gave the researcher the opportunity to engage the children with 
the task if they were showing disinterest or lack of focus. It was felt that a teddy may not be 
engaging for a 4 or 5 year old child so the ‘naughty teddy’ was replaced with a ‘cheeky bird’ 
puppet. The bird puppet also made a noise when activated again helping to capture the 
attention of the participants. The time the participants had to free play with each set of props 
was extended in order for them to feel comfortable with the props. This enabled the researcher 
to gauge whether the children knew what each set of props was for before the task proper, if 
the child was unable to play appropriately with the props then the task was discontinued. The 
free play situation also set up a play dynamic between the researcher and the child to encourage 
the children to ‘buy into’ to the pretence of the researcher. It was felt they were more likely to 
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engage with the researcher’s pretend play sequence if they had already been involved in play 
with her.  
The teddy search others’ intentions task (task 2) followed exactly the same procedure as 
outlined in group 1. For the full protocol see Appendix 2. 
 
The symbolic play task, task 3, was modelled on study III by Harris and Kavanaugh (1993), 
‘Adjusting pretend actions to a make-believe identity’ (pg. 26) and was also influenced by other 
tests of symbolic play by (Bellagamba & Tomasello, 1999) and the Test of Pretend Play (ToPP) 
(Lewis & Boucher, 1997).  These both make the distinction between pretend play, in which 
children use small world versions to support their imaginative play and symbolic play, in which 
children mentally transform objects to take on a new identity.  In symbolic play the child must 
retain the real property of the object whilst maintaining its newly bestowed property (Leslie, 
1987). This requires two representations to be held in mind. Arguably this is more complex than 
in pretend play where the child only needs to create one representation which is tied to the real 
object (Pratt & Garton, 1993).  
In the present study the child was given a knitted scarecrow doll to play with, specifically chosen 
to be non-gender specific. The child was then given two props to choose from, for example a 
green ball and some building blocks and asked “My scarecrow is hungry, can you find him an 
apple?”. All key words were signed and the sentence was repeated if the child gave no response 
after 10 seconds. After a further 10 seconds the researcher said “What can we pretend is an 
apple?” (see protocol in Appendix 2 for full details). The child could choose either prop, but 
needed to ‘feed’ the scarecrow the prop in order to pass the task. This was repeated with ‘needs 
a hat’ (target action to put on head), ‘wants to write’ (target action to hold ‘pen’ in hand and 
pretend to write) and ‘wants to sleep’ (target action to put the scarecrow in a box).  
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In addition to the tasks the child completed all parents and carers in this group were asked to 
complete a questionnaire about the language their child used with them, and the language they 
used with their child. The questionnaire followed the same format as that used with group 1 
however the word choices were more complex;   a sample questionnaire is attached at Appendix 
3.  
Adults who were present in the testing were also sent a questionnaire regarding the testing 
session. The aim was to gather insight into how the adult thought the child had responded and 
whether their performance was indicative of their usual levels. The questionnaire gave 
opportunities for comments as well as likert scale questions; an example is attached in Appendix 
4. 
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6.6.3 Group 3 tasks 
  
Task  Abbreviation Brief description Purpose 
BPVS British Picture Vocabulary 
Test 
 
BPVS The BPVS was administered as per instructions To determine each child’s verbal 
comprehension level 
WM Working memory digit span 
task 
WM task The children were asked to point to a sequence 
of numbers, increasing in complexity. 
To determine the individuals digit span 
FC False contents task *not all 
children were given this task 
see… chapter 9 
FC task Children were shown a box and asked what they 
thought it contained, they opened it and then 
were asked what they had thought it contained 
before they opened it.  
To test for the child’s understanding of 
their own false belief 
1 False Belief 1  FB1 - dolls The FB story was told by the researcher using 
dolls and props to act out the scenes. 
To test the child’s understanding of 
another person’s false belief 
2 False Belief 2  FB2 – book An illustration book showing the FB story was 
‘read’ with the child. 
To test the child’s understanding of 
another person’s false belief 
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3 False Belief 3  FB3 - digital The FB story was told with the dolls and props 
and photos were taken on a tablet computer to 
record key moments.  
As above 
4 False Belief 4  
*not all children were given 
this task see chapter 9 
FB4 - dolls The FB story was told by the researcher or the 
child using dolls and props to act out the scenes. 
To test the child’s understanding of 
another person’s false belief 
R = Researcher 
 
Table 7. Brief description of group 3 tasks 
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The BPVS was administered as per group 2 above.  
The working memory task used a proforma taken from a freely available source3 which was 
produced by Della-Salla et al as part of a dual task paradigm (Sala, Baddeley, Papagno, & 
Spinnler, 1995) and is found at Appendix 5. For this task the children were shown a Numicon4 
number line. Numicon is widely used in UK primary schools as a way to teach early maths to 
typically developing children and those with special needs. It teaches the children to associate a 
number with a coloured shape and then to use these shapes to work out simple maths. Numicon 
was chosen as many of the children in the present study would have used the symbols in their 
learning and may have been familiar with them.  
In general digit span tasks require a verbal response, since many individuals with Down’s 
syndrome have difficulty with spoken language (Chapman, 1997) it was felt that asking for a 
spoken response may put them at a disadvantage. It was hoped that the number line would 
enable all participants to respond, regardless of expressive language ability. Using the number 
line however, brought with it a number of difficulties which had not been anticipated (see 
chapter 9). Aside from using a number line the digit span task was administered as per the 
instructions. Numbers were verbally presented to the participant and the participant repeated 
the numbers back to the researcher either verbally or by pointing at corresponding numbers on 
the number line. The numbers began in sequences of 2 and no participant got further than 
listening to a sequence of 4. 
The false contents task has been widely used in theory of mind research and forms part of 
Wellman’s scale of theory of mind tasks (Astington & Gopnik, 1988; Gordon & Olson, 1998; 
Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, & Kristen, 2012; Wellman & Liu, 2004).  In this study children 
were presented either with a crayon box or with a miniature cornflake packet and asked what 
                                                          
3 http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/psychology/people/sergio-della-sala 
 
4 https://global.oup.com/education/content/primary/series/numicon/?region=uk 
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they thought was inside. After the child’s answer the researcher and child looked inside and 
found a small sock in the crayons box or pencils in the cornflake packet. The child was asked 
what they thought was inside the packet before they opened it. This task is thought to measure 
the child’s ability to reflect on their own cognition (metacognition) and to recognise that his or 
her own belief was wrong. In pilot testing the full version of this task was attempted. This 
requires the child to hypothesise what someone who has not seen the contents of the box would 
think was inside. In the pilot testing this was unsuccessful and caused much difficulty for the 
participants, so this element of the task was dropped. Although there is a verbal element to this 
task it was considered that the participants would be able to respond to the simple question 
‘What do you think is in here?’ using a spoken or signed response. It is not necessary to 
understand the ‘think’ element of the question in order to respond appropriately (the question 
can be responded to appropriately by answering ‘What is in here?’). This task was not 
administered to all of the participants as it was at the end of the test session and some 
participants had withdrawn consent to continue by this point (see chapter 9). 
  
Figure 11. Items used in group 3, FB dolls task 
 
The false belief dolls task (FB1 –dolls)  was taken from versions of the Wimmer and Perner (1983) 
false belief (FB) task, such as that used in Baron-Cohen et al. (1985), which has become known 
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as the Sally/Anne task. It was necessary to change the names of the protagonists to highlight 
their gender and to be more memorable for the children.  Names were chosen which the 
children would easily be able to sign, which began with familiar sounds and were easily 
distinguishable. Sally was changed to Dinah and Anne was changed to Maxi (taken from Wimmer 
and Perner’s original paradigm). The following scenario was acted out using dolls in front of the 
child: Dinah has a toy. She hides her toy in a drawer and then goes out. Maxi takes the toy from 
the drawer and hides it in a box. Dinah returns.  On Dinah’s return the children were asked 3 key 
questions: 
a) Where did Dinah hide her toy (the memory question) 
b) Where did Maxi hide the toy? (the reality question) 
c) Where will Dinah look for her toy? (the false belief question) 
Wellman et al (2001) show that the ordering of these questions makes little difference to 
whether children pass the final false belief question or not, however (Siegal & Beattie, 1991) 
suggest that subtle inferences in the way the questions are phrased may influence children’s 
understanding of the questions. For example in some studies the false belief question has been 
‘Where will Dinah look first for her ball?’ (Siegal & Beattie, 1991). It was felt that the addition of 
the word first may be confusing to the present cohort and they may not give it the same 
implicature as adults do. However by omitting the word ‘first’ there is also the demand on the 
child to imply the meaning ‘Where does Dinah think her toy is?’ from the sentence ‘Where will 
Dinah look for her toy?’. A decision to use practical question (where will she look) was made to 
allow the children opportunity to act out their answer with the dolls if they wished and to 
maintain a shorter sentence for the children to mentally process.  
The story was acted out using male and female dolls and a chest of drawers all taken from the 
Lego™ Dolls Family Set, a small card box and a small bag (Figure 11). The toys which were hidden 
were a toy car, a toy baby and toy mole. In task 1 the story was acted out by the researcher using 
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the props and the child watched. The child was not prevented from participating if he or she 
wanted to. The story was signed with key words using Makaton. Dinah had a different hiding 
place and a different toy in each of the stories to maintain interest and to aid distinction between 
each telling of the story. The children were invited to help choose the hiding places in each telling 
of the story. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Example from group 3, FB book task (original book in full colour) 
 
For the False Belief 2 task, FB2 – book, an illustrator Matt Ferres5 was commissioned to illustrate 
the story in the FB false belief task. (See Figure 12 for example pages, whole book is included in 
Appendix 6). The book was designed to appeal to the older children in the group who may not 
want to engage with the dolls. The book was cartoon like in quality and used bold black outlines 
and engaging strong colours to help the children see the images clearly. The images were 
                                                          
5 http://www.ferres.co.uk/ 
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purposefully uncluttered but detailed enough to not look like a younger age picture book.  The 
purpose of including a book version of the story was to examine whether this version of the false 
belief task would give the children in the present study any advantage in comprehending the 
story and answering the questions.  
The Wellman et al. (2001) meta-analysis found that different versions (books, videos, live actors 
for example) of the false belief task did not make any difference to the age children passed the 
task. As the current cohort were older than those usually tested and have known difficulties with 
working memory capacity (Jarrold & Baddeley, 2001) it was considered that a picture book may 
help to engage the older children more than the dolls of task 1 and that the fixed nature of the 
story book may help with remembering the story. In this task the researcher and child looked 
through the story book together, the researcher commented on what was happening in the 
story and asked occasional questions to keep the child engaged. The 3 key questions were asked 
whilst the child had the book open in front of them. 
The false belief digital task (FB3 – digital) was included for similar reasons to those stated above. 
A concern with using dolls to act out the story, as in task 1, was that it was not age appropriate 
for some of the older children. A tablet computer was used to take photographs of each stage 
of the story. The children were encouraged to be involved in creating the story and taking the 
photographs. They were encouraged to view and talk about the photographs they had taken. It 
was hoped that because the children were creating an image of the dolls, much like a stop frame 
animation or a story board, this removed the element of ‘playing with dolls’ who instead became 
their subjects. It was postulated that the children would be able to recall the salient story 
information more easily because they had created a visual image of the sequence of events. The 
story was told in the same way as task 1 but with the children taking the lead if they so wished. 
The researcher provided prompts where necessary to keep the story on track.  
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The final false belief task (FB4 – dolls) was a repeat of first false belief task (FB1 – dolls) however 
in this task the children were encouraged to act the story out with the dolls themselves. The 
researcher gave prompts where necessary or acted out the story where the children did not 
want to. This task was not administered to all of the participants as it was at the end of the test 
session and some participants had withdrawn consent to continue by this point (see chapter 9). 
In addition to the tasks the child completed all parents and carers in this group were asked to 
complete a questionnaire about the language their child used with them, and the language they 
used with their child. The questionnaire was the same at that used with group 2 and is attached 
at Appendix 3. 
Adults who were present in the testing were also sent a questionnaire regarding the testing 
session following the same protocol as for group 2, attached at Appendix 4.  
 
6.7 Study design key points 
This study was shaped by the commitment to a person centred approach which puts the 
participants’ needs at the centre of the design. Modifications to tasks were put in place to help 
the children feel successful and at ease in the test situation in the hope that this would enable 
a true reflection of their abilities.  
Tasks were designed to allow a variety of ways to respond so that the participants could choose 
their most effective way of communicating and the researcher’s style of interaction was tailored 
to meet individual needs.  
The tasks were structured enough to allow for quantitative analysis of passes and fails, but the 
testing sessions were also flexible to allow for qualitative analysis of the children’s interaction 
with and outside of the tasks.  
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Chapter 7: Group 1 results and interim 
discussion 
 
7.1 Analysis methodology 
7.1.1 Quantitative analysis methodology 
For each child the video of their session was watched by the researcher and the child’s responses 
to the tasks were scored according to the scoring protocols (Appendix 2). The scoring systems 
were decided upon during the design phase of the study and were an essential element of 
recording not just whether each child passed or failed a task, but how they responded to each 
task. Each scoring system was slightly different according to the group due to the nature of the 
tasks set, but each system allowed for the recording of passes and fails, number of prompts 
needed and if off task behaviours or ‘no responses’ were observed. Quantitative data was 
rescored for reliability by 2 research students. Scores were at 72% agreement on a small sample 
(4 children, 10% of the cohort). Differences in scoring were discussed and agreed upon to 
achieve 100% agreement. Although a wider sample (12 children, 30% of the cohort) was sent 
for checking, one researcher was unable to complete the checking and one researcher found 
understanding the tasks (the responses were scored the opposite way round) and understanding 
the children’s responses very difficult. This brought to light the issue that working with children 
with special needs is a very specific area and that checking data needs specialists who are 
experienced in working in this area. That two researchers found it difficult to comprehend the 
children’s answers suggests that their scores may not be accurate and so the data validation 
procedures in this study may not be helpful in the analysis of the data.  
After initial pass and fail data were recorded scores relating to the behaviours of the children 
were examined. Children were recorded as either passing, failing, off task or no response. These 
were then grouped into all on task behaviours (passing and failing combined as a failed attempt 
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was considered on task), off task behaviours and no responses. This allowed the examination of 
on task behaviours versus other behaviours. Data was analysed in this way by task, by all tasks 
combined and by age.  
Group 3 data was examined further in that the errors the children made in the false belief tasks 
were recorded and analysed.  
 
7.1.2 Case series analysis methodology 
For the second stage of analysis, video of the sessions of four children from each group were re-
examined with a number of foci. Since the tasks gave opportunities to respond in physical as 
well as oral ways, it was essential that all aspects of their responses were examined in detail. 
Prior literature on the behavioural and  social aspects of functioning in this group (see Chapter 
4) reveals a number of areas of potentially interesting foci; eye contact and focus switching, use 
of sign and speech, use of gesture and pointing, body language and social interaction.  
Eye contact and focus switching 
One of the earliest skills babies learn is to make and maintain eye contact with others  (Carvajal 
& Iglesias, 2000). The ability to interact with another person in this way eventually leads babies 
to the knowledge that other people are independent agents who can be manipulated to attend 
to their needs. Initially children learn to follow a parent’s line of sight and this skill develops into 
the understanding of shared referents (Butterworth, 1995a). Learning to make eye contact with 
others’ is an essential skill in early development; it is the earliest form of social interaction and 
helps babies to develop a sense of a shared world (Meltzoff, 1999).  
Eye contact in babies with Down’s syndrome has been shown to progress in marginally different 
ways to the typically developing child. Carvajal and Iglesias (2000) found that the onset of eye 
contact was later in than in typically developing infants and eye contact was held for shorter 
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periods of time. In addition, the ability to switch focus between parent and referent has also 
been seen to be affected in children with Down’s syndrome, with children spending a longer 
time looking to the parent than observed in typically developing children (Berger & Cunningham, 
1981).  
This may have a substantial impact on the way the child learns; for example if the child is unable 
to switch focus effectively and quickly between parent and say, a dog, whilst the parent is 
labelling the animal for the child, the child may not accurately learn the label. Typically 
developing children are able to use subtle indications to help with labelling new objects 
(Baldwin, 1993) but if joint attention appears later in children with Down’s syndrome (Fidler et 
al., 2005) then they may be slower to label new objects. If a difference in early eye contact and 
focus switching is apparent in this group of children it may mean that their learning and 
knowledge building is affected right from the outset. The qualitative analysis in the present study 
will examine how these two areas develop and whether there appears to be any continuum 
across the age ranges. 
Use of sign and speech 
Children with Down’s syndrome are often considered to be ‘visual learners’ (see chapter 4), as 
a result of this and spoken language delays many children with Down’s syndrome in the UK are 
taught to use basic sign language (often Makaton™) in infancy. It has become popular for parents 
of typically developing children to attend ‘baby signing’ groups as signing is thought to provide 
a bridge between the pre-verbal and verbal stages of development (Doherty-Sneddon, 2008). 
For children with Down’s syndrome, however, the gap between these stages can be very 
extended, with some children never achieving comprehendible speech. The difference between 
what children understand and what they are able to verbally produce can be very marked 
((Roberts et al., 2007) and see chapter 4). Is it suggested that parents use sign language with 
children with Down’s syndrome to support children’s early language production (Buckley, 2000). 
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Many of the children in the present study had been exposed to sign language through their 
involvement with Early Intervention Groups and parent support groups, although exposure is 
not consistent across the whole cohort.     
In this analysis how the children use sign and speech to communicate, how they respond to the 
researcher using sign and if these areas are different within different age groups will be 
examined.  
Gesture and Pointing 
Some recent studies have suggested that children with Down’s syndrome use gesture in their 
communication in a more integrated way than is seen in the typically developing population 
(Stefanini, Caselli, & Volterra, 2007). It is suggested that gesture supports children’s speech and 
it can help the transition from the comprehension of words to the expression of words (Iverson 
& Goldin-Meadow, 2005). Studies of typically developing children have suggested that children 
use gesture during periods of assimilation of new concepts and theories (Alibali, 1999; Carlson, 
Wong, Lemke, & Cosser, 2005). A delay in using pointing, in particular when used as instrumental 
requesting, has been implicated as a feature of the early development of the child with Down’s 
syndrome (Kasari, Freeman, Mundy, & Sigman, 1995). The present analysis will investigate and 
examine gesture and pointing across participants.  
Body Language and Social Interaction  
As discussed in chapters 4 and 5 the social abilities of children with Down’s syndrome may be 
used in different ways than by typically developing children (Fidler et al., 2008) and social skills 
may not be generalised in the same way (MacTurk, Hunter, McCarthy, Vietze, & McQuiston, 
1985). There may be a range of factors involved in the apparently successful social functioning 
of this group, not least the ability to imitate effectively (Wright et al., 2006). Fidler et al. (2008) 
suggest individuals with Down’s syndrome may not develop a strong underpinning of the 
pragmatics of social situations and they may over-use social behaviours in complex tasks. 
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Through the case series analysis it will be possible to see how the children’s body language and 
social interactions work with, or against, the other elements of their verbal and non-verbal 
responses. The analysis will allow a description of the social behaviours of the children during 
different tasks and at different stages of development. 
By combining quantative and qualitative analysis is it hoped that a picture of the developmental 
pathway of theory of mind in children with Down’s syndrome will begin to emerge. The 
quantitative analysis will show what theory of mind skills are developing at different stages 
across the three groups and will allow for an examination of how the children’s off task 
behaviours may impact on their passing or failing of tasks. The qualitative analysis will offer 
insight from the children’s physical responses showing how the children are, or are not, 
developing their theory of mind skills in ways not captured in the quantitative data.  
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7.2 Group 1 – Quantitative analysis 
7.2.2 Object permanence tasks. 
 
Participant 
Age 
years 
months 
OP 1 OP 2 OP 3 Pass 3/3 
Laurie 2.2 3 3 3 1 
Frank 2.3 3 0 0 0 
Sally 2.5 -3 -2 3 0 
Georgia 2.6 3 3 3 1 
Otto 2.7 3 3 3 1 
Aisha 2.11 3 0 3 0 
Cassian 3.1 3 3 3 1 
Annie 3.3 3 3 3 1 
Jake 3.3 3 3 3 1 
Nora 3.3 3 3 3 1 
Henry 3.4 3 0 3 0 
Muni 3.5 3 3 3 1 
Gia 3.8 3 3 3 1 
Hugo 3.11 3 3 0 0 
Tabitha 3.11 3 3 3 1 
Scoring: 
3 pass no prompts  
2 pass with one prompt 
1 pass with two prompts 
0 fail by looking in incorrect place 
-1 no response 
-2 off task, plays with toys  
-3  off task, plays with adults 
  
 
Table 8. Group 1 Object Permanence tasks, individual children’s scores 
 
Fourteen out of fifteen children passed OP1 and 1 child was off task.  10/14 children passed OP2, 
1 child was off task and 3 failed the episode by looking in an incorrect place.  13/15 children 
passed OP3, 2 children failed the episode by looking in an incorrect place. Two children were 
responsible for 57% of the off task and fail behaviours seen over the 3 episodes. That most 
children in this group were able to access the tasks indicates that these tasks were within the 
ability range of the majority of this group. Frank failed 2 episodes and Sally was distracted on 2 
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episodes, suggesting that for these two participants the tasks were more difficult either to 
access or to carry out.  Both of these children were in the lower end of the age group (2y3m and 
2y5m) and both showed off task behaviours in later, more complex tasks.  
When all on task behaviours (passes and fails combined) were added together the children were 
on task 95% of the time. From the high pass rate of the OP episodes it can be assumed that they 
were easily accessed for most children in the group. All of the children who passed did so without 
any extra prompts which suggests the task instructions were easily processed and acted upon 
by those who passed. As none of the children needed a prompt to act on the task instructions, 
it could be suggested that a fail response was due to a lack of representational ability (an inability 
to represent the object even though it is out of sight), rather than a processing difficulty (which 
may result in needing prompts to attempt the task).  
All of the fails in this task were on the more difficult episodes; OP2, in which there is a choice of 
2 boxes (3 children failed) and OP3, in which the toy is moved to a different location (2 children 
failed).  These episodes needed the child to hold in mind a representation of the true state of 
affairs and in OP3 to mentally manipulate that representation. Since the task instructions were 
minimal (‘Where’s the ball?) and all but one child passed the first task, it may be assumed that 
the processing the task demands were not a major contributing factor to the fails. As the 
complexity of the mental representation needed increased with each episode it could be that 
this was a contributing factor. However it should be noted that two of the three children who 
failed OP2 went on to pass the more complex OP3.  
 
 No response task  Off task Fail task  Pass task  
All OP tasks 
combined 
0% 5% 11% 84% 
 
 
Table 9. Group 1 Object Permanence tasks, group performance 
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Ninety-five percent of children were on task (passes and fails combined) throughout the OP 
episodes, whether trying and failing or trying and passing. This shows that even if the children 
were unable to achieve a pass outcome they were willing to engage with the activity. Three of 
the 4 children who failed an episode went on to attempt a further episode, indicating that failure 
did not prevent them from trying again. Both of the off task responses in the OP task were 
contributed by one child, Sally, who also displayed similar behaviours in later tasks.  
7.2.3 Joint attention – bird task  
 
 Age in years. months Joint attention – bird task  
Laurie 2.2 0 
Frank 2.3 2 
Sally 2.5 3 
Georgia 2.6 3 
Otto 2.7 3 
Aisha 2.11 3 
Cassian 3.1 3 
Annie 3.3 3 
Jake 3.3 3 
Nora 3.3 2 
Henry 3.4 3 
Muni 3.5 0 
Gia 3.8 3 
Hugo 3.11 3 
Tabitha 3.11 2 
Scoring:  
3 Looks at experimenter to start or stop the bird 
2 Looks to parents or carer to start or stop the bird 
1 Moves towards or away from object to start or stop 
0 No change in behaviour or disengages 
 
Table 10. Group 1 Bird task, individual children’s scores 
All children except Muni and Laurie responded by looking toward the parent or researcher when 
the bird made a noise. Although they were instructed not to respond, 2 carers made a noise or 
showed surprise when the bird appeared which may have confounded these results.  
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Action Number of 
children 
Percentage 
Look/move toward carer 3 20% 
Look/move toward researcher 10 67% 
No response 2 13% 
 
 
Table 11. Group 1 Bird task, group looking behaviour 
 
It could be suggested that the children who looked to the researcher understood that the 
researcher was in control of the puppet. However a move toward the researcher may also have 
indicated that the child wanted to play with the bird and so the results in this task are unclear. 
The video footage does not capture eye contact explicitly; it is therefore difficult to establish 
whether joint attention has been initiated by the child or whether their movement and looking 
behaviour is more concerned with wanting to play with the bird. Because of a lack of clarity in 
the results of this task it has not been considered further in the quantitative analysis.   
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7.2.4 Others’ intentions tasks  
 
 Age in 
years 
months 
Tin task Doll task Teddy search 
task 
 
Laurie 2.2 3 1 -1 
Frank 2.3 3 1 -1 
Sally 2.5 -1 3 -1 
Georgia 2.6 3 1 0 
Otto 2.7 3 3 0 
Aisha 2.11 3 3 3 
Cassian 3.1 3 3 -2 
Annie 3.3 0 3 3 
Jake 3.3 3 3 3 
Nora 3.3 3 3 -2 
Henry 3.4 3 -3 -3 
Muni 3.5 3 3 0 
Gia 3.8 3 3 3 
Hugo 3.11 3 3 0 
Tabitha 3.11 2 3 0 
Scoring:  
3 responds within 5 seconds, attempts to pull apart 
2 responds after 1st prompt after a further 5 seconds 
1 responds after 2nd prompt after a further 5 seconds 
0 picks up object but fails in attempt 
-1 does not respond 
-2 off task, plays with toys 
-3 off task, engages with adults  
 
Table 12. Group 1 Others’ intentions tasks, individual children’s scores 
 
Ninety percent of children passed both the others’ intentions tasks. Three children only passed 
1 task, Sally and Henry showed off task behaviours in 1 task and Annie failed to complete the tin 
task. Three of the 4 youngest children, Laurie, Frank and Georgia, needed 2 prompts to help 
them complete the Doll task however they did not need this prompt in the Tin task.   
The Tin task was potentially confounded by the amount of practice many of the children had 
had in their Early Development Groups. At Early Development Groups, run by local support 
groups, children work on their fine motor skills; one of the activities regularly practiced is the 
skill of picking up an object and then releasing it into a container. As all the children in this group 
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had attended a support group, this may have been a factor for the success rate in this particular 
task. Rather than the children succeeding in reading the researchers intentions, they may have 
been using a well-practiced routine of putting objects ‘in’. However that the Doll task was passed 
just as successfully suggests that some children may have been able to read the researcher’s 
intentions. The children clearly watched the researcher in her attempt to open the doll and many 
children produced exacting imitations of the researcher’s movements and sounds as they tried 
to open the doll. Because of this excellent imitation it is difficult to surmise whether the children 
understood the intention of the researcher or whether they were able to imitate her action and 
therefore open the doll as a consequence. 
In the Teddy search task the responses were evenly distributed, with more children failing the 
task, n=5, than passing, n=4. The three youngest children, Laurie, Frank and Sally all showed a 
‘no response’ behaviour to the task, all other responses were fairly evenly spread across the 
participants.  
 
 
 
 
When the passes and fails were combined into ‘on task’ behaviours, it emerged that 60% of 
children were engaged with the task. Twenty percent of children showing off task behaviour is 
much higher than found in any of the other tasks to this point in the assessment. 
That the Teddy search task revealed a different pattern of behaviours to the Tin and Doll tasks 
and to the OP tasks suggests that the children found this task more difficult to access and 
complete.  The large proportion of children showing off task behaviours may be due to the 
children not understanding the requirements of the task. Similarly the high fail rate in this task 
Task No response  Off task Fail  Pass  
Doll 0% 7% 0% 93% 
Tin 6% 0% 7% 87% 
Teddy Search 20% 20% 33% 27% 
Table 13. Group 1 Other’s intentions, group performance 
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may also point to a lack of understanding of the task; the children were able to mimic the 
researcher (they picked up the boxes), but they were unsure of what the researcher’s goal was 
(they did not display any search behaviour). Such behaviour may indicate that those who failed 
the Teddy search task may have some understanding of mimicking as a tool for learning (watch 
and do), but were unable to understand another’s intention.  
7.2.5 Others’ perspective - book task 
 
Participant Age in years months Book task 
Laurie 2.2 -1 
Frank 2.3 -1 
Sally 2.5 -1 
Georgia 2.6 0 
Otto 2.7 3 
Aisha 2.11 0 
Cassian 3.1 -3 
Annie 3.3 -3 
Jake 3.3 0 
Nora 3.3 3 
Henry 3.4 -1 
Muni 3.5 -1 
Gia 3.8 0 
Hugo 3.11 0 
Tabitha 3.11 -3 
3 responds within 5 seconds, turns book to show 
2 responds after 1st prompt after a further 5 seconds 
1 responds after 2nd prompt after a further 5 seconds 
0 points to picture in the book 
-1 does not respond 
-2 off task, plays with book  
-3 off task, engages with adults 
 
Table 14. Group 1 Others’ perspective, individual children’s responses 
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 No response Off task Fail Pass 
Book task  34% 20% 33% 13% 
 
 
Table 15. Group 1 Others’ perspective, group performance 
 
The book task presents a similar range of behaviour as the Teddy search task. However the 
overall ‘on task’ behaviours are reduced to 46%.  Notably the behaviour observed the most in 
this task is no response, at 34%, contributed by the three youngest children in the group, Laurie, 
Frank and Sally, and 2 other children, Henry and Muni.  Only 2 children passed the task; Otto 
and Nora. In response to the researchers question ‘Can I see the duck please?’ most children 
either failed to respond or pointed to the picture in the book (rather than turn the book around 
to ensure the researcher could see).  
The high ‘no response’ rate may indicate that the demands of the question or task were too 
high; the children did not understand the meaning of the question and therefore could not 
respond to it. Most of the children who did appear to understand that a question was being 
asked of them were not able to respond to it appropriately; of the 7 children who responded to 
the question, only 2 responded correctly. The children who failed this task pointed to the ducks 
in the book, but did not turn the book around so that the researcher could see; suggesting that 
they may not have developed a sense of ‘seeing is knowing’. 
The linguistic content of this task may also have been too demanding. To understand the 
difference between ‘can I see’ and ‘point to’, may have been too challenging for this group of 
children; they may have understood the instruction as ‘point to the duck’.  
Complicating the interpretation of this data is the involvement of the carers. Although instructed 
not to comment when the question was asked question, some carers made comments such as, 
‘Show Lucy the book’, or ‘Where’s the duck? Show Lucy’, especially if the child was slow to 
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respond to the researcher’s question. Clearly such comments could affect the performance of 
the child, and create a false positive or a false negative. Supported by data from the Teddy search 
however, it could be tentatively suggested that children failed to succeed in this task because 
they were unable to see the book from the researcher’s perspective. Although they appeared to 
understand that the researcher wanted to see picture (shown by the children pointing at the 
duck), they were not able to represent another’s perspective.  
7.2.6 Group 1, All tasks combined analysis 
 
 
Figure 13. Group 1 all tasks, whole group responses 
 
From analysis of the group 1 tasks it is possible to characterise where this group are in terms of 
their precursors to theory of mind and also to discuss how behavioural patterns are appearing. 
Figure 13 shows that the children were most successful at the OP task, which required a simple 
mental representation of an object, and the Doll and Tin tasks in which the child could use 
imitation to succeed. In all these tasks rates of off task behaviours were low and the children 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
OP tasks Doll task Tin task Teddy search task Book task
No response task Off task task Fail task Pass task
113 
 
 
  
who failed the task were engaged. Since the pass rates were almost at ceiling in these tasks it 
would be useful to work with a younger cohort to examine at what point these skills emerge.  
In the Doll and Tin tasks the children showed they could use mimicry to achieve a goal and this 
may be linked to an understanding of others’ intentions, however this is not clear from the 
results. In a typically developing cohort similar tasks would be passed by children of around 15 
months (Rast & Meltzoff, 1995). The 2 and 3 years olds in this study could be working at a similar 
cognitive level to typically developing children of 15 months, but may have reached this point 
by using a different set of skills. It may be that the children in this study were using imitative 
learning to develop their understanding of others’ intentions similar to those seen in  Wright et 
al. (2006). 
Taking the Teddy search task into consideration the patterns become more complicated. As can 
be seen in Figure 13 the children’s behaviours were much more evenly spread, suggesting that 
the task may have been difficult either to access or to perform. Although the children were able 
to imitate the researcher pull a Russian doll apart in the Doll task, they did not imitate the 
researcher looking through boxes in the Teddy search task. This could suggest that in the Doll 
and Tin tasks the children understood the researcher’s intention, but in the Teddy search task 
the intention was unclear and therefore the children did not imitate. The children may have 
been using some level of inference of goal detection in their understanding of the tasks. In the 
Doll task they were able to infer from the researcher’s actions that she wanted to pull the 
Russian doll apart, and so could copy the behaviour to achieve an end goal. However they were 
unable to infer any goal from watching the researcher look in boxes in the Teddy search task so 
did not copy the behaviour. It is possible that the children needed to understand the end goal 
in order to use their ability to imitate; without this purposefulness there was ‘no point’ to what 
the researcher was doing.   
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The Book task shows a very similar pattern of behaviours to the Teddy search task (Figure 13), 
again suggesting that the children may have found the task difficult to access or to perform. 
However the Book task used different methods of instruction as shown in Table 16.  
 
Task     
Teddy search  Non - verbal No instructions Little interaction 
with researcher 
Success by 
imitating 
researcher 
Book  Verbal – parent 
interaction and 
researcher 
questioning 
An explicit 
instruction ‘Can 
I see the duck 
please?’ 
Interaction with 
parent 
Success by using 
own knowledge  
 
Table 16. Group 1 Differences between the structure and demands of The Teddy search task 
and the Book task 
Because of these task demand differences, it cannot be presumed that the children displayed 
similar patterns of behaviour because of the same reasons. There were subtle differences in 
the way children responded. In the Teddy search task 20% of children showed ‘no response’ to 
the task (Laurie, Frank and Sally), in the Book task this increased to 34% (Laurie, Frank, Sally, 
Henry and Muni).  There are a number of possibilities for this. During the Book task the 
children were sat with their parents sharing the book, when the researcher asked the question 
she was not part of that shared experience and so the children may have not accepted her 
question (even though care was taken to get each child’s eye contact before the question was 
asked). There is also the possibility that the children simply did not understand that a question 
was being asked, or the content of the question.  The three youngest children showed ‘no 
response’ in the Teddy search task and they also gave this reaction in the Book task. This may 
indicate that some children in this study showed ‘no response’ when a task is beyond their 
comprehension level.  
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 No response Off task On task 
2-3 years 15% 4% 81% 
3-4 years 3% 11% 86% 
 
Table 17. Group 1 On and off task behaviour, grouped by age 
 
Across all tasks, changes in response appear related to the age of the children. As can be seen 
in Table 17 on task behaviour remains consistent across age however the younger children were 
more likely to not respond and the older ones more likely to display off task behaviours. This 
could be that the younger children were unable to process the demands of the task, and so 
behaved as though it had not been set. The older children may have been aware of the task and 
that they were finding it difficult, so possibly displayed off task behaviours to avoid the task. 
However, as discussed in chapter 4, examining the performance of children with Down’s 
syndrome by chronological age may not be useful because the performance of children of similar 
ages can be very different (Chapman & Hesketh, 2000). For this set of tasks a more appropriate 
means of comparison may be between those who passed all the first 6 tasks (Pass 6) and those 
who did not (No Pass 6).   
 N = 
Mean 
age in 
months 
Pass Fail Off task 
No 
response 
Children who 
passed all the first 
6 episodes 
7 38.1 21% 50% 29% 0% 
Children who did 
not pass the first 6 
episodes 
8 35.3 12% 25% 13% 50% 
 
Table 18. Group 1 Performance in the Teddy search task and the Book task combined, broken 
down into groups of children who performed at ceiling for the first 6 episodes and those who 
did not. 
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Of note in Table 18 is the similar mean age of the two groups. The children who did not pass all 
the first 6 episodes found the Teddy search task and the Book task more difficult and they were 
more likely to show no response. More children failed the final two tasks from the Pass 6 group, 
indicating that this group were more likely to attempt the task. However this group were also 
more likely to produce off task behaviours. These results support the suggestion that those 
children who were more cognitively advanced (i.e. could pass all the easier tasks) were also more 
aware of their own limitations when attempting a task and so more likely to display off task 
behaviours. This group may have an awareness of their own abilities and when a task 
overreaches them they respond with task avoidance behaviours. That said, some members of 
this group do also attempt the task and fail, suggesting that they were able to cognitively process 
the demands of the task, but did not have the necessary theory or knowledge to be successful 
at it.  
Child Age in 
years 
months 
Teddy search task Book task 
Georgia 2.6 Fail Fail 
Otto 2.7 Fail Pass 
Cassian 3.1 Off task Off task 
Annie 3.3 Pass Fail 
Jake 3.3 Pass Fail 
Gia 3.8 Off task Fail 
Tabitha 3.11 Fail Off task 
Table 19. Group 1 Performance on the last 2 tasks of the children who passed all prior 6 
tasks. Highlighted children passed all prior 6 tasks with no prompts and passed one of the 
final two tasks. 
Highlighted in Table 19 are the three children who passed either the Teddy search task, or the 
Book task and had perfect scores (needed no prompting) for the prior 6 episodes. These three 
also attempted and failed one of the last two tasks, rather than displaying off task behaviours. 
This supports the hypothesis posed that cognitively these children may be in a position to 
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process the task demands, but they are just on the cusp of having the knowledge, experience or 
theory to pass the tasks. These three children don’t display any off task behaviours, potentially 
because they were engaged with the tasks and felt able to attempt them. Included in Table 19 
are the ages of the children, to note is the lack of correspondence of age to failing or passing. 
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7.3 Group 1 - Case series analysis 
 
In order to get a spread of different responses to the tasks participants were chosen for the case 
series study using the flow chart in Appendix 7. Age was not a defining factor, however it was 
important to ensure there was not an artificial age/development relationship in the case series 
participants. The four participants chosen are shown in Table 20.  
Child 
Age in 
years/months 
Age in 
months 
Seen at 
Attended 
Early 
Support 
Groups 
Reason for 
inclusion in case 
series analysis 
Henry 3y4m 40 centre  
Does not pass 
any tasks 
Annie 3y3m 39 centre  
Inconsistent 
passing 
Tabitha 3y11m 47 centre  
Passes OP and 
Intention tasks 
Otto 2y7m 31 centre  Passes all tasks 
 
Table 20. Group 1 Attributes of the four children chosen for case series study 
 
7.3.1 Eye contact and focus  
 
The ability to focus attention on both the researcher and the task was inconsistent across the 
four children.  On the simpler OP tasks if children were able to switch their gaze between the 
researcher and the task, they appeared to be more successful at the task. Otto and Tabitha 
looked from the task to the researcher as she was speaking and back to the task again, before 
picking up the correct box. The same two children were also able to use focus switching in the 
Doll task. They looked from the doll, to the researchers face and to the doll again a number of 
times.  
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However this ability to switch focus appeared more limited the more the tasks required an 
understanding of the researcher’s intention. In the Doll, Tin and Teddy search tasks all 4 children 
focussed either entirely on the researcher or on the task, with only brief glances to the 
researcher. This was particularly apparent where children appeared unsure of the task 
requirements, such as in the tin task:  
Participant Focus  
Tabitha No interaction with R whilst R leading. When Tabitha self-directs play and 
puts her foot in the tin she looks directly at R. Then looks back at tin and 
remains focussed on the tin until the task finished. 
 
Otto Watches discs as R trying to put them in, but doesn’t look at R. 
 
Henry Doesn’t look at R throughout task. 
 
Annie Doesn’t look at R whilst being shown task. Throws discs then looks to R.  
 
 
Table 21. Group 1 Participants gaze switching in the Tin task 
Success in the more complex Tin task relied somewhat on looking to the researcher for social 
cues about the task; the researcher made a ‘disappointed’ face and sounds as she was unable 
to get the discs in the tin. If the child only watched the tin they would have seen a disc being put 
near the tin; in order to understand that the disc was supposed to go into the tin, the child 
needed to ‘read’ the intention of the researcher. One of the ways they could have done this was 
by looking to the researcher’s face. It would also have been possible to work out the intended 
trajectory of the discs by only watching them as they ‘miss’ the tin and this may have been the 
way some children solved this task. However a lack of gaze switching may suggest that rather 
than using all the information available to them, social as well as practical cues, the children may 
have been focussing only on the practical aspects of the task.  
When working on the Teddy search, Tabitha, Annie and Henry’s focus became much more 
erratic. They switched their focus but appeared to have their own agenda behind their focus: 
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Participant Focus 
Tabitha Initially watches R. Imitates her looking. Becomes focussed on bag, 
plays with it by putting the teddy card in it looks to R whilst playing. 
Copies R again looking in a box. Becomes focussed on a box and putting 
the teddy picture card in it, doesn’t look again to R until the card is in 
the box. 
 
Annie Initially watches R then moves focus to the bag. Says and signs bag 
whilst looking at R. Focus changes back to box, picks up box and shakes 
it.  
 
Henry Focusses on boxes, bangs on them and throws them. Looks briefly to 
teddy card but not at R.  
 
 
Table 22. Group 1 Participant’s focus in the Teddy search task 
From these brief scenarios it seems possible that the more difficult the children found the task 
the more likely their focus was to become fixed on an element which they could interact 
comfortably with, for example playing with a bag or banging boxes. Just as possible is the reverse 
hypothesis; the more likely the children were to find an object which took their attention, the 
less able they were to attend to the task. Only Otto was successful in this search task: 
Participant Focus 
Otto: Lots of gaze switching between boxes and R. Finds teddy, gaze remains 
fixed on boxes.  
 
Table 23. Group 1 Otto’s focus in the Teddy search task 
Otto did not look to either the researcher or his mother when he found the teddy which may 
indicate a lack of interest in the task. However this could also be indicative of a wider issue 
concerning lack of referential looking. Otto did not check that either adult in the room had seen 
that he had found the teddy, but praised himself for it by clapping. This follows a wider pattern 
seen in both the pointing and social understanding analyses later in this chapter.  Some of the 
children do not check to see whether their conversational partner (or in this case play partner) 
has seen their conversational attempts. As we have seen in earlier chapters (chapters 3 and 5), 
joint attention relies on the child’s ability to check that his or her partner shares the referent.  It 
is possible that the children in this case series had not yet developed this underpinning concept 
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of ‘to see is to know’, leaving children taking conversational or play turns which are unattended 
to.  
From the analysis of eye contact and focus a number of areas of interest have been identified 
and will continue to be discussed throughout the rest of the analysis: 
a. The ability to switch focus during a task, particularly during the instructional part, may 
improve children’s success on these tasks. Children need the ability to watch the task 
requirements (the practical information) and to combine these with social signals to 
achieve successful problem solving. The children in this case series may have attempted 
to problem solve by focussing on the practical information given and not utilising social 
cues.  
b. An ability to know (and check) that others have seen and understood underpins most 
social situations. The children in this study may not have used this theory to help them 
achieve successful social interactions.  
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7.3.2 Sign and speech  
 
Table 24. Group 1 Individual participants use of signs 
Child Sign Copied Independent In 
task 
To 
change 
topic 
With 
vocalisation 
With 
speech 
Henry ball       
 dog       
 car       
 cow       
 monkey       
 duck       
Otto Thank you       
 ball       
 where ball       
 dog       
 looking       
 where gone       
 gone       
 car       
 finished       
 no       
 music       
 rabbit       
 eating       
 elephant       
 cow 
monkey 
      
Tabitha L       
 ball       
 where       
 dog       
 watching       
 where dog       
 car        
 ready       
 where car       
 elephant       
Annie where       
 bag       
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All the children in this case series used sign and some speech sounds, although the amount and 
how it was used varied (see Table 24). The majority of signs were seen in the OP tasks and were 
the names of the objects used (ball, car, dog) and the sign ‘where’. It was during these tasks that 
the researcher also used most signs and many of the children’s signs appeared in direct response 
to this. The second most common time for signs to be used was in the story book task where 
the children signed the names of animals from the book. Signing was limited to nouns and 
‘where’, with very few exceptions. During the doll and the tin tasks no signs were used by any 
of the children (or by the researcher), with the exception of Otto who signed ‘music’ to his mum 
in an attempt to move on from the task at hand.  Of notable interest are the different ways in 
which the children used their signing and how this was associated with their speech and 
vocalisations.  
Use of sign Focus Speech and speech sounds 
R signs dog 
Henry signs 
dog 
Looks at R first, then when repeats 
dog looks to parent 
R: What’s next? 
Henry: Ahh dee 
R: dog 
Henry: do 
R signs dog 
Henry signs 
dog 
Looks to parent as speaking but then 
to dog as it is being hidden 
R: dog 
Henry: do 
 
Table 25. Group 1 Henry’s use of speech, sign and looking in OP1 
 
On each occasion that Henry used a sign and vocalised during this task he looked to his parent 
who was sat behind him a few feet away. It appears that for Henry, speaking and signing was a 
way to gain the approval and praise of his parent, but there was little imperative to use sign for 
any other reason. For example Henry did not use any signs to communicate with the researcher 
throughout the rest of the session, until the story book task where he named the animals in the 
book.  
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Use of sign Focus Speech and speech sounds 
 Henry is distracted from mum and 
takes book from R. 
mum: Aaah baby animals 
 Continues to look at book, no shift of 
focus 
Henry: Eeee (monkey) 
cow Looks to R on name shifts focus 
between book and R. 
Does not respond to question 
R: Henry, can I see… 
Henry: Mooo 
R: …can I see the cow? 
monkey  Henry: Weeee (monkey) 
R: Can I see the monkey? 
Henry: Eeee  (monkey) 
 Looks at pages in book, closes book Henry: Ba baye. ah di  
Duck  
Duck  
Focussed on R throughout this 
exchange 
Henry: Duck  
R: The duck. Can you show me the 
duck? 
Henry: Duck (laughs) 
Monkey 
monkey 
Looks up to R when signing, then looks 
back to book. 
Looks again to R then to Mum  
Henry: Ahheee (monkey) 
R: Monkey? 
Henry: Aaaheee 
R: That’s a good monkey noise I 
like that. 
Mum: Hmmmm 
R: laughs 
 
Table 26. Group 1 Henry’s use of sign and speech in the Book task 
 
Henry appeared to use signs to support his speech as he vocalised on every sign, but there was 
limited evidence that he had an understanding of this communication as a two way interaction. 
He communicated by naming animals and objects, but he may have been doing this for the 
purpose of adult praise, rather than as a conversational exchange. The parent response on his 
language questionnaire was that he is not yet putting two words together in speech or sign, 
although he was using imperatives (want and more) in sign. It could be suggested that Henry is 
at the single word learning phase of language acquisition, however, since children with Down’s 
syndrome are often much better comprehenders than their expressive language shows, this may 
not have influenced Henry’s performance in the tasks.  
Otto had a very different pattern of language and communication. He made no speech sounds 
throughout the entire session, but used sign and pointing as methods to communicate with the 
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researcher and with his mum. In particular Otto made independent communicative attempts to 
the researcher: 
Pointing 
Child’s 
use of 
sign 
Focus Speech and speech sounds 
 Looking Eye contact remains on the 
dog as it’s covered 
R: Looking 
 Where 
Gone  
Eye contact with R as she 
asks question 
R: Where’s the dog 
Points with 
finger onto 
the top of 
incorrect 
box 
 Looks at box whilst pointing  
 Gone  Looks at R immediately 
after pointing, whilst 
signing 
R: Have a look 
  Looks and moves to correct 
box and lifts lid. Does not 
make eye contact with R 
R: Oh good boy 
Mum: He’s saying it’s gone. I 
think he was saying it’s not in 
there it’s gone.  
R: Oh it’s gone, oh wow.  
 
Table 27. Group 1 Otto’s use of speech and sign in the OP tasks 
 
As mum clarified, Otto was saying that the dog was not in the empty box (it’s gone) and he was 
also able to show he knew where it was by consistently picking the correct boxes in this task. 
This was extra information that the researcher had not requested and was offered 
independently.  The majority of Otto’s signs were used without prompts from the researcher 
and were made before she said or signed a phrase or key word. This indicates that for Otto, the 
use of sign was much more than an imitative device, he used sign to bring attention to, to name 
and (in a limited way) offer extra information to the situation. However, how much he 
recognised that in order for communication to be effective it must be attended to is unclear, as 
is discussed in the pointing and gesture analysis below. Indeed in his language questionnaire his 
mother identified that he could put two words together in sign, but was not yet using the term 
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‘want’. This suggests that he could utilise his word knowledge to name and describe, but was 
not yet confident in using language as a means-end tool.   
Tabitha used signing in a different way again; she was more verbally confident than the other 
participants and used sign only when the researcher did, with two exceptions (‘ready’ and 
‘elephant’). All her sign was accompanied by intelligible speech and she often used speech 
without sign. When speaking or signing her vocabulary was still mostly limited to nouns and 
repeated phrases; for example ‘where’ and ‘bye-bye’, until the exchange shown in Table 28. 
Use of sign Social interaction Focus Speech and speech sounds 
 Glances to R 
whilst putting 
teddy in bag - 
smiles 
Focus on bag – picks 
it up. Looks in it, 
takes picture card 
and puts it in bag. 
Tabitha: Bag. bag. ok. oh. oh 
bag. bag. bag. In. come on 
teddy.  
 Holds bag towards 
R. Moves it away 
when R tries to 
take teddy card.  
Looks up to R, then 
back to bag 
Tabitha: Bye bye 
R: Ok. bye bye. Can I take him 
out again? 
Tabitha: No 
R: Can I have him? thank you 
  Watches R as she 
looks in boxes, but 
doesn’t look at her.  
Tabitha: No (in response to R 
looking in a box) 
  Picks up pink box – 
focus remains on box 
until teddy picture is 
in it and lid on.  
Tabitha: In a box 
R: In that box? 
Tabitha: Yeah 
R: Hmmm  
Tabitha: No, it teddy, in 
R: Oh I see, you want him in, I 
don’t know if he’ll fit, he’s a 
bit big.  
Tabitha: Big. Lid on 
 
 
Table 28. Group 1 Tabitha’s use of sign and speech in the Teddy search task 
 
This conversational exchange shows the Tabitha engaged the researcher as a conversational 
partner and used the exchange to instruct and control the sequence of play (in this example she 
moved the play away from the researcher’s intended goal to a self-directed goal).  She used no 
signing in this exchange, suggesting that her use of sign in the OP tasks could have been 
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prompted by the researcher’s use. Within this sequence she also used 2, 3 and 4 word 
combinations, an expressive language ability unusual for a child with Down’s syndrome of this 
age. Her language questionnaire reported that her main form of communication is speech and 
she was ‘all the time’ putting two word sequences together and using ‘want’ and ‘more’ without 
prompting.  However this did not appear to impact on her ability in the tasks; she did not attempt 
all the tasks and some of the tasks she attempted she didn’t complete. It could be suggested 
from this that when a child with Down’s syndrome is observed refusing or failing tasks, it may 
not be inefficient language which is causing the difficulty. In Tabitha’s case it seemed more likely 
to be either a lack of understanding of the task requirements or a conceptual difficulty which 
led to failure in the tasks.  
Throughout the testing session Annie used two signs and some clear speech. Some of her speech 
was phrases repeated from the researcher, much was unintelligible to the researcher and she 
relied very heavily on ‘yeah’ as a communicative device.   
Gesture Pointing Social interaction Focus 
Speech and 
speech sounds 
    Annie: (unint) 
  Picks up box and 
tries to hide the 
car 
 R: It’s ok we’ve 
got a car 
Annie: Got a car  
R: Oh, are we 
going to hide it? 
nods    R: Can I do it? 
Annie: Yeah 
   As soon as boxes 
are on floor gaze 
remains on boxes, 
doesn’t look at R 
R: Where’s the 
car? 
Holds hands 
out in 
‘where’ type 
gesture 
 Picks up other box 
and looks under 
Looks to R after 
picking up box 
Annie: Ball (picks 
up box) ball? 
 Full hand 
point 
towards ball  
 Looks around R to 
see ball  
Annie: They t’eee 
 
 
Table 29. Group 1 Annie’s use of sign and speech in OP1 
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As can be seen in Table 29 Annie was able to instigate conversation, based on her own needs 
and desires (she wanted to find the ball from the previous task). Although she appeared to be 
finding the hidden car, she was actually looking for the ball and communicated this to the 
researcher through her speech and a ‘where’ gesture. For much of the rest of the session Annie 
used one word phrases, mostly in response to the researcher’s questions.  
Across the four participants there was a wide range of signing, speech and speech sounds, as 
would be expected from children who are in the early stages of language development. In the 
typically developing population the use of one and two word phrases begins in children aged 18-
24 months (Roberts et al., 2007). What is of interest is that 3 out of the 4 children primarily used 
sign to name objects and to copy the researcher. There was little independent signing from 
Henry, Tabitha and Annie and only a few signs which moved away from the naming nouns. That 
Otto used sign in a different way may be as a result of his difficulty with speech sounds and may 
indicate that, whilst many children with Down’s syndrome may only use sign for a short while, 
perhaps to support their transition into using speech, some may use sign as their primary means 
of communication for much longer.    
Of particular interest are the reasons behind the children’s use of sign. Only Otto used his signing 
as a way to direct the researcher and to show opinions through using signs such as gone, finished 
and no. The other three children relied much more heavily on their body language and/or 
vocalisations to indicate to the researcher their feelings about the tasks.  This could be that the 
children have not yet been taught the signs to express emotions or give directives, or that they 
have not reached the stage of development where they are able to express these types of 
communications. 
From the examination of speech sounds and signing there are 2 emergent themes which warrant 
further exploration in Group 2 and 3: 
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a. Communication is not always recognised as a two-way exchange. 
Children in this group were not always aware that their communicative attempts 
needed to be seen or heard in order for the researcher or parent to act upon them. This 
may mean that they have not yet built an understanding of the dynamic ‘to see/hear is 
to know’.  
b. Communication can be used to redirect the task or situation. 
Even the children with limited speech and sign were able to use their communicative 
attempts (physical or vocal) to engage with or redirect the researcher. There appeared 
to be an early understanding that tasks could be avoided through redirection. However, 
this may contradict the suggestion above that communication is not always recognised 
as a two way exchange. 
 
7.3.3 Gesture and pointing 
 
All the children used pointing to gain the researcher’s attention and all used gestures at some 
point in their session, although both forms of communication were limited.  Otto used pointing 
the most prolifically and as a specific communicative device. 
Gesture Pointing Use of sign 
Body 
language 
Social 
interaction 
Focus 
Speech 
and 
speech 
sounds 
Bring LH 
over in 
sweeping 
motion, 
repeated 
with RH 
 Signing no/ 
finished? 
  Doesn’t look 
directly at R 
throughout 
this 
exchange 
Otto: 
unint 
 Looks and 
points to 
LHS of R 
(to boxes?) 
To put 
away? 
    Otto: 
unint  
Brings LH 
up across 
 Signing no/ 
finished? 
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chest to 
touch RH 
side 
    Works 
cooperativ
ely with R 
to put the 
doll back 
together 
Does not 
make eye 
contact 
throughout 
this 
 
     Makes eye 
contact 
R: Thank 
you 
L Hand 
point 
towards 
R’s boxes 
  Moves top 
of body 
forward to 
lean on RH 
 Looking at 
boxes 
behind R? 
Otto: 
unint 
     Watches tin 
as R brings it 
out of box 
 
 
Table 30. Group 1 Otto’s use of pointing during the Doll task 
 
By pointing at the boxes behind the researcher Otto appeared to request that the task be 
finished and returned to the box or another task retrieved from the box. Otto did not make any 
eye contact when pointing. He looked at the boxes behind the researcher but did not look at her 
until she spoke to him. It was not clear that Otto fully understood the functions involved in 
instrumental pointing; if the recipient of your pointing does not see your point, or the referent, 
it holds no purpose. Typically developing children point and then check to see whether the adult 
is following their line of regard, particularly if the adult does not respond to their initial point 
(Moore & Dunham, 1995). Otto’s use of pointing suggests that whilst he may understand that 
pointing can move a situation on or show a request, he may not be aware that his pointing must 
be attended to.  
Annie also used pointing to steer the session away from a task she was not showing any interest 
in, however Annie made clear eye contact with the researcher after pointing. 
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Pointing Body language Focus 
Speech and speech 
sounds 
 R tries to show dog First looks away 
then looks 
directly to camera 
R:Look 
Finger point (middle 
finger?) to the camera 
 Looks back to R 
after pointing 
R: That’s my camera 
 R tries to show the 
dog again 
  
Finger point behind her  Looks back to R 
after pointing 
R: That’s the telly 
Turns round to finger 
point the other way 
behind her  
 Doesn’t look 
behind her, but 
unclear where 
focus is 
R: This…is my dog 
 Gets up and walks 
over to mum (being a 
dog?) 
Comes back of own 
accord 
 Annie: Woofwoof 
  Focusses on dog 
and boxes  
 
 
Table 31. Group 1 Annie’s use of pointing in OP1 
Annie appeared to want to distract the researcher away from the task. When the researcher 
continued the task by trying to redirect to the dog, Annie walked away from the task. Whilst 
both Annie and Otto seem to understand that pointing is a way to move the situation away from 
the task, only Annie made the crucial eye contact to check her communication had been 
received by the recipient.  
No pointing was seen from the other two children in this case series, with the exception of 
Tabitha pointing to pictures in the Book task. There may have been little reason for the children 
to point since the tasks were directly in front of them. All four language questionnaires stated 
that the child ‘occasionally’ or ‘all the time’ pointed to something to show it to a parent.  
The children’s use of gestures was interestingly absent. Very few gestures were used other than 
the common cultural gestures of shaking head (for no), holding hands in to body (to show fear) 
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and clapping (for self-praise). On occasion the children directly copied the gestures of the 
researcher, for example straining to open the doll, or putting hand on chin in a ‘puzzled’ 
expression when trying to find the teddy. This imitation may be an indication that the children 
were trying to ‘put themselves in the researcher’s shoes’ in order to make sense of the task. 
Alternatively they may have been using a previously successful learning strategy. All of the 
children in this case series (in fact all but one in the whole of group 1) were enrolled in Early 
Intervention Groups and one of the strategies in these groups is to learn through imitation. 
Whilst this is a successful strategy in speech sound learning (copying sounds) and in simple tasks 
(putting a ball ‘in’ for example), it may not be helpful when a combination of the social and 
practical elements of a task both require interpreting. To copy another person’s facial expression 
or action does not lead to an understanding of their intention. All four children’s language 
questionnaires reported that their child ‘occasionally’ or ‘all time’ showed distress when 
someone is upset, showing that they are able to recognise others’ emotions. However whether 
they are able to use this information to understand another’s intention is unclear.  
From the examination of gesture and pointing there are two emergent themes which will be 
developed through group 2 and group 3 analysis: 
a. Gesture use appears to be culturally defined rather than used as an addition to 
language. Imitation of the researcher’s gesture was also prevalent. 
b. Pointing appears to be used to distract the researcher. However it is unclear whether 
the children are aware that ‘to see is to know’.  Declarative pointing has been found 
to be less proficient in children with Down’s syndrome (Legerstee & Fisher, 2008) 
and our analysis is consistent with this finding.  
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7.3.4 Body language and social interaction 
As it would be unfeasible to reproduce all the children’s social and physical interactions in this 
analysis the results were broken down into two areas which appeared across all four 
participants: joint attention and the children’s responses to the unknown outcomes of the tasks. 
The discussion of social interaction and body language also brings together the other areas in 
this case series: pointing, sign, gesture and speech, as all are examples of social interaction.  
Joint attention 
Throughout the sessions all the children showed signs that they were unable to source and 
utilise information to help them decipher the task. As discussed above difficulties in switching 
focus between the researcher and the task meant that at times the child appeared to be only 
focussing on one aspect of available information. When they did not get enough information 
from watching the task in order to understand the outcome the child did not, as we may expect, 
look to the researcher for further clues. For example, in the Teddy search task, Henry seemed 
unaware of the tasks outcome but did not make any attempt to interact with the researcher 
who was acting out failing to find the teddy:  
Participant Social Interaction 
Henry Bangs on pink box. Picks up bag and throws it. Focus on boxes, not R 
Looks at teddy pic as R is pointing to it 
Helps R open box, R points to teddy pic, Henry glances at pic but main focus 
on putting lid on pink box.  
Table 32. Group 1 Henry’s social interaction during the Teddy search task 
 
This behaviour suggests that Henry may not have been aware that there was further social 
information to be sourced and that this could help him with solving the task. A further 
interpretation may be that Henry was aware that there was social information available, but he 
did not have the mental capacity to process the task requirements and the social information at 
the same time. Some evidence for this is seen in the reverse of the above situation; in this 
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instance Henry was able to copy the researcher’s behaviours, but did not replicate the action 
that was required to complete the task: 
Participant Social Interaction 
Henry Looks to R as she starts activity, watches her attentively. 
Henry moves as though in exertion – pulls body back. Copies her sound of 
exertion.  
Makes eye contact with R as he picks up the doll, smiles.  
Appears to imitate R, whilst looking at her. Then hands back doll. 
Table 33. Group 1 Henry’s social interaction in the Doll task 
In this example Henry may have thought the task goal was to copy the researcher. After he had 
done this he handed the doll back to the researcher and then began to engage in off task 
behaviours.  
Tabitha was able to switch her gaze between the researcher and the task (and indeed copied 
the researcher’s gesture), but did not synthesise these two bits of information to understand 
the task goal.  
Participant Social Interaction 
Tabitha Copies R gesture of looking puzzled – hand on chin 
Looks directly at R as copying her 
Watches white box and glances at R. 
Watches pink box and glances R.  
Glances to researcher whilst putting teddy in bag - smiles 
Focus on bag – picks it up. Looks in it, takes picture card and puts it in bag. 
Holds bag towards R. Moves it away when R tries to take teddy card.  
Looks up to R, then back to bag 
Watches R as she looks in boxes, but doesn’t look at her face.  
Picks up pink box – focus remains on box until teddy picture is in it and lid on.  
Table 34. Group 1 Tabitha’s social interaction in the Teddy search task 
Goal detection 
The possible information sourcing and synthesising issue evidenced above could also be 
compounded with a lack of persistence with unfamiliar tasks. All four children had to be 
encouraged to re-engage with a task (most notably in the teddy search task and the book task) 
and a variety of off task behaviours were shown during the more difficult tasks. The two most 
notable behaviours observed were moving the task onto a self-directed form of play and 
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completely off task behaviours. When the children were not engaged with a task they all used 
the task toys to create their own play. Annie sat compliantly throughout the Doll task, watched 
the researcher and completed the task, but she behaved rather differently in the Tin task:  
Action Speech sounds 
R puts tin down, Annie picks it up, reaches for 
discs 
 
Takes disc from R and throws Annie: Baba (bye bye?) 
Throws more discs 
No focus on R – just playing with discs  
Annie: makes sounds as discs are thrown 
Laughs, looks to R then mum. Then throws more 
discs 
Annie: makes sounds as discs are thrown 
Looks to R each time a disc is thrown Annie: makes sounds as discs are thrown 
Points to where discs have been thrown to Annie: Gada (unint)  
Crawls across floor Annie: Aba (unint) 
Crawls around to collect the disks R: Let me get these ones 
Annie: Oh, more 
R: You get that one 
Annie: Yeah 
Walks back to R Annie: (unint) 
Throws discs again. R: Shall we try it again? Watching, watching 
Annie watches as R tries to put discs in. Then 
throws discs. 
 
Sees one disc left and goes towards it. Annie: More 
Table 35. Group 1 Annie’s social interaction in the Tin task 
After the session the Annie’s mother told the researcher the child has a similar Russian doll at 
her Grandma’s house to the one used in the task, this may go some way to explain the difference 
in Annie’s behaviour in the two tasks. In the Doll task there was some familiarity for her, perhaps 
she knew the outcome, but in the Tin task she seemed unaware of or uninterested in the 
researcher’s set goal. Potentially the difficulty in understanding the researcher’s goal led Annie 
to create her own self-directed play in which she was able to be successful and in which she 
didn’t have to work to another’s direction.  
A similar situation occurred in Tabitha’s session. She enjoyed using the researcher’s props and 
making her own game with them: 
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Action Speech and speech sounds 
Focussed on her own actions – puts doll in tin, tells the R 
‘nonono’ when she tries to remove the doll. 
Puts doll back in tin. 
Tries to take discs from researcher (does not look at her) 
Gaze completely focussed on the toys on the floor – does 
not look to the researcher for another 60 seconds (until she 
takes tin and puts it on her foot), even though she engages 
with her verbally. 
Tabitha: Nononono. There. 
Right, baaa 
R: Oh is she going in there is 
she? I see. 
Tabitha: Yeah yeah yeah, unint 
R: Can I do these ones? 
Tabitha: Yeah 
R: I’ll take her out and put them 
away 
Watches the discs and the tin, but not the R   
Bends down and looks at each disc as they miss the tin  
Lays discs out on the floor, picture side up  
Takes tin and put her foot in it  
Looks up at R after she has put her foot in the tin and 
smiles – but then does not look again until R starts getting 
next task 
R: Are you putting your toes in? 
Are you putting your toes in my 
tin? 
Puts second disc in Tabitha: Oooh der 
Puts all discs in Tabitha: unint  (as each disc is 
put in a sound is made) 
Puts tin down and looks to R  
Table 36. Group 1 Tabitha’s social interaction in the Tin task 
Tabitha had a clear agenda of using the tin as a container firstly for the doll (possibly a bath) and 
then for her foot. She only engaged with the researcher’s goal after she had exhausted her own 
activity. It is possible that she was practicing working out the task goal by putting a variety of 
items ‘in’ the tin. In this instance she appeared to understand the task, but only after taking 
some time to engage with it. However in the example given in the use of sign and speech section 
above she is not successful in the task and again uses the toys for her own self-directed play. 
That Tabitha uses self-directed play in these ways indicates that she may be using it as a way to 
avoid a task which she doesn’t understand, or as a way to bide her time or experiment with the 
toys as she works out the task demands. Note in the example above however that she does not 
appear to use any of the social cues from the researcher, she remains focussed on the tin 
throughout and appears to use the practical elements of the task (there is an empty tin and a 
pile of discs of the same size) to find the end goal. This strategy would be less successful in the 
Teddy search task as it is not clear, without comprehending the social aspects of the task, 
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whether the aim is to put the teddy picture card in a box or to find a teddy. This may have 
contributed to Tabitha’s ability to pass the Tin task but not the Teddy search task, even though 
she used self-directed play in both tasks.  
The second behaviour seen where children may not have been clear of the goal or were bored 
of the task were behaviours which served to distract the researcher. Each child had a preferred 
way of distracting the researcher, for example, pointing at something, unwanted behaviours, 
engaging the parent or physical redirection. In the Book task the nature of the activity changed, 
the child was no longer required to sit opposite the researcher (they sat with their parent) and 
there were no toys to play with. In the example below Tabitha’s behaviour had changed from 
being sat opposite the researcher and engaged with her, to using mum as a physical barrier to 
the task. 
Action Speech and speech sounds 
Curling into mum, rolling onto the floor, mum 
encourages to sit up 
Mum: What’s this 
Tabitha: Elephant, (unint) stroke 
Looking at R, smiling.  
Curling into mum, swivelling on floor, 
wriggling around, hand in mouth 
R: Can I see the ducks please? 
Tabitha: No 
R: Can you show me the ducks? 
Tabitha: No 
Table 37. Group 1 Tabitha’s social interaction in the book task 4 
It is possible that Tabitha found this task difficult to understand and she was unable to use her 
previous strategy of using the researcher’s props as a means to work out the goal of the task. 
She distracted away from the task by displaying ‘babyish’ behaviours which were not seen prior 
to this task, such as thumb sucking and curling into mum. 
Henry also used physical means to disengage with a task. Just before the exchange below Henry 
had repeated the researcher’s words and signs for ball and dog. Each time he spoke and signed 
he looked at the researcher and then at his mum behind him, smiling and, after signing dog, 
clapping himself. This suggests that he may have thought the aim of the task was to repeat and 
sign the words of the researcher.  
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Action Eye contact and focus Speech and speech sounds 
Moves straight to correct 
box, drags it away, lifts it up. 
Does not look at R even 
though she is speaking and 
comes up next to him. 
R: Good boy that was really 
good looking and thinking. 
Did you find it? 
Henry: babbling unint. (Lifts 
other box) ohhhh 
Between activities walks over 
to the camera, is brought 
back by R. 
Does not respond to R 
saying his name.  
R: Ok, Henry, Henry… 
Sits opposite R Sits down and makes eye 
contact with R. 
R points to car 
R: Sitting, good sitting, well 
done…wait…look  
 Looking directly at R whilst 
saying and signing 
Henry: Dog 
 Looks at R whilst saying and 
signing 
R: Car 
Henry: Car 
Attempts to get up and walk 
towards camera, is sat back 
down by R 
Looks to R and then to 
mum  
 
 Watches car being hidden  
Gets up and runs towards 
camera – brought back by R.  
  
 Watches researcher R: Can you see my red car 
 Follows car being hidden   
Attempts to get up again, sat 
back down by R 
 Henry: Laughs  
R: Wait waiting, looking. 
Table 38. Group 1 Henry’s social interaction in OP1 
If Henry assumed that the purpose of the activity was to sign and say the objects shown, then 
he may not have understood that the researcher had further goal in mind. This confusion is 
potentially shown by rejecting the researcher’s task and physically moving away.  
Otto used a different strategy to disengage from a task. As seen in his use of instrumental 
pointing he used pointing extensively to try to direct the researcher away from the current task. 
In the example below he used his mum to try and distract away from the Teddy search task.   
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Pointing and gesture Action 
Eye contact and 
focus 
Speech and speech 
sounds 
  Attempts to put lid 
back on, focus on 
box. R helps, then 
looks in another 
box.  
 
 Swivels around to 
right  
Glances at mum  
Points to left of 
mum (where 
speakers are) 
  Otto: uh 
Waves both arms at 
shoulder height, 
twice (Mum later 
says he was signing 
music) 
 Looks to mum  
 Swivels back round 
to R after hearing 
name 
Looks at boxes 
where R is tapping 
R: Otto  
  Takes picture of 
teddy 
 
Claps  Opens box, and puts 
picture of teddy in. 
Does not make eye 
contact with R 
 
Claps  Closes box  
Table 39. Group 1 Otto’s social interaction in the Teddy search task 
Otto attempted to open two boxes before the distraction and later clapped himself for putting 
the teddy picture in a box. This could indicate that his perceived goal for the task was more 
about opening boxes (and perhaps putting an object in) than finding the teddy. Otto may have 
been using a distraction technique to finish the task and move on to something he found more 
appealing (the music). 
Annie uses a mixture of strategies to finish or avoid the tasks set; she uses pointing on two 
occasions to try and distract the researcher and she also uses physical means to stop the task 
(walking away, putting head on floor and spinning around). 
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Themes which have emerged from examining body language and social interaction, and which 
will be taken through to the group 2 and 3 analysis, are focussed on the way the children used 
social means to comprehend and disengage from the tasks: 
a. In this case series the children had difficulty either initiating and maintaining joint 
attention or fully utilising the information gathered during joint attention. 
b. All the children in this case series disengaged from the tasks. It is proposed that 
disengagement arose from a difficulty in perceiving the researchers goal and acted as 
either a means to finish the task or to bide time whilst the task goal is worked out. 
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7.4 Group 1 - Interim discussion 
The children in group 1 made a wide range of responses to the tasks, observable in both the 
quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data alone suggests some uniformity of 
response, however the qualitative data describes a varied picture of the mechanisms children 
used to address or reject tasks. By bringing together the two types of data it is possible to suggest 
a tentative developmental pathway on which the children in group 1 can be situated.  
At the end of this chapter Figure 14 gives a brief description of the changes in social 
understanding observed in this group and Table 40 describes these changes in more detail. It 
links observed behaviours to both types of data and to underlying mechanisms of prior 
knowledge, representational ability and executive functioning and working memory. The 
discussion below expands on these points suggesting a tentative developmental pathway and 
suggesting why the behaviours observed may be occurring. 
Some of the children in this group showed behaviours which suggested their understanding of 
the tasks was fixed on the currently observable state.  This narrow range of observation enabled 
the child to focus entirely on the task set and be unaware of possible distractions, but conversely 
did not support learning through or about joint attention. A child fixed on the currently 
observable state may use imitation to attempt tasks and may perceive imitation as the end goal 
(for example, copying the researcher’s movements and facial expressions when trying to open 
the Russian doll). A fixation on the current state means that the tasks which require a projection 
of a long term goal, or an understanding of others’ perspective (the Teddy search and the Book 
tasks) are not understood as problems which have a goal and so produce no response from the 
child. Children can work at this level by having prior knowledge of the existence of objects. They 
may also have some schemas which represent praise as a positive reinforcer and imitation as a 
means end strategy.  Representational ability is restricted to an empirical account of what is 
currently observable (Rast & Meltzoff, 1995) and is not shared amongst domains (Karmiloff-
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Smith, 1995), limiting the ability to draw on information from other domains in problem solving. 
This may explain the use of imitation as a way to solve the Tin and Doll tasks, as children were 
relying on what was directly observable to solve the problem (the researcher’s actions), rather 
than drawing on other resources (such as knowledge about forces).  
The child’s executive functions may further constrain responses to the tasks. Difficulties with 
concurrent processing and storage (Carney et al., 2013) may limit the amount of information 
which can be processed and held in mind, compounding the propensity to focus on the here and 
now. However as Lanfranchi, Carretti, et al. (2009) found sequential spatial elements of working 
memory were consummate with mental age,  it is possible that this element of working memory 
is supporting the child in representing objects which are not visually available (as in the OP 
tasks). In their study sequential spatial working memory was tested by asking participants to 
follow the path of a frog moving around a chessboard and remember certain steps. This skill 
may enable the child to follow sequential tasks such as the OP tasks, as they can visually 
represent the last place (or step) in the hiding sequence. Using this ability may help them 
overcome the concurrent processing and storage difficulties found by Carney et al. (2013). 
A change in the children’s behaviour toward the tasks appeared to coincide with an ability to 
switch focus between the researcher and the task. It is possible that when the children were 
more aware of information aside from that which was immediately in front of them (i.e. the 
task) they were also more aware of a requirement to achieve or pass a task. Children who were 
able to focus on the researcher as well as the task appeared more likely to display unwanted 
behaviours. It is possible that children at this point are beginning to develop a schema of ‘failure’ 
and that this provokes behaviour to distract away from a task they feel they may fail.  This 
suggests that their representational ability is developing to be able to predict a future state, 
possibly moving towards a dual representation model (Perner, 1991) or level E1 according to 
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Karmiloff-Smith’s (1995) model. Concurrent processing and storage difficulties may continue to 
constrain the amount of information able to be processed.  
A next point of development observed in this study was as the children developed object play 
skills and used them skilfully to distract away from or work out the task at hand. For example 
when Tabitha used the tin to put the doll and her foot in she may have been activating her prior 
knowledge of ‘in’ and working through a variety of objects to put ‘in’ before she was able to 
determine the researcher’s goal. Perseverance amongst the children at this point in 
development was high and although they still used imitation to access the task, they showed 
persistence in attempting the tasks. Play schemas appeared to be pervasive in children at this 
point in development as they produced off task behaviours which were focussed on playing with 
the toys. This may be that the children’s early pretend play skills were showing as their 
representational ability became hypothetical (Rast & Meltzoff, 1995) or they were able to use 
dual representation (Perner, 1991). Difficulties with inhibitory control (Borella et al., 2013) may 
also be implicated at this point in development as prepotent responses, such as self-directed 
play, were uninhibited.  
The children who were the most successful in the tasks may have had the most well developed 
joint attention skills and underlying schemas. These children were able to switch their attention 
between the task and the researcher and were most likely to attempt the last two tasks (Teddy 
search and Book tasks) and pass one of them. These children appeared to be developing an 
understanding of other people, shown through their purposeful communication such as 
declarative pointing and joint attention. Underlying schemas of goal comprehension may at this 
point of development support children’s understanding of others as intentional agents 
(recognition of others’ goals) and their understanding of intentional communication 
(communication which has a purpose or goal). However children at this point are still working 
at a representational level E1 (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995) and they have not yet moved on to 
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metarepresentation. This is evidenced in the inconsistent responses seen in the Teddy search 
and the Book tasks.  A metarepresentational ability would allow the child to recognise the 
researcher had a different physical point of view in the Book task. It would allow for multiple 
representations to be made: 1. the child’s own view, 2. the researcher’s physical view, 3. the 
position of the book and it would have the flexibility for the child to manipulate these 
representations, using their underlying goal detection schema, to work out a possible solution 
(turn the book around).  Development of representational ability may be constrained by the 
simultaneous spatial working memory. Lanfranchi, Carretti, et al. (2009) suggests that this 
aspect of working memory does not function efficiently in individuals with Down’s syndrome 
and may affect the ability to process simultaneous spatial information. The Book task and the 
Teddy search task both require the mental manipulation of a physical object located in space 
(the book or the teddy) in order to solve a problem, without an efficient simultaneous spatial 
working memory this may not be possible. Continued concurrent processing and storage 
difficulties (Carney et al., 2013) may also compound this.   
Outlined above is the progressive development of early theory of mind skills seen in the children 
in group 1.  An increase in their prior knowledge and their schema building is observed, but 
continued restrictions are placed on both of these mechanisms by difficulties with executive 
functions and working memory. An inefficient imitative learning style also seems to be apparent 
and persistent in this age group, supporting prior conclusions in this area (Wishart, 2001; Wright 
et al., 2006). Joint attention and declarative pointing are areas of weakness which undermine 
the children’s ability to access the tasks and to utilise all the information available to them, this 
is a finding consistent with some prior studies (Legerstee & Fisher, 2008), but not others (Fidler 
et al., 2005). The children who passed the most tasks used joint attention and declarative 
pointing to engage in purposeful communication, but this was not tied to age. Whilst there was 
some increase in passing tasks with age this was not consistent across the group. Passing the 
easier tasks without prompts appeared to be a much better indicator of whether the children 
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would attempt (but not necessarily pass) the more difficult tasks. Table 40 outlines the possible 
trajectory of the early theory of mind skills and social cognition of the children in group 1. There 
are purposefully no age boundaries on the figure, because of the non–uniformity within our 
group in terms of age and ability. The arrow however indicates the direction of development. 
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Empirical representations 
based on what is 
observable 
 
Imitation as a goal 
Joint attention in tasks 
which are understood 
Representations able to 
take on hypothetical 
situations 
 
Imitation as a problem 
solving strategy 
 
Some awareness of own 
ability  
 
Unable to project  long 
term goals 
Representations developing 
– dual representation  
Continued use of imitation, 
although perseverance now 
seen 
Self-directed play overrides 
task set 
 
Awareness of own success 
and failure 
Joint attention not yet 
secure 
Representations  moving 
towards, but not yet at meta 
stage 
Sense of  achievement when 
persevering with task, leading 
to securing of goal schema 
Other people as 
communicative partners  
Others as intentional agents 
Use of declarative pointing 
and joint attention in 
communication and problem 
solving 
7.4.1 Group 1 - Simple description of the development of theory of mind skills observed 
 
Increase in complexity of cognitive skill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Group 1  Simple description of the development of theory of mind skills observed 
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7.4.2  Group 1 - Synthesis of qualitative and quantitative data and prior research 
 
 Qualitative and quantative data linked to prior research   
Increase in 
complexity 
of 
cognitive 
skill 
 
  
Description of 
qualitative 
behaviours observed 
Description of 
quantitative findings 
Prior knowledge and 
schemas 
Representational 
ability  
Working memory 
and executive 
function  
Development of 
social 
cognition/theory of 
mind 
Gaze switching 
apparent in object 
permanence tasks 
Little gaze switching 
in others’ intentions 
and perspective tasks 
Main focus on task 
not researcher 
Looking to others for 
praise 
Imitation of 
researcher seen as a 
goal, access to praise 
 
High pass rate and no 
extra prompts 
needed in OP tasks 
Very few off task 
behaviours shown 
throughout session 
Use imitation to pass 
3a and b others’ 
intentions tasks 
Younger children 
show no response in 
tasks 3c (teddy 
search) and 4 (book)  
Engaged with tasks 
regardless of passing 
or failing 
  
 
Schema for ‘objects 
existence even when 
they are not 
observable’ 
Performance or 
imitation = praise 
Simple language = 
nouns and verbs 
 
Empirical 
representations 
which are tethered 
to the present 
No ability to call up 
previous 
representations  
 
Concurrent 
processing and 
storage not efficient 
Able to use 
sequential spatial 
working memory to 
support task 
demands 
 
Fixed on what is 
observable therefore 
success is achieved 
through imitation 
Uses inappropriate 
or old schemas to 
tackle new problems 
(imitation) 
Unable to form goals 
from others’ actions 
because of use of 
imitation as a 
strategy 
Joint attention in 
tasks which are 
understood, but not 
used in difficult tasks 
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Child distracts away 
from task by using 
physical distance and 
unwanted 
behaviours 
Usually focused on 
either the researcher 
or the task 
Some limited focus 
switching  
Relies on imitation to 
attempt others’ 
intentions tasks 
 
Off task behaviours 
seen in last two tasks 
by those children 
who passed all first 6 
episodes with 
prompts 
Use of imitation to 
attempt tasks 3a and 
b, others’ intentions 
Older children 
showing off task 
behaviours 
 
Emotional schema 
for correct/ 
incorrect 
performance  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Representations still 
empirically based  
Used to call up prior 
experience of failure 
Representations able 
to be used by a 
number of domains 
 
Concurrent 
processing and 
storage not efficient 
Able to use 
sequential spatial 
working memory to 
support task 
demands 
 
Has developed 
awareness of own 
limitations (I know 
that I don’t know) 
due to prior 
successes and 
failures, leading to 
off task behaviours 
Cannot project 
forward a longer 
term goal  
Use of imitation as a 
problem solving 
strategy  
  
 
Child distracts away 
from task using self-
directed play 
Erratic focus shifting 
(is easily distracted) 
Relies on imitation to 
attempt others’ 
intentions tasks, 
however can 
persevere and gain 
success 
Able to self-satisfy—
eg. makes up own 
goal for task, 
congratulates self 
Pass all 6 prior 
episodes without 
prompts, attempt 
but fail last two tasks 
Younger children 
need prompts to 
attempt doll task 
Attempts book task 
but points to picture 
in book rather than 
turns book around 
 
Goal schema in 
development 
Play schemas more 
prepotent than task 
requirements  
 
Hypothetical 
representations 
beginning to be 
formed—allowing for 
goal detection 
 
Concurrent storage 
and processing not 
efficient 
Inhibitory control not 
efficient and lets play 
schema overwrite 
task requirements  
 
Growing sense of self 
and awareness of 
own successes 
Own play is more 
interesting and 
important than task 
set 
Continued use of 
imitation to solve 
problems, however 
with goal detection 
now available 
perseverance is seen 
Joint attention is not 
well established 
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Table 40. Group 1 Synthesis of qualitative and quantitative data and prior research 
 
 
 
  
Successful focus 
switching between 
task and researcher 
Others’ goals are 
attended to  
Attempts to use 
others to move on 
from task (purposeful 
communication) 
  
 
Pass one of the last 2 
episodes after 
passing prior 6 
episodes with no 
prompts and no fails 
Attempts last two 
episodes, regardless 
of passing or failing  
 
Goal schema 
established 
Communication as a 
2 way device 
  
 
Hypothetical 
representations 
continuing to be 
developed, but do 
not yet support meta 
representation 
 
Simultaneous spatial 
working memory 
inefficient - so unable 
to represent 2 spatial 
possibilities in last 2 
tasks 
 
Sense of 
achievement when 
persevering with 
task, leading to 
securing of goal 
schema 
Developing sense of 
other people as 
communicative 
partners  
Developing sense of 
others as intentional 
agents  
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Chapter 8: Group 2 results and interim 
discussion 
 
8.1 Group 2 - Quantitative analysis  
 
8.1.1  British Picture Vocabulary Scales (BPVS) 
 
The BPVS was included in the tests for this group to gather information about each child’s 
language comprehension ability. As discussed in detail in Chapter 6 there were concerns over 
how reliable this type of test would be with children with Down’s syndrome and as such the 
results of the BPVS should be treated with some caution. On the administration of the test, in 
both groups 2 and 3, it was clear to the researcher that many of the children knew much of the 
vocabulary they were tested on, but were unable to respond appropriately to the test. This is 
discussed along with group 3’s responses in Chapter 10. 
Participant 
Age in years 
months 
Raw 
score T1 
Raw 
score T2 
Average 
of T1 and 
T2 
Difference 
between 
T1+T2 
Daisy 4.5 47 41 44 -6 
Freya 4.7 12 10 11 -2 
Theo 4.8 - - - - 
Connie 4.9 19 24 22 5 
Ellie 4.9 26 29 28 3 
Fabian 4.11 28 24 26 -4 
Maia 5.1 29 22 26 -7 
Joel 5.2 11 23 17 12 
Ollie 5.11 37 27 32 -10 
Table 41. Group 2 BPVS raw scores at T1 and T2 
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To try and capture an accurate picture of the children’s verbal comprehension levels the BPVS 
was administered at both testing points for all the children in group 2 and 3. The results for 
group 2 shown in Table 41 support the claim that the BPVS may not be a reliable tool for children 
in this clinical group. The table reports each participant’s performance at T1 and T2 and shows 
the difference between the two time points, which were no more than 3 weeks apart. Five 
children got lower scores at T2 and 3 children got higher scores at T2. One child was unable to 
be tested; although the test was presented he did not, or could not participate in it. The average 
difference between testing points was 6 raw score points, for some children this made a 
difference between being able convert the raw score to a standardised score, or not.  
Table 42 shows the raw and standardised scores for all the participants in group 2.  Three 
children reached a raw score high enough to standardise at T1, and 4 at T2 (2 of these being 
different children than at T1). Because of these marked differences in children’s performance at 
the two testing points the average raw score from the two tests has been used throughout the 
analysis. As described in detail in Chapter 4 there may be a number of reasons for children’s 
poor performance in this test; lack of experience in a test situation, lack of knowledge, medical 
and health issues, focus and concentration issues, memory function difficulties and fine and 
gross motor difficulties. Averaging out scores across the two time points may allow for some of 
these difficulties whilst at the same time not over estimating each child’s abilities (as could be 
the case if only their best score was used).  Because only 5 children were able to have their 
scores standardised each participant’s raw score was used for analysis.  
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Participant 
Age in years 
months 
Raw 
score 
T1 
Standardised 
score T1 
Percentile T1 
Age 
equivalent T1 
Raw 
score 
T2 
Standardised 
score T2 
Percentile T2 
Age 
equivalent T2 
Daisy 4.5 47 91 28 <3.9 41 88 22 <3.9 
Freya 4.7 12 - - <3.9 10 - - <3.9 
Theo 4.8 - - - - - - - - 
Connie 4.9 19 - - <3.9 24 70 2 <3.9 
Ellie 4.9 26 - - <3.9 29 73 4 <3.9 
Fabian 4.11 28 72 2 <3.9 24 70 2 <3.9 
Maia 5.1 29 70 2 <3.9 22 - - <3.9 
Joel 5.2 11 - - <3.9 23 - - <3.9 
Ollie 5.11 37 - - <3.9 27 - - <3.9 
Table 42. Group 2 BPVS raw and standardised scores, T1 and T2 
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8.1.2 Pretend play – cats’ task.  
 
Participant 
Age in years 
months 
BPVS average raw 
score 
Pretend Play 
Pass 1 
Fail 0 
Daisy 4.5 44 1 
Freya 4.7 11 0 
Theo 4.8 0 0 
Connie 4.9 22 1 
Ellie 4.9 28 0 
Fabian 4.11 26 1 
Maia 5.1 26 1 
Joel 5.2 17 0 
Ollie 5.11 32 1 
Table 43. Group 2 Pass and fail rates in the pretend play cats’ task.  
Five out of 9 children passed the pretend play task (passed 3 out of 4 episodes). Of the 4 who 
failed 3 were due to incorrect responses and 1 was due to off task behaviours. Across 35 trials 
in this task only 1 off task and 2 no response behaviours were shown, giving an extremely high 
level of engagement from this group (91% on task behaviours). One child who passed needed 
prompts to help them engage or access the task. Given the high level of compliance with this 
task, it could be assumed that most of the children found it engaging and it held their attention 
across the four trials. Many of the children appeared to engage with the task on a social or moral 
level, telling the cheeky bird off or trying to act out the cheeky bird themselves. They showed a 
delighted dismay when the bird caused a mess and were happy to be involved with the storyline. 
However, when those children who failed the task are investigated more closely, it is possible 
that the task may not have been as accessible as it was engaging.  
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Three of the 4 children who failed the task, and the child who needed extra prompts were all 
under 4 years 9 months. Three of the 4 children in the whole group aged over 4 years 9 months 
were able to pass the task. Although the make-up of these two age groups was different, with 4 
children aged 4 years 11 months and over and 5 children under 4 years 9 months, it can be 
tentatively suggested that there is some relationship between age or maturation and the 
children’s abilities to process and access the task.  
However, Daisy, who was the youngest in group 2 at 4 years and 5 months, performed at ceiling 
on this task. Her BPVS average raw score was also the highest in group 2 (44), suggesting that 
success on this task may have been moderated by some degree by language comprehension. 
Indeed the instruction ‘Can you clean where the bird has spilt the milk?’ may be easily 
misunderstood as ‘Can you clean the milk?’ a rather less specific instruction. As working memory 
is implicated in speech and language difficulties in this population (Jarrold & Baddeley, 1997) it 
may be that the children’s working memories did not support the retention and comprehension 
of the instruction given.  
Although neither age nor average scores on the BPVS are consistently related to success in this 
task, as is illustrated in Table 43, the children with the lower BPVS average raw scores tended to 
fail the task and the children with BPVS average raw scores over 22 tended to pass the task. This 
finding is in accordance with the above hypothesis that the task relies heavily on understanding 
a verbal instruction. Those children with the lower BPVS scores may have found the task difficult 
not because of the nature of the representations required, but because of the linguistic demands 
of the task.  Note however the two participants aged 4 years 9 months; Ellie, who has the higher 
BPVS score failed the task and Connie who has the lower BPVS score passed the task, highlighting 
the need for caution when interpreting these results. 
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8.1.3 Teddy search task – reading others’ intentions 
 
Participant Age at testing 
in years months 
BPVS average 
score 
Pass fail search 
Daisy 4.5 44 1 
Freya 4.7 11 1 
Theo 4.8 0 0 
Connie 4.9 22 1 
Ellie 4.9 28 1 
Fabian 4.11 26 1 
Maia 5.1 26 1 
Joel 5.2 17 1 
Ollie 5.11 32 1 
Pass = 1 Fail = 0 
Table 44. Group 2 Teddy search task passes and fails, organised by age of participant 
Eight out of the 9 children in this group passed the teddy search task. Only 1 child needed 
prompts indicating that the task was pitched at an accessible level and the children were 
engaged with the activity. The children appeared able to pick up the non-verbal prompts and 
copy the researcher’s activity to find the teddy without any difficulty. All children were on task 
and no off task behaviours were displayed. That the task had no verbal instruction may explain 
why those children who failed in Task 1 (the pretend play cats’ task) were able to access this 
one. It’s possible that the amount and complexity of information to be held in the working 
memory was less than in Task 1 and so the children were able to complete the task. 
A discussion of this groups’ performance versus group 1 performance (the 2 and 3 year olds in 
the study) on the same task can be found at Chapter 8.2 and suggests that age/maturation may 
be an indicator in performance in this task.  
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8.1.4 Symbolic play – the scarecrow task. 
 
Participant Age at testing 
in years 
months 
BPVS average 
score 
Pass/fail scarecrow 
Daisy 4.5 44 1 
Freya 4.7 11 1 
Theo 4.8 0 Not attempted 
Connie 4.9 22 0 
Ellie 4.9 28 1 
Fabian 4.11 26 1 
Maia 5.1 26 1 
Joel 5.2 17 1 
Ollie 5.11 32 1 
Pass = 1 Fail = 0 
Table 45. Group 2 Scarecrow task passes and fails, organised by age of participant 
Seven out of 8 children passed (passed 3 out of 4 episodes) of the symbolic play task and the 
task was not attempted with 1 participant, Theo. Of the children who passed Freya and Ellie 
needed prompts, and these same 2 children also failed one of the episodes. All the other children 
passed at ceiling, with no prompts and no failed episodes. Only Connie failed the task, however 
she displayed mostly on task behaviour, only losing focus on her last episode.  
The high level of focus on this task may be down to task design; the task was play based and the 
relationship between the researcher and the child was reciprocal rather than instructional. The 
researcher asked questions of the child, but phrased in such a way that incorporated the 
question into the play: “I think the scarecrow is hungry, can you find an apple for him to eat?”. 
Similarly the type of play may have been well practiced for many of the children; giving the 
scarecrow pretend food, putting a hat on him, putting him to bed.  
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That the children managed to transform the objects they chose, however, allows for speculation 
that they were going further than repeating well established play routines. The objects the 
children were given may have had some resemblance to the objects they were to be 
transformed into (a bowl becoming a hat for instance), however the children did not stick rigidly 
to a look–a-like; one child put a ball on the scarecrow’s head for a hat. This suggests they were 
able to use a symbolic mental representation to transform one object into another and therefore 
it did not need to have a direct similarity. Indeed the object which posed the most difficulty for 
the children was a stick; when asked to help the scarecrow write many children picked the stick 
but were confused when it didn’t work. Its resemblance to a pencil may have meant it was too 
similar to be symbolically transformed in play.  
The high success rate in this task may also be explained by the simple language used. Sentences 
such as ‘The scarecrow is tired, can you find him a bed?’ were used to direct the play. Even if the 
sentence length was too long to hold in working memory, following only the second half of the 
question would allow for success in this task, provided you were able to symbolically transform 
objects. 
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8.1.5 Comparison across tasks – on and off task behaviours, passes and fails.  
 
 
Figure 15. Group 2 No response, off task, fails and pass responses across all tasks 
By far the most commonly seen behaviour in group 2 was a successful attempt at the task; most 
of the children passed most of the time. When discussing the rest of the results it must be kept 
in mind that the percentages of other behaviours seen are very small as can be seen in Figure 
15.  
Overall this group showed on task (passes and fails combined) behaviours 95% of the time.  This 
level of on task behaviour could indicate they were engaged with the tasks and the tasks were 
pitched at a level where the children felt comfortable working. The nature of the tasks may also 
have helped with this; since the tasks were play based the children may not have felt pressure 
to provide an answer. 
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 Age in 
months 
BPVS av. 
raw score 
No 
response 
Off 
task 
Fail Pass On task 
(composite 
of pass and 
fail) 
Theo 4.8 0 1 1 1 1 2 
Freya 4.7 11 1  4 4 8 
Joel 5.2 17   2 7 9 
Connie 4.9 22 1  2 6 8 
Fabian 4.11 26   1 8 9 
Maia 5.1 26    9 9 
Ellie 4.1 28   3 6 9 
Ollie 5.11 32    9 9 
Daisy 4.5 44    9 9 
 Totals   3 1   72 
Table 46. Group 2 No response, Off task, Pass and fails of individual participants across all 3 
tasks, organised by BPVS average raw score 
The three children who displayed ‘no response’, Theo, Freya and Connie, also have three of the 
lowest scores on the BPVS (see Table 46). This may indicate that there was some element of 
language comprehension difficultly in accessing the tasks for these three children, particularly 
since these 3 ‘no responses’ are in the two tasks which require some language comprehension 
(Tasks 1 and 3). However, these very small percentages of ‘no response’ and ‘off task’ 
behaviours, must be seen in light of the more general on task responses (passes and fails 
combined) from this group.  
Across all the tasks the children passed 82% of the time and failed 18% of the time. The pass 
rates appear to have some minor gains with improvement in BPVS raw score, as can be seen in 
Table 46,  suggesting that the better the child’s comprehension the more successful they were 
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in passing the tasks. Conversely this suggests that failing a task may not be indicative that the 
child’s ability to create mental representations is inhibiting success, but that it may be some 
difficulty with language which is preventing access to the tasks.   
 Pass Fail 
Task 1 - Pretend play, Cats’ 56% 44% 
Task 2 - Other's intentions, Teddy search 89% 11% 
Task 3 - Symbolic play, Scarecrow 78% 22% 
Table 47. Group 2 Pass and fails rates, whole group, compared by task 
When pass rates of the three tasks are compared in Table 47,  it is clear that the more language 
based tasks (Tasks 1 and 3) have a larger fail rate than Task 2 which had no verbal instructions. 
The language difference may have some part to play in the increased pass rate of Task 2, but 
this may also be due to the fact that the task was originally designed for the youngest 
participants in the whole study, the 2 and 3 year olds in group 1. The task was added into group 
2 when it became apparent that it was causing difficulties for the younger participants. A 
combined analysis of group 1 and group 2 responses to the Teddy search task is given in Chapter 
8.2.   
8.1.6 Use of prompts 
 
Participant 
Age in 
years 
months 
Average 
BPVS raw 
score 
Pass no 
prompts 
Pass 
with 
Prompts 
No 
response 
Off 
task 
Fail 
Theo 4.8 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Freya 4.7 11 3 1 0 1 4 
Joel 5.2 17 6 1 0 0 2 
Connie 4.9 22 3 3 1 0 2 
Fabian 4.11 26 8 0 0 0 1 
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Maia 5.1 26 9 0 0 0 0 
Ellie 4.9 28 4 2 0 0 3 
Ollie 5.11 32 9 0 0 0 0 
Daisy 4.5 44 9 0 0 0 0 
Table 48. Group 2 Passes and fails by type of prompt used, organised by BPVS score 
Written into the protocols for the sessions was the use of prompts to help the children attempt 
the tasks (see Chapter 6 and Appendix 2). When the tasks were scored the number of prompts 
needed to pass a task were marked. Two prompts were allowed before the task was deemed 
failed. A number of children in the sessions needed prompts to help them begin the task, 
however what was recorded was only the children who needed prompts and passed. In many of 
the failed and off task marks the researcher prompted the child, but this was not recorded in 
the data. An interesting further piece of analysis would be to examine all prompts and to see 
what proportion led to fails and passes. Table 48 shows the spread of each child’s responses to 
individual episodes and brings up some interesting points.  
Three participants Maia, Daisy and Ollie passed all the episodes with no prompts or fails, one of 
these being the youngest and one the oldest in the group. Four children in the group; Freya, 
Joel, Connie and Ellie, needed prompts to help them attempt and pass the tasks and all of these 
children failed at least 2 episodes across the session. The children who needed prompts show a 
much more even spread of types of response, indicating that they may be less secure in their 
understanding of the tasks and are using a number of strategies to either attempt or withdraw 
from the task.  
Overall the prompts needed were evenly spread between the cats’ task (3 prompts) and the 
scarecrow task (3 prompts), with only 1 prompt needed in the search task. All off the 3 children 
who needed prompts in the scarecrow task had either failed a episode or needed a prompt in 
the cats’ task. The child who needed a prompt in the search task had also failed two episodes in 
the cats’ task. This suggests that if a prompt was needed the children may have been insecure 
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across all the tasks, but most often in the cats’ and scarecrow tasks. As other data has also 
suggested the search task appears to have been the most accessible task for the participants in 
this group.   
When compared against the children’s BPVS scores 3 of the children with the lowest BPVS 
required prompts and all the children with scores over 26 did not require any, with the exception 
of 1 child. The children’s need for prompts indicates that they may not be accessing the task as 
quickly as some of the other children and potentially need more processing time to work out 
the task requirements. Given that the researcher set the tasks through oral instruction 
supported by sign there may have also been a language processing element to the children’s 
slow reaction to the tasks. That those who needed prompts also passed, failed and showed off 
task and no response behaviours indicates that they may be in a transitional period in the 
development of their pretend play abilities. All of the children who needed a prompt were able 
to pass the search task without prompts, indicating that they are at a developmental stage 
where they can understand another’s intention; however their performance on the 
representational tasks were less secure. It could be suggested that the children in group 2 were 
developing their use of representations in play as they were all engaged in pretend and symbolic 
play at some point in the session, but these representations may be unstable.  
8.2 Combined analysis of the teddy search task (groups 1 and 2)  
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The teddy search task was originally designed for the youngest participants in the study (group 
1), but when the results from this group were initially analysed it became clear that the children 
in this group had found this a difficult task. The task was inserted into group 2’s assessments to 
address whether the task was at fault or whether the nature of the task was too difficult for the 
youngest children.  
The two groups results were combined to enable an analyis of children’s responses from age 2 
to age 5. As can be seen from Figure 16 there is a marked improvement in pass rates from the 
youngest children at 17% to 100% for the oldest. Although this is an important finding in itsself 
as it shows that the task is accessible to the older children, what may be more interesting is the 
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Figure 16. Group 1 and 2 combined results on the others’ intention teddy search task 
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change from failing to passing. In order to address this the whole cohort of group 1 and group 2 
were merged and split into four age groups spanning 10 months each. Age groups were chosen 
to represent an even spacing between the age of the groups. Table 49 shows the make-up of 
these groups.  
Age span of group in years 
and months 
Average age of group in 
years and months 
N= 
2.2 – 2.11 2.6 6 
3.1 – 3.9 3.4 8 
3.10 – 4.8 4.5 4 
5.9 – 5.11 5.1 6 
Table 49. Groups 1 & 2 Average ages and number of children after combining and dividing into 
10 month age span groups 
In the youngest age group of 2 years and 2 months – 2 years 11 months,  the highest response 
is a ‘no response’ (see Figure 16), suggesting that the children were unaware that they could 
help the reseacher look for the teddy, or unaware that the researcher was even looking for 
something. In either case this would suggest that recognising another person’s intention was 
not something which was developed within their current cognitive profile. No child in this 
youngest age group showed off task behaviours, which suggests that the children in this group 
were either engaged in some way with the task or were unaware of the task set. The lack of off 
task behaviours in this youngest age group could suggest that they have not yet developed a 
sense of ‘knowing what they don’t know’.  
As the children mature the nature of the way they approach the task changes; at 3 years the 
children begin show off task behaviours (see Figure 16 above). More children also begin to pass 
the task at this stage and less fail the task. This may suggest that as the children mature they 
become more aware of their own capabilities (or lack of them) and so are more likely to display 
165 
 
 
 
off task behaviours as a way to reject a task which they are unsure of. There is also a possibility 
that the children in this age group are aware of a task but are unable to deploy the relevant skills 
to attempt it.  
At age 3 years 10 months the pass rate increases along with the focus on the task,  with 100% 
of children attempting the task in this age group (see Figure 16 above). At 5 years 9 months 
100% of children pass the task. This change in the way the task is attempted suggests that it is 
not just an inability to complete the task which prevents children passing at a younger age. The 
youngest children appear to show a lack of awareness of the researcher’s intention, indicating 
that they may not have the underlying schema or representaitonal ability to pass the task. The 
children aged 3 years appear to be aware of a task but may not be able to fully process it. It 
could be that, at this stage in development there is an incongruity of the child’s cognitive ability 
and their processing capacities. In other words, the child understands the nature of the task, is 
able to see the researcher’s intention, but is not able to hold this in mind long enough to carry 
out the task his or herself. In the teddy search task the child needs to be able to create a 
representation of the researcher’s intention, hold in mind a representation of the teddy and 
carry out the action of searching. Combined, these mental and physical activities may be too 
demanding for a child of 3 years who has Down’s syndrome. That the child is able to recognise 
and understand the task, but not carry it out may lead to the off task behaviours seen in the 3 
years – 3 years 9 month age group. A potential developmental pattern may be that as the 
children’s executive and memory functions improve they are first of all able to attempt the task 
(albeit with many still failing) and finally go on to pass the task.  
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8.3 Group 2 - Case series analysis 
 
As with group 1 the qualitative analysis of group 2 was organised to examine a number of 
different areas; gesture and pointing, sign and speech, eye contact and focus, and body language 
and social interaction, as described in detail at the beginning of Chapter 7.  
Children from group 2 were chosen for the case series in the first instance by whether they 
passed or failed the tasks. These groups of children were then split again, according to the flow 
chart in Appendix 7, to ensure an even spread of responses to the tasks. The four children chosen 
were selected to avoid an age bias in this part of the study.  Group 2 is the smallest group in the 
study (N=9) and 8 of the children have only 9 months between their ages. To ensure an artificial 
age-ability increase was not created children of similar ages but who performed very differently 
were chosen. The children chosen for the case series analysis are all within 4 months age of each 
other and yet display remarkably different profiles of performance. Since children with Down’s 
syndrome can sometimes be seen and treated as a homogenous group it was felt it important 
to explore the issue of different performances and profiles in similarly aged children (Tsao & 
Kindelberger, 2009). 
 
Participant Age at testing in 
years and 
months 
BPVS 
average 
score 
Seen at Reason for inclusion in 
case series analysis 
Daisy 4.5 44 Home Passed all the tasks 
Freya 4.7 11 School Passed scarecrow and 
search tasks only 
Connie 4.9 22 School Passed Cats’ and search 
tasks only 
Theo 4.8 - School Did not pass any task 
Table 50. Group 2 Attributes of the four children chosen for case series study 
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8.3.1 Eye contact and focus 
 
Each child in the case series used their eye contact and focus in different ways, but often with a 
similar purpose. Generally the children did not look at the researcher often (Freya looking the 
most often) but 3 out of 4 looked to her when they either wanted to show her something, or 
needed her help. In each of the examples in Table 51 the participants use eye contact, rather 
than speech, to gain the researcher’s focus and bring an object to her attention.  
Daisy  
Social interaction  Focus and eye contact Speech and speech sounds 
Puts spoon in bowl but it slips 
inside, 
Tries again and same thing 
happens 
Looks to R when the spoon 
slides in 2nd time, holds gaze 
until R notices 
Daisy: oh…oh 
 Gaze back on bowls even 
when R speaking 
R: Oh its ok, there we are, oh 
it might just slide in, shall we 
put it by the side? 
Puts spoon in bowl on RHS 
and it slips in.  
Shrugs shoulders 
 Daisy: teddy (?) …humph 
   
Freya 
Social interaction  Focus and eye contact Speech and speech sounds 
Picks up milk bottle   R: Give them some milk? 
Takes lid off, looks inside, 
holds up bottle upside down
  
Looks to R when holding 
bottle up 
R: Which cat’s having some 
milk? I know, it’s just pretend 
   
Connie 
Social interaction  Focus and eye contact Speech and speech sounds 
Shakes the packet, then tries 
to look inside. turns box 
around in hands  
Focussed on box R: That’s it, it’s just pretend, 
you can’t open it. Everybody 
wants to open that box 
 
Trying to open the packet Looks to R as she tries to open 
the box.  
Glances at R’s action of 
putting cereal in bowl 
R: It’s pretend Connie. Can 
you pretend, ch ch ch ch 
Gives up trying to open 
packet and shakes it over the 
bowl on RHS, then moves to 
LHS 
Glances at R again in middle 
of own shaking action (before 
R speaks) 
R: Superb. Well done they 
both got some.  
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R makes cat on RHS eat out of 
bowl  
Looks up at R and smiles as 
she makes cat eat 
R: chumchumchcum 
Table 51. Group 2 Examples of participants Daisy, Freya and Connie using eye contact to ask 
the researcher for help 
In the examples in Table 51, Freya and Connie were both in need of some direction; they 
appeared confused that the milk bottle was empty/the cornflakes packet wouldn’t open and so 
looked to the researcher for some help. Similarly Daisy requested the researcher’s help with a 
spoon that wouldn’t sit nicely on the side of the bowl, when the researcher didn’t fix the 
situation satisfactorily Daisy shrugged her shoulders and ‘humphed’.  
That the children were able to use their gaze in such a way suggests that they have developed a 
capacity of shared attention and know that in order for another to attend to what you want you 
must first have their attention. That Daisy, Freya and Connie chose to do this primarily non-
verbally (although in later tasks Daisy and Freya were more verbally active) suggests that they 
were aware of the theory ‘to see is to know’ and were using showing rather than telling as their 
primary means of communication.  
For children who find clear articulation difficult this is potentially a more reliable route than 
speech, which can be misinterpreted. That the children did not know the researcher may have 
increased this insecurity as the researcher may have been more likely to misinterpret what the 
child was saying. There is some evidence to support this as later in the sessions both Daisy and 
Freya begin to use more verbal language to interact with the researcher, suggesting they may 
have felt more confident with the researcher at this point. 
Theo did not engage the researcher in the same way; however he may have used looking to his 
mum in a similar fashion. In the example in Table 52 Theo appeared to look to his mum after he 
had thrown toys (twice) off his table. The researcher didn’t react apart from to pick the toys up.  
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Theo 
Social interaction  Focus and eye contact Speech and speech sounds 
Picks up cups and throws on 
floor 
Looks to where he has 
thrown cups 
 
Pushes cats off the table  R: I’ll collect them, here they 
are 
 Watches R, then turns away 
to look at mum 
R: Can the cats, can my cats 
have a drink. Mum’s there 
she’s watching.  
 Looks up to ceiling Theo: unint 
R: Yeah she is 
 Looks at R R: Can we give them a drink 
Table 52. Group 2 Example of Theo looking to Mum 
Theo could have been making an intentional communication with his mum, which may have 
served one of two purposes. His look across to her could have meant ‘I want to stop’ (hence 
throwing the toys), or it could have been a look of ‘I know I’m being cheeky throwing toys’. A 
similar situation happened twice more in the session. In each situation the eye contact appeared 
intentional; indicating that Theo, a child who does not yet speak or sign, has an understanding 
of the way eye contact and focus is used to communicate.  
Throughout all the sessions, with all four of the participants, any shared focus was very much 
directed by the children. When involved in play they were mostly focussed on the activity and 
rarely made eye contact with the researcher, even when she was asking questions or giving 
instructions. During the exchange in Table 53 between Daisy and the researcher, Daisy does not 
look at the researcher at any point, even though they share a conversation.  
Daisy 
Social interaction  Focus and eye contact Speech and speech sounds 
Picks up spoon, looks at it 
then puts it down 
Focus on toys Daisy: what…spoon…oh (unint)  
 
Picks up stick and examines 
it. Looks at one end, tries to 
write, looks again  then 
turns it around and ‘writes’ 
Focussed on stick and 
paper 
Daisy: colouring … oh… (unint) 
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 Focussed on stick and 
paper 
R: That’s good pretending. Well 
done. Can the scarecrow do 
some? 
Hand the stick to the 
scarecrow (R is holding SC) 
and turns pages of paper  
Looks to the 
scarecrow, then 
focusses on paper 
Daisy: Yes…there you go…wanna 
drawing mine? (unint) pages. 
R: Want to turn the pages, ok 
that’s fine. 
R makes SC ‘write ‘ on the 
paper using the stick 
All the time focussed 
on the paper on floor 
R: What do you think he might 
draw? 
Daisy: Daisy 
R: You think he’s going to draw 
Daisy?  
Daisy: Yeah 
R: Is he going to write your name? 
Daisy: Yeah 
R: There we go. There! Good 
writing scarecrow! 
Table 53. Group 2 Example of Daisy’s interaction with the researcher 
Although Daisy was very focussed on the toys and engaged with the play, she did not look to the 
researcher for clues about the play or for instructions. This could have been because her pretend 
play schema was secure and so she did not need to find any extra information in order to 
complete the play sequences. She may have been well rehearsed in pretending to give toys cups 
of tea and cleaning up and therefore completed those sequences from memory, whilst also 
being able to incorporate new information from the researcher.  
That Daisy’s language comprehension is unusually proficient (she is the youngest in the group, 
but scores the highest on the BPVS) may influence her ability to take in verbal instruction without 
having to make eye contact with the speaker. She appeared to understand all the instructions 
and requests the researcher gave and could answer without looking to the researcher. For Daisy 
the combination of well-rehearsed pretend play and proficient verbal and comprehension 
language skills may have enabled her to access and complete the tasks without looking to the 
researcher for extra information. Alternatively, the lack of looking to her play partner may come 
from a need to focus on the task in hand, in order to process the instructions, hold the pretence 
in mind and manipulate the pretence; she may have not had enough processing capacity to look 
at the researcher and take on pragmatic information as well. 
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In contrast Freya looked the most to the researcher during her session. She often looked when 
the researcher asked questions, when involved in play and to gauge the researcher’s reaction. 
Freya used a variety of means of communication in the play situations as shown in Table 54. She 
was able to switch her focus between the researcher and the toys and appeared to complete 
actions according to the researcher’s questions.  
Freya 
Gesture Use of 
sign 
Social 
interaction 
Focus Speech and speech 
sounds 
   Looking directly at 
R 
R: I’ve got two cats 
 cats  Looks to cats when 
signing. Follows 
them as R puts 
them on table 
R: That’s right, cats, 
nice signing. Here’s 
one, here’s the other 
one. 
nods   Looks to R R: Two cats! 
nods   Looking at R but 
not at her face? 
R: They’re really 
thirsty. Shall we give 
them a cup of tea?  
  Takes teapot 
from R, pours 
into RHS cup 
first then LHS 
cup then 
returns to both  
Focussed on cups R: Here’s the tea pot, 
here’s some tea cups. 
Oh good pouring 
Nods in answer    Focussed on 
pouring tea – head 
down 
R: Shall we give one 
cup to this cat? Shall 
we give it to them? 
Yeah? 
  Holds cup in the 
air and then 
gives it to cat on 
LHS 
Looks directly at R R: Who’s that cup 
for?...Who’s it for? 
For this cat. That’s 
good. Are they 
enjoying their cup of 
tea? shlp shlp shlp 
Puts hand over 
mouth when R 
makes intake of 
breath  
Copies 
R’s sign 
cheeky 
 
 Looking at R and 
bird 
R: Oawww, I’ve got a 
really cheeky bird 
  Puts finger out 
to bird’s mouth, 
R makes bird 
bite finger. Pulls 
finger away. 
Then presents it 
again.  
Looking at bird R: Its friendly but it’s 
cheeky. quark quark 
quark. 
Freya: Ow! 
R: It’s ok it didn’t really 
hurt you! 
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   Watches the bird – 
glances to R  
R: Look what this bird 
is doing. pssshhhh. 
nods   Looking at bird R: Ohh, he’s put tea all 
over the table.  
Table 54. Group 2 Example of Freya’s eye contact with the researcher during a play sequence 
Freya switched her focus to the researcher when the bird appeared, potentially looking to the 
researcher to gauge her reaction to the bird. Indeed she mimicked the researcher’s initial intake 
of breath by placing her hand over her mouth and copied the researcher’s sign for cheeky. When 
the bird performed the ‘naughty’ activity, pouring tea on the table, Freya glanced to the 
researcher, possibly to gather information about ‘how we should react’ to this naughty deed. 
Interestingly however, Freya fails this and all subsequent episodes in this task. Even though she 
seemed able to collect information from both practical and pragmatic aspects of communication 
and use the researcher as a guide, she was unable to follow the pretend play sequence once it 
departed from the norm. She was focussed on watching the bird ‘spilling the tea’, but when she 
was asked to clean it up she was not able to identify the correct area (she cleaned a cat instead 
of the table). 
Since she is able to take part in the pretend play sequence, it could be suggested that Freya’s 
representational ability is developed enough to create a pretend situation. However once the 
pretend play moved away from the practiced sequence, she seemed unable to hold all the 
information she needed in mind. As can be seen in Table 55, further on in the session Freya has 
incorporated the bird into her play script and anticipates its actions by handing it the toothpaste. 
Freya 
Social interaction Focus Speech and speech sounds 
Hands the bird the toothbrush, 
then the toothpaste 
Watches bird and 
toothpaste going onto 
cats tail 
R: Oh oh, here comes the 
naughty bird, she’s going to 
take the toothpaste. ch ch ch 
ch 
Table 55. Group 2 Example of Freya’s anticipation of the bird in the pretend play sequence 
Even with this re-writing of her play script however, Freya was unable to correctly identify the 
place where the toothpaste had gone (she cleaned the incorrect cat). A possible reason for this 
is that Freya lacks the underlying knowledge and relevant theories of physical properties. She 
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cannot incorporate the knowledge of where the paste is as she does not have a secure enough 
theory about the property of liquids. Possibly her theory is that a liquid comes out of a vessel 
and goes ‘everywhere’ or ‘anywhere’, hence she cleans the centre of the table each time, not 
understanding that toothpaste would be limited to the place where it was squeezed.  
Connie’s eye contact is almost entirely limited to when she wants to draw the researcher’s 
attention to her actions. In the sequence in Table 56 she appears to be looking for some kind of 
interaction, when she doesn’t get the response she wants from the researcher she looks to the 
TA and then eventually turns her back on them both. Interestingly, although she doesn’t do what 
the task requires (use a stick or spoon as a pretend pencil), she is able to symbolically transform 
an object (a stick) into something different (some food), and appears to want to share her ability 
to do this with the researcher and the TA.  
Connie 
Social interaction Focus Speech and speech sounds 
Reaches out and takes spoon. R 
puts pad and stick in front of 
her, she picks up stick as well. 
Then uses spoon to get some of 
stick and pretends to eat it 
Looks up to R after 
pretending to eat – with 
smile 
R: What can he use to do 
his writing? we need to 
pretend there is a pencil 
 Looks and smiles at R, then 
looks around room  
R: what can he use to do 
his writing 
Connie: unint 
 Looks at TA Connie: eh (unint)  
 Looking at TA TA: Cheeky. Do some 
writing 
Connie: eh (unint) 
Plays with spoon and stick, 
holds spoon in air 
With back to R Connie: Spoon. 
R: It is a spoon, what a 
good word. 
Table 56. Group 2 Example of Connie’s eye contact with the researcher and the TA 
Throughout most of her play Connie was focussed on the toys, not the researcher and only 
incorporated the researcher when she needed some help. Connie was able to pass the cats’ task 
and the search task with very little looking towards the researcher. It could be suggested from 
this that Connie’s representational ability allowed her to engage in pretend play. However, in a 
similar way to Daisy, it is possible that Connie may be able to hold in mind a number of 
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representations, but to add in any more information (for example the researcher’s facial 
expression or eye contact) may be too cognitively demanding.  
Whilst Daisy’s language profile was very proficient, Connie’s spoken language was minimal (2 
intelligible words) and her BPVS score was 22, in the lower range for the group. Yet they showed 
a similar looking pattern in the cats’ task. It is important to note that although Connie’s BPVS 
score was only 22, she was able to carry out most of the instructions asked of her even when 
she was not looking at the researcher when she was speaking.  
The only looking behaviour which was consistent across three of the four participants was their 
ability to look to the researcher when they wanted her involvement in their communication. 
This happened at various points in the sessions and is illustrated in Table 57. Very often when 
the children were engaging with the researcher it was to add information to the topic or when 
they were off task.  
Daisy (during BPVS) 
Sign Focus Speech and speech sounds 
Doctor 
Gestures around neck 
– sign for 
stethoscope? 
Looks directly to R when 
speaking and signing, both 
times 
R: Binoculars 
Daisy: Doctor 
R: Oh that is like the doctor, 
yeah, this one. 
Daisy: Tethescope 
   
Freya (during Scarecrow task) 
Body language Focus Speech and speech sounds 
Lifts her left leg up and 
points to her shoe 
 Freya: My shoe 
 Looking between R and shoe R: My boy scarecrow Alex… 
Freya: My shoe 
R: What’s up with your shoe? 
Freya: (unint) 
R:It’s very nice 
Lifts her other leg up 
and shows her shoe 
Looking between shoes and R Freya: (unint) 
R: And another one, you’ve got 
two 
 Looking at SC R: Are you looking at his shoes 
as well? 
Lifts left leg again. then 
puts down and turns 
back to table 
Looking between R and shoes 
and SC 
R: Are they the same, he’s got 
shoes on, different colour 
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Connie (during scarecrow task) 
Body language Focus Speech and speech sounds 
 Looks back to bowl then to R as 
speaking 
R: where can he go to sleep 
Connie? 
Connie: ness (unint) 
Points into bowl  R: You’re still eating your 
breakfast? 
Connie: sss 
R: Oh I see 
Table 57. Group 2 Looking behaviours of 3 participants when engaging with the researcher on 
their chosen topic or when off task 
All three participants in Table 57 are able to direct their focus to the researcher when they want 
to share information about what they are doing. Interestingly, these moments of shared interest 
for Daisy and Freya came just before a request to stop, and from Connie when she was 
disengaged with the scarecrow task. It could be that the children recognise that in order to 
control the situation, they need to have the researcher’s attention and that attention is sought 
through eye contact as well as other forms of communication. These short episodes show that 
these 3 children are capable of maintaining joint attention when they feel it necessary.  
Theo (during cats’ task) 
Body language Focus Speech and speech sounds 
 Turns and looks to mum then 
to where noise is coming from 
just below table  
Bird squawks  
On ‘cereal’ reaches 
out to birds beak 
Very focussed on bird, watches 
and follows action. Maintains 
focus on bird throughout 
sequence 
R: Here comes the bird. It’s a 
cheeky bird. Look. Oh he’s got the 
cereal, from the breakfast and he’s 
going to make it go all over the 
table 
Turns to cat to move 
it off table 
 R: (unint). 
 
Puts fingers in birds 
beak, plays with 
beak 
Completely focussed on bird 
whilst playing with it 
Bird squawks a number of times 
R: Oh its noisy 
Takes fingers away Lifts head and looks up past R  
Table 58. Group 2 Example of Theo’s prolonged focus on an object of interest 
Although Theo rarely made eye contact with the researcher, the episode shown in Table 58 
displays his ability to control his focus, firstly by looking towards mum and then a definite and 
prolonged focus on the bird (34 seconds). Whilst it appeared throughout the session that Theo’s 
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focus was not very well controlled, as he often looked up into the air and appeared to avoid eye 
contact, when he was engaged with a topic he was able to control his focus and maintain it for 
some time.  
 
Considering Theo’s ability to maintain focus in the example above, his apparent lack of focus 
throughout the session must be considered carefully. During this first session Theo was sat in 
his chair, with no ability to get out of it independently (during the second visit this was resolved 
and the researcher worked with him on the floor). As Theo’s speech and signing was limited he 
had restricted means of communication available to him (one means, his ability to move away 
from the task, had been removed by seating him in a chair). Theo’s ‘lack of eye contact and 
focus’ may have been his only means of communicating a lack of interest in the tasks or concern 
with lack of familiarity with the researcher.  
Indeed in Theo’s second session, where he was not restricted in his movement, he was able to 
engage and disengage with the tasks through physical interaction.  A lack of eye contact, in 
Theo’s case, may not have been a lack of focus, but a clear communicative sign that he was not 
interested in the tasks or the researcher. 
 
From the analysis of eye contact and focus in Group 2 we can suggest a number of areas of 
interest which are consistent with the themes arising from Group 1: 
a. The ability to switch focus during a task, particularly during the instructional part, did 
not appear to make any improvement to task outcomes. 
 In fact Freya, who used most focus switching, failed the cats’ task. The complex 
interplay of focus on the task and focus on the instructor (in this case the researcher) 
may be either not well developed or absent as a foundational skill.  
b. Children’s use of checking that others had received their communication was limited.  
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The children in group 2 appeared to use this knowledge only when it was helpful to their 
side of the communication (i.e. they sought eye contact when they were trying to move 
a topic on or add information, not when the researcher was). There may be a lack of 
awareness that eye contact is important for both the receiver and the sender of 
information.  
8.3.2 Sign and speech 
 
The children in this case series used very little sign and, with the exception of Daisy, very little 
speech throughout their sessions. This may have been as a result of lack of confidence in a new 
situation and an unfamiliar adult.  Daisy was the most confident speaker and used this as her 
preferred method of communication, however she occasionally used sign to complement some 
of her speech. As can be seen in Table 59 Daisy used sign supported speech during the BPVS to 
move the researcher away from the target word (binoculars) to focus on what she   wanted to 
talk about (the stethoscope).  
Daisy (during BPVS) 
Sign Focus Speech and speech sounds 
Doctor 
Gestures around neck – 
sign for stethoscope?  
Looks directly to R when 
speaking and signing, both 
times 
R: Binoculars 
Daisy: Doctor 
R: Oh that is like the 
doctor, yeah, this one. 
Daisy: Tethescope 
Table 59. Group 2 Daisy using sign to support her speech 
At this point in the BPVS Daisy had begun to choose incorrect answers so it could be suggested 
that she was beginning to find it difficult or had lost focus. It is possible that she found the 
researchers request to find ‘binoculars’ too difficult and focussed on a familiar picture instead. 
Daisy may have been searching for an unfamiliar word (stethoscope) and first came up with an 
association (doctor) which was easier to say and sign.  
Freya also used sign to redirect the researcher when she was not engaged with the scarecrow 
task, as shown in Table 60. Throughout the scarecrow task Freya used a number of different 
178 
 
 
 
strategies (which will be discussed further in the social interaction section) to redirect the 
researcher. Her use of sign to obtain the researcher’s attention may come from her 
understanding of the praise she is given when she signs which is reinforced by the researcher 
when she signed ‘A’ for Alex. Freya was able to engage the researcher off task when she tried to 
sign ‘which’ and then turned this into the sign for aeroplane. 
Freya 
Sign Gesture Focus Speech and speech sounds 
Signs A in response 
to R’s sign  
  R: My scarecrow is called Alex, 
good signing well done. 
Attempts to sign 
‘which’ after R 
 Focus on own 
hands trying to 
sign  
R: It could be a girl or a boy, 
which? 
  Focus on own 
hands, trying to 
sign 
R: Are you trying to sign 
which? Good girl what a good 
try. Freya, Freya 
Allows R help her to 
create the sign for 
‘which’ 
 Doesn’t look at R  R: Do you want me to help 
you? Like this. Oh it’s really 
hard. That’s it. and stick the 
thumb out and the finger out 
and we say which  
 Holds her hand 
up to show R 
which  
Looks up at R R: Good signing, which  
Makes aeroplane 
sign with hand 
 Looking at R. 
Then gives a big 
smile on 
aeroplane 
R: and it’s a bit like an 
aeroplane as well isn’t it, it’s 
the same sign you’re right. 
This is aeroplane isn’t it? 
Table 60. Group 2 Example of Freya using sign to distract the researcher from the task 
Theo used no sign in his session and Connie’s use of sign was limited to copying the researcher 
when she signed ‘clean’ and adding ‘please’ to a verbal request for help.  Given that 3 of the 4 
participants in the case series study used very little speech, it is surprising that they also used 
very little sign to communicate. In comparison to the group 1 case series, where 3 of the 4 
children used sign to support their verbal and non-verbal communication, there appears to be 
less overall communication from the older children in group 2. This could be an expression of 
their understanding of the test situation and their wariness of the researcher or it may equally 
be a sample effect.  
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From this discussion of sign and speech there are 2 areas, following on from group 1, which 
continue to develop: 
a. Communication is not always recognised as a 2-way exchange. 
Children in the group 2 case series used very little communication, suggesting that they 
may have not recognised their part in the joint communication.  
b. Communication is used to redirect the task or situation.  
Two children from this group used communication to direct the researcher away from 
the task and onto a topic they wanted to communicate about. 
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Child Sign Copied Independent In task To change 
topic 
To add information  With 
vocalisation 
With speech 
Daisy tired        
 drinking        
 hungry        
 eat        
 doctor        
 stethoscope        
Freya cats’        
 cheeky        
 A        
 which        
 aeroplane        
 apple        
Theo No signs used         
         
Connie clean (3x)        
 thank you         
 please        
Table 61. Group 2 Signs used with and without speech during each case series participant’s session
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8.3.3 Gesture and pointing 
 
Although the children in this case series did use gesture and pointing it was relatively rare and 
much of their gesture use was culturally defined. Two of the 4 children showed a ‘shock’ reaction 
to the bird spilling the tea, and a third, Connie, gave the cat a cuddle when it had had ‘milk’ 
poured on it. These gestures, shown in Table 62,  appear to be ritualised and are very similar to 
those seen in the group 1 case series.  
Daisy (Cats’ task) 
Gesture Focus Speech and speech sounds 
 Watching R then looking at 
bird 
R: Oh oh, here comes the 
cheeky bird again 
Waves arms up in the air 
towards the bird – pulls a 
‘scared’ face 
Watching bird  
   
   
Freya (Cats’ task) 
Gesture Focus Speech and speech sounds 
Puts hand over mouth when 
R makes intake of breath 
   
 
Looking at R and bird  R: oawww, I’ve got a really 
cheeky bird 
  
Connie (Cats’ task) 
Gesture Focus Speech and speech sounds 
Helps R give the milk bottle to 
the bird  
   
  
Focussed on bird pouring milk 
on cat 
R: Yeah can he have the milk? 
What is he going to do this 
time? Oh cheeky bird. 
 
Gives cat a cuddle Focussed on the cat which 
has milk poured on its head
  
 
Table 62. Group 2 Examples of culturally defined gestures used by three participants 
Theo appeared not to use gestures or pointing during his session, however any gestures he may 
have used could have been hidden in his continuous movement and simply not picked up on by 
the researcher.  
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None of the children appeared to use gesture as an addition to or to enhance their speech and 
communication, with the exception of Daisy who used gesture once to reiterate her meaning. 
Similarly, the use of pointing (outside the BPVS) was limited; Daisy and Connie used pointing to 
show their answers to questions and Theo did not appear to use any pointing. However Freya’s 
use of pointing was similar to that which was seen in the group 1 case series. In the example in 
Table 63, she pointed to direct the researcher away from the task she had not been able to 
complete. The researcher had prompted her 4 times to try and clean the tea up, but Freya had 
not been able to carry out the action.  She handed the teaching assistant in the room the cloth 
as soon as she managed to redirect the task, which may imply she had achieved her desired 
result (to stop the task).  In the second example Freya had just previously shown the stop card 
to the teaching assistant, but the teaching assistant had not reacted. Although she indicates at 
the end of this sequence that she is happy to continue, the pointing behaviours may have come 
as a result of the stop card not working as a way to stop the session/task. As the stop card was 
introduced as a novel way for the children to give ongoing consent, Freya may have been 
confused as to why it didn’t stop the task and so relies on previously successful behaviours to 
finish tasks (redirecting the researcher).  
Freya Pointing example 1, Cats’ task 
Pointing Social 
interaction 
Focus Speech and speech 
sounds 
  Looks at R’s hands 
as she’s signing 
R: Lets clean it up, shall I 
help?  
  Looking to distance Freya: (Unint) 
R: Wow that was a big 
sentence.  
Points to something 
across room  
  R: Are you looking at the 
books? Yeah  
Points again with 
opposite arm 
   
Points to cat on her 
LHS 
 Looks to R as she’s 
speaking 
R: These cats, they’ve 
finished their tea 
 Turns to TA and 
holds out cloth 
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Freya. Pointing example 2, Scarecrow task 
Pointing Social 
interaction 
Focus Speech and speech 
sounds 
   R: Do you want to stop? 
Or do you want to play 
some  more 
Points towards 
camera 
 Then looks at R R: That’s my video 
camera, it’s looking at 
you and at me 
Points to her LH S    
Points to her RHS 
near camera  
 Looking at R  R: Those are the books in 
the library 
  Looking at R  
  
   
R: Are you looking at the 
pictures on the wall 
Points behind R  Looks behind R R: Do you want to play 
some more? 
  Looks to 
scarecrow. Nods 
slightly  
R: yeah? Shall we play 
with my scarecrow 
Table 63. Group 2 Examples of Freya using pointing to distract from the task 
As she pointed to a number of different objects it appears that Freya’s was not trying to direct 
the researcher’s attention to anything in particular. In pointing behaviours of typically 
developing children if the message is not understood there is an attempt to repair the message 
by repeated pointing at the same object, or by accompanying pointing with speech sounds 
(Golinkoff, 1986). Freya did not make any attempt to repair her message when the researcher 
was unsure of what she was pointing at, in fact she pointed to a different place each time the 
researcher responded to her. This suggests that she was using the pointing simply to redirect 
the researcher, not to direct her to something of interest. This potential strategy could be of 
interest when examining the BPVS. If children with limited communication do not reliably point 
to direct their conversational partner, they may also not be reliably pointing to what they do or 
don’t know in the BPVS.  
Themes developing from group 1 and 2 
a. In this case series gesture use appears to be culturally defined rather than used as 
an addition to language. Imitation of the researcher’s gesture was also prevalent. 
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b. Pointing appears to be used to distract the researcher. However it is unclear whether 
the children are aware that ‘to see is to know’.  Declarative pointing has been found 
to be less proficient in children with Down’s syndrome (Legerstee & Fisher, 2008) 
and the current analysis appears to be consistent with this finding.  
 
8.3.4 Body language and social interaction  
 
The analysis for this section is focussed on two areas: the children’s interactions when they 
attempting to redirect the task or avoid the task as these are the times when they interacted 
most with the researcher; and the lack of social interaction the children engaged in throughout 
their sessions. Whilst on task the children in this case series were very focussed on the toys and 
the task at hand, they rarely interacted with the researcher directly, but when off task the 
children’s interaction with the researcher appeared to increase.  
8.3.5 Social interaction 
As shown in the analysis of eye contact and focus above, all four of the children in this case series 
were able to follow instructions and play with the researcher without making sustained eye 
contact. In fact long periods of interaction would pass without the child’s focus shifting to the 
researcher, as is evident in Table 64.   
Focus Speech and speech sounds 
Looks to boxes, then to bowls on ‘yeah’, 
looks to R on ‘cats’ then back to bowls 
R: do you know after breakfast,   
Daisy: yeah 
R: those cats they need their teeth cleaning 
 
 Daisy: yeah 
R; do you think you could clean their teeth? 
Daisy: yeah  
Looking at toothpaste, not R R: So this is just pretend ok?  
Looking at toothpaste R: it’s just pretend 
Daisy: lid on 
R: yeah we’ll keep the lid on, so we’ll just pretend 
to squeeze it ok? 
 Daisy: squish squish squish…there 
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Focussed on toothbrush and cat R: which cat are you going to do first? 
Daisy: cat 
Glances towards cat on RHS R: that’s excellent brushing 
Daisy: cat 
 Daisy: teeth 
R: lovely 
Focussed on toys, doesn’t look to R Daisy: done 
Looks to bird, not R R: oh Daisy here comes the cheeky bird 
Daisy: ooh 
R: what’s he gonna get? oooh  
Watches the bird, then glances to R on 
‘tail’ then watches bird again 
R: he’s squeezing toothpaste all over the cat’s 
tail. oooh naughty bird. Oh dear 
Watches the boxes, focussed on the 
sponge coming out of box 
R: Daisy could you clean the cat 
Glances at R Daisy: yeah 
Table 64. Group 2 Daisy’s use of social interaction in the cats’ task 
Daisy was able to follow instructions and to observe and process the action she was involved in, 
but she did not use looking at the researcher as a socially useful tool in interpreting the task. It 
is possible that Daisy’s language comprehension ability meant she was able to access the tasks 
by verbal instruction only but she needed to remain focussed on the task to enable her to 
process the instruction and work out the goal. It may be that in order to process all the task 
demands Daisy needed to filter out any information which she deems least useful in helping her 
to pass the task. 
 Interestingly, on the researcher’s second visit, Daisy was very animated before and after the 
session and interacted with the researcher, showing her toys and telling her they were going on 
holiday. It is possible that Daisy identified a usefulness in using her social cognition skills in this 
situation that wasn’t apparent to her in the cats’ task.  
Freya used a very different style of interaction and looked to the researcher often throughout 
the tasks. Although she did not use very much speech or sign she interacted with the researcher 
by looking to her and nodding in response to her questions and suggestions. For Freya however, 
her ability to interact with the researcher did not appear to help her with the more complex 
cats’ task.  
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Gesture Pointing Interaction Focus and eye 
contact 
Speech and 
speech sounds 
   Not clear where 
she is looking – 
either at R or 
cloth (or both as 
they are very 
close together) 
R:can you clean 
where he poured 
the tea 
  Takes cloth 
from R, slowly 
unfolds it 
 R: can you clean 
it up 
Freya: ah 
Nods on tea 
everywhere 
 Turns to TA and 
holds cloth out. 
TA indicates to 
where tea was 
‘spilled’ on 
table.  
Looks to TA and 
then to table  
R: oh it’s a big 
cloth 
TA: oh you like 
cleaning don’t 
you. Need you to 
clean that mess 
up. Oh dear, tea 
everywhere 
 
Brings hand up 
to face and 
then onto 
forehead 
  Unclear focus – 
not on R or TA 
Freya: eh. 
TA: urgh 
   Peeps at R 
through hand 
R: can you clean 
it? 
Let’s clean it up. 
  Makes large O 
shape with 
mouth 
Looks up to R  
 Points to teacup   R: where’s the 
tea? 
 Point to other 
teacup 
Sticks out 
tongue 
After pointing 
looks to TA sat 
on her RHS.  
R: well there is 
some in there 
that’s right, and 
some in there 
that’s right 
nods   Looks at table R: and some on 
the table, yeah?  
TA: oh 
   Look sat R’s 
hands as she’s 
signing 
R: lets clean it 
up, shall I help  
   Looking to 
distance 
Freya: (Unint) 
R: wow that was 
a big sentence.  
Immediately after this episode Freya uses pointing as a way to distract the researcher from 
the task. (n.b. the teaching assistant (TA)  had been asked to not be involved in the task) 
Table 65. Group 2 Freya’s use of social interaction in the cats’ task 
187 
 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 65, Freya was engaged with the researcher throughout the episode; she 
responded to her questions and made eye contact with her. However she also found the task 
difficult; when the researcher asked, “Where’s the tea”, she pointed to the tea cups, even 
though it was made explicit by the TA that the tea was ‘spilt’ on the table. She was unable to 
identify where the tea has been ‘spilt’ and displayed behaviours (hiding behind her hand) that 
possibly indicate she was feeling uncomfortable with not understanding the request to clean up.  
Throughout her session Freya often looked to the researcher or the TA after answering a 
question or carrying out a request. This may have happened because she found it difficult to 
process the task and was looking for some reassurance about her answer (whether she is right 
or wrong). Alternatively she could have been looking for pragmatic signals from the researcher 
and the TA about the task, for example social signals from the adults as to whether her answer 
was appropriate. In contrast to the way Daisy behaves Freya appeared to need social 
reassurance about her performance, whereas Daisy appeared confident in her approach to the 
tasks and did not look for reassurance. This idea may also be supported by the change in Daisy’s 
looking in the harder stages of the BPVS, she regularly looked to the researcher and engaged 
her in her answering of the questions, as is shown in the discussion of sign and speech above. 
Connie engaged in the tasks in a similar way to Daisy, she was able to access and pass the cats’ 
task without much social interaction. She mostly focussed on the toys in front of her, even when 
the researcher asked direct questions.  
Body language and  
social interaction 
Eye contact and focus Speech and speech sounds 
Puts toothbrush down 
and reaches for 
sponge before R 
speaks 
Focussed entirely on the 
sponge 
R: can you clean the cat with the 
toothpaste on his tail? 
Uses sponge to clean 
correct tail  
Focussed on sponge and then 
cat 
 
 Turns to TA and gives her the 
sponge, but doesn’t make eye 
contact 
R: well done, good remembering, 
good girl 
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Immediately picks up 
milk bottle  
Focussed on toys R; do you think you could give them 
some milk? 
Tries to take the lid off 
milk bottle  
Focussed on bottle Connie: milk  
R: ooh lovely talking Connie, milk  
Table 66. Group 2 Connie’s social interaction in the cats’ task 
The example in Table 66 comes from the third cleaning request in the task therefore Connie may 
have been expecting the researcher’s question (indeed she reaches for the sponge before the 
request is made) and so was able to anticipate the sequence of spilling and cleaning. 
 This lack of social interaction in the tasks is evident in both Daisy and Connie’s sessions even 
though they both appear to understand and perform the tasks effectively. However there is a 
marked difference in their speech ability and in their BPVS performance. Connie’s BPVS score is 
one of the lowest in group 2 and she uses 3 intelligible words and signs throughout the session. 
Daisy scores the highest in the BPVS and is verbally competent for her age. It is possible then 
that language is not the mediating factor in participants’ ability to pass the cats’ task and that 
the level of representational ability needed has more influence over the children’s passing or 
not passing. This is supported to some extent by the evidence of Freya, who has a better BPVS 
score and uses more language than Connie, but is unable to represent the spilt tea. It may be 
that the children who are using their representational ability to pass the task, Daisy and Connie, 
need to maintain focus on the task in order to update their representations with new 
information. As Freya is potentially not able to incorporate new information into her 
representation she is able to look to the researcher and the TA for extra social signals to help 
her work out the task.  
8.3.6 Redirecting the task (off task behaviours)  
 
All the children in the case series were adept at manipulating the tasks and the researcher to 
redirect the play when they chose. They used a number of strategies which ranged from 
approaches seen in typical early development, such as throwing toys away, to sophisticated 
engagement with the researcher to redirect her focus. The underlying driver of the redirections 
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could be either because the child could not access the task or because they were bored or tired 
in the session. Redirection observed in the case series took three forms; refusing the task, self-
directed play and engaging the researcher.  
Refusing to engage with the task was used by 2 of the 4 participants, Theo and Connie. Neither 
of these participants used clear spoken language and only Connie used minimal signs (3 in the 
session). Connie showed her lack of interest in the task by physically moving away from the 
researcher and task: 
When the BPVS is brought out Connie gets down off her chair and picks up her mat for sitting 
on and attempts to go out the door. She stays at the door until the R puts away the BPVS, 
brings out the scarecrow and asks if Connie will play with it. Connie then puts her mat down, 
comes back of her own accord and climbs back on her chair. 
Table 67. Group 2, Connie’s task redirection in the BPVS 
As Theo was in his chair for his session, he was unable to move away from a task he was not 
engaged in. However he was able to show his lack of engagement in a number of other ways as 
seen in Table 68. 
Throws cup on floor, focus follows where he has thrown the cup, then turns back to R. Tries 
to push cats off table, looks up to R, then to cats. 
 Looks up to ceiling. 
Takes cloth from R, looks to R and cats.  
Waves cloth around.  
Waves cloth down at LHS, drops on the floor.  
Glances at mum 
Table 68. Group 2 Theo’s task redirection during the cats’ task 
Although both these children showed that they were not engaging with the task through a 
refusal to take part, there was a marked difference in the way they conveyed this information 
to the researcher. Connie recognised that one way to stop the task is to go back to class room, 
which  shows some understanding of a wider context of the testing situation. Theo was unable 
to use this strategy because he was seated in his chair (we cannot say whether he would have 
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chosen this strategy had he not been in in his chair) instead he removed the toys from in front 
of him. From his glances to the researcher and mum after he had thrown the toys it is possible 
to suggest that he had done this purposefully. However earlier in the session he also appeared 
to enjoy watching the toys as they fell.  
For Connie and Theo their redirection behaviour may show signs of their developing 
metacognition, an understanding that ‘I know that I don’t know’ which propelled them to reject 
the task. It could also be suggested that this behaviour is indicative of children who have not yet 
begun to understand other’s points of view. Connie walking to the door to finish the session 
shows that she problem solved from a self-centred point of view; the way to stop the session is 
not by changing someone else’s behaviour (i.e. the researchers) but by changing her own 
behaviour (removing herself from the situation).  Similarly Theo solved the problem by removing 
the toys not by changing the researcher’s behaviour (although one could argue that removing 
the toys necessarily changes the researcher’s behaviour as she has to tidy them up). Connie also 
used the strategy of removing the activity in the BPVS; she pushed the board away and refused 
to continue.   
Connie used a further strategy in the scarecrow task, which she found difficult to engage with: 
Connie reaches out and takes spoon. R puts pad and stick in front of her. 
Connie picks up stick. Then uses spoon to get some of stick and pretends to eat it. Looks up 
to R after pretend eating – with smile.  
Looks and smiles at R then looks around room.  
Looks at TA.  
Plays with spoon and stick. 
Holds spoon in air. Turns round and sits with back to R. 
Table 69. Group 2 Connie’s task redirection behaviour in the scarecrow task 
During this sequence Connie used the toys available to create her own pretend play. Her play 
was self-directed and did not follow the instructions of the researcher. She appeared to take 
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pleasure in her own pretence as she smiled at the researcher and rejected the set task by turning 
her back.  
This use of self-directed play is seen by 3 of the 4 children; they take the toys and use them in a 
different way than the task requires. It is possible that the children engage with the toys in this 
way because it means they will be successful in their play. If they are finding it difficult to engage 
with the task set by the researcher, and they are aware they are finding it difficult, an option 
with a more successful outcome may be to engage in their own self-directed play.  
Table 70 shows that Freya used a number of different redirection strategies during the 
scarecrow task . 
Looks to TA. Holds up stop card to TA – then puts it on table when no more reaction from TA. 
Looks at R. 
Looking at R, points towards camera. Looking at R, points to her LHS. Looking behind R, points 
to her RHS near camera. 
Signs A in response to R’s sign, looks to scarecrow.  
Attempts to sign ‘which’ after R, focussed on own hands trying to sign.  
Lets R help her to create the sign for ‘which’.  
Makes aeroplane sign with hand. Looking at R. Then gives a big smile on aeroplane. 
Looking at scarecrow, makes scarecrow bite her LHS finger, makes scarecrow bite her RHS 
finger, switching focus between scarecrow and R. 
Lifts her left leg up and points to her shoe, looking between R and shoe. 
Lifts her other leg up and shows her shoe, looking between R and shoe. 
Points to the scarecrows shoe, lifts left leg again, looking between R and shoes and SC. 
 Then puts down and turns her back to table. 
Picks up stop card and turns to TA, focussed on stop card. Holds up stop card to TA. 
Table 70. Group 2 Freya’s use of off task behaviours in the scarecrow task 
This wide variety of strategy use shows that Freya was attempting to problem solve using trial 
and error and was able to adjust her strategy in her attempts to prevent the researcher 
continuing.  As each strategy didn’t work and the researcher attempted to reconnect her with 
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the task, she moved on to a different strategy. There appear to be four particular strategies she 
used in the example in Table 70: 
a. Use of a new strategy: the stop card – a strategy which was introduced by the researcher 
at the start of the session. 
b. Use of distraction: signing, pointing, showing shoes. 
c. Use of self-directed play: making the scarecrow bite her fingers. 
d. Rejection of task: turning her back on the table. 
It is possible that Freya is using a repertoire of strategies which she has built up over the course 
of her development and as the most recently learned doesn’t work for her (the use of the stop 
card) she tries out other strategies. That she was able to use the more complex strategy of 
engaging the researcher (by redirecting her with signing, pointing and talking about her shoes) 
shows that she had some understanding of other’s intentions. To understand that to stop the 
session or task the researcher must be redirected from her goal (of continuing with the session) 
necessitates a reading of the researcher’s intention (or desire) and means end thinking on how 
to manipulate it. Whilst this is not an indication of a fully formed theory of mind, it may show 
that some children in this group were able to use their understanding of intention to manipulate 
other’s behaviour.  
Daisy used similar strategies to Freya, but in an even more sophisticated way; she not only 
created some self-directed play, but involved the researcher in the play, as is seen in Table 71. 
 
Looks at objects. R asks “what can we use as a hat?”  
Picks up ball and puts it briefly on scarecrows head.   
Doesn’t look at R – focussed on scarecrow.  
Shuffles backward to move into a position to play catch.  
Remains fixed on scarecrow.  
Throws ball to scarecrow who ‘catches’ it (with R’s help) and then throws it back. 
Daisy throws ball back to SC but it bounces on R’s head.  
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Glances at R then back at ball then to R as she asks question “What can we use as a hat?” 
then back to ball.  
Leans forward and places ball on scarecrow’s head. 
Table 71. Group 2 Daisy’s task redirection behaviours in the scarecrow task 
In this sequence Daisy threw the ball to the scarecrow, which was being held by the researcher, 
therefore the researcher had to catch the ball on behalf of the scarecrow. Daisy redirected the 
play to something she was engaged with and that the researcher had to take part in, thereby 
directing the researcher away from her initial goal. Daisy also used the stop card twice 
throughout the session (both times in the BPVS), showing that she was able to take on a new 
strategy and implement it.    
An interesting point of note is that many of the distraction techniques happened outside of the 
tasks (in between tasks) or after the child had already answered the researcher’s question. In 
Table 71 above Daisy had briefly put the ball on the scarecrow’s head in answer to the 
researcher’s question and then began the distraction. It is possible that Daisy felt she had 
answered the question and therefore the session could move on in a way she would like it to.  
Similarly, in the example in Table 70 Freya began her distraction when the next task (the 
scarecrow) was brought to the table.  These between task redirection behaviours could be why 
in the quantitative analysis there are very few ‘off task’ responses recorded. Even though the 
children in this group did display off task behaviours they were mostly not during in a task or 
were after they had provided an answer. This suggests that the children were aware of when a 
task was ‘in progress’ and were able to apply themselves to the task at that time.  
Of note in the body language analysis of group 2 are 2 areas which are also reflected in the group 
1 analysis: 
a. In this case series the children had difficulty either initiating and maintaining joint 
attention or fully utilising the information gathered during joint attention. 
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b. All the children in this case series disengaged from the tasks. The children in group 2 
used more sophisticated means to redirect the researcher and the task.  
8.4 Group 2 - Interim discussion 
 
In a similar way to group 1, the group 2 results show a uniformity of results when looking at the 
quantitative data, but the qualitative data shows contrasting behaviours across participants. By 
considering both aspects of analysis it may be possible to see a developmental pathway the 
children in this group are taking. Analysis from group 1 will be briefly referred to here but 
Chapter 10, the whole study analysis, will bring together analysis from all three groups. Figure 
17 below gives an overview of the quantitative and qualitative observations made in this chapter 
and links them with other areas of research. Table 72 extends this overview to show how the 
data from group 2 connects explicitly to earlier discussions of working memory, executive 
functioning, prior knowledge and representational ability and provides a short description of 
how the social cognition and theory of mind skills may be developing in this group. Below there 
is an attempt to describe a tentative developmental pathway, expanding the overviews given in 
Figure 17 and Table 72 at the end of this chapter.  
Some of the children in this group showed behaviours which could be considered  to similar to 
those seen in with children just learning about object properties and object permanence (Piaget 
et al., 1969). Behaviours such as banging, mouthing and dropping toys were seen in conjunction 
with a ‘no response’ to the tasks set, which could suggest that the child is unable to access the 
task. In these children prior schemas may be limited to physical properties and pretend play 
sequences have not yet developed. It is suggested here that children at this level are restricted 
to a level I (implicit) level of representation (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995) which is based on their 
empirical understanding of objects (Rast & Meltzoff, 1995).  
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Children working at this level are able to represent objects which are directly observable, but 
they are not able to form representations of them which are shared across domains. 
Phonological loop difficulties may prevent the child at this level from being able to process and 
retain the verbal information in the tasks, especially in the more language heavy cats’ and 
scarecrow tasks. However there is a need for caution here, as the child in group 2 whose 
behaviour matches this description most fully was also able to hold focus on toys which 
interested him and play with them appropriately (for example making the naughty bird ‘eat’ his 
fingers).  In fact this child did engage in some limited play scripts on the researcher’s second 
visit. That some purposeful focus and engagement with activity was observed suggests that the 
child was able to utilise an aspect of his social understanding. There were some play schemas in 
place, but the tasks set may not have activated them. This possibly suggests that a child showing 
these kind of behaviours may be affected by a poor inhibitory control response (Borella et al., 
2013) which restricts their ability to control the throwing, banging and mouthing schemas which 
are present and prepotent (especially in the presence of new toys which haven’t been explored 
before).  
Although children at this point in their development may be lacking in representational ability, 
it may be as a result of poor working memory and inhibitory control responses which in turn 
restrict the exploration and development of new schemas. This idea is explored in cognitive load 
theory which suggests that if the cognitive load is too high, then learning cannot take place  
(Borella et al., 2013).  
An increase in eye contact and a reliance on the researcher for feedback was apparent in 
children who showed mixed responses to the tasks (passing, failing, no response and off task).  
These children may have weak schemas which are in development. For example they may know 
about liquids, but not understand individual properties such as the difference in fluidly of a paste 
versus tea. In this instance children may check in often with the adults around them by looking 
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to them and may be unfocussed in their activity due to a weak representation of the task. 
Representations, perhaps moving to level E1 (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995) or dual representation 
(Perner, 1991) cannot support pretend play because of weak underlying knowledge schemas. 
Whilst the representational ability may be in place, it may be constrained by weak knowledge 
schemas.  
This potential mismatch of representational ability versus underlying knowledge could be an 
important feature in the development of theory of mind skills in children with Down’s syndrome. 
This is supported by the findings of Beeghly and Cicchetti (1987) that children with Down’s 
syndrome repeat their play actions for longer and engage more in concrete play than typically 
developing children. It could be that children with Down’s syndrome need longer to secure their 
underlying knowledge schemas before being able to use these in a more abstract, 
representational manner. This need to focus on the concrete may also be seen in the children’s 
inability to depart from an existing play schema and incorporate new information into it. For 
example children showing ‘no response’ to the cats’ task may be finding the addition of 
unexpected material into their existing ‘pretend tea drinking’ schema too complex to process. 
This is supported by Carney et al. (2013) who suggest that concurrent processing and storage is 
a difficulty.  
Children working this point in development may also be restrained by phonological loop 
difficulties (Jarrold, Baddeley, & Phillips, 1999) which could restrict their ability to follow 
instructions such as ‘clean the cat’s tail which has the toothpaste on it’. This may explain why 
some children were able to pass the more representationally complex scarecrow task but which 
had a simpler language component and not the cats’ task, which was representationally more 
simple but the instruction was complex.  
For children working at this level the use of distraction as a means to engage with the adults 
around them or to move off task shows the children’s sense of other people is developing. They 
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are able to use joint attention skills and declarative pointing to draw the adult’s attention to 
their subject of focus. This growing understanding of others may be coupled with a developing 
sense of ‘I know that I don’t know’ which leads the children to use a variety of techniques to 
distract the researcher and reject the task. This would be in line with what we know about typical 
children’s developing metacognition; at around the age of 2 years they begin to use mental state 
terms to describe others and their own behaviour (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman & Estes, 
1987). At this stage they are developing an awareness of their own mental states and they are 
able to use simple reasoning in arguments and discussions (Dunn, 1988). What could be an 
important difference for the children in this study is that typically developing children at 2 years 
will have the spoken language skills to negotiate and explain behaviours (albeit in simple terms), 
but children with Down’s syndrome often have spoken language skills which are delayed beyond 
their comprehension and more general cognitive abilities. So where a typical 2 year old could be 
expected to explain that they didn’t understand, or that they don’t know, the children in this 
study may not have the language skills to express this. Whilst they may have some metacognitive 
awareness of ‘I know that I don’t know’, they are unable to express this in a verbal way and it is 
therefore expressed through the physical means of distraction and task rejection.  
The children who passed and failed with prompts and then passed and failed with no prompts 
are more difficult to describe as the case series did not include any of these children. Without 
case series data behavioural outcomes cannot be discussed, however it may be possible to 
suggest how the children’s underlying abilities support or constrain their attempts at the tasks. 
That these children showed no ‘no response’ or ‘off task’ behaviours during tasks shows that 
they were able to focus their attention within tasks. Potentially their representational ability has 
developed to a stage where they are able to represent things which are not there, supporting 
an ability to engage with the pretend and symbolic play tasks. This could be the beginnings of 
dual representations (Perner, 1991) where the children are able to use hypothetical information 
to problem solve (Rast & Meltzoff, 1995). Hypothetical representations would support schemas 
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which use trial and error as a means to problem solve, which is why a combination of passing 
and failing across trials is seen. That the children at this stage are focussed on the task in hand 
may suggest a growing ability to control external distractions. 
The final development observed in group 2 was to being able to pass all the tasks. This was 
accompanied with a clear focus on the task, such that looking to the researcher or other adults 
was minimal. This may suggest that the more focussed the children are on the task the more 
able they are to pass the task. This may indicate some children’s developing ability to filter out 
information which is not essential for the task. In order to focus their cognitive resources on 
processing the task demands and on using their representational ability to call up and modify 
appropriate schemas they are able to reject information which is deemed not useful.  Children 
appeared able to select information which was important for the task, such as the practical 
elements of the task and some pragmatic information, but reject the more obsolete or difficult 
to read elements of the situation, such as extraneous environmental or social cues.  
Schemas for pretend and symbolic play appeared well rehearsed in these children and they were 
able to incorporate new information into their schemas, such as information from the 
researcher’s unexpected play sequence. This would suggest that their representational ability is 
secure in being able to represent more than one representation at a time (Perner, 1991) and 
that representations can be shared across domains to incorporate new information (Karmiloff-
Smith, 1995).  
More developed inhibitory control mechanisms may allow for the control of external 
distractions (such as interference from the researcher, or environmental disturbances), but are 
still unable to inhibit internal distractions. This is seen in the children’s inability to symbolically 
transform the stick into a pencil; their inhibitory control may be not strong enough to prevent 
the prepotent response that, because of its close look-a-like quality, the stick actually is a pencil. 
Even when the children were told it was really a stick, some still responded with an attempt to 
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write and a phrase similar to ‘it’s not working’. This confusion over what something looks like, 
as opposed to what it really is, is supported in the appearance-reality distinction work of Flavell 
et al. (1986). Typically developing children between the ages of 3 and 5 develop in their ability 
to separate out what an object ‘looks like’ and what it ‘really is’. The children in this study may 
still be experiencing a difficulty with this distinction which typically developing children have 
usually resolved by 5 years old (Flavell et al., 1986). 
 A further advancement that children who were able to pass the tasks made was their ability to 
request help and stop the tasks by engaging with the researcher. Although explicit, verbal 
requests for help were not made the children made good use of joint attention and non-verbal 
requesting to elicit the researcher’s help with, for instance, opening the milk bottle. This 
suggests that, by this stage in their development they are secure in their understanding that 
other people are intentional agents who are able to be directed to align their focus with that of 
the child. Butterworth (1995a) suggests this happens in typically developing children at around 
18 months to 2 years at which time pretend play skills also develop (Lewis & Boucher, 1997).  
The findings from group 2 suggest that the children in this study may have followed a similar 
pattern of development albeit to a different timescale and by overcoming a number of different 
constrains not seen in typical development. 
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8.4.1 Group 2 - Simple description of the development of theory of mind skills observed 
 
Increase in complexity of cognitive skill 
 
Joint attention not 
developed 
Still developing schemas of 
physical properties  
Some sense of self 
emerging (I don’t want) 
Short sequences of pretend 
play are evident, but lots of 
adult support needed to 
firm up schemas 
Developing understanding 
of controlling others’ 
attention  
Attempting to draw on a 
variety of information but 
not able to draw it all 
together 
Movement from prompts 
to no prompts suggests 
child moving from directed 
play to partner play—
understanding partner as 
involved in pretence 
Joint requesting and simple 
problem solving secure—
being able to ask for help 
Emerging understanding of 
other’s minds as different 
(have different contents of 
pretend play) 
Figure 17. Group 2 Simple description of the development of theory of mind skills observed 
201 
 
 
 
8.4.2 Group 2 - Synthesis of qualitative and quantitative data and prior research 
 
 Qualitative and quantative data linked to prior research   
Increase in 
complexity 
of 
cognitive 
skill 
 
  
Description of 
qualitative 
behaviours observed 
Description of 
quantitative findings 
Prior knowledge and 
schemas 
Representational 
ability  
Working memory 
and executive 
function  
Development of 
social 
cognition/theory of 
mind 
Doesn’t make eye 
contact 
Rejects tasks by 
throwing/moving 
toys 
Purposeful 
communication 
when interested in 
the toy 
No response to tasks 
Banging/throwing 
toys 
 
Schemas in 
development for 
physical properties of 
objects 
No pretend play 
schemas 
 
Level I (implicit) 
representation 
Empirical 
representations fixed 
to observable events 
and objects 
 
Concurrent 
processing and 
storage not efficient 
Phonological loop 
difficulties 
preventing access to 
task 
Inhibitory control not 
controlling physical 
actions on toys 
Joint attention not 
developed 
Developing schemas 
of physical properties 
Some sense of self (I 
don’t want) 
 
 
Shifts focus between 
tasks, adults and 
environment 
Attempts to draw 
adults away from the 
task using a variety of 
means—distraction, 
engagement, refusal 
Checks with adults 
for encouragement/ 
praise  
Mixed responses—
pass, pass with 
prompts, fail, off task 
and no response 
 
Underlying pretend 
play schemas are just 
developing but not 
consistently applied 
Short script 
sequences evident in 
pretend play 
 
Hypothetical 
representations in 
development 
Representation not 
able to support 
longer play 
sequences—because 
of weak pretend play 
schemas. 
Concurrent 
processing and 
storage made more 
difficult by weak 
pretend play 
schemas 
Phonological loop 
prevents clear 
representation of 
sequences 
Short sequences of 
pretend play are 
evident, but lots of 
adult support needed 
to firm up schemas 
Developing 
understanding of 
controlling others’ 
attention  
Attempts to draw on 
a variety of 
information but not 
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able to draw it all 
together 
Not evidenced in case 
series 
Fail and pass with 
prompts moving to 
fail and pass no 
prompts 
 
Pretend play 
schemes are 
developing through 
trial and error 
 
Able to represent 
entities which are 
not there  
 
 
Inhibitory control 
developing enough 
to control 
distractions outside 
of task 
 
Movement from 
prompts to no 
prompts suggests 
child moving from 
directed play to 
partner play—
understanding 
partner as involved in 
pretence 
Focussed on tasks 
Able to request help 
verbally or through 
eye contact 
Uses sophisticated 
means to stop task—
engagement with 
adult 
 
Passes tasks 
  
  
  
 
Pretend play 
schemas in place 
Others as intentional 
agents developing 
  
 
Dual representation 
allows pretend play 
and allows for 
objects to be 
renamed in play 
  
  
 
Inhibitory control is 
able to control 
external distractions, 
but not internal—the 
stick is a pencil  
 
Joint requesting and 
simple problem 
solving secure—
being able to ask for 
help 
Emerging 
understanding of 
other’s minds as 
different (have 
different contents of 
pretend play) 
Table 72. Group 2 Synthesis of qualitative and quantitative data and prior research
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Chapter 9: Group 3 results and interim 
discussion 
 
9.1 Group 3 – Quantitative analysis 
 
9.1.2 British Picture Vocabulary Scales (BPVS) 
The BPVS was administered in the same way as for group 2. Table 73 reports each participant’s 
performance at T1 and T2 and shows the difference between the two time points, which were 
no more than 3 weeks apart. Six children got lower scores at T2 and 7 children got higher scores 
at T2. One child was unable to be tested, possibly due to difficulties with motor skills and 1 child’s 
score remained the same. The average difference between testing points was -1 raw score 
points, however the range was from +22 to -31 and for some children the differences in their 
scores at T1 and T2 gave different results after converting to a comprehension age equivalent.  
Table 74 shows the raw and standardised scores for all participants in group 3. Only Anna is able 
to score high enough to standardise her score at T2, but 6 children gain scores which are so 
different at T1 and T2 they result in different comprehension ages.  Because of these marked 
differences in children’s performance at the two testing points the average score from the two 
tests has been used throughout the analysis, as per the group 2 analysis. To create comparable 
results across groups 2 and 3 and because only 1 child was able to have their score standardised, 
participant’s raw scores are used in this analysis.  
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 Age at testing 
years and 
months 
T1 raw  
score 
T2 raw 
score 
Average 
raw score 
Difference T1 
– T2 
Anna 6.0 39 55 47 +16 
Misha 6.0 18 15 17 -3 
Shana 6.0 13 13 13 0 
Rose 6.5 26 28 27 +2 
Morris 6.10 52 33 43 -19 
Pria 6.11 41 43 42 +2 
Alice 7.2 0 16 8 +16 
Laura 7.6 37 44 41 +7 
Jake 7.7 59 36 48 -23 
Louis 7.11 U U U - 
Olivia 8.2 52 54 53 +2 
Barney 8.5 69 63 66 -6 
Scarlett 8.6 67 36 52 -31 
Ruth 8.11 68 64 66 -4 
Thomas 8.11 23 45 34 +22 
Table 73. Group 3 BPVS - Differences in raw scores at T1 and T2, average raw score 
 
 Age at 
testing 
years.months 
Raw 
T1 
St’d 
T1 
Per 
T1 
Age 
equiv 
T1 
Raw 
T2 
St’d 
T2 
Per 
T2 
Age 
equiv 
T2 
Anna 6.0 39 *** *** <3.9 55 71 3 4.0 
Misha 6.0 18 *** *** <3.9 15 *** *** <3.9 
Shana 6.0 13 *** *** <3.9 13 *** *** <3.9 
Rose 6.5 26 *** *** <3.9 28 *** *** <3.9 
Morris 6.10 52 *** *** <3.9 33 *** *** <3.9 
Pria 6.11 41 *** *** <3.9 43 *** *** <3.9 
Alice 7.2 u u u u 16 *** *** <3.9 
Laura 7.6 37 *** *** <3.9 44 *** *** <3.9 
Jake 7.7 59 *** *** 4.5 36 *** *** <3.9 
Louis 7.11 U U U U U U U U 
Olivia 8.2 52 *** *** <3.9 54 *** *** 3.9 
Barney 8.5 69 *** *** 4.11 63 *** *** 4.8 
Scarlett 8.6 67 *** *** 4.10 36 *** *** <3.9 
Ruth 8.11 68 *** *** 4.10 64 *** *** 4.8 
Thomas 8.11 23 *** *** <3.9 45 *** *** <3.9 
Table 74. Group 3 BPVS - Raw scores (raw) standardised scores (st’d) percentile (per) and age 
equivalents (age equiv) 
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9.1.3 False-belief tasks. Episodes FB 1, 2, 3 & 4.  
 
The fourth episode of the FB task (a repeat of the dolls episode) has not been considered in this 
analysis as it was not attempted with 5 participants and not completed with 2 participants, all 7 
of these participants withdrew ongoing consent by either using the stop card or by refusing to 
engage with the task.  
As can be seen in Table 75 the different method of presentation (dolls, book or tablet) of each 
episode did not lead to greater or lesser pass rates. Indeed the pass rate across the whole group 
and all episodes was very low. Sixty-seven percent of the participants (10 children) passed no 
episodes, 27% passed one episode (4 children) and only one child passed all three episodes. This 
participant is the only child in group 3 to ‘pass’ the false belief task.  
Episode No. of participants 
Number of episodes passed in 
whole group 
FB1 - dolls 15 2 
FB2 - book 14 3 
FB3 - tablet 15 2 
   
Table 75. Group 3 False belief (FB) episodes. Number of episodes passed in whole group across 
all three tasks. N.B. One participant accounts for 3 of the passes 
All of the four children who passed one or more episodes were older than 6 years 11 months, 
and three them were the oldest in group 3 (8.6, 8.11 and 8.11). Although age appears to have 
some relationship to passing an episode, BPVS score does not, as can be seen in Table 76.  
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Name Age in years 
and months 
FB episodes 
correct 
BPVS Raw Score 
Average 
BPVS age 
equivalent in 
years and 
months 
Anna 6.0 0 47 <3.09 
Misha 6.0 0 17 <3.09 
Shana 6.0 0 13 <3.09 
Rose 6.5 0 27 <3.09 
Morris 6.10 0 43 <3.09 
Pria 6.11 1 42 <3.09 
Alice 7.2 0 8 <3.09 
Laura 7.6 1 41 <3.09 
Jake 7.7 0 48 <3.09 
Louis 7.11 0 u u 
Olivia 8.2 0 53 <3.09 
Barney 8.5 0 66 4.10 
Scarlett 8.6 2 52 <3.09 
Ruth 8.11 3 66 4.10 
Thomas 8.11 1 34 <3.09 
 
u = unable to administer the test. Shaded rows = participants who passed an episode of FB  
Table 76. Group 3 BPVS - organised by age. Showing times passed a FB episode, BPVS raw 
score and BPVS age equivalent 
Thomas, who is the oldest in the group, has one of the lowest BPVS scores and passed one 
episode of FB. Barney, who has the joint highest BPVS score did not pass an episode, although 
the two children with the next highest scores passed 3 and 2 episodes respectively. Although 
some increased likely hood of passing an episode with a higher BPVS score may be suggested, 
this is not consistent across the group. 
 As typically developing children begin to pass versions of the FB task between the ages of 4 and 
5  (Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004) it could have been expected that the children 
who had a BPVS age equivalent score of over 4 years would begin to pass the FB episodes. 
However Barney, who has a verbal comprehension age of 4 years 10 months does not pass any 
episode, and yet Laura, Pria, Scarlet and Thomas, who all have a verbal comprehension ages 
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below 3 years 9 months all pass at least one episode. This may suggest that the children in this 
group are not following the same developmental trajectory as typically developing children 
when acquiring their theory of mind, or that there is much more individual variation in when 
and how theory of mind develops in this group. It is also likely that, given the difficulty children 
with Down’s syndrome have with acquiring spoken language, the connection between language 
and theory of mind is much more complex in this group than in the typically developing 
population.  
9.1.4 Error pattern analysis 
 
 Within this section of analysis one child is omitted as he did not provide enough answers to be 
able to examine error patterns and 1 child is omitted due to researcher error preventing the 
correct recording of all his answers.   
Because the limited pass rates of the false belief tasks had been anticipated, albeit in a less 
profound way, the way the children responded to the tasks was recorded in a number of 
different ways, as described in Appendix 2. Since the transition from failing to passing the tasks 
did not appear to follow a clear age related or vocabulary comprehension related pattern the 
way the children responded to the tasks was examined to highlight potential insight into how 
the children’s theory of mind was or was not developing. 
Any responses which were recorded as ‘off task’ were not included in the error pattern analysis; 
it was decided that if a child was displaying off task behaviour, this did not necessarily mean they 
did not know the answer, but they may have been finding it difficult to engage with the task 
(potentially for a variety of reasons). Off task behaviours are analysed separately in Chapter 
9.1.7. 
The different types of errors made are outlined in Table 77. The three most common types of 
error have been named according to the type of mistake been made. According to Flynn, 
O'Malley, and Wood (2004) a child without a fixed understanding of false belief will rely on 
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reality to help them answer the questions, therefore pointing to the place where the toy actually 
is. Children who make this error response are unable to move away from the salience of the 
toy’s actual hiding place and so point to the current whereabouts of the toy in answer to all 
three questions. This is named the ‘salience’ response and is shown as the Error-Correct-Error 
(ECE) pattern in Table 77.   
The next most common error that was observed was a Correct-Correct-Error (CCE) pattern. Two 
correct answers are given in response to the questions which have some memory component 
(“Where did Dinah hide the toy?” and “Where is the toy now?”), however the child is unable to 
answer the false belief question correctly. This error pattern is termed the ‘Memory’ response 
and shown as Correct-Correct-Error (CCE) in Table 77. 
The final most common response was Correct-Correct-Correct (CCC) in which all the questions 
are answered correctly and has been termed ‘Correct’ in this analysis. Although the Correct 
response is seen 23% of the time, one child accounts for 3 out of the 7 times this response is 
used (i.e. she always answered the questions correctly), so this must be considered throughout 
the analysis. 
 Other error patterns were seen, but were seen so infrequently that they have been termed 
‘indiscriminate’ responses: an incorrect response to all three questions (Error-Error-Error), 
incorrect responses to the memory questions, but a correct response to the FB question (Error-
Error-Correct), and two rarely seen responses: Correct-Error-Error and Error-Error-Correct.  
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Error 
pattern 
type 
Q1: 
Where 
did 
Dinah 
hide the 
toy? 
Q2: 
Where 
did Maxi 
hide the 
toy? 
Q3: 
Where 
will 
Dinah 
look for 
the toy? 
Recorded as Times 
seen 
across all 
episodes 
Percentage 
of times 
seen across 
all episodes 
EEE Error Error Error Indiscriminate 
response 
2 6% 
EEC Error Error Correct Indiscriminate 
response 
3 10% 
CEE Correct Error Error Indiscriminate 
response 
0 0% 
ECC Error Correct Correct Indiscriminate 
response 
1 3% 
ECE Error Correct Error Salience 
response 
11 32% 
CCE Correct Correct Error Memory 
response 
8 26% 
CCC Correct Correct Correct Correct 
response 
7 23% 
Table 77. Group 3 Error patterns summary chart 
Since the three most common error patterns were the Salience, Memory and Correct responses 
these errors are the focus of this analysis. The other error patterns combined make up only 19% 
of the responses and so it could be suggested that the children used them indiscriminately. It 
could be that the use of these indiscriminate error patterns is seen in children who do not have 
any developing understanding of false belief and therefore cannot understand the nature of the 
questions. Where the indiscriminate errors appear to change the dynamic of responses, they 
have been included in discussion.  
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9.1.5 Error patterns by task 
 
 EEE EEC CEE ECC ECE 
Salience 
CCE 
memory 
CCC 
Correct 
FB1 - 
dolls 
1 1 0 1 3 4 2 
 8% 8%  8% 25% 34% 17% 
FB2 - 
book 
0 2 0 1 4 1 3 
  18%  9% 37% 9% 27% 
FB3 - 
tablet 
1 0 0 0 4 3 2 
 10%    40% 30% 20% 
Table 78. Group 3 Error patterns by false belief episode, given in raw numbers of responses 
and percentages 
Table 78 shows that across the three FB episodes there is a similarity of responses. This suggests 
that the three types of tasks were of comparable difficulty and were tapping into the same 
cognitive functions. It is worth noting here that the participant who scores CCC across all three 
episodes is the only child who displays a consistent pattern of answers. All other participants 
show at least two types of error patterns. This could be considered in two different ways. It may 
be that the children are attempting some kind of trial and error process; since they are never 
given feedback on their answers this may be in the form of ‘I don’t know if I was right or wrong, 
so I’ll try a different way.’ What seems more likely, given the inconsistency in pointing and 
answering seen in the BPVS (as discussed in the case series analysis in Chapter 9.2) is that the 
children’s responses are not always in answer to the question asked. Children often pointed to 
a place or grabbed for an object before the question was fully asked, indicating that they may 
have not heard the full question or that their reaction was not in response to the full question.  
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9.1.6 Error patterns by age 
 
Error Response EEE EEC ECC CEE ECE 
salience 
CCE 
memory 
CCC 
correct 
Number of 
children 
1 2 0 0 7 5 2 
Percentage 6% 12%    41% 29% 12% 
Table 79. Group 3 Error patterns made by children aged 6 years to 7 years 6 months  
 
 
Error Response EEE EEC ECC CEE ECE 
salience 
CCE 
memory 
CCC 
correct 
Number of 
children 
1 1 1 0 4 8 5 
Percentage 5% 5% 5%  20% 40% 25% 
Table 80. Group 3 Error patterns made by children aged 7 years 7 months to 9 years 
 
When the group is split directly in to two age groups, 6 years to 7 years 6 months (Table 79) and 
7 years 7 months to 9 years (Table 80), a clear change in the way error patterns are seen 
emerges. The children move from predominantly making the ECE (Salience) pattern to making 
the CCE (Memory) and CCC (Correct) answer patterns. In the younger group (Table 79) the 
predominance of ECE (Salience) suggests that the children do not have a sufficiently developed 
working memory to support them in the task and that their representational ability is restricted 
to the immediate present. The children only point at the present location of the toy and are not 
able to remember (or represent) where the toy was previously. This response also suggests they 
are unable to supress their prepotent response, possibly due to a less effective inhibitory 
function. Within this younger half of the group the three oldest children are responsible for all 
of the CCE (Memory) responses, which suggests there may be some change in children’s 
responses with age. The older children appear able to employ their working memory to be able 
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to answer the two memory questions correctly, however using metarepresentation to 
understand Dinah’s belief is still too complex.  
This picture continues to develop when the older half of Group 3 is examined (Table 80). A drop 
in the Salience response is seen alongside an increase in both the Memory and Correct 
responses, suggesting that the older the children have more developed working memories and 
can use metarepresentation to suggest Dinah’s state of mind.   
 Age in years and 
months 
BPVS average 
raw score 
Type of response most used 
Shana 6.0 13 Salience  
Misha 6.0 17 Salience  
Anna 6.0 47 Salience  
Rose 6.5 27 Salience  
Morris 6.10 43 Salience  
Olivia 8.2 53 Salience  
Alice 7.1 8 Memory +1 other 
Barney 8.5 66 Memory +1 other 
Pria 6.11 42 Memory + correct 
laura 7.6 41 Memory + correct 
Scarlett 8.6 52 Salience, memory, correct 
Thomas 8.11 34 Salience, memory, correct 
Ruth 8.11 66 Correct 
Table 81. Group 3 Error patterns organised by types of error most commonly made 
To examine this possible pattern further the group was split by the types of responses the 
children used; what emerged was an even clearer age difference. As can be seen in Table 81 the 
whole group was split according to main type of error pattern the child made.  
The youngest children, aged up to 6 years 10 months, all use the Salience response at least once, 
in fact it is the predominant answer used 67% of the time (Figure 18). None of this group passed 
any episode. The group of children aged between 6 years 11 months to 7 years 11 months use 
only the Memory response or Correct response (Figure  19). The oldest group, 8 years 2 months 
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to 8 years 11 months, use a variety of responses and the Correct rate increased to 33% (Figure 
20), bearing in mind three uses of CCC are from one child.  The only child who does not ‘fit’ their 
age group is Olivia, who uses only the Salience and EEC responses, more similar to the youngest 
participants than her age matched peers.   
As can be seen in Table 81, the individual BPVS raw scores show little relationship to the types 
of errors the children are making. For example Thomas who has a raw score of 34 makes the 
same error patterns as Scarlett who has a raw score of 52 and the children with the five highest 
BPVS scores make the whole range of error patterns. It could be that these children are trying 
out a range of strategies to approach the task. Because the relationship between BPVS score 
and strategy use appears complicated, other aspects of functioning, such as working memory, 
representational skill and prior knowledge may also need to be considered to explain the error 
pattern results.  
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CCE
memory 
71%
CCC
correct
29%
EEE
6% EEC
7%
ECE
salience
27%
CCE
memory
20%
ECC
7%
CCC
correct
33%
Figure 18. Group 3 Distribution of error patterns by children aged 6 -6.10 years in the FB task. 
N=5. Ave. BPVS raw score 29.3 
EEE
11%
EEC
22%
ECE
salience
67%
Figure 19. Group 3 Distribution of error patterns by children aged 8.02 - 8.11 years in the FB 
task. N=5. Ave. BPVS raw score  54 
Figure 20. Group 3 Distribution of error patterns by children aged 6.11 -7.11 years in the FB 
task. N=5. Ave BPVS raw score  35 
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9.1.7 On and off task behaviours 
 
Age in months   72- 90 
(6-7.5 years) 
91-107 
(7.5-9 years) 
 N=8 N=7 
On task 70% 91% 
Off task 23% 7% 
No response  7%  2% 
Table 82. Group 3 on and off task behaviours seen across all tasks, split by age (on task includes 
pass and fails) 
Across all episodes the children were on task 79% of the time. This means they were engaged 
with attempting to answer the questions, even though they may have answered them 
incorrectly. The off task behaviours displayed tended to come from complete episodes;  children 
usually displayed off task behaviours by refusing to engage with a whole episodes, as opposed 
to disengaging with individual questions. This suggests that the off task behaviours seen were 
more to do with the episode as a whole rather than a child’s inability to answer a particular 
question. It does not appear that children were refusing to answer individual questions because 
they found them difficult, more so that they are not engaged with the episode in general. This 
may be because they were finding it difficult, or boring, to follow the false belief story and so 
‘switched off’ before the questions were asked. This is explored further in the qualitative analysis 
of individual case studies.   
As can be seen in Table 82 the number of off task behaviours is much larger in the younger half 
of the group. This suggests that this half of the group found it harder to access or process the 
tasks and resorted to more off task behaviours to avoid the tasks (for example both Misha and 
Rose put the dolls away in the box). The older half of the group were much more on task, even 
when they got the answers incorrect.  
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When the groups’ off task behaviours are mapped against their average BPVS raw scores (Table 
83), it appears that there may be some association between BPVS raw score and off task 
behaviour. 
 Age in years  
and months 
BPVS Average 
raw score 
Number of off task 
behaviours recorded 
Misha 6.0 u 5 
Shana 6.0 8 6 
Anna 6.0 13 3 
Rose 6.5 17 6 
Morris 6.1 27 0 
Pria 6.11 34 4 
Alice 7.1 41 1 
Laura 7.6 42 1 
Jake 7.7 43 0 
Louis 7.11 47 0 
Olivia 8.2 48 0 
Barney 8.5 52 0 
Scarlett 8.6 53 0 
Thomas 8.11 66 0 
Ruth 8.11 66 0 
Table 83. Group 3 Children’s BPVS scores and number of off task behaviours recorded, ordered 
by BPVS score 
As the BPVS raw score increases, potentially indicating a greater receptive vocabulary, the 
number of off task behaviours decreases, indicating more engagement in the task. Whilst this 
improvement in receptive vocabulary does not necessarily allow the children to successfully 
answer the questions in the tasks, as evidenced in the error pattern analysis above, it may have 
allowed the child initial access to the task which enabled them to engage with the story.   
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Episode FB1 FB2 FB3 
On task 95% 63% 80% 
Off task 5% 28% 15% 
No response 0% 9% 5% 
Table 84. Group 3 On and off task behaviours by FB episode 
Only one child displayed off task behaviour in the FB1 dolls episode (Table 84); this high rate of 
engagement in the FB1 episode may be accounted for by the fact that it was always first and 
therefore the children were more likely to be responsive. In the FB2 book episode five children 
showed off task behaviours. These five have some of the lowest BPVS scores and four are in the 
younger half of the group. Two of these children went on to display off task behaviours in the 
final FB3 tablet episode, indicating that they were finding all episodes difficult to engage with.  
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9.1.8 Digit span task 
 
The results of the digit span task were much as expected, no child in the group reached a digit 
span of over 3 and some were unable to access the task. 
Name Age in years  
and months 
Digit 
span T1 
Digit 
 span T2 
FB episodes 
correct 
BPVS Raw 
Average 
Anna 6.0 3 2 0 47 
Misha 6.0 1 u 0 17 
Shana 6.0 1 u 0 13 
Rose 6.5 u 1 0 27 
Morris 6.10 u 0 0 43 
Pria 6.11 2 1 1 42 
Alice 7.2 1 2 0 8 
Laura 7.6 1 1 1 41 
Jake 7.7 1 1 0 48 
Louis 7.11 u u 0 u 
Olivia 8.2 1 1 0 53 
Barney 8.5 1 1 0 66 
Scarlett 8.6 1 1 2 52 
Ruth 8.11 3 3 3 66 
Thomas 8.11 1 1 1 34 
u= unable to score 
Table 85. Group 3 Digit span task T1 and T2 
The only child who scored a digit span of 3 consistently was Ruth, who was also the child who 
passed all the false belief tasks and had one of the highest BPVS scores. However Anna also 
scored 2 and 3 on the digit span but did not pass a false belief episode.  
The results of the digit span tasks were confounded by the way the children responded to the 
task. As outlined in Chapter 6 a Numicon number line was used to enable the children to respond 
physically to the task rather than orally. However, the way the children used pointing in response 
to the task was surprising. Most of the children were able to point to single numbers in an initial 
check of their number knowledge. When two numbers were introduced many children used 
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both hands to point and kept each hand on each number. This meant they sometimes pointed 
to the two numbers simultaneously. When asked to point to three numbers the children found 
it difficult, because they only had 2 hands to use. Some tried to extend their fingers of one hand 
to point to the third number but would not lift their hand off the first or second number.  
Whilst this doesn’t help to give an accurate picture of the digit span of the group, it does 
illuminate some possible differences in the way children with Down’s syndrome may approach 
tasks. That the children were not able to point to the numbers one after another and had to 
keep their hand on each number could suggest that the way they approached the task was to 
remember all the numbers together, rather than to remember a sequence of numbers. This is 
further supported by the fact the children often got the order of the numbers wrong. This could 
mean that the children are unable to discard numbers they have already used in the sequence 
and but retain the sequence as a whole.  
9.1.9 False contents task 
 
Because the false contents task came at the end of the testing session it was not administered 
to seven of the children and so the results of the task have not been used in this analysis. In 
designing the session it was felt that the False Belief episodes needed to take precedence in 
order to gain some results in this area and the false contents task could afford to be ‘lost’ due 
to withdrawn consent. That the children were fatigued and withdrew consent at this point in 
the testing session was not unexpected.  
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9.2 Group 3 - Qualitative analysis 
 
Child Age at testing in 
years/months 
BPVS 
average 
score 
Seen at Reason for inclusion 
in case series analysis 
Misha 6y 0m 17 School Did not pass any FB 
tasks 
Anna 6y 0m 47 School  Answered some 
reality/memory 
questions correct   
Laura 7y 6m 41 Support 
group  
Passed 1 FB episode  
Ruth 8y 11m 66 School Passed all FB tasks 
Table 86. Group 3 Characteristics of the 4 children chosen for the case series study 
 Children were chosen for the case series by the same method as that used in the group 1 and 2 
case series and by the criteria set out in the flow chart in Appendix 7. Again it was felt important 
to explore the issue of markedly different development in similarly aged children, so 2 
participants aged 6 (Misha and Anna) were chosen for analysis.  Some of the decision making 
for this case series study also had to be based on the quality of video; because of this none of 
the male participants were able to be included. 
Qualitative analysis of group 3 follows the same rationale and sequence as that in group 1 and 
group 2.  
9.2.1 Eye contact and focus 
 
All four children were able to make eye contact with the researcher, but for some this was 
limited to particular moments or tasks. During the BPVS both Misha and Ruth looked to the 
researcher after they had pointed to each picture. It was possible that they did this either to 
gain feedback on whether they are correct or not (which is not given), or in anticipation of the 
next word. Laura did not look to the researcher at all throughout the BPVS and Anna often 
looked after the researcher had said a word, in order to have the word repeated. Misha also 
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looked to the researcher during the BPVS after she had said or signed something, possibly to 
check that the researcher has understood or listened. The BPVS may have set up a strange 
situation for the children as they were being asked to complete a task without any feedback as 
to whether they were correct or incorrect and this may have impacted on how they interacted 
with the researcher later on in the session.  
Misha - BPVS 
Pointing Eye contact/Focus Speech/speech sounds 
Points first to leaf 
Then to carrot (says aya)  
Then to apple 
Focussed on BPVS then looks 
to R when she says carrot. 
Watches R sign apple.  
Looks to BPVS to choose 
then back to R after 
choosing apple 
R: apple 
Misha: aya (carrot) 
R: apple (signs) 
Misha:apple 
 
Table 87. Group 3,  Misha looking to researcher after speaking and pointing, BPVS 
In the example in Table 87 Misha appears to check that the researcher has listened and 
understood her word and sign, indicating that she has some understanding that other people 
need to attend (either through listening or looking) in order to know. She checks that the 
researcher has listened to her speech (carrot) possibly with an expectation of response. 
However, throughout much of the session, Misha did not apply this principle to herself; she 
often did not attend (by looking) to the researcher when she was spoken to. 
Table 88. Group 3 Misha not looking at researcher when she is being spoken to, FB1 
Although Misha could apply her theory of ‘to see/hear is to know’ to other people, and ensured 
that they were attending to her when she spoke and signed, she did not seem to recognise that 
Misha – FB1 
Action  Eye contact/focus  Speech/speech sounds 
 Looking up towards the 
camera – not focussed on R 
or her hands 
R: Yeah? Ready? Where did 
Dinah hide her toy?  
Seems to almost go for the 
drawers pauses at them, 
then grabs quickly at the box. 
R takes box from Misha 
Looks down at box/drawers 
as they are moved 
R: Which one, can you show 
me? That one ok. 
Misha sits back, wriggles 
around, kicking feet under 
the table 
Looking under table at feet.  R: Ok so when Dinah comes 
back in, here she comes… 
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she also must attend in order to know. Of course, Misha may have been listening attentively to 
the researcher whilst looking under the table, but she gives no social indication of her attention.  
All four children, to varying degrees, ignore the social convention of looking at ones 
conversational partner whilst engaging with them, although there may be different reasons for 
each of them doing this.  Misha, as above in Table 88, was often distracted throughout the 
session and her focus wandered regularly. Anna however, did look to the researcher when she 
was answering the key questions from the episodes but rarely throughout the episodes, even 
when speaking directly to the researcher. 
Anna – FB3 
Action Eye contact/focus Speech and speech sounds 
Gets Dinah and her toy Doesn’t look up at R on 
answering q, focussed on 
the car 
R: Now what’s she going to do 
with her toy? 
Anna: Hide it 
R: Hide it, good girl 
Anna: Wooo (playing with car) 
 
Table 89. Group 3 Anna engaging with the researcher without making eye contact, FB3 
In the example in Table 89 Anna appears to be listening to the researcher, as she answers her 
question, but the toys she is playing with take her visual focus. Laura’s ability to engage with the 
researcher without looking at her was similar, she remained fixed on the toys for most of the 
session and answered questions without looking up. Ruth was able to answer all the 3 key 
questions correctly every time but she did not always look to the researcher when engaging in 
conversation with her, as can be seen in Table 90. 
Ruth – FB3 
Action  Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
Picks up Maxi doll, makes 
him get car out of bag, takes 
car to drawers and puts in 
blue drawer. 
 
Focussed on the Maxi doll Ruth: Get the car 
R: He’s going to get the car. 
That’s it. What’s he going to 
do with the car? 
Ruth: He put it in there. 
Drawer falls out, she puts it 
back in. 
Focussed on own actions with 
dolls 
Ruth: I can’t do it 
Table 90. Group 3 Ruth engaging with the researcher without making eye contact, FB3 
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It may be that for these four children to focus on the story line and the action in front of them 
is a more efficient use of their cognitive functions, such as working memory, than switching their 
gaze between the researcher and the activity. Ruth’s looking pattern in FB1 as seen in Table 91 
where she was observing the action and not being involved in the story line, is markedly different 
than the example in Table 90 when she was physically engaged with the action. 
Ruth – FB1 
Eye contact/focus Speech/Speech sounds 
Watching R’s hands and face R: I have got a girl here, this girl is  called 
Dinah,  
Watching R’s hands and face R: and the boy is called Maxi  
Looks at dolls  
Looking between R and dolls, points 
accurately  
R: Can you point to Dinah, that’s right, and 
can you point to Maxi, well done. 
Looks at Dinah when R says name. Then looks 
at toy in R’s hand 
R: Dinah has got a very special toy. Can you 
see? That’s Dinah’s toy. 
Watches R put the toy near Dinah, looks at 
Dinah  
R: She really loves it, it’s very special. 
Looking at the dolls, not the R. Glances at R, 
watches action  
R: She wants to hide it away so she’s going 
to put it in her drawer. 
Looks at R after she has put the toy in the 
drawer 
R: Shall we put it in? 
Table 91. Group 3 Example of Ruth’s looking pattern, FB1 
As FB1 is the first time the children hear and see the FB story, it could be that in the example in 
Table 91 Ruth was gathering information from a variety of sources in order to help her 
comprehend the story. When the children were on their third repetition of the story (FB3) they 
all appeared to have learnt some aspects of the story (the dolls names, the sequence of the 
action, for example) and were happy to be involved in telling the story. Potentially the more 
interactive storytelling in FB3 needed them to focus on their own actions and draw on their own 
internal resources to remember and act out the story, rather than look to the researcher for 
guidance.  
Despite the children’s lack of eye contact during the episodes, all four children make use of gaze 
switching between the researcher, her hands (as she is signing) and the toys when the 
researcher asks the 3 key questions at the end of the episode.   
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Misha – FB1 
Action  Focus and eye contact Speech and speech sounds 
  
   
   
glances at R, then at own hair 
(playing/chewing) then at 
Dinah, big smile  
 
R:Dinah’s coming back in 
now 
glances at box on Maxi, goes 
immediately for box before q 
is finished.  
looking at R and her hands 
signing.  
R: I’ve got some questions. 
Misha, where did Maxi hide 
the toy? 
 
 glances at R – with big smile R: Good girl 
goes straight for the box, R 
intercepts  
 
watching the signing, glances 
at R   
 
R: Where did Dinah hide the 
toy? 
R taps Dinah’s head, Misha 
copies. 
looking at dolls R: Where did Dinah hide the 
toy.  
Misha: phhhhh  
 
 looks at R, then down R: Can you remember? Shall I 
ask again? 
Misha: (nods) 
 
 
Anna – FB1 
Goes to take box, R moves it 
back    
When box is moved back 
Anna goes to take drawers 
focussed on r, then box R: Where did Dinah put her 
toy? 
 focussed on drawers then 
looking at Dinah 
R: Just wait. Can you point to 
where Dinah put her toy? 
 looks at R after pointing R: Can you point to where 
Maxi put the toy? Aww 
 looking at R then at Dinah 
doll 
R: Point to where you think 
Dinah is going to look for her 
toy. 
Anna: di (unint)  
Takes doll from R and makes 
Dinah ‘look’ in the drawer 
focussed on Dinah and then 
drawers 
R: Where is she going to look 
for her toy? 
Anna: There 
 
Laura – FB1 
 glances up to R’s face (before 
she says her name), then 
watches her hands 
R: Laura, where did Maxi 
hide the toy? 
 looking at the box Laura: The box  
R: good talking 
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reaches towards the box, 
picks it up and opens it 
watches R’s hands signing 
then looks at drawers 
R: Where did Dinah hide the 
toy? Good looking. 
 
R takes box and puts lid back 
on and places back on the 
table  
focussed on box R: Well done, so, oh waiting, 
put the lid back on,  
Laura: unint 
R: just put it back on that’s it. 
 
 looks to Dinah, follows R’s 
hands  
R: So when Dinah comes 
back in and she wants to look 
for her toy where is Dinah 
going to look 
 looks at box Laura: there 
 
Ruth – FB1  
  Glances at R, watches her 
hands, looks to Maxi, 
watches the action  
Looks at R 
R: Maxi really wants Dinah’s 
toy, so he is going to get it 
out of the drawer and he is 
going to hide it in his box  
 Looks at R whilst she is 
asking the question 
R: Can you remember, where 
did Dinah put the toy?  
 Looks at drawers Ruth: In there 
R: That’s right 
 Looks at R as she asks the q R: and where did Maxi put 
the toy? 
 Looks at box Ruth: In there 
 Looks at R, glances at the 
drawers whilst q is being 
asked, then back to R 
R: So when Dinah comes 
back in where is she going to 
look for the toy? 
 
 Looks at drawers and then R 
whilst pointing 
 
Table 92.Group 3 Misha, Laura, Anna and Ruth’s gaze switching when the researcher is asking 
key questions 
Even though all four children are able to switch their focus during the final questions, this does 
not appear to have any relation to whether they are able to pass the task or not. This may 
suggest that it is not lack of attention to the questions which is causing the children to fail the 
task. Whilst there is evidence of children losing focus (Misha in Table 88 above, for example) this 
appears to be at least after the first question is asked. This indicates that there may be a  
comprehension difficulty rather than a lack of focus preventing access to the questions. Whilst 
they may attend to the final questions, they may not understand the concepts underlying them, 
which leads to incorrect answers.   
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An understanding of the FB storyline however, may be observable through the children’s looking 
patterns as seen in Table 93. All four children looked towards the researcher when she suggested 
that Maxi was going to take Dinah’s toy. This could be some indication that they are aware of 
the social and moral aspects of the story and that they are able to attribute some sense of 
ownership to the dolls (this is explored in more depth in the discussion section).  
Misha – FB1 
Action Eye contact/ focus Speech/ speech sounds 
very quick glance at drawers 
then back to Maxi 
 R: But look who’s come. 
Maxi. 
 looks at R then at floor then 
back to R 
R: He wants Dinah’s toy. 
 looks at drawers  
takes toy out of drawer, 
gives it to Maxi 
 R: He’s going to go and get 
it. That’s it. Ohhh Maxi. 
 
Anna – FB1 
R tries to take maxi, but 
Anna holds on to him 
focussed on Maxi R: Maxi really wants Dinah’s 
toy, he really want to play 
with it 
 looks to R  
helps to take toy out of 
drawer and hide in the box 
focussed on the toys – 
watching the action –  
R: He’s going to take it out of 
the drawer and he’s going to 
hide it in his box 
Anna: laughs 
 
Laura – FB1 
 looking at Maxi doll  R: well, Maxi is quite cheeky 
 watching Rs hands, looks to 
her face when she signs hide  
R: He’s going to take her toy, 
and he’s going to hide it 
somewhere else 
 watching the action  R: maxi’s going to take 
Dinah’s toy, he’s going to 
play with it, and he’s going 
to hide… 
Laura: whispers unint 
R:  …it in his box 
 
Ruth – FB1   
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 glances at R, watches her 
hands, looks to Maxi, 
watches the action  
looks at R  
R: Maxi really wants Dinah’s 
toy, so he is going to get it 
out of the drawer and he is 
going to hide it in his box  
Table 93. Group 3 Misha, Laura, Anna and Ruth looking to the researcher when she suggests 
that Maxi is going to take Dinah’s toy 
 That the children looked to the researcher at this point is not indication in itself that they 
understood the nature of the story, however their looking at the crucial point when Dinah came 
back in to find her toy, may provide further evidence of their understanding of the story.  
Anna – FB1 
Action Eye contact/ focus Speech/ speech sounds 
 focussed on the Maxi doll 
but glances at R 
R: Let’s put Maxi over here, I just 
want to pop him over here. 
Dinah is going to come back 
now. 
takes chest of drawers 
and moves then towards 
her, then allows R to 
push them back  
looking at drawers then 
focussed on Dinah 
R: ok 
 
Laura – FB1 
smiles at Dinah and Maxi 
dolls  
looks towards Dinah’s 
drawers, then looks 
towards Dinah  
R: Dinah is going to come back 
inside, here she is, she’s coming 
back. Oh hello, hello Maxi 
Table 94. Group 3 Anna and Laura looking to where Dinah hid her toy on Dinah’s return 
As seen in Table 94, Anna and Laura looked towards the place where Dinah hid her toy (not the 
place where the toy currently is). Laura passed one episode and Anna was able to correctly say 
where Dinah will look, but got the memory questions wrong on two episodes. This supports the 
suggestion developed in the discussion section below that some of the participants may be 
developing their theory of false belief, but are struggling with conflicting theories.  
Ruth – FB1 
Eye contact/ focus Speech/ speech sounds 
looks at R, glances at the drawers whilst q is 
being asked, then back to R  
R: so when Dinah comes back in where is 
she going to look for the toy? 
looks at drawers and then R whilst pointing  
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Table 95. Group 3 Ruth looking at her answer before the researcher has finished asking the FB 
question 
In the example in Table 95 Ruth, who passes all the FB episodes, did not look to Dinah’s initial 
hiding place when Dinah was reintroduced to the story, possibly because her false belief theory 
is secure enough and she is not experiencing any conflict of theories. Ruth glances at her answer 
whilst the researcher is asking the final  question, further indicating that there is no conflict for 
her, she is sure of her answers. 
The children’s eye contact and focus indicates a number of areas worthy of exploration 
throughout the rest of the case series analysis of group 3, and follow on from group 1 and group 
2 analysis:  
a. Varying patterns of looking at the researcher are not necessarily indicative of the level of 
attention being paid to the task.  
This group did not show any consistent patterns in their looking behaviours; switching 
between the researcher and the task did not necessarily mean a better understanding of the 
story or its underlying principles. This is consistent with evidence from group 2 where gaze 
switching was also unrelated to passing or not passing tasks, but contrary to group 1 whose 
participants’ were more successful when they were able to gaze switch.  
b. Participants looking may indicate a moral/social understanding of the story. 
That the children looked to the researcher when Maxi was about to be ‘naughty’ may 
indicate that they understood the story on a moral or social level, and therefore were able 
to attribute some ‘character’ to the dolls.  
c. Children’s looking may indicate emerging knowledge. 
That 2 of the participants were able to look Dinah’s correct hiding place when she returned 
to the story, even though they were incorrect in their answers, could show that they are 
struggling with conflicting theories.  
d. Children’s use of checking that others had received their communication was limited.  
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That the children used looking to the researcher at points where they were being asked a 
question and when there was some sense of moral injustice, may indicate a developing 
sense of their understanding that ‘to see/hear is to know’, however this is not consistently 
applied.  ‘To see/hear is to know’ may be a late developing skill, and one which underpins 
the FB task. The data from all of our groups suggests that the theory of ‘to see/hear is to 
know’ is difficult for this group of children to build. Although able to switch gaze when the 
researcher was asking questions, all the children in this case series showed some evidence 
that this theory was not secure; they often did not look at the researcher whilst engaging 
with her. It could be that the children were able to apply the theory to themselves but have 
not yet applied this theory to others. This may mean they are also unable to apply the theory 
to Dinah and so are unaware that if she is ‘not there’ she cannot see what is happening to 
her toy.  
9.2.2 Speech and signing 
 
Consistent with the group 2 findings, the children in group 3 used very little sign and very little 
unsolicited speech. As suggested in group 2, by this age the participants may have been aware 
and wary of the unusual test situation and of an unfamiliar adult. Indeed many of the 
participants were more vocal and communicative in their second sessions. All of the participants’ 
in this case series study were able to respond verbally to the task, however this is not 
representative of the whole of group 3. Two of the children were not verbally proficient enough 
to use speech, but were able to respond through physical means and through vocalisations.  
Very few children in the whole of group 3 used sign and only Misha in this case series study 
produced any number of signs (5 altogether). Misha is the youngest in the whole group 3 cohort 
(she had just turned 6 when she was visited) and showed a low BPVS average score. Her signing 
was used in support of her speech (rather than instead of), but it was very sparse across the 
session. That such little signing was used in group 3 was a surprise to the researcher, however 
230 
 
 
 
all the children in this case series study appeared interested in and focussed on the researcher’s 
use of sign. Much of their gaze moved between the researcher’s hands and the toys as is evident 
in Table 96. 
Misha –FB1 
Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
Looking at R and her hands signing. Glances 
at box on Maxi  
 
R: I’ve got some questions. 
Misha, where did Maxi hide the toy? 
 
Anna - FB1 
Looking at the doll R: this girl, she’s a girl and she is called 
Dinah 
Anna: eee 
R: Dinah 
looking at the dolls, then watches R’s hands 
then looks to her  
Anna: cavah (Dinah) 
R: this boy, the boy is called Maxi 
 
 
Laura – FB2 
looking at appropriate picture,  
watches R as she signs  
R: he’s hiding it here, and what colour’s his 
cupboard? 
Laura: green 
R: lovely talking yeah he’s put it in the 
green cupboard 
 
 
Ruth – FB1 
watching R’s hands and face   
  
R: I have got a girl here, this girl is  called 
Dinah 
watching R’s hands and face R: and the boy is called Maxi 
Table 96. Group 3 Misha, Anna, Laura and Ruth watching researcher’s hands as she signed 
Whilst it is impossible to suggest what impact the researcher’s signing had on the outcome of 
the tasks, it is notable that all 4 of the case series study children paid attention to her signing.  
A particular use of speech from this group was designed to move the researcher away from the 
task and onto a topic more appealing to the child. This happened most commonly during the 
BPVS. 
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Misha - BPVS 
Pointing Body language Eye contact/focus Speech/speech 
sounds 
points at picture of a 
bag 
head down, rubbing 
eyes 
looks to R after 
pointing, then looks 
at table 
Misha: Ba 
R: There is a bag, 
listen 
points at belt and 
moves finger round 
  Misha: round 
 
points at zip (almost 
without looking) 
rubbing head, 
moves head down 
towards the table 
looking vaguely at 
BPVS, then at table 
R: Listen, belt 
points very quickly to 
incorrect picture 
without looking at 
BPVS 
 looks up to R  R: Look at me Misha, 
belt 
good girl 
Table 97. Group 3 Misha using speech to redirect the researcher and draw attention to her 
chosen topic, BPVS 
In the example in Table 97 Misha had become distracted during the BPVS and may have been 
finding the words at this stage a bit difficult. Rather than giving up however, she chooses to 
engage the researcher in discussion of her own chosen words, instead of the more difficult ones 
chosen by the researcher. Anna used a similar tactic when she attempted to engage the 
researcher in discussion about a picture which interested her (although note, she doesn’t make 
eye contact with the researcher throughout the exchange in Table 98). 
Anna - BPVS 
Action Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
points to a picture focussed on BPVS Anna: What those 
R: Hopping (not in response to 
Anna’s question)  
 good girl 
helps turn page focussed on BPVS – doesn’t 
look at R during exchange 
Anna: Look, look 
R: Oh, what’s she doing? 
Anna: Climbing 
R: That’s right she is on the 
climbing frame 
Anna: Me too 
Table 98. Group 3 Anna changing the topic to talk about a picture which interests her, BPVS 
Laura and Ruth displayed no off task speech and most of their speech was in response to 
questions.  
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Because most of the speech from the case study series participants was in response to questions, 
their responses were very short and limited to one or two word answers. However, as seen in 
Table 99, all four children increased their speech in the FB3 episode.  
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Participant FB1 FB3 
Misha Maxi unintelligible  
BPVS score 17 oh oh oh 
Age 6 y bye baby 
 phhhh hide toy 
 where bye 
  blue 
  out 
  no there 
  no  
  der, der 
Anna eee yeah back again 
BPVS score 47 Cara (Dinah) what’s that? 
Age 6 y you have Maxi  sit her down 
 there x2 hide it 
 in there swimming 
  Maxi 
  in there 
  coming back 
  he’s sitting down x2 
  you two  
Laura Maxi Dinah 
BPVS score 41 yeah Maxi 
Age 7 y 6 m Bye bye Dinah and Maxi 
 unintelligible car 
 the box yeah x4 
 there out a walk 
  bye Dinah 
  bag 
  a blue 
  that one 
  the tablet 
Ruth bye who’s that 
BPVS score 66 in there x2 Dinah 
Age 8 y 11m  yeah yeah x11 
  bye Dinah 
  him 
  he put it in there 
  I can’t do it 
  that’s a bit close 
  err, the toy back 
  in the bag 
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  it’s in there 
  in there 
  I don’t know x2 
Table 99. Group 3 Comparison of amount of speech in FB1 and FB3 episodes, by participant
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Although much of their speech was still in response to the researcher’s questions, the children 
contributed much more in the FB3 episode. Ruth in particular changed not only how many 
utterances but also the length and complexity of them.   
This change in verbalisation may be as a result of two elements. Firstly in FB1 they were 
introduced to the Dinah/Maxi story and so they had to focus on following the story. By FB3 they 
had heard the story twice and many of the group were able to remember the characters and the 
plot. This may mean they were not using as much working memory to process the immediate 
task and therefore had mental capacity to generate more speech.  
Secondly the children were much more involved with the FB3 episode; they were encouraged 
to act out the story themselves using the dolls, to make decisions about where the toy wold be 
hidden and to take photographs of key moments using the tablet. This may have given the 
children more opportunity to engage verbally either in response to researcher’s questions or by 
commenting on their own actions.  In addition to these aspects of the episodes, the FB3 episode 
also took place towards the end of the session, the ‘stranger effect’ of the situation and the 
researcher may have lessened as the session wore on.  
Throughout the session the children used 3 main types of speech; speech in response to a 
question, repetition of the researcher and independent speech. 
 
 Speech in response to a 
question  
Repetition of the 
researcher 
Independent speech 
 
Misha (In between tasks) 
R: what can you see 
Misha: apple 
R: that’s right that’s an 
apple. 
R: can she hide her toy? 
Misha: hide…toy 
R: can she hide 
(plays with box – puts toy 
back in and hides it under 
the table) 
Misha: where? 
R: where, good girl, are 
you doing my job? 
Anna R: what colour’s this 
cupboard?  
Anna: green 
R: green  
 
R: that’s right, inside the 
white cupboard 
Anna: (whispers) white 
Anna: stairs 
R: yeah that’s some stairs. 
Anna: round there round 
there 
R: that’s right 
Anna: and there 
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Laura R: Laura, where did Maxi 
hide the toy? 
Laura: the box 
R: good talking 
R: Ok this time her 
special toy is a car 
Laura: car 
(WM) 
R: can you point to 5,4 
Laura: finished 
R: alright that’s fair 
enough 
Ruth R: Ruth, where did Dinah 
put the toy? 
Ruth: in the bag 
 (BPVS) 
R: jogging 
Ruth: jogging (whisper) 
R: well done 
R: shall we find him where 
is he 
Ruth: there 
R: there he is 
Ruth: that’s a bit close 
Table 100. Group 3 Types of speech used by participants. All examples from a FB episode 
unless otherwise stated 
Both the repetition and the answer types of speech tended to be used within tasks and were 
often limited to one or two words. For Anna, Laura and Ruth their independent speech was more 
directive (as in Laura’s example in Table 100) or descriptive (as in Anna’s example in Table 100) 
and often used more than one or two words. This suggests that eliciting speech through 
questioning may not be an effective way of encouraging this group of children to use and widen 
their vocabulary. 
Two of the participants, Misha and Ruth, repeated the researcher’s words during the BPVS. 
Misha - BPVS 
Pointing Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
Points as says word glances away then back to 
pics  
R: duck 
Misha: duck 
R: good talking 
hesitates whilst says the 
word 
looks at pics then to R after 
choosing then back to BPVS 
R: mouth 
Misha: mouth 
R: good girl 
points at a picture then signs 
on arm 
Points again after R says 
jumping 
focussed on BPVS Misha: (before R says word) 
dud (jump) 
R: listen to the word. 
Jumping 
good girl that was lovely 
signing 
 
points to cake then to spoon 
when prompted 
looks over the top of the 
BPVS after pointing – 
perhaps to TA? 
R: spoon 
Misha: ta (cake) 
Misha:spoon 
R: good girl nice talking 
 
Ruth - BPVS 
mouths word whilst looking 
at pics 
 R: delivering 
good looking Ruth  
 glances to R  R: desk 
Ruth: desk (whisper) 
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good 
 focussed on pics  R: jogging 
Ruth: jogging (whisper) 
R: well done 
smiles as she points focussed on pics R: binoculars 
you spotted those 
mouths word focussed on pics R: astronaut 
well done 
Table 101. Group 3 Misha and Anna repeating the researcher’s words during the BPVS 
Both of the examples in Table 101 were at the beginning of the BPVS, after these examples 
Misha repeats another three words during the task, Ruth repeats another five.  
 
Participant Word repeated Set given in 
BPVS 
Correct pointing Incorrect 
pointing 
     
Misha duck 1st   
 mouth 1st   
 jumping 1st   
 spoon 1st   
 apple 1st   
 aeroplane 2nd   
 dancing 3rd   
     
     
Ruth delivering 1st   
 desk 1st   
 jogging 1st   
 astronaut 1st   
 jewellery 1st   
 rough 2nd   
 vehicle 2nd   
 sorting 2nd   
 bannister 3rd   
Table 102. Group 3 Misha and Ruth’s repetition of words and pointing patterns during the 
BPVS 
As seen in Table 101 for both participants there was no consistency with their correct or 
incorrect answers according to whether they had repeated the word or not. Both girls repeated 
more at the start of the BPVS, perhaps indicating that they were working out the task 
requirements and the rehearsal helped them to retain the word whilst also remembering the 
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task instructions. That the children repeated words during their first set of pictures in the BPVS 
(Ruth and Misha started on different sets of pictures, appropriate for their ages) suggests that 
these words were in their vocabulary. This may mean that later words which were repeated but 
an incorrect picture was pointed to, were in fact within their vocabulary but they were unsure 
of how they might be pictorially represented.  
Considering the areas in speech and signing identified in group 1 and group 2, the analysis from 
group 3 offers some interesting developments, as well as some additional areas for exploration: 
a. Communication is not always recognised as a 2-way exchange. 
In groups 1 and 2 the participants’ use of speech and sign was not always specifically 
directed to the researcher, there seemed to be a limited understanding that to see/hear is 
to know. This is reflected somewhat in group 3, where a lack of eye contact during 
communication may indicate this theory is not securely embedded. However, in group 3 the 
participants took part in the questions and answers and responded appropriately to the 
researcher, so appeared to have an understanding of the nature of communicative 
exchanges.   
b. Communication can be used to redirect the task or situation. 
By group 3 this theory appears to be securely embedded and some of the children use 
sophisticated verbal means to redirect the researcher to their own knowledge and interests. 
c. Questioning may not enhance communication  
That the children’s responses were more extensive when they were self-directed may 
indicate that when given this freedom they are more able to generate and produce longer, 
more complex sentences.  
d. Action may promote speech  
239 
 
 
 
All the children spoke more in the FB3 episode where they were able to act out the story; 
FB3 gave rise to longer sentences and more description. This may also have been as a result 
of reduced questioning and intervening by the researcher or that the children were more 
comfortable with the testing situation.  
 
9.2.3 Gestures and pointing  
 
 Similar to groups 1 and 2 the use of gestures in this group was limited, perhaps even more so. 
Most gestures used were culturally defined (nodding, waving) with the exception of Misha and 
Anna, who used some gestures to aid their description. 
Misha - BPVS 
Gesture Speech/speech sounds 
points at picture of belt and moves finger 
round 
Misha: Round 
 
 
Anna - BPVS 
mimics bow and arrow R: oh yeah, she’s got a bow and arrow hasn’t 
she. 
Anna: unintelligible 
Table 103. Group 3 Misha and Anna using  gestures for description 
In both of the instances in Table 103 the children are describing, through gesture, something 
they potentially do not yet have the vocabulary for. Through gesture they are able to 
communicate some component of the picture to the researcher.  
The children also used pointing to share information and knowledge with the researcher, 
although the interplay between pointing and communication was more complicated than that 
of the gesturing. Initially the children were asked to use pointing to show their knowledge in the 
BPVS, for many children in this group, as in group 2, this proved a difficult skill to sustain. All the 
children began the BPVS paying attention to the pictures and the researcher, pointing accurately 
at the pictures, but as the test continued their pointing became more erratic and unclear.  
Misha - BPVS 
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Pointing Action Eye contact/focus  Speech/speech 
sounds 
points at zip (almost 
without looking) 
rubbing head, moves 
head down towards 
the table 
looking vaguely at 
BPVS, then at table 
R: listen belt 
points very quickly 
to incorrect without 
looking at BPVS 
 looks up to R  R: look at me Misha, 
belt 
good girl 
points at tractor 
(before looking at all 
pics) 
bend up over the 
table 
looking at BPVS, then 
at R’s papers 
R: farmer 
well done 
points before word 
is said 
 at BPVS R: thumb 
points before word 
is said 
  R: listen  
castle 
loud back ground 
noise (counting in 
French) 
points to house 
(incorrect) 
after asked 2nd time 
points in a vague 
way 
smiles at R, then 
when she asks again 
bends head down 
over table  
looks at BPVS and 
then up to the R 
when signs home, 
then looks down at 
table, then looks up 
to BPVS and then 
immediately up to R 
after pointing and 
smiles 
Misha: unintelligible,  
(then signs home) 
R: castle. that is a 
house you are right 
which one is castle 
points in a cursory 
way incorrect 
leaning across the 
table, leg up in the air 
 R:listen, empty, 
empty 
Table 104. Group 3 Misha’s pointing during the BPVS 
Misha’s focus appeared to be waning in the example in Table 104;  she was finding it difficult to 
concentrate and was physically very active. Her incorrect answers may not have been indicative 
of her actual verbal comprehension level, but more indicative of her lack of focus and ability to 
persevere when the task became increasingly difficult. Her pointing became vague and she often 
pointed before the word had been said or without really looking at the pictures.  
Laura and Anna also showed erratic and irregular pointing behaviours such as pointing before a 
word had been said, not looking the pictures before pointing and pointing in quick succession to 
more than one picture. This level of irregularity was not confined to the BPVS; all the children in 
this case series study also found pointing at the number line difficult in the working memory 
task. They all used 2 hands to point to 2 numbers, rather than point to the numbers in 
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succession. This meant pointing to three numbers was very difficult. Some of the children also 
used a full hand point, possibly to disguise the fact they were unsure about what to point to.  
If pointing in these two tasks was so irregular there must also be a question over how reliable 
the participants’ pointing was in the FB task. Although the children appeared to be making a 
choice, it is worth questioning whether they were able to control and monitor their own 
pointing.  
Considering the pointing and gestural behaviours of groups 1, 2 and 3, the continued themes for 
discussion are: 
a. Gestures are culturally defined rather than an addition to language, or used in imitation. 
In fact in this group, most gestures used were culturally defined. There were fewer 
gestures and these most consistently these came from the child with the most limited 
verbal language.  
b. Pointing may be used as a communicative (instrumental) device.  
In this group the children had begun to use pointing to communicate their answers, 
albeit in an irregular way. They appear to understand how pointing works as a way to 
direct your partner and show your knowledge. No pointing to distract the researcher 
was seen. However, see point c.  
c. Pointing may not be a reliable indication of knowledge or ability in this group 
Children’s pointing was so erratic and unreliable that it may not be an effective way of 
eliciting children’s knowledge. 
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9.2.4 Body language and social interaction 
 
In analysing this area, as with groups 1 and 2, clear themes began to emerge. Some which were 
specific to this group and others which follow on from group 1 and 2 analysis.  Redirecting the 
task is a common theme in all 3 groups, but task interpretation and small world play will also be 
discussed in this analysis. 
Redirecting the task 
As with group 1 and group 2 analyses, much of the children’s interaction was focussed on 
redirecting a task through a variety of means. The redirection falls loosely into 3 categories, all 
of which have been seen at various points with groups 1 and 2:  
a. changing the task to self-directed play 
b. refusing the task 
c. engaging with the researcher – sharing knowledge 
 
a. Changing the task to self-directed play 
 
Three of the 4 the participants in this case series attempted to change the task by playing with 
the equipment in a different way than the researcher was requesting, as is seen in Table 105. 
Participant Example of redirection 
Misha – WM Points to all numbers in backward sequence and recites them. When gets 
to the end takes number line and turns it over. 
Anna - BPVS Turns the page of BPVS herself after choosing, tries to turn folder round. 
Turns the next page, then moves BPVS to show TA the pictures. 
Laura – FB3 R: ok, who’s going to come back? 
Laura picks up Maxi and makes him ‘go out’ 
R: oh is he going out as well, I think we need to have them both in, shall 
we have them both in? 
Laura: yeha 
Table 105. Group 3 Misha, Anna and Laura changing the task to self-directed play 
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In each of these examples, although all the participants are self-directing, they appear to be 
doing it for different means. Misha was finding the WM task very difficult and was disengaged 
with the task, by directing her own play she was able to show the researcher that she was able 
to do, what she felt she could succeed in. In this instance the off task behaviour may have helped 
the participant feel re-engaged and successful. Anna however may have been trying to control 
the play herself. She was displaying signs of boredom just before the sequence in Table 105 and 
then took over the play. Laura redirects the episode by changing the story and making the Maxi 
doll ‘leave the scene’. Shortly after this example, when the researcher attempted to ask the key 
questions, she took the dolls and threw them into the researcher’s box, finishing the task. Laura 
may have been changing the story line to prevent the researcher from asking the questions she 
found hard to answer.  
b. Refusing the task.  
Two participants used physical means to finish a task before the researcher had completed it. 
Participant Example of redirection  
Misha – FB3 Picks up Maxi and throws him away in R’s box. Throws all the other toys in 
the box. 
Lays on the table.  
Laura – WM Laura folds up number line 
R unfolds number line  
R: can we try one more?  
Laura: yeah 
R: one more good thank you  
R: can you point to 5,4 
Laura folds up number line and says ‘finished’ 
Table 106. Group 3 Misha and Laura physically redirecting a task 
Both of the participants in Table 106 were finding the tasks difficult and were possibly finding a 
way to end the task because they were uncomfortable with the task difficulty.   
c. Engaging with the researcher – sharing knowledge.  
Misha and Anna both engaged with the researcher at a number of points in order to share their 
knowledge with her (Table 107). It could be that, as they found the tasks difficult, they were 
keen to direct the researcher to something they found more interesting and more available for 
them to discuss. 
Participant Example of redirection  
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Misha – BPVS R: hopping 
Misha: (points to picture) look 
R: what’s she doing 
Misha: (gestures climbing) eh 
R; that’s right she’s climbing isn’t she this girl. 
Anna – FB2 Anna: (pointing at steps in picture) stairs 
R: yeah that’s some stairs. 
Anna: round there round there 
R: that’s right 
Anna: and there 
Table 107. Group 3 Misha and Anna engaging with the researcher to share their own 
knowledge 
 
All the above examples give an indication of the variety of means the children employed to move 
away from a task which was either not engaging or too difficult. These strategies are very similar 
to those identified in groups 1 and 2 with a key difference in verbal language ability. The children 
in this group were more verbally adept (which may be a group effect as much as an age effect) 
which gave them an added skill to employ when avoiding tasks.  
Notably absent in the above tables are any examples from Ruth. Ruth remained on task 
throughout the entire session and completed all the tasks without requesting to stop.  
Task interpretation and prior knowledge 
In an attempt to understand why the children’s approaches to the tasks were so different, the 
response of each participant to the key questions in the FB episodes was examined, considering 
what knowledge they appeared to bring to their answer. It is possible that the prior knowledge 
the children brought to the task directly influenced how they interpreted the FB task. For 
example, Misha appeared to interpret the FB task as a simple ‘where is’ game. This is shown by 
her own game at the end of the session in Table 108. 
Misha – FB3 
Action Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
plays with box – puts toy 
back in and hides it under 
the table 
  
pops up from below table  Misha: Where? 
R: Where? Good girl, are you 
doing my job! 
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takes lid off box and shows it 
to R 
looks toward R, looks at box Misha: ah. dudu. 
R: did you find it? 
Table 108.Group 3 Example of Misha recreating the FB task using a ‘where’ game 
Misha’s understanding of the storyline could have been limited to each doll hiding and then 
finding the toy; an understanding based on desire psychology without the complexity of belief, 
similar to that outlined by Wellman (1990) in his description of 2 year olds. Therefore when she 
is told a doll wants the toy, she finds it for them. Although she understood the nature of hiding, 
it doesn’t appear that she was clear on the nature of hiding so someone else doesn’t know where 
it is. A common mistake young children make when playing hide and seek (Peskin & Ardino, 
2003), which is evidenced in her asking the researcher ‘Where’ in the above example (the 
researcher has just seen her hide the box). Misha’s theories of the physical world (her naïve 
physics) and of others’ psychology (her naïve psychology) were potentially not yet at a point that 
she understood ‘to see is to know’, or more importantly in hide and seek, ‘to not see is to not 
know’. Misha’s responses to the FB1 questions were to reach for the box where the toy was 
hidden (in fact before the researcher could finish the questions), this could indicate that her 
primary concern was that the Dinah doll got the toy she desired and the questions were 
somewhat superfluous.  
Anna’s responses were very mixed; in her FB3 answers she found it difficult to conceptualise the 
toy in any place other than where it actually was. She responded by pointing to the current 
whereabouts of the toy, as though the only question being asked was ‘Where is the toy?’. If 
Anna’s prior knowledge did not include secure schemas of ‘time’ or ‘past’ then she may have 
only comprehended the task within the present tense. The questions regarding where the toy 
was hidden, may have been understood as ‘where is the toy’.  This misunderstanding may not 
be a language comprehension difficulty, but a lack of conceptual framework regarding time and 
sequencing. Anna’s other responses are more complex, in both FB1 and FB2 she pointed to the 
incorrect places of where the toy was originally hidden and it’s current whereabouts (i.e. she 
got these answers the wrong way round), but the correct place of where Dinah would look for 
the toy.  
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Anna – FB1 
Action Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
takes doll from R and makes 
Dinah ‘look’ in the drawer 
focussed on Dinah and 
then drawers 
R: where is she going to 
look for her toy? 
Anna: there 
opens drawer and finds it 
empty, goes to box and opens it 
focussed on own actions, 
looks up to R when she 
finds the toy 
Anna: in there 
R: it’s not in there 
Anna: there 
Table 109. Group 3 Anna’s response to the final question in FB1 
In the example in Table 109 Anna would not point to her answer but took the Dinah doll from 
the researcher and ‘made her look’ in the drawers. This would seem to indicate that Anna was 
able to attribute some internal life to Dinah, by ‘making her real’. Although during this session 
Anna did not get any FB episodes correct, during her second session she did pass one of the 
episodes. This suggests that Anna could be developing a psychological theory of false belief, 
similar to the sequence of unpredictable passing and failing suggested by Flynn et al. (2004). 
Possibly her developing theory of false belief was undermined by lack of a secure foundational 
knowledge of time and sequencing, particularly with reference to temporal vocabulary (‘is’ and 
‘was’).    
Laura, however, appears to bring some prior knowledge of time to the tasks. She was able to 
accurately remember where the toy was, and know where the toy currently is.  
Laura – FB1 
Pointing Action Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
  glances up to the R’s 
face – before she 
says her name. Then 
watches her hands 
R: Laura, where did Maxi 
hide the toy? 
points to the box  looking at the box Laura: the box 
R: good talking 
points to drawers  watches R’s hands 
signing then looks at 
drawers 
R: where did Dinah hide 
the toy? 
good looking,  
 reaches towards 
the box, picks it up 
and opens it. R 
takes box and puts 
lid back on and 
places back on the 
table 
focussed on box R: well done, so, oh 
waiting, put the lid back 
on  
Laura: (unintelligible) 
R: just put it back on 
that’s it 
  looks to Dinah, 
follows Rs hands 
R: so when Dinah comes 
back in and she wants to 
247 
 
 
 
look for her toy where is 
Dinah going to look  
points to the box  looks at box Laura: there 
Table 110. Group 3 Laura’s correct answer to the memory and reality questions, but incorrect 
answer to the FB question 
Laura’s consistent answering of the memory and reality questions, on all three FB episodes, 
shows that her schema for time was at such a level she understood that a state had occurred 
and that it no longer existed (the toy had been in the drawers, even though it was no longer 
there). Laura’s interpretation of the task appeared to be as memory game, answering questions 
about where the toy was and is. Potentially her lack of understanding of the final question as 
psychological, rather than physical, means she misinterpreted the question. Perhaps what Laura 
found difficult was the concept that Dinah did not know that the toy has been moved; that she 
had a false belief. Laura’s false belief schema may not be sufficiently secure for her to be able to 
answer the false belief question correctly all the time. That Laura was able to pass the FB2 but 
not the other two episodes may show that she was developing and testing out her theory of 
mind theory but it was in conflict with her simpler ‘desire’ based theory (Dinah wants the toy so 
she will go to the place where it is). This inconsistent passing of the false belief task is consistent 
with that seen in the Flynn (2006) study.   
For Ruth however there appeared to be no such conflict; she securely answered all three 
questions correctly on all the episodes in both her sessions. She appeared to bring to the task 
her prior knowledge of time, sequencing, memory, and crucially an understanding of mental life. 
She bestowed on Dinah not only false belief, but by FB3 a problem solving ability. A seen in Table 
111, after she had made Dinah hide her toy in her bag, she tried to make sure Maxi wouldn’t be 
able to get it by making Dinah leave the scene with the toy in her bag:  
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Ruth – FB3 
Action Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
 looking at the toys R: and now what’s Dinah going 
to do? 
makes Dinah pick up her bag 
and starts to make her ‘go out’ 
  
  R: she’s going to take her bag is 
she?  
Ruth: yeah  
Table 111. Group 3 Ruth using problem solving to prevent Maxi getting the toy 
Even though Ruth was able to utilise her understanding of naïve psychology to pass the task, she 
was unable to explain Dinah’s internal state.    
Ruth – FB3 
Action Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
takes bag from R, makes 
Dinah look in the bag 
looking at bag, smiling R: what’s going to happen when 
she looks in the bag? 
Ruth: in there 
playing with toys looks at R R: oh, what’s she going to think 
Ruth: I don’t know 
Table 112. Group 3 Ruth and the researcher discussing the FB task 
Although in the example in Table 112 the researcher only asked the question in passing (it wasn’t 
part of the task), Ruth was unable to further express Dinah’s false belief. This is similar to how 
typically developing children initially respond to questions about false belief; they are able to 
pass the task but are unable to explain how they reached their conclusion (Amsterlaw & 
Wellman, 2006).  
The 4 children in this case series appeared to bring a variety of prior knowledge to the tasks 
which may have impacted on their interpretation. Their responses to the tasks may have been 
dependent on where they were in developing their naïve theories of physics and psychology. 
Small world play  
A key feature of the FB task, which is automatically assumed when using the tasks with typically 
developing children, is that the participants are able to attribute character to the dolls. There is 
an assumption that when the researcher presents the dolls, the children will know that they are 
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expected to pretend they are biological entities with internal thoughts. On reviewing the case 
series videos, it became apparent that the children in this study were not reliably able to do this.  
Small world play requires a similar ability as pretend and symbolic play in that it requires the 
child to take on a dual role, that of a narrator and that of the character.  It is akin to symbolic 
play in its nature as it requires the understanding of the symbolic function of the small world 
figures; they are representing the real thing (Bretherton, 1984). When engaged in small world 
play children use the figures as puppets, speaking for them and attributing physical and mental 
states to them. Only Ruth was able to instinctively do this. 
Ruth – FB3 
Action Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
 glances at R then back 
to toys 
R: I think she might be a bit sad 
Ruth: yeah 
R: yeah and she’ll have to ask 
Maxi, Where’s my toy? Where’s 
my toy? 
Holding the dolls, acts out 
Dinah asking Maxi  
looking at toys Ruth: I don’t know (being Maxi) 
Table 113. Group 3 Ruth using the dolls in small world play 
In the example in Table 133 Ruth was able to make the dolls ‘talk’ to each other and even 
affected a different voice for Maxi. She could pretend the dolls were biological and psychological 
entities who had the same attributes as real people.  
The other three children in this case series study did not show the same signs of attributing a 
psychological life to the dolls, but Laura and Anna did show some understanding of pretending 
the dolls were biological entities who do physical things. In the example in Table 114 they are 
able to suggest new things that Dinah could do when she goes ‘out’, unprompted by the 
researcher. 
Laura – FB3 
Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
focussed on the toys R: Bye. Where’s she going to go this time 
Laura? 
Laura: out a walk 
R: out for a walk?  
Laura: yeah 
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Anna – FB3  
focussed on own activity R: where’s Dinah going now? 
Anna: swimming 
R: she’s going outsi…she’s going where? 
Anna: swimming 
R: she’s going swimming, ok, that’s fine she 
can go swimming that’s good, bye Dinah 
Table 114. Group 3 Laura and Anna attributing physical actions the Dinah doll 
That Laura and Anna were able to do this suggests that, whilst their understanding of naïve 
biology is developing (living things have actions) and they could attribute this to the dolls, they 
had not yet developed an understanding that living things also have mental states, or 
psychology. They were able to make the dolls ‘do’ but they were unable to make the dolls ‘be’.  
That all the children are able to attribute ownership to Dinah may appear to contradict this 
argument: 
Misha – FB1 
Action Eye contact/focus Speech/speech sounds 
R takes Dinah doll.  
Moves drawers as Misha 
tries to get them. Shows the 
toy, moves it into her eye 
line 
looking at toy and drawers R: Dinah has got a special 
toy. Here. Are you looking? 
can you see? that’s Dinah’s 
special toy. Can you give it to 
her 
Misha takes it and gives the 
toy to Dinah 
Focussed on Dinah and the 
toy 
R: That’s right. Its really 
special 
 
Anna -  FB1 
takes toy from R, then holds 
it up to Dinah 
looks at toy then out 
window? 
R: look, this is Dianh’s special 
toy. that’s her favourite toy. 
that’s Dinah’s favourite toy. 
that’s right it her’s 
 
Laura – FB1 
takes toy when R hands it to 
her  
watching R’s hands  
puts toy on table watching the toy R: so Dinah has got a really 
special toy, look. it’s her 
favourite toy 
Laura puts toy near Dinah, 
Dinah falls over, R sits her 
back up 
looking at toys  R: can you give it to Dinah? 
that’s it oh Dinah! 
Table 115. Group 3 Misha, Anna and Laura attributing ownership to the Dinah doll 
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Although in the example in Table 115 Misha and Laura are prompted to ‘Give Dinah the toy’ by 
the researcher, all three children are able to show that Dinah ‘owns’ the toy by giving it to her, 
and later helping her to hide it and then find it.  
However, the ownership that is attributed may well belong to a physical understanding of 
belonging together (i.e. categorising) rather than on a psychological level. Giving Dinah her toy 
attributes ownership, but doesn’t necessary confer on her a character or inner life. For example 
ownership terms are used about inanimate objects, for example ‘that toy belongs in the garden’. 
This doesn’t imply that the garden has a psychological life, but it does suggest that the garden 
‘owns’ the toy, or at the very least that they belong together. That all the children in the case 
series are able to do this suggests that they have begun to understand categorising and ordering, 
an essential skill in their cognitive development (Tager-Flusberg, 1985). 
In following these four children’s interpretations of the FB task it is possible to suggest areas of 
the children’s development which impact heavily on their ability to access the tasks, and which 
potentially affect the way they behave and respond to the tasks.  
a. Prior knowledge influences how the children perceive the task.  
Because of the lack of homogeneity in this group and the way data has been analysed it 
is possible to suggest that the prior knowledge children bring to the tasks has a profound 
effect on the way they perceive the task. It can be suggested from the case series 
analysis that children who have no understanding of the psychological theory that we 
all have ‘minds’ are unable to perceive the task as anything other than a hide and seek 
task. Those children who lack sound knowledge of ‘time’ and ‘sequencing’ are unable to 
access the comprehension detail of ‘is’ and ‘was’ in the questions. When this 
understanding begins to develop access to the memory and reality questions may be 
enabled, but it may be not until all these areas of prior knowledge and psychological 
theory building converge that children are able to pass the tasks.  
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b. Off task behaviours may indicate a lack of foundational knowledge. 
Three children in this case series study behaved in a variety of off task ways, all of whom 
found the tasks difficult, possibly because of their lack of foundational knowledge. Much 
of the off task behaviour was designed to engage the researcher with a topic the child 
wanted to communicate about, potentially bringing the session back within the child’s 
understanding. The 1 child who was able to pass the tasks did not display any off task 
behaviours.  
9.2 Group 3 - Interim discussion  
 
From the quantitative and qualitative data discussed above a developmental pathway that the 
children in this group may take can be suggested. The analysis of their pass and fail rates has 
little to offer in this account but the way they moved from passing to failing, as evidenced in 
their error patterns, gives some potential insight. Coupled with behavioural observations it is 
possible to suggest that the children in this group follow a similar pattern of moving from failing 
to passing the False Belief task as typically developing children, but with some potentially 
important differences in the way this is achieved and the time it takes.  
One child in this group, Louis, was unable to access any of the tasks set. As has been stressed 
right through this work, it is of upmost importance that every child in the study is included in 
the analysis as they represent the heterogeneous nature of individuals with Down’s syndrome. 
As Louis could not perform any of the tasks it could be concluded that he did not have any of 
the skills which he was being tested for. However it may equally be suggested that the tests 
were not presented to him in the right way, or that, had he been presented with tasks from 
group 2, he may have shown some engagement. Louis was able to follow instructions (such as 
‘hide the toy in the drawer’) and did show some engagement with the Dinah/Maxi story. As he 
did not answer any questions his interaction could not be recorded in the quantitative results 
nor, as he was not part of the case series, in the qualitative results. However the clear focus of 
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this research on ensuring all children with Down’s syndrome, regardless of perceived ability, are 
considered in research and practice runs throughout the following Whole Group analysis, Impact 
and Further Research chapters. 
One of the main responses observed in this group was the use of the error-correct-error 
(Salience) strategy to answer the questions. This response suggests that the children were 
unable to restrict their prepotent response of pointing to where the toy actually is. These 
children may have a lack of inhibitory control, as suggested by Borella et al. (2013). This would 
not be unusual in the development of theory of mind skills as Flynn et al. (2004) and Perner and 
Lang (1999) suggest that executive controls are an important development which happens 
before (Flynn et al., 2004) or at the same time as (Perner & Lang, 1999) false belief 
understanding. However for children with Down’s syndrome it may take much longer for them 
to develop the required control to prevent their prepotent response (Rowe et al., 2006).  
At this point in development the children in this study may have been using prior knowledge in 
the form of schemas for ownership and categorisation (Mervis & Pani, 1980), but these may not 
support the mental understanding implied in the story. Level E1 representations allow the 
exchange of ‘procedural components’ (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995, p.20.) across domains to follow 
the practical elements of the story, but representations may not enable a social interpretation 
of the story. Understanding may be further constrained by poor concurrent processing and 
storage (Carney et al., 2013) and the demands on weak executive functions (Carney et al., 2013; 
Lanfranchi et al., 2010) may make accessing the tasks very difficult.  Children using skills at this 
point in development  may be using a range of off task behaviours, such as ‘where’ games, 
verbally engaging the researcher and playing with the dolls, to move the session to a level they 
feel more comfortable with. This suggests that they may have an implied understanding of ‘I 
know that I don’t know’ but may be unable to articulate this or indeed even have a 
metacognitive understanding of their own abilities  (Kuhn, 2000).  
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The children in this study appeared to develop in the way they responded to the FB task by 
employing memory strategies to answer the first two questions correctly. This implies that 
changes have taken place which have a) released some of the constraints on the working 
memory system and b) allowed for the development of schemas regarding time-sequencing. 
The working memory system can now recall both places in which the toy has been hidden, 
suggesting a potential increase in capacity or that capacity has been ‘freed up’. A new ability to 
supress the prepotent response (pointing to where the toy actually is on all three questions) is 
also apparent, suggesting that the inhibitory response mechanism has developed. Perhaps a 
newly developed understanding of temporal sequencing, usually seen by 3 years old in typically 
developing children (Bauer & Mandler, 1992), enables the child to organise its memory 
effectively allowing for correct encoding and retrieval. Representational ability may not be very 
different than in the children described above, it appears still grounded in an empirical 
understanding of events (Rast & Meltzoff, 1995) and does not yet take into account hypothetical 
situations.  
This is evidenced in the children’s inability to judge the doll’s actions on anything other than a 
desire based reasoning (Dinah wants the toy, so she will go to the place where it is). Bartsch and 
Wellman (1995) suggest that even when desire reasoning is developing into a belief/desire 
psychology the desire aspect is more potent for the child and they are unable to supress the 
desire over the belief (although Wellman has since gone on to slightly review this stance in 
(Wellman, 1990). Representations may still be constrained by the sharing of ‘procedural 
components’ rather than the consciously available representations which Karmiloff-Smith 
describes at level 2 explicit (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995).  
The children at this point of development  appear to have some ability to attribute actions and 
ownership to the dolls, suggesting they understand others at least as biological entities who can 
‘do’ and can ‘have’ (Wellman, 1990). These children are good at using a variety of skills such as 
using speech to talk about their own interest, playing with the toys and refusing to engage, to 
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redirect the researcher. This suggests they could be using their social cognition to control the 
test situation, even though they may not be able to use it in the false belief task. This is 
supported by Dunn (1988) who describes typically developing children’s early use of social 
understanding in social situations such as arguments with parents and playing with siblings, far 
earlier than is seen in experimental work. 
The children in this study seemed to move from using a Memory response in their answers to 
the questions to using mixed strategies which incorporated the Memory, Salience and Correct 
responses. It could be that children at this point in development are using some trial and error 
type strategies in order to work out the correct response to the task (however this is complicated 
in the FB task as the correct response results in finding no toy). Children using these responses 
may look to the correct place either when Dinah comes back in to find her toy, or when the 
researcher asks the final question, suggesting they are developing an implicit understanding of 
false belief, similar to finding in typically developing children of around 2 ½ - 3 (Clements & 
Perner, 1994). 
 An implicit understanding shows that the children seem to be able to ascribe beliefs and desires 
more securely and they may be developing their understanding that Dinah’s belief does not align 
with the true state of the world. This is seen in the way children at this point are beginning to 
act out with the dolls, ascribing to them desires (Dinah wants her ball) or creating novel actions 
for them (Dinah is going swimming). However old schemas persist, such as action based only on 
desire, which leads them to use a range of strategies to attempt the task. This instability of 
response leading up to secure performance in false belief tasks was also found in Amsterlaw and 
Wellman (2006) and in Flynn et al. (2004).  
Children at this point may be undergoing a period of representational change which sees the 
sharing of information across domains which are now accessible to consciousness, as in level 2 
of Karmiloff-Smith’s theory of representational redescription (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995). This may 
account for the children’s ability to modify their responses in so much as they are consciously 
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able to monitor their own behaviour. It could be suggested however that this level of 
representational ability is not secure at this point. Representations and the development of 
schemas may still be restricted by the simultaneous spatial working memory which is unable to 
process following where the toy is in the story and simultaneously following Dinah’s false belief. 
Although Dinah’s false belief may not appear to need a spatial representation, in order to 
understand her false belief the child must spatially represent her being out of the ‘room’ and 
therefore unable to see (and therefore know) that her toy has been moved. 
 Language comprehension barriers may still exist for children working at this point, particularly 
when attempting to decode the final question. Children need to be able to understand the 
implied part of the question ‘Where will Dinah look for her toy given that she did not see it being 
moved?’. Without understanding this the question may still be interpreted as ‘Where does Dinah 
need to look to find her toy?’. It may be that developing this linguistic understanding is an 
essential component to being able to develop false belief understanding (San Juan & Astington, 
2012). The phonological loop system may also be implicated (Jarrold, Baddeley, & Phillips, 1999), 
potentially impacting on how well the children can remember and store the questions.  
The final response seen in group 3 was an ability to answer all the questions correctly all the 
time. When discussing this however, we must bear in mind that this was only observed in one 
child in group 3. However, other children did use the correct response some of the time, so 
examples from their responses can also be drawn on. The children working at this point seem to 
have an understanding of false belief.  Their underlying schemas have changed to support the 
idea that people’s beliefs do not always align with the true state of the world, and potentially 
many schemas are able to be called upon at one time (for example, a hiding schema, a ‘to see is 
to know’ schema, an ‘ownership’ schema as well as a ‘false belief’ schema). A developed 
representational ability, potentially at a level E2 of Karmiloff-Smith’s description, allows for the 
interaction of these schemas to problem solve (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995). The children have now 
developed a meta-representational ability; they can represent the contents of other’s minds and 
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can use that information to inform their own thinking (Perner, 1991). Or in Wellman’s (1990) 
terms they have developed a subjective interpretive model rather than a direct - copy model. 
However it still appears that, for the children in this study, the movement to Karmiloff-Smith’s 
E3 level of representational ability may not have happened (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995). This level is 
an explicit level of conscious representation which is able to be described linguistically.  Although 
there has almost certainly been some development in language comprehension in order to 
access the final question, gains in expressive language may not have been as successful and 
therefore may prevent articulation of knowledge. Amsterlaw and Wellman (2006) found that 
verbal mentalistic explanations were the last kind of explanation to be developed with typically 
developing children.  
That children working at this point can follow the task’s practical elements and simultaneously 
follow Dinah’s beliefs suggests that their working memory and executive functions have 
developed to a point which no longer constrain this skill. This is not to suggest that these systems 
are now working effectively as we know that adolescents and adults continue to have difficulties 
(E. K. R. Bird & R. S. Chapman, 1994; Rowe et al., 2006) but they may be working at a good 
enough level to allow for the task demands. Similarlily the phonologial loop system may be 
working at just enough capacity to retain and store the questions. Children at this point are able 
to engage in small world play to attribute beliefs, desires and false belief to inanimate objects 
(in this case, dolls).  
Through the description of the quantitative and qualitative data, a pattern of development 
towards the acquisition of theory of mind has been outlined. This develomental pattern follows 
loosley that which is seen in the typically developing population. However, the routes which a 
child with Down’s syndrome may have taken to achive this may be different. Constraints from 
working memory, execuitve functions, prior knowledge and representational ability may all 
impact on the child’s ability to develop their theory of mind, and may force the child to use 
alternative means to express their knoweledge. The particular tradjectory described above is 
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outlined below in Figure 21 which shows how the development of social cognition and theory 
of mind may occur in children with Down’s syndrome. Table 116 describes this trajectory by 
linking the observations from this study to prior research.  
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9.3.1 Group 3 - Simple description of the development of theory of mind skills observed 
 
Increase in complexity of cognitive skill 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Repetition in play to 
secure prior schemas 
needed 
 
Problem solving relies on 
old schemas 
 
Higher demands on EF 
making access to the tasks 
difficult 
 
Redirection shows an 
understanding of others’  
minds as different than 
own (containing different 
knowledge) 
Understanding of people 
as possessors of things 
and as ‘doers’  
Able to attribute 
ownership to dolls 
 
Desire understanding 
overrides developing 
belief 
  
Focus on social aspects of 
task (Dinah’s needs) 
 
Difficulty interpreting 
questions 
Understanding of people 
as possessors of beliefs 
and desires 
 
Some developing 
understanding that belief 
guides action, but desire 
schema overrides 
 
Language barriers to 
question comprehension 
still persist 
Understanding that beliefs 
do not always align with 
reality but unable to explain 
verbally 
Language comprehension 
has developed enough to use 
existing schemas (time, FB) 
to work out questions 
Figure 21. Group 3  Simple description of the development of theory of mind skills observed 
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9.3.2 Group 3 - Synthesis of qualitative and quantitative data and prior research 
 
 
 Qualitative and quantitative data linked to prior research   
Increase in 
complexity 
of 
cognitive 
skill 
 
  
Description of 
qualitative 
behaviours observed 
Description of 
quantitative findings 
Prior knowledge and 
schemas 
Representational 
ability  
Working memory 
and executive 
function  
Development of 
social 
cognition/theory of 
mind 
Child plays own 
simple game, such as 
‘where’ to engage 
the researcher 
Redirects the 
researcher by 
refusing the task or 
using speech and 
sign to talk about 
something else 
Grabs at toys before 
questions are 
finished  
Gives the toy to 
Dinah—wants Dinah 
to have her toy back? 
Remembers the plot 
and character names 
Fails all FB episodes 
Uses Salience (Error-
Correct-Error) 
response 
Off task behaviours 
recorded 
Inconsistent pointing 
in the BPVS, uses 
pictures as a way to 
distract the 
researcher 
  
 
Play schemas limited 
to dolls as objects 
rather than symbols 
Simple  ownership 
schema (things 
belonging together) 
 
Representations at 
level E1, elements 
able to be shared 
across domains 
Representations 
allow following of 
story 
In task inhibitory 
control unable to 
prevent prepotent 
response (salience) 
 
Storage capacity able 
to retain story but 
cannot concurrently 
store and process 
Repetition in play 
to secure prior 
schemas needed 
 
Problem solving 
relies on old 
schemas 
 
Higher demands on 
EF making access 
to the task difficult 
 
Redirection shows 
an understanding 
of other’s mind as 
different than own 
(containing 
different 
knowledge 
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Redirection through 
engaging researcher 
Attributes ownership 
and action to dolls 
 
Follows events 
accurately 
 
Looks between the 
researcher and toys 
on key questions 
Fails task  
 
Memory response 
(Correct—Correct—
Error) 
 
Off task behaviours 
recorded 
 
Time schema in place  
 
Belief/desire schema 
developing? 
 
Dolls as symbols 
developing  
 
Dual representation 
allows for pretend 
play with dolls 
 
Story representation 
still empirically based  
 
Inhibitory control still 
preventing the 
inhibition of salience 
 
WM is able to store 
the detail of the story  
 
Understanding of 
people as 
possessors of 
things and as 
‘doers’  
Able to attribute 
ownership to dolls 
Desire 
understanding 
overrides 
developing belief  
Focus on social 
aspects of task 
(Dinah’s needs) 
 
Complex redirection 
strategies 
Small world play with 
dolls 
Follows story events 
and is able to change 
them 
Looks to correct 
place but gets 
answers incorrect 
Looks between 
researcher and dolls 
on key questions 
 
Mostly fails task 
Mixed strategy 
responses (ECE, CCE, 
CCC) 
Some off task 
behaviours recorded 
 
Belief/desire schema 
in place 
False belief schema 
emerging 
 
Undergoing 
representational 
change to be able to 
use information from 
a number of domains 
 
Able to supress 
prepotent response 
Simultaneous spatial 
WM unable to 
process false 
Understanding of 
people as 
possessors of 
beliefs and desires 
Some developing 
understanding that 
belief guides 
action, but desire 
schema overrides 
Language barriers 
to question 
comprehension still 
persist 
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 Attributes 
ownership, action 
and a mental life to 
dolls 
On task all the time  
Follows events 
accurately  
Shows problem 
solving abilities 
Looks between the 
researcher and toys 
on key questions  
 
Correct response  
 
False belief schema 
developing  
A number of schemas 
in use at one time 
 
Meta representation 
allows flexible 
thinking across 
domains 
 
Executive control 
developed enough to 
allow for concurrent 
processing and 
storage 
 
Understanding that 
beliefs do not 
always align with 
reality but unable 
to explain 
Language 
comprehension has 
developed enough 
to use existing 
schemas (time, FB) 
to work out 
questions 
 
Table 116. Group 3 Synthesis of qualitative and quantitative data and prior research 
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Chapter 10: Whole group analysis and 
discussion 
 
This section briefly details a number of analyses which have not been covered so far and which 
relate all three of the groups in this study.  
10.1 Use of prompts  
An important element of the testing procedure was that the children were given extended time 
to answer questions and that they were given prompts to remind them of the task if they failed 
to engage (see the protocols in Appendix 2). In designing the tasks it was felt important to give 
the children the time and support they needed in order to access the tasks as fully as they could. 
However very few children needed prompting to engage with and pass a task.  
Group Prompts resulting in pass Out of number of trials 
1 7 120 
2 7 76 
3 3 130 
Table 117. All groups Number of prompts per group resulting in a pass (not including prompts 
resulting in task failure) 
The figures in Table 117 suggest that the children were either easily able to focus on the task 
thereby not needing prompts to engage with the questions, or they failed the task (with or 
without prompts). However this does not mean that they understood the questions or were 
responding appropriately to them. In fact, many children were observed reaching for toys before 
a question was finished. This may suggest an understanding that a question was being asked, 
but the content of the question was irrelevant to the child. An inability to inhibit a physical 
response whilst listening to input or a question may prevent the child from being able to fully 
access a task.   
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From the results in Table 117 it may also be questioned whether repeating a question for a child 
with Down’s syndrome actually helped or hindered them in problem solving and answering 
questions. It may be that repeating the question forced the child to begin the process of 
decoding the question from the beginning again, thereby interrupting the child’s initial decoding 
process. The more prompts given the more times the child has to restart their decoding process. 
By the third prompt the child may have (understandably) given up and therefore a fail is 
recorded. This could have serious implications for the way questioning is used in schools and by 
parents and carers. When questions are re-asked, especially if they are rephrased and therefore 
creates a ‘new’ question to decode, it may prevent the child from having ‘thinking time’ and 
therefore being able to reach an answer.    
10.2 Stop card 
Four children in group 3 chose to use the stop card during the session to finish a task or to take 
a break. However 6 chose to finish tasks through other means, such as tidying the toys away or 
refusing to engage with a task. Since this was a new method for the children to use, there is 
some doubt as to whether its use was fully understood.   
As part of the testing session the adult who was present at the session was given a feedback 
form to complete (see Appendix 4) which asked for their opinions about the tests and how the 
child had performed. The carers and teaching assistants responses to the stop card were 
positive, suggesting that this is a support which may be useful in a range of environments.  Table 
118 shows comments made by parents and teaching assistants regarding the stop card.  
Group and author Comment 
Group 2  
Teaching assistant “Great gives ownership to the child over the activities in a non-
verbal way.” 
Teaching assistant “Have not used this idea before.” 
Parent “Fabian hasn’t used this strategy before so I’m not sure if he fully 
understood this.” 
  
Group 3   
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Teaching assistant “Liked the idea of a ‘stop’ card. It was a simple, straight forward 
command to let the adults know they had had enough.” 
Parent “A fantastic idea. Was worried initially that she would say stop 
straight away but enjoyed the tasks.” 
Teaching assistant “Thomas currently does not express any needs/wants – unsure 
whether his use of card was used in the correct way.” 
Parent “Good idea – though Rose will vocalise when she has had enough.” 
Teaching assistant “A great visual piece. Anna didn’t need to use it though.” 
Teaching assistant “Misha didn’t initiate the use of the stop card when she had had 
enough. It seemed like a good visual back up for confirming that 
she wanted to finish. I would normally sense that she had had 
enough and she usually agrees to do ½ more.” 
Teaching assistant “Thought it was a useful tool for the child to be more in control of 
their own self when in a more ‘abstract setting’ i.e. when not 
familiar with persons and tasks before them.” 
Table 118. Parent and TA responses to the use of the stop card 
 
10.3 Language questionnaire 
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 how and what mental state language is used around a child can 
affect their ability to label their own and other’s mental states (Beeghly et al., 1986; Tingley et 
al., 1994). In this study very simple information about the types of language used with each 
participant was collected via a parent questionnaire (see Appendix 3) which focussed on terms 
for labelling internal states: think, like, want, play, know, remember, pretend, tired, worried, sad 
and frightened. Tables 119, 120 and 121 show parent reporting, from all groups, of the way they 
use language around their child.  
 
target word examples Never Once a 
month 
Once a 
week 
Daily 
think ‘I think it’s here.’ 
 ‘Where do you think it goes?’ 
II   IIIIIIIIII 
like ‘I really like this song.’ 
‘Do you like bananas?’ 
  I IIIIIIIIIII 
want ‘I want you to go in there.’ 
‘Do you want a drink?’ 
   IIIIIIIIIII
I 
play ‘I’d like to play with this.’ 
‘What are you playing?’ 
  I IIIIIIIIIII 
know ‘I know where you’re hiding!’ 
‘Do you know whose house this is?’ 
 I IIIII IIIIII 
remember ‘Hmm, I can’t remember that.’ III  IIIII IIII 
266 
 
 
 
‘Can you remember where it is?’ 
pretend ‘It’s ok, I’m just pretending to be sad!’ 
‘Can you pretend to be a mouse?’ 
IIII II IIII II 
tried ‘I’m so tired, is it bedtime yet?!’ 
‘Are you tired?’ 
   IIIIIIIIIII
I 
worried ‘Is she worried she will be late for school?’ IIIIIII I III I 
sad ‘Why are you sad?’ 
‘I’m sad because I banged my toe.’ 
 II III IIIIIII 
frightened ‘The little mouse was frightened of the snake’.  IIIII III III I 
Table 119. Group 1 Mental state vocabulary questionnaire responses, N=12 
target word examples Never Once a 
month 
Once a 
week 
Daily 
think ‘I think it’s here.’ 
 ‘Where do you think it goes?’ 
 I I I 
like ‘I really like this song.’ 
‘Do you like bananas?’ 
  I II 
want ‘I want you to go in there.’ 
‘Do you want a drink?’ 
   III 
play ‘I’d like to play with this.’ 
‘What are you playing?’ 
  I II 
know ‘I know where you’re hiding!’ 
‘Do you know whose house this is?’ 
 I I I 
remember ‘Hmm, I can’t remember that.’ 
‘Can you remember where it is?’ 
I  I I 
pretend ‘It’s ok, I’m just pretending to be sad!’ 
‘Can you pretend to be a mouse?’ 
I  I I 
tired ‘I’m so tired, is it bedtime yet?!’ 
‘Are you tired?’ 
   III 
worried ‘Is she worried she will be late for school?’ I II   
sad ‘Why are you sad?’ 
‘I’m sad because I banged my toe.’ 
  III  
frightened ‘The little mouse was frightened of the snake’.  I  II  
Table 120. Group 2 Mental state vocabulary questionnaire responses, N=3 
target word examples Never Once a 
month 
Once a 
week 
Daily 
think ‘I think it’s here.’ 
 ‘Where do you think it goes?’ 
 I 
 
I 
 
IIIIIIIIII 
 
like ‘I really like this song.’ 
‘Do you like bananas?’ 
   IIIIIIIIIII
I 
 
want ‘I want you to go in there.’ 
‘Do you want a drink?’ 
   IIIIIIIIIII
I 
 
play ‘I’d like to play with this.’ 
‘What are you playing?’ 
  I 
 
IIIIIIIIIII 
 
know ‘I know where you’re hiding!’ 
‘Do you know whose house this is?’ 
  II 
 
IIIIIIIIII 
 
remember ‘Hmm, I can’t remember that.’ 
‘Can you remember where it is?’ 
I 
 
 IIIII 
 
IIIIII 
 
pretend ‘It’s ok, I’m just pretending to be sad!’ I I IIIIII IIII 
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‘Can you pretend to be a mouse?’     
tired ‘I’m so tired, is it bedtime yet?!’ 
‘Are you tired?’ 
  II 
 
IIIIIIIIII 
 
worried ‘Is she worried she will be late for school?’ III 
 
II 
 
IIIII 
 
I 
 
sad ‘Why are you sad?’ 
‘I’m sad because I banged my toe.’ 
  IIIIIIII 
 
IIII 
 
frightened ‘The little mouse was frightened of the snake’.  I 
 
IIIII 
 
IIIII 
 
I 
 
Table 121. Group 3 Mental state vocabulary questionnaire responses, N=12 
Whilst these snapshots do not give a fully rounded picture of the parents use of language with 
their child, it is possible to see that in all groups (considering that group 2 only had 3 responses) 
there is daily or weekly use of simple mental state terms such as ‘think’, ‘like’, ‘want’ and ‘know’. 
In group 1 ‘remember’ and ‘pretend’ are used less frequently but by group 3 this had increased. 
The least used words were ‘worried’ ‘sad’ (group 1) and ‘frightened’, suggesting a similar pattern 
to the lack of negative state words in the Tingley et al. (1994) study. Overall the parents in this 
study used a variety of mental state terms with their children on a daily or weekly basis and this 
pattern does not appear to change markedly with the ages of the children.  
10.4 BPVS 
As discussed throughout, the inclusion of the BPVS in the testing and analysis of this study was 
contentious. It was understood from the outset that the BPVS may not adequately capture the 
children’s comprehension levels. On administering the tests the researcher felt that the children 
were not always showing their true ability and this was confirmed by the comments of the 
teaching assistants and parents who were present at the sessions. As can be seen in Table 122 
the adult who was present at the session was given the opportunity (in the feedback 
questionnaire, Appendix 4) to comment on how effectively they thought the BPVS captured the 
child’s receptive vocabulary. They were given space to write an open comment about how they 
felt the child responded to the test. 
Author Comment 
Teaching assistant “The child appeared to be pointing to a picture even as the word 
was said – anticipation, recognition of a familiar picture? Did see 
some evidence of self-correction.” 
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Teaching assistant “Great focus to begin with but half way through a picture triggered 
thoughts and to contribute info verbally giving more detail. Then 
figetty.” 
Parent “Fabian’s attention reduced as the task progressed and he got 
some wrong which he knows. There were one or two that he 
knows but didn’t point to. Sometimes impulsively pointed to the 
first picture he focussed on.” 
Parent “Answered most accurately to her knowledge. Only a few I would 
say she knows at home but got wrong (1 or 2).”  
Teaching assistant “Felt slightly that didn’t always do the child justice as to their 
capacity and potential. Interesting as sometimes felt child knew 
certain things but it appears the child did not.” 
Teaching assistant “Watched with interest at how some of the vocabulary used was 
quite difficult but Scarlett got some of the trickier ones correct.”  
Teaching assistant “The picture scales were appealing to Misha. She enjoys showing 
off her vocab knowledge. She turned off the task when they 
became more difficult and she began to get a few wrong. Maybe 
some more simpler words mixed in may have kept her going for 
longer.” 
Teaching assistant “Anna did enjoy this, however she did get a little unsettled after a 
while.” 
Parent “Gets bored quickly then gets words wrong on purpose.” 
Teaching assistant “Ruth is very eager to please and sometimes points at the wrong 
picture bit then thought about it and changed her answer – good 
to see.” 
Teaching assistant “Some right/wrong that I didn’t expect – noticed often chose 
bottom left of picture when unsure (Thomas left handed).” 
Table 122. Group 2 and 3 Parents’ and teaching assistants’ responses to the BPVS 
Many parents and teaching assistants ticked the boxes ‘Knew more words than I expected’ and 
‘Got word wrong which I think he/she knows’ indicating that the child’s performance was 
inconsistent and potentially unreliable, as has also been suggested in the raw score data. As seen 
in the group 2 and group 3 analyses, the BPVS data does not clearly relate to any other factors 
in this study, for example pass and fail rates or off task behaviours. Along with the inconsistent 
pointing evidence that was seen in the group 3 case series analysis, the data evidence from the 
BPVS must be treated as an incomplete and potentially unreliable picture of the children’s 
language comprehension ability. 
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Chapter 11: Whole study findings and 
discussion  
 
This chapter brings together the three discussions from the individual group analyses. The 
developmental trajectories outlined in earlier chapters are synthesised to map out firstly the 
behavioural changes observed across the groups, and then to suggest what cognitive changes 
may be taking place to create those behavioural changes. 
Through individual group analysis developments in the children’s behaviour, which are 
potentially underpinned by cognitive changes, have been described. To try and bring this 
information together is a complex task. In order to synthesise the analysis from all three groups, 
firstly behavioural and then cognitive changes will be described. Finally the two areas will be 
synthesised to describe a possible trajectory for the whole group’s development of theory of 
mind skills.  
The behavioural change description will show how particular behaviours persisted throughout 
the different age groups and describe how some were restricted to particular groups. How 
cognitive changes may constrain or allow conceptual change across the whole group will be 
explored and by drawing together these two descriptions a development of theory of mind for 
individuals with Down’s syndrome will be described. In Chapter 12 this development is discussed 
in terms of the educational implications and the support of individuals with Down’s syndrome. 
Before the whole study findings are considered, comparisons with typically developing groups 
must be discussed. Although reference has been made throughout this thesis to when typically 
developing children reach particular milestones or develop skills, it has been done with the note 
of caution raised in Chapter 2. It would be possible to compare the trajectory described below 
with that of typically developing children and indeed such comparisons may produce some 
interesting discussion points. However as suggested earlier such comparisons may encourage 
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the ‘delay or deviance’ debate which pits ‘normal’ against ‘not normal’ and forgoes the right of 
those with developmental disabilities to have a ‘typical’ trajectory of their own which is as valid 
as any other. In terms of comparing the trajectory being described to that of typically developing 
children there are two specific points to consider; 
1. Although what is being described behaviourally appears to proceed in a similar manner 
to a typical trajectory there are important underlying cognitive differences which 
individuals with Down’s syndrome must work with in order to reach a similar end point. 
According to a neuroconstructivist approach, small differences in the brain at birth may 
mean that the ‘route’ a child with Down’s syndrome may take to develop a skill may be 
very different to that of a typical child.  
2. The development described here covers 7 years (ages 2 to 9 years). A typical time frame 
for theory of mind development is between 3 and 4 years (between the ages of 1 – 5 
years). This would seem to suggest that individuals with Down’s syndrome do indeed 
have developmental delay, working at roughly ½ their chronological age. However as 
can be seen in the descriptions that follow, constraints placed on cognitive development 
mean that whilst it may appear that individuals with Down’s syndrome have merely 
delayed functions, underlying that delay may be different processes and routes of 
progression to the same end point.  
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11.1 Behavioural developments seen across the whole cohort 
 
Seen 
at 
ages 
Joint attention Imitation Off task behaviours Pretend play/symbolic play TOM/ 
social 
understa
nding 
Gaze 
switching 
Pointing/ 
directing 
 Refusing task 
– no 
response 
Refusing task 
– physical 
means 
Refusing task 
– self-
directed play 
Refusing task 
– redirecting 
researcher 
Pretend play Symbolic 
play 
 
2-3 
4-5 
6-9 
no gaze 
switching 
pointing at 
an image  
imitation of 
practical 
aspects of 
task 
looking 
away/ 
avoiding the 
task 
walking 
away from 
task 
     
2-3 
4-5 
gaze 
switching 
which 
doesn’t help 
task 
pointing to 
distract 
partner 
without 
checking 
imitation of 
social 
aspects of 
tasks 
 throwing/ 
pushing toys 
away 
    people 
are 
separate 
than me 
4-5      using toys to 
create self-
directed play 
engaging 
researcher in 
play 
following 
simple script 
sequences 
uses object 
for what 
they are 
 
 
4-5 
6-9 
 
gaze 
switching to 
check for 
answers 
 
pointing to 
distract 
partner with 
checking 
  tidying toys 
away to end 
task 
using toys 
appropriatel
y but for 
different 
outcome 
engaging 
researcher 
through 
sign/speech 
 
small world 
play – dolls 
as objects in 
own right  
 
 
 
people as 
possesso
rs of 
things 
(ownersh
ip) and 
people as 
doers 
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(biologica
l entities) 
 
4-5 
6-9 
  
pointing to 
lots of 
answers or 
vague - no 
clarity 
   
 
 
 
  
following 
transformati
on 
sequences 
 
able to use 
one object to 
stand for 
another 
 
people 
have 
different 
contents 
in their 
minds 
 
4-5 
6-9 
  
 
     able to 
embed 
transformati
ons in own 
script 
able to use 
one object to 
stand for a 
number of 
things 
 
 
 
6-9 
 
gaze 
switching on 
key 
questions/ 
moments 
 
pointing to 
indicate an 
answer 
        
people as 
having 
desires 
and 
beliefs 
 
6-9 
 
 
    
 
  
no off task 
 
 
small world 
play – dolls 
‘stand for’ 
people 
  
people as 
having 
false 
beliefs 
Table 123. All groups Description of the behavioural changes observed across the whole cohort (groups 1, 2 and 3) Shaded areas show where the 
behaviour is not see
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Behavioural changes observed across the whole cohort are mapped out in Table 123, which 
charts the way gaze switching, imitation, off task behaviours and pretend/symbolic play changed 
in the three groups of children. The first column shows at what ages behaviours were seen and 
the final column shows how the behaviours seen (or those which were absent) relate to the 
development of theory of mind. Shaded areas show where a particular behaviour is not seen. 
From this table a number of interesting points arise. 
The behaviours of no gaze switching, imitation of practical aspects of the task, looking 
away/avoiding the task and walking away from the task were observed in all the age groups. 
This suggests that these behaviours are not indicative of an entire lack of some conceptual 
knowledge or cognitive ability, but that they were produced when the children could not access 
the particular tasks set. Therefore the children in group 3 who produced these behaviours may 
well have been able to access the tasks from group 2, had they been presented with them. It is 
important to consider that, just because an 8 year old and a 2 year old produce the same 
behaviours, it does not mean that they are necessarily cognitively comparable. It may be that 
the older child relies on old learnt behaviours to reject tasks which are too difficult.  
The way children use pointing for more sophisticated means appears to develop at the same 
time as more purposeful gaze switching. Since both of these behaviours are underpinned by 
joint attention ability this seems an appropriate alignment. However the time it took for these 
two behaviours to appear fully functional appears very extended. In fact it was only children in 
the 6-9 age group (and at the top age range of this group) who used gaze switching to support 
their learning and accurate pointing to communicate an answer to a question. This may come 
as a result of slow to develop non-verbal requesting behaviours (Mundy et al., 1988), 
instrumental requests (Fidler et al., 2005; Kasari et al., 1995) and less declarative pointing 
(Legerstee & Fisher, 2008) in infancy.  
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The use of imitation to engage in a task appears to stop in the 4 and 5 year olds. In accordance 
with prior research on this (Wright et al., 2006) imitation may be used for problem solving in 
younger children, however there was no evidence of this happening in our older children.  That 
some children were still using imitation at ages 3 and 4 may indicate that they are relying on this 
skill to tackle tasks they were not cognitively able to address.  
Off task behaviours were observed all the way through the age ranges and became increasingly 
sophisticated in the older age group. Behaviours to avoid tasks have been found in other studies 
(Pitcairn & Wishart, 1994; Wishart, 1996) and have been linked to task difficulty. It appears in 
this study that the more the children were finding a task difficult (measured by their task scores) 
the more likely they were to display off task behaviours. What may be interesting however is 
that their off task behaviour strategy use appears to develop at the same time as their social 
understanding. As the children acquire a more developed theory of mind, such as understanding 
that ‘other people are different than me’, they are also able to use off task strategies which 
employ this understanding, redirecting the researcher for example.  
In the small group of 4-5 year olds (n=9) pretend play and symbolic play appeared to develop in 
tandem, there was little difference in the passes and fails for these tasks. Other studies have 
also suggested a non-linear path in the development of pretend and symbolic play in children 
with Down’s syndrome (Hill & McCune-Nicolich, 1981). However the group in the current study 
was very small and the results were obtained cross-sectionally, so crucial developments in these 
two areas either before or after the assessments may have been missed. What is interesting to 
note is that some children in the 6-9 year old group were displaying pretend play skills by simple 
small world play but they were also finding the group 3 tasks very difficult and displaying off task 
behaviours. This would suggest that they were not at a developmental stage to pass the false 
belief tasks but could have been successful if group 2 tasks had been administered. 
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The final column in Table 123, which tracks how the social and theory of mind skills are changing 
across all three groups, shows a development similar to that which would be seen in typically 
developing children (Amsterlaw & Wellman, 2006; Flynn et al., 2004). The children in the current 
study appear to be able to use their developing skills to approach the tasks set with an increasing 
understanding of others, however it must be stressed that even in the oldest group it appeared 
that this understanding was still very fragile.  
A key aspect of behaviour which is missing from this analysis is that of expressive language. 
Whilst language comprehension is implicit in the children’s responses to the tasks, the 
expressive language of the children was rarely seen. In fact the most expression was seen in off 
task behaviours when the children used sign and speech to redirect the researcher.  The children 
did not use very much expressive speech in the tasks, and used little outside, but this absence 
may be important. That the children would engage the researcher when the topic was of interest 
to them (when they were off task) could indicate that the children’s working memory is working 
at full capacity during the tasks and they have no ‘space’ to create spoken language. When the 
children are off task they do not have to follow someone else’s thoughts or actions and therefore 
may have capacity to generate speech. Furthermore there is a social imperative to engage in 
speech which moves situation onto a topic which is familiar. These are issues which could 
certainly be the basis of an interesting further study. 
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11.2 Cognitive developments seen across the whole cohort 
Implicated 
at ages 
Prior knowledge Working memory Executive functions Representational ability TOM/social 
understanding 
2-3 
4-5 
6-9 
Schema for ‘objects 
existence even when they 
are not observable’ 
Performance or imitation = 
praise 
 
Able to use sequential 
spatial working memory to 
support task demands 
 
Concurrent processing and 
storage not efficient 
  
Inhibitory control not 
controlling physical actions 
on toys 
 
Empirical representations 
which are tethered to the 
present 
No ability to call up 
previous representations  
Representation fixed to 
domain  
 
 
2-3 
4-5 
Emotional schema for 
correct/incorrect 
performance  
  
Schemas in development 
for physical properties of 
objects 
 
No pretend play schemas 
 
Simultaneous spatial 
working memory 
inefficient - so unable to 
represent 2 spatial 
possibilities  
 
 Level I (implicit) 
representation 
Empirical representations 
fixed to observable events 
and objects 
 
 
2-3 
4-5 
Goal schema in 
development 
 
Play schemas more 
prepotent than task 
requirements  
 
 Inhibitory control not 
efficient and lets play 
schema overwrite task 
requirements  
 
Hypothetical 
representations beginning 
to be formed—allowing 
for goal detection 
 
people are separate than 
me 
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2-3 
4-5 
Goal schema established 
 
Communication as a 2 way 
device 
 
    
 
 
6-9 Play schemas limited to 
dolls as objects rather than 
symbols 
 
Simple  ownership schema 
(things belonging 
together) 
 
Phonological loop 
difficulties preventing 
access to task 
 
   
4-5  Underlying pretend play 
schemas are just 
developing but not 
consistently applied 
 
Short script sequences 
evident in pretend play 
 
Phonological loop 
prevents clear 
representation of 
sequences 
 
Concurrent processing and 
storage made more 
difficult by weak pretend 
play schemas 
 
Representation not able to 
support longer play 
sequences—because of 
weak pretend play 
schemas? 
Able to represent entities 
which are not there  
 
people as possessors of 
things (ownership) and 
people as doers (biological 
entities) 
 
4-5 Pretend play schemas are 
developing through trial 
and error 
 
 Inhibitory control 
developing enough to 
control distractions 
outside of task 
 
Dual representation allows 
pretend play and allows 
for objects to be renamed 
in play 
 
 
4-5 Pretend play schemas in 
place 
 
Others as intentional 
agents developing 
 Inhibitory control is able to 
control external 
distractions, but not 
internal—the stick is a 
pencil  
Representations at level 
E1, elements able to be 
shared across domains 
 
people have different 
contents in their minds 
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  Representations allow 
following of story line 
 
6-9 Time schema in place 
  
Belief/desire schema 
developing? 
 
Dolls as symbols 
developing  
 
Storage capacity able to 
retain story but cannot 
concurrently store and 
process 
 
In task inhibitory control 
unable to prevent 
prepotent response 
(salience) 
 
 
 
Undergoing 
representational change to 
be able to use information 
from a number of domains 
 
people as having desires 
and beliefs 
6-9 Belief/desire schema in 
place 
 
False belief schema 
emerging 
 
WM is able to store the 
detail of the story  
 
Able to supress prepotent 
response 
Simultaneous spatial WM 
unable to process false 
  
6-9 False belief schema 
developing  
 
A number of schemas in 
use at one time 
 
 Executive control 
developed enough to 
allow for concurrent 
processing and storage 
  
 
Meta representation 
allows flexible thinking 
across domains 
 
 
people as having false 
beliefs 
Table 124. All groups Description of the possible cognitive developments underlying the behavioural changes observed across the whole cohort (groups 
1, 2 and 3) 
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The possible cognitive changes that are outlined in Table 124 are necessarily much more 
speculative than the behavioural changes which could be readily observed. The suggested 
cognitive changes are drawn from the knowledge the children appeared to show during their 
assessments, prior research on the cognitive development of children with Down’s syndrome 
and theoretical explanations of the development of representation in typically developing 
children. In charting the changes across the three groups it is possible to suggest a continuum 
of cognitive development which doesn’t seem apparent when examining each group individually 
but, as the data is not longitudinal, is equally not a clear trajectory.  
In Table 124 the children’s prior knowledge appears to develop through small changes in 
understanding which may be mediated by the more overarching understanding of theory of 
mind. The figure shows that many changes were seen in the conceptual development that the 
children brought to the task, but far fewer changes in theory of mind development. This may 
suggest that, whilst prior knowledge is formed into topic and action schemas on an ongoing 
basis, constantly changing the child’s knowledge base, theory of mind developments are slower 
to construct and change.  
In the first row of Table 124 there is an age overlap, suggesting that children from any of the age 
groups may show evidence of working at this level. However, taken with the similar caution as 
the behavioural changes above, it may be that the children were displaying these types of 
cognitive abilities as their response to tasks which were too difficult. Similarly, they may well 
have had cognitive abilities above those displayed, but our tests did not capture them. 
Quite how working memory and executive functions affected this cohort is very difficult to 
assess using the chosen methodology. There is some evidence in the way children responded to 
the tasks, for example being unable to supress a prepotent response, which suggests that 
executive functions played a part in the way behaviours manifested. It is suggested here that 
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working memory and executive functions may allow or constrain development of other areas, 
however it is also possible that prior knowledge or representational ability constrain working 
memory and executive function in a similar way. The known difficulties with concurrent 
processing and storage (Carney et al., 2013), inhibitory control (Borella et al., 2013), the 
phonological loop system (Jarrold, Baddeley, & Phillips, 1999) and spatial working memory 
(Lanfranchi, Jerman, et al., 2009) may all contribute to the way in which schemas and 
representations are developed.  
The challenges that difficulties in working memory and executive function present may 
necessitate children finding alternative ways to support their knowledge generation.  For 
example Beeghly and Cicchetti (1987) suggested that children with Down’s syndrome show 
much more repetition in their play. It may be that this is needed to overcome working memory 
limitations.  Similarly Wright et al. (2006) suggest that children with Down’s syndrome use 
imitation in order to tackle tasks. It could be suggested that this strategy is used in order to 
facilitate learning; if the child can use imitation rather than having to commit a sequence to an 
inefficient working memory then they may be able to reach the solution by bypassing the 
working memory aspect of the task. This would facilitate learning the end point of a task, and 
afterwards being able to use freed up working memory (because the task outcome is already 
known) to work out the task process. At this stage this is conjecture, but it may be an important 
avenue to pursue in further research if we are to understand the learning processes of 
individuals with Down’s syndrome.  
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11.3 Analysis and Discussion Summary 
 
From this study it can be suggested that children with Down’s syndrome follow a trajectory in 
the development of their theory of mind which begins with an understanding that people are 
separate from oneself, develops into an idea that people can ‘possess’ and can ‘do’, progresses 
to an understanding of other people as having minds and eventually this develops into a 
belief/desire and then false belief understanding. There may also be many points of 
development in between these stages which this study was not sensitive enough to capture and 
which may show a subtler and a perhaps less linear course of development. 
 These changes in theory of mind appear to happen through a development of representational 
ability which is supported by a reciprocal relationship with the prior knowledge of the child. 
Representational change and knowledge acquisition are mediated by the working memory and 
executive functions, which work in a distinctive way in individuals with Down’s syndrome.  
The sequence of theory of mind development is protracted and is still not secure at the age of 8 
or 9 years old. Children may not secure skills along this trajectory quickly; this study noted 
children of different ages using the same strategies to approach or reject tasks. This suggests 
that children with Down’s syndrome need much more practice to consolidate their skills and to 
secure their prior knowledge.  
Off task behaviours were informative in this study about children’s ability to use their developing 
theory of mind. That they were able to use ever more sophisticated means to redirect the task 
and it is suggested that, although they may not be able to use their developing skills in formal 
tasks, they were practicing using their skills in social situations and at points where they were 
able to direct the communication.   
These social abilities appeared to develop at a similar time to the children’s understanding of 
intentional communication, which took take a long time to become well embedded in children’s 
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behaviour. Although the children in this study were able to show their developing theory of mind 
skills at different stages, it was rare that this was homogenous across groups or that behaviours 
were only observed at one age range.  What this suggests is that not all 6 year olds, for example, 
with Down’s syndrome will have developed the same set of theory of mind skills, an essential 
consideration in a school setting.  
How these results may impact on children’s education and learning is an important 
consideration. If children with Down’s syndrome are entering school without secure theory of 
mind skills, this may prevent them from learning in a number of key areas.  
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Chapter 12: Impact and application  
 
12.1 Educational impact  
 
Many children with Down’s syndrome now have access to mainstream primary schooling 
(Cuckle, 1997)6 and are expected to start school at age 4 or 5 along with their typically 
developing peers. Children with Down’s syndrome grow up with the same psychological and 
physical needs as any other child and develop into teenagers who have the same aspirations 
as their typically developing peers (Cuckle & Wilson, 2002). As such it is important that 
children with Down’s syndrome are educated with their peers and that age appropriate 
interests and needs are nurtured. Whilst research suggests that mainstream schooling for 
individuals with Down’s syndrome is important in academic terms (Buckley, Bird, & Sacks, 
2006; Casey, Jones, Kugler, & Watkins, 1988; Cunningham, Glenn, Lorenz, Cuckle, & 
Shepperdson, 1998), it may be less positive in terms of social development and quality of 
friendships (Cuckle & Wilson, 2002).  
Successive governments have placed a focus on the child’s ‘school readiness’. Current Early 
Years guidance suggests that the Early Years Foundation Stage “promotes teaching and 
learning to ensure children’s ‘school readiness’ and gives children the broad range of 
knowledge and skills that provide the right foundation for good future progress through 
school and life”. (DfE, 2012, pg. 5). The issue of school readiness is important when we 
consider that right across all cohorts in this study children’s theory of mind was not well 
developed. In the group of 4 and 5 years olds (group 2) developing pretend play skills were 
observed, but in the 6 to 9 year olds theory of mind skills were only just beginning to develop. 
This may suggest that children with Down’s syndrome are not yet ‘school ready’ in this 
                                                          
6 These are the most recent figures collated. Local Authorities are not required to report figures for 
children with Down syndrome; they are included in SEN figures.  
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important area at age 4 and 5. This important aspect of their social and emotional 
understanding may impact on their future success at school: 
“Most children begin reception class at age 4, and for most parents and carers this is when 
school life begins. If children are not ready for this transition or the move to Year 1 because, 
for example, they are not yet toilet trained, able to listen or get on with other children, then 
their experiences of school could present difficulties which will obstruct their own learning as 
well as other children’s. The evidence is clear that children who are behind in their 
development at age 5 are much more likely than their peers to be behind still at age 7, and 
this can lead to sustained but avoidable underachievement.” (Pg 19. Tickell, 2011) 
Whilst Tickell is describing the underachievement of typically developing children here, her 
idea of an ‘avoidable outcome’ can also be applied to children with Down’s syndrome. Whilst 
we do not know how well theory of mind skills may be encouraged in children with Down’s 
syndrome (and have little evidence in the typically developing population (Flynn et al., 2004; 
McGregory, Whiten, & Blackburn, 1998)), it is evident from the results of this study that it is 
a significant area of difference which may affect progress in other areas. Because theory of 
mind is an essential component of social and emotional development, the implications of 
not having developed a theory of mind by the time of stating school could be long term:  
The associations over time found in this study support the view that children who are 
especially mature at understanding others in their early preschool years do attempt to 
negotiate and resolve conflicts in ways that take account of others’ views and needs. […] It 
was how children worked towards resolution—rather than how often they disagreed and 
quarrelled with their friends—that was linked to their early mindreading abilities, emotion 
understanding and moral orientation. ( Pg 12. Dunn & Herrera, 1997) 
What the authors are suggesting here could be important in the findings of the current study; 
not only will children who begin school with a poor, or absent theory of mind be 
disadvantaged in their academic success, they may also struggle to negotiate friendships and 
social activities. Since this is an area which children and adolescents with Down’s syndrome 
find difficult because of speech and language differences, social exclusion and different 
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interests (Cuckle & Wilson, 2002; Sigman & Ruskin, 1999), an underdeveloped theory of mind 
may only compound these difficulties. 
Much of the literature on education of children with Down’s syndrome sensibly focusses on 
literacy and numeracy (Jones et al., 2013) and social understanding in education is rarely 
discussed in its own right (for an exception see Buckley, Bird, & Sacks, 2002) or comes under 
a more general ‘behaviour’ heading (DSA, 2011e). Social understanding is often discussed in 
peer-relationship terms (Sigman & Ruskin, 1999) but our research suggests that young 
children with Down’s syndrome may be a lacking fundamental foundational knowledge 
about others’ minds which underpins much of what happens in schools.  
Theory of mind skills are an essential foundation on which much learning in school is built 
upon. There is an underlying assumption that reception aged children will have already 
developed some ability to pretend play, to understand characters’ behaviours and emotions 
in stories and to have early skills in abstract concepts such as number and time. Table 125 
shows examples of some of the areas which children are expected to develop in over their 
reception year, all of which require some understanding of ‘the mind’ or an understanding 
of the possibility that things exist which are not directly observable.  
Early 
learning 
goal 
 
ELG03 Speaking: Children express themselves effectively, showing awareness of 
listeners’ need. They use past, present and future forms accurately when 
talking about events that have happened or are to happen in the future. 
They develop their own narratives and explanations by connecting ideas or 
events.  
How 
theory of 
mind is 
implicit in 
this goal 
Listeners need suggests an understanding of other’s points of view.  
Past and future both rely on a representational ability to imagine these 
hypothetical and not current situations.  
Connecting ideas suggests the use of purposeful mental activity, thereby 
needing representational ability and potentially some understanding of 
one’s own meta-cognition.  
 
ELG02 Understanding: Children follow instructions involving several ideas or 
actions. They answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions about their experiences and 
in response to stories and events.  
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How 
theory of 
mind is 
implicit in 
this goal 
To follow several ideas or actions one must be able to call up a number of 
representations at a time 
How and why are theoretical questions which ask for an interpretive answer 
based on an assumption of psychological understanding (in this instance). 
 
ELG12 Space, shape and measures: Children use everyday language to talk about 
size, weight, capacity, position, distance, time and money to compare 
quantities and objects and to solve problems. They recognise, create and 
describe patterns. They explore characteristics of everyday objects and 
shapes and use mathematical language to describe them.  
How 
theory of 
mind is 
implicit in 
this goal 
Size, weight, capacity, position, distance, time and money are all abstract 
concepts which require a representation of them to be formed in order to 
manipulate understanding.  
 
ELG 13 People and communities: Children talk about past and present events in 
their own lives and in the lives of family members. They know that other 
children don’t always enjoy the same things, and are sensitive to this. They 
know about similarities and differences between themselves and others, and 
amongst families, communities and traditions.  
How 
theory of 
mind is 
implicit in 
this goal 
To imagine past and present events a representational ability is needed. 
Understanding other children don’t always enjoy the same thing requires at 
least a basic belief/desire reasoning ability.  
Knowing about similarities and differences between oneself and others 
requires an understanding that other people have minds.   
Table 125. Examples of areas of learning taken from the Early Years Foundation Stage 
Handbook, my italics  (DfE, 2014) 
Implicit not only in these goals, but in the language used to describe these goals is a clear 
assumption that children will be able to use mental processes to grapple with abstract 
concepts and at some points be aware of their own and other’s mental processes. Aside from 
the fact that children with Down’s syndrome may not have the expressive language abilities 
to express these ideas, our research suggests that children with Down’s syndrome aged 4, 
and most likely until the ages of 7 and 8, are unable to use theory of mind skills to address 
these kinds of goals.  
In year 1 the curriculum becomes more academically focussed, with less emphasis on play 
centred learning and a more cognitive style of engagement with learning encouraged. In the 
English curriculum for example, pupils should “develop a capacity to explain their 
understanding of books and other reading, and to prepare their ideas before they write. They 
must be assisted in making their thinking clear to themselves as well as to others and teachers 
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should ensure that pupils build secure foundations by using discussion to probe and remedy 
their misconceptions.” (DfE, 2012, p.12). The emphasis here is on the children’s 
metacognition, or learning through thinking, rather than learning through doing. For children 
who are unware of their own, or other’s, cognition this shift in emphasis may create a barrier 
to learning. If children who have not developed a theory of mind are ‘moved on’ too quickly 
from being able to explore through role play, pretend play and symbolic play this may slow 
down the progress of developing their representational theory of mind.  
Most children with Down’s syndrome in mainstream schools have work differentiated for 
them and work with support to enable them to access the curriculum to some degree. (Bird, 
Alton, & Mackinnon, 2000; Miller et al., 2004).  Advice on how to differentiate work often 
considers levels of verbal language, language comprehension, reading ability, working 
memory and the learning through using physical and visual resources (Bird et al., 2000; DSA, 
2011b). There is a focus on teaching children with Down’s syndrome to read (Bird & Buckley, 
2001; DSA, 2011c) and to be numerate (Bird & Buckley, 2001; DSA, 2011d) in recognition that 
these life skills are in important element of independent living as an adult. It could be argued 
that the development of a theory of mind is an equally important skill which enables social 
and emotional capacity and understanding. A challenge is to consider what aspects of theory 
of mind may be able to be scaffolded, how they can be supported and what effect this may 
have on a child’s overall development.  
The evidence from this study suggests a number of ways the development of theory of mind 
may vary in children with Down’s syndrome. Some of these areas are supported by the good 
practice and quality first teaching already established in schools, but some will require new 
ways of working with children. 
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 Areas identified in the whole study findings in Chapter 11 are discussed below in detail, with 
reference to specific educational situations where the area of variance may be particularly 
relevant.   
12.2 Educational application  
 
Of upmost importance in the development of this study was the concern with how the 
findings of the study could be utilised by professionals working with children with Down’s 
syndrome. Section 12.4 describes in detail how a lack of theory of mind skills may impact on 
a child’s ability to learn and develop. This section extends this description to outline specific 
areas of development professionals should identify and indicates what skills may need to be 
encouraged for the child to reach a next level of theory of mind development. Table 126 also 
gives suggestions of the types of general support which can be given as well as specific 
examples of activities.  
To consider when accessing the suggestions below is the chronological age of the learners 
and where they may be in terms of their schooling. Whilst it is easy to suggest how to engage 
a typically developing child of 18 months in pretend play, as the setting they are in (nursery 
or pre-school for example) will have the necessary equipment and set up, this may not be so 
for a child with Down’s syndrome aged 4 or 5 in reception or year 1. Schools provide less and 
less opportunity for natural play based learning as children move through the school years 
and so opportunities for this type of learning need to be carefully created by practitioners. 
There is no suggestion here that children should be taken to younger years’ classrooms for 
the activities suggested below, or that they are extracted alone for the activities. Care has 
been taken in the examples to show how the activities can take place in whole class or small 
group situations and that the activities are linked to age appropriate whole class work and 
curriculum themes.  
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A further consideration when designing activities to develop theory of mind skills is to 
recognise that theory of mind is a social skill. Activities carried out with one child or between 
a practitioner and child will not give much opportunity for social learning through mimicry, 
observation or practice. Although the activities below are manufactured situations they 
should be made as social as possible, ensuring that natural learning about social cognition, 
as well as the more formal learning, can take place.  
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Theory of Mind Key Area: Joint attention – gaze switching 
Practitioner observation of 
child’s skills: 
Unable to purposefully switch 
gaze 
Gaze switching doesn’t help 
with tasks 
Switches gaze to adult to 
check answers 
 
What we need to do: Help the child to actively 
switch their gaze between 
objects/people 
Help the child to recognise 
that looking between 
objects/people can give us 
useful information  
Help the child to ensure the 
adult knows they are 
requesting attention  
General strategies  When playing gaze switching 
games ensure items are all 
similar distance away to avoid 
re-focussing issues  
Take clear turns when talking 
to the child – wait for them to 
switch gaze, say their name to 
help them know to look at you 
(Example 1)  
Give clear instructions to 
the child about when 
looking will help.  
(Example 2)  
Make explicit reference to 
when the child is looking at 
you, ‘You want me to see 
the car?’, ‘Good looking.’  
Encourage gaze switching 
with others; ‘Can you show 
Sarah the car?’  
Examples of specific 
targeted activities:  
(Nursery/reception 
classroom) 
1 2 practitioners work together to model looking behaviour. Play a ball game rolling the ball between members of the group, 
before each roll say the recipient’s name and wait for eye contact.  
 2 Children and practitioners play a ball game together in which the ball has to be rolled to a choice of 2 images. Each child 
is given a picture card and they have to roll the ball to the matching card. This will encourage the child to look between 
the cards to see the match.  
 3 Children and practitioners work together to complete a series of activities which are slightly too difficult for the child 
(unscrewing a jar for example). When the children need help the practitioner waits for eye contact before helping. This 
can be made more complex by the practitioner purposefully looking away so the children have to work hard to get her 
attention – either by vocalising or by touch.  
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Theory of Mind Key Area: Joint attention (pointing)  
Practitioner observation of 
child’s skills: 
Points to distract or request, 
without eye contact checking  
Points to distract or 
request, with eye contact 
checking 
Points to indicate an answer 
but vague/lots of different 
pointing 
Points to indicate an 
answer – sticks to one 
answer  
What we need to do: Help the child to develop gaze 
switching strategies along 
with pointing 
Develop the child’s 
understanding of pointing 
to label and show 
knowledge – using sign and 
speech  
Develop the child’s ability to 
say they don’t know/ask for 
help. 
Develop the child’s 
understanding of pointing to 
label and show knowledge  
Develop support for 
pointing – using speech or 
sign to show 
understanding/develop 
answer 
General strategies  Ensure staff don’t respond to 
pointing without gaze – 
particularly in requesting  
Label items for child verbally 
and with sign – encourage 
copying 
Model using pointing with 
checking gaze  
(Example 1) 
When child makes eye 
contact label items for child 
verbally and with sign – 
encourage copying. 
(Example 2) 
Allow the child’s answer but 
help to narrow down how 
specific the child’s pointing 
is.  
(Example 3) 
Allow the child to point to 
show answer but develop 
answers by giving more 
options.  
(Example 4) 
Encourage child to label 
verbally and with sign.  
Examples of specific 
targeted activities:  
(Nursery/reception 
classroom) 
1 Find 5 farm animals the child knows the verbal labels for. Let the child watch you put them within an easy visual distance 
around the child but out of reach. You are going to make a farm, but you need to find the animals. Ask ‘Where’s the dog?’. 
Practitioner occasionally points to the wrong item. Encourage the child to follow your gaze from the object to each other 
and back again. Watch for signs that the child knows you have pointed to the wrong object. Encourage child to show you 
the correct answer (‘Oh, isn’t that the dog? Where’s the dog then?). In this game you are modelling using gaze and pointing 
to check that you are both sharing the same referent.  
 2 2 practitioners work together alongside the child. Outside in the mud kitchen the child and practitioners play. Practitioner 
1 points to a spoon, looks to practitioner 2. Practitioner 1 labels the spoon ‘Do you want the spoon?’ Practitioner 2 models 
response ‘Spoon please’, whilst still pointing. This kind of exchange can happen a number of times within a play session to 
reinforce for the child how to verbalise/sign a label.  
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 3 A small group are singing ‘5 currant buns in a baker’s shop’. They have a number of props; they take it in turns to wear the 
baker’s hat and to be the boy/girl with the penny. The practitioner asks Jack, who has Down’s syndrome, which bun he 
would like. He points to all of them in turn. The practitioner responds with speech and sign, ‘Oh you would like all of them? 
Well, let’s choose one for now – can you point to the red bun?’ Jack points in a vague motion towards the buns. 
Practitioner: ‘Let’s try and point to the red bun’. He asks the children to point to the red bun, including Jack. On Jack’s turn, 
if needed, the practitioner can pick up the bun and move it towards Jack to help him point specifically at the red bun. After 
Jack has pointed the practitioner can reinforce ‘You pointed at the red bun Jack, so you can have the red bun’.    
 4 In the music corner the children have a range of instruments out. The practitioner has picture cards with pictures of the 
instruments on, with ‘sound’ words and illustrations (loud/quiet, tinkle/boom, hard/soft etc.) and ways to play (blow, hit, 
bang, tap, strum). The children can choose 2 cards by using pointing, speech and sign. So they may choose ‘loud’ and ‘blow’ 
– then they can discuss which instrument might make a loud noise when you blow it (and then of course have a go on the 
instrument). This will enable the child with Down’s syndrome to choose from a range of options by using pointing, and 
their choice making is reinforced by speech, sound and by playing the instrument they choose.   
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Theory of Mind Key Area: Pretend play skills 
Practitioner observation of 
child’s skills: 
Child can follow/copy the 
practical aspects of the play 
sequence (for example, 
holding a cup to toy’s mouth)  
The child can follow the 
pretence when something 
unexpected happens but 
may not be able to change 
their play  
The child can embed and 
anticipate unexpected 
sequences and incorporate 
them into their play 
Toys can ‘stand for’ 
people and have 
likes/dislikes/needs and 
feelings 
What we need to do: Develop the child’s 
understanding that the 
sequence is a ‘pretend’ 
version of real life situations  
Develop the child’s 
flexibility in pretend play, 
focussing on incorporating 
new information  
Engage the child’s 
understanding that 
unexpected events affect 
not just the play sequence 
but the ‘psychological’ life of 
the toys 
Develop the child’s 
understanding that we 
have different responses 
and contexts to events 
General strategies  Use free play to practice the 
practical elements of pretend 
play: stirring, building, 
drinking 
Practitioners to use explicit 
mental state vocabulary ‘I’m 
pretending that…, ‘It’s not 
real.’ (Example 1)  
Ensure the child has lots of 
time to process before 
moving the play on, if 
necessary ask other 
children to wait. 
Practitioner to suggest 
simple disruptions in 
pretence. (Example 2)   
Use key ‘feelings’ words to 
describe the toys; ‘Is 
Spiderman happy his 
chocolate cake is on the 
floor?’ 
‘Oh, Elsa thought we were 
going to the beach, but now 
we’re going shopping? How 
does she feel?’ (Example 3)  
Use contrasts to highlight 
differences; ‘I’m going to 
paint purple, because 
that’s my favourite, but 
teddy likes green best’.  
‘The grass is out of 
bounds today because it’s 
wet. I don’t like the grass 
so I’m happy. What about 
you?’  
(Example 4)  
Examples of specific 
targeted activities:  
(Year 1/2 classroom)  
1 At snack time the practitioner suggests that the class icon (a toy) also joins in snack. In a small group the children take it in 
turns to give the toy some snack/drink and are encouraged to say what they are pretending to do. This could be extended 
to suggest whether the toy likes/dislikes the snack/drink.  
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 2 The class project is about pirates. The children have constructed a pirate ship in the corner of the classroom, the 
practitioner is supporting them in pretending to scrub the decks, climb the rigging etc. S/he introduces the idea of a storm 
and prompts the children in deciding what they might need to do in their pretence to incorporate this new information.  
 3 Practitioner and children work together to create social stories about key people and events from current topics. Using IT 
resources such as stop-frame animation the child can create a story, add in an unexpected event and then show how the 
character might feel about it.    
 4 Practitioner and children work collaboratively to make likes/dislikes charts and diagrams. For other students in the class 
this can form part of their maths curriculum, developing tally charts and pie diagrams. For the children developing their 
understanding of theory of mind this can be focussed on examining the differences in people’s opinions. 
The child can take photographs of the other children in the class (and the class icons) and place them on a chart to show 
what they like or dislike.  
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Theory of Mind Key Area: Symbolic play  
Practitioner observation of 
child’s skills: 
Child uses objects/props for 
what they are 
Child can use an object to 
stand for another thing 
Child can use an object to 
stand for more than one 
thing 
What we need to do: Encourage child to use 
imaginative skills to allow 
objects to be transformed 
Develop the child’s ability 
to be flexible in their 
symbolic thinking  
Develop the child’s ability to 
become more abstract – 
imagination not tied to 
objects  
General strategies  Use terminology which 
encourages the child to see 
similarities ‘It’s like a…’ ‘It 
could be a…’  
(Example 1)  
Offer alternatives for the 
child when discussing what 
objects are like.  
(Example 2)  
Use explicit mental state 
terms to describe what we 
‘see’ in our mind when 
imagining. For example ‘I 
imagine…’, ‘I think…’, ‘In my 
mind I see…’  
(Example 3)  
Examples of specific 
targeted activities:  
(Year 1/2 classroom) 
1 Practitioner and child work together to create imaginary scenarios for a toy (or class icon). For example, Elsa needs a horse 
to ride, what can we use for a horse?’ Practitioner can carefully choose a variety of props which are able to be transformed 
into the suggestions (for example a cushion for the horse). At this stage making the props distinct from one another may 
help the child to symbolically transform them.  
 2 Big box game. Practitioner and group of children have a large cardboard box and a number of other props (fabric, tubes, 
hoops etc). The children work together to transform the box into a variety of different objects. They may take turns to 
suggest what the box will become, or the practitioner could give them cards with suggestions on to choose from. This 
activity could be linked to a curriculum theme such as ‘transport’ or ‘where people live’. The children can take pictures of 
the transformations and then create a book describing what they were pretending.  
 3 Use a key ‘journey’ text such as ‘We’re going on a bear hunt’ to frame an imaginative journey around the school. The 
children can take it in turns to lead a part of the journey, describing what they can see and acting out the journey, the rest 
of the group follow and join in acting out the story. The practitioner can encourage imaginative detail which moves away 
from the text of the book (‘Look, there’s a fish’, whilst wading through the river).  
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Theory of Mind Key Area: False belief/theory of mind 
Practitioner observation of 
child’s skills: 
Child is aware that people are 
individuals 
Child is aware that people 
are possessors of objects 
and can complete actions 
Child is aware that people 
have different contents in 
their minds (different 
knowledge and thoughts) 
Child is aware that people 
have beliefs and desires 
What we need to do: Develop the child’s 
understanding of ownership 
and individuality   
Develop the child’s 
understanding of ‘the mind’ 
and that different people 
have different knowledge 
Develop the child’s 
understanding that people 
can believe something to be 
true, that they have desires 
which make them act in 
certain ways 
Develop the child’s 
understanding that 
sometimes there is a 
discrepancy between 
belief and reality 
General strategies Use naturalistic situations to 
talk about difference, 
compare and contrast 
children’s lives. Be explicit 
with contrastive language; 
‘Ben doesn’t have any pets, 
but Shreela has a cat.’  
(Example 1) 
Use explicit mental state 
and metacognitive 
terminology ‘I am thinking’, 
‘Do you know?’, ‘What do 
you think?’ 
(Example 2)  
Use naturalistic 
conversation to discuss 
people’s actions; ‘Tyler is 
upset, I think she wanted 
the same pencil as you’, 
‘Jack has gone out because 
he wanted to get that book’. 
(Example 3)   
Make explicit the contrast 
between belief and reality 
‘Jack thought the book 
was out there, but it 
wasn’t’.  
(Example 4)  
Examples of specific 
targeted activities:  
(Year 3/4 class)  
1 Practitioner and children design character cards (or use dolls if appropriate). Each character is given a set of likes, dislikes, 
ownerships and activities (see example below) from a set of predefined choices. Children take turns to turn over a card in 
the middle which relates to the attributes. If their character has that attribute they keep the card, if not they have to ask 
the other players if their character has that attribute, and then give the card to them. This activity could be based on a 
class book or topic. 
 2 Practitioner gives children cards with pictures on (fruit for example). Children have the pictures face up. They are asked to 
think about the picture on the card, and then to guess what the other children are thinking about. Discuss how we know 
what they are thinking. Play the game again but this time the children do not let anyone else see their card. Can they guess 
what the other people are thinking? Why not?  
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 3 In groups the children act out short scenarios which are given out by the practitioner. For example: The boy has a ball, him 
and his friend put it in the cupboard. The girl is going swimming, with her dad she packs her swimsuit in her bag. Children 
and practitioners talk about how the characters know where the ball/swimsuit is. Discuss if anyone else knows it’s there? 
Discuss what might happen if someone moved it.  
 4 As a follow on from activity 3, the scenarios are extended; the boy puts his ball in the cupboard and goes out. His friend 
comes in and moves it. The girl packs her swim suit and goes out. Her mum and dad decide the family will go to the farm 
instead and so put her wellies in her bag instead.  
Discuss what the characters will think when they come back. Where will the boy think his ball is? What will the girl think is 
in her bag? The practitioner will need to be explicit in their description of why the characters held a false belief.  
This activity can be recorded to watch back, or photographed to make books to be read again. The number of possible 
scenarios is endless and so the activity can be completed many times.  
 
Table 126 Suggestions of educational activities 
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12.3 Extension of this study to other groups of learners 
 
Whilst it has been made clear that a whole class approach to these teaching suggestions would 
potentially benefit many children in the class, there are specific groups of learners who may find 
a change in focus particularly beneficial.  Deaf children (Peterson & Siegal, 1999; Peterson & 
Siegal, 2006; Woolfe et al., 2002) and those with an autistic spectrum condition (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985; Peterson et al., 2013) have been shown to develop theory of mind skills later than 
typically developing children or not at all. The suggestions made above may specifically support 
the development of theory of mind skills in these groups. Other children may arrive at school 
without having had opportunities to develop their theory of mind skills because of, for example, 
maltreatment (O’Reilly & Peterson, 2015), non-specific learning difficulties (Bauminger & Kimhi-
Kind, 2008; Kavale & Forness, 1996) or speech and language difficulties (Marton, Abramoff, & 
Rosenzweig, 2005). All these groups may benefit from initial assessment of and subsequent 
support in developing their theory of mind abilities. Children with poor reading comprehension 
skills share some similarities in cognitive profile with children with Down’s syndrome in that 
their verbal profile is weaker than non-verbal (Nation, Clarke, & Snowling, 2002) and working 
memory may be implicated in their difficulty with comprehension (Carretti, Cornoldi, De Beni, 
& Romanò, 2005). It may be that some of the areas of variance seen in our study are replicated 
in this group of ‘poor comprehenders’ and so the teaching and learning suggestions may also 
aid theory of mind development in this group. 
The implications for this study could be far reaching if, as is suggested, theory of mind skills are 
assessed when children first start school and these assessments are used to support and develop 
children’s social cognition. Considering the groups discussed above the number of children 
needing support in this area could far outweigh those with numeracy or literacy difficulties. 
Specifically supporting the development of social cognition in the early years may improve 
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children’s ability to think abstractly and use their representational ability in other subjects; 
supporting early social cognition may help the core academic practices of numeracy and literacy.
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Chapter 13: Limitations and further research 
 
13.1 Limitations and recommendations 
 
As with any study there are limitations and drawbacks from the way this research was 
conducted. Getting the assessment situation right for the children meant the data collection was 
not as tightly controlled as would be expected in a more experimental study. Although there 
was an aim for consistency, the use of questions and interaction with the children was not 
consistent across groups because a prime aim was to make the participants comfortable and 
happy to attempt the tasks. Additionally, because the session was stopped when the child 
indicated there is some incomplete data.   
A larger cohort of children, particularly in the middle age group where the dropout rate meant 
there were less participants (mostly because of difficulties contacting and arranging with 
schools) may have given greater quantitative data power. It may also have prevented some of 
the ceiling scores seen in group 2, where the age range was limited. Increasing the age range to 
include some older participants would have enabled examination of how consistent passing the 
false belief task is at older ages.  
A major limitation of this study is it’s cross sectional nature. Ideally this would have been a 
longitudinal study which followed a cohort of children over 7 or more years to examine how 
each child developed in the area of social cognition and theory of mind. However time and 
financial restraints were such that this was not possible. 
13.2 Further research  
There are a number of routes which this work could now to take in order to validate the results 
and extend the findings. Firstly this study needs to be replicated, ideally as a longitudinal study 
following a cohort of children across a number of years. However funding for longitudinal 
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research is costly and in the current funding climate, difficult to obtain. It is suggested that, given 
the wide range of research there is on infants with Down’s syndrome a longitudinal study should 
focus on children in their pre-school and primary school years. Longitudinal studies of individuals 
with Down’s syndrome are rare, with notable exceptions of Janet Carr’s study of 6 week to 4 
year olds who were then followed up at 21 years  (Carr, 2012), the work at the Hester Adrian 
Research Centre, University of Manchester (Cunningham, 1986) and a number of more recent 
studies carried out by Down Syndrome Education International (Byrne, Buckley, MacDonald, & 
Bird, 1995; Byrne, MacDonald, & Buckley, 2002).  
A longitudinal study would allow for a number of distinctive features which were seen in the 
results of this study being tracked over time. A limitation of the current work is that links 
between certain skills at different ages are hypothesised; these links need to be tested using 
longitudinal evidence.  A particular benefit of a longitudinal study would be to examine the 
development of children similar to those in our study who were unable to access the tasks we 
set. The only conclusion drawn in the current study about these children’s skills is that they were 
not able to complete the tasks, however it is impossible to suggest how they may have gone on 
to develop their skills or whether they would have been able to pass tasks administered to a 
different group or in different ways. It is particularly important that these children are included 
in further research because they form part of the heterogeneous group of ‘children with Down’s 
syndrome’. Without their data the group become more homogenous and less reflective of 
reality. 
An important part of this research has been to suggest not just that the findings will have an 
impact on the education of children with Down’s syndrome, but also to offer practical 
suggestions as to how the findings of this study could be used within educational settings. The 
suggestions are untested and are based on the researcher’s experience as a teacher. An obvious 
next stage would be to test them out in context to determine their efficacy and practicality in 
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administration. An interesting and important project would be to work closely with teachers and 
teaching assistants to develop the ideas into workable classroom changes and to follow the 
progress of children’s development of theory of mind across a school year. A study such as this 
could include other groups of learners, such as those suggested in Chapter 12 to determine 
whether the changes in classroom practice would also aid their learning in social cognition and 
theory of mind areas.  
A further interesting piece of work would be to replicate the work of Flynn, 2006 and Flynn et 
al., 2004 using a microgenetic model of developing theory of mind skills. In their studies with 
typically developing children they showed that some children make some progress in this area 
with explicit teaching. It would be interesting to determine whether this could also be the case 
with children with Down’s syndrome and some of the other groups identified in Chapter 12. 
This study was barely able to touch on the way that language learning and use impacts on the 
development of theory of mind (or/and vice versa). As this is such an important connection a 
longitudinal piece of research examining these connections in children with Down’s syndrome 
could make an interesting contribution to the literature. It is important to know, specifically for 
this group of children, how the relationships between language and theory of mind may restrict 
or enable growth in social cognition and how this may also be tied up with the way parents, 
carers and those working with children use language around them. A study examining this could 
have a major impact on the understanding of how theory of mind develops in children with 
Down’s syndrome.  
Since this study was an exploration in the appropriateness of testing techniques and focussed 
on an under researched area in children with Down’s syndrome, it opens up a vast area for 
further research. This research has raised many more questions than it has answered and offers 
the research community a number of areas to develop work on. In any work following on from 
this study it is hoped that the heart of this work remains in focus; finding innovative and child 
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centred ways to help all children tell us, as researchers, what they know and how they came to 
know it. 
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Chapter 14: Conclusions 
 
As I stated in the opening remarks of this paper, my primary aim in this piece of research was to 
have at its core the people whom it concerns. From the initial interest in early development, to 
the much wider final remit of theory of mind development I have tried to ensure that my 
thinking and decision making was person centred. A task no doubt made much easier by my 
daughter serving as a daily reminder of why I am doing this.  
Taking a person centred approach has led to difficulties; it is hard to devise tasks which on the 
one hand focus on the child but also manage to extract the key piece of information needed for 
analysis. Children (people) are unpredictable and to be person centred research must ‘go with’ 
this unpredictably and in the hope that it may produce some interesting data in its own right, 
no matter how far off the experimental course it is (which of course, it did). Person centred 
research meant that all of the participants were included in the analysis and the results of those 
children who were unable to access the tasks were not ignored. 
The results of this study show that children with Down’s syndrome do develop social cognition 
skills and that these probably will result in a ‘theory of mind’. The time scale of development is 
slow and the children appear to take a long time firstly to be able to consolidate their knowledge 
and then to be able to generalise their knowledge. Theory of mind skills were seen earlier in 
naturalistic situations where the child had some element of control, than in the experimental 
conditions. Questioning did not help children to express their knowledge or encourage them in 
conversation; they were most communicative in situations where they could speak or sign about 
their own interests. I hypothesise that developments in theory of mind are constrained by 
working memory and executive functions, specifically concurrent processing and storage and 
the simultaneous spatial working memory. Knowledge schemas co-occur with the development 
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of representations, whether there is a relationship between the two and how this relationship 
may work needs further research.  
I have suggested that using a neuroconstructivist approach will help to answer some of the 
questions about why children with Down’s syndrome develop the way they do, and indeed this 
framework has been useful in its construction of the way representations are redescribed. There 
is capacity for this framework to be used in a much more detailed way than there has been space 
for here, which may help in understanding the process of change in theory of mind skills and 
how the trajectory is linked to other functions, such as working memory. Neuroconstructivism 
may encourage research which focusses on individual abilities and could help to change the 
discourse of deviance or delay. 
Staying on track with the commitment to advocating a particular description of the way children 
with Down’s syndrome may develop a theory of mind has also had its challenges. Nearly every 
article and book read has engaged in the discourse of typical development, of deviance and 
delay, of remediating and ameliorating difference. The discussion of individuality, of models of 
disability and of how cognitive variance fits within them, stays within ‘disability rights’ research 
and rarely makes in-roads into psychological and developmental discussions. Education fares a 
little better, with discussions over equity and equality and what we mean by inclusive practice. 
However education research still very often prefers to discuss what we should be doing to 
improve the learning of individuals with different learning needs, rather than considering how 
the needs of these learners can be incorporated into the whole school community.  
I have almost certainly fallen into the discourse of typical versus non typical at points. Indeed 
the results are discussed in the knowledge that what has been observed in our groups of children 
is a ‘much slower’ development than is seen in typically developing children. However I hope I 
have managed to stay true to an underlying commitment which allows children with Down’s 
syndrome individuality, which describes their development as a particular trajectory and which 
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opens up discussions about how researchers and educators view and talk about cognitive 
variance and different ways of learning. 
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IQ = Intelligence quotient  
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R = Researcher 
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Appendix 1: Parent information  
 
Parent information pack  
Lucy Dix - PGR student 
University of Leeds 
School of Education 
Hillary Place 
Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
Dear parent or carer, 
Some of you will know me or my daughter, Kitty, who has Down syndrome, through our 
involvement with the Down Syndrome Training and Support Service Ltd (DSTSS). I began 
to teach some Early Development groups for DSTSS at The Pamela Sunter Centre in 
September 2011 and from there I developed a particular interest in how children with 
Down syndrome learn and how their specific learning styles affect their learning.  
Thank you for taking an interest in this research project, I hope the information in this 
pack gives you a good idea of what the study is about, why it’s an important piece of 
research and how you could be involved. 
I began my research in September 2012 and I am now at a stage where I need to find 
volunteers to participate in my study. The time your child will need to be involved is 
minimal, at most about 3 hours, and this will be spread over a couple of weeks. We aim 
to run the assessments between October ‘13 and June ’14. Your involvement will be to 
fill in some questionnaires to help us understand the background, health and language 
comprehension of your child. All of this is given in much more detail in the enclosed 
pack.  
There is lots of information in this pack, but it doesn’t matter if you don’t read it all; I am 
running two information sessions where parents and carers are invited to come to ask 
questions and hear more about the study. These will take place May and will be at the 
Pamela Sunter Centre and at the University of Leeds. 
If you would like to take part in the research, or you’re not sure and you’d like more 
information, please contact me.  You can email, phone, text or send a letter (you can 
leave post for me at the Pamela Sunter Centre, or send it to the address at the top). If 
you decide you would rather not take part, that's fine and you don't need to take any 
further action. 
I am happy to discuss any aspects of my research and can be contacted on 
edled@leeds.ac.uk or 07973 513 806. 
Thanks again for your interest in this study. 
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Lucy Dix 
 
How does Theory of Mind develop in children 
with Down syndrome? 
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What the research is about 
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This research will look at how a key aspect of development, called Theory of Mind, happens in 
children with Down syndrome.  
 
Developing a Theory of Mind is important; it means children can be more flexible in their 
thinking and begin to use a wider set of skills, such as:  
 Working out problems 
 Imagining 
 Using skills learnt in lots of different situations.  
But these skills also put a huge strain on memory and brain power; you need to be able to think 
about lots of different solutions, perspectives and outcomes all at the same time.  
Some adults and older children with Down syndrome have been tested in other studies to see 
how their Theory of Mind has developed, with very mixed results. These tests, which have 
involved lots of verbal instructions and questions, may not have given people with Down 
syndrome the best chance to show what they can do. All the tasks used in this new piece of 
research will be especially designed and changed to play to the strengths of children with Down 
syndrome; we will focus on visual and physical elements and care will be taken not to overload 
memory or use too much verbal instruction. 
Over the course of the research we will look at three age groups; 2-3, 4-5 and 7-8. In the two 
youngest groups we will be looking for signs that children are developing the very early skills 
which we know lead on to the development of a Theory of Mind. The older children in the study 
will be tested to see if they are developing any aspects of Theory of Mind. As children with Down 
syndrome develop at roughly half the rate of typically developing children, we have doubled the 
ages at which typically developing children are tested for these skills. 
As there has been very little research done in this area on children with Down syndrome, it is 
very difficult for us to predict what we will see in each of the groups of children. We may to be 
able to show that either Theory of Mind is developing and needs to be encouraged and 
supported in specific ways, or that Theory of Mind is very slow to develop and that children with 
Down syndrome need targeted help to ensure its development.  We will also be looking at some 
aspects of language development and working memory, to see if they are linked in any way to 
how Theory of Mind develops.  
Here are a few things that you are able to do as you develop a Theory of Mind, some of 
them are very complex and don’t fully develop until adulthood: 
 Know that things and people still exist even when you can’t see, hear or touch 
them. 
 Pretend and imagine in play. 
 Understand different perspectives – know that other people see and think about 
things differently than you, and that they have different experiences than you.  
 Put yourself ‘in someone else’s shoes’ – and so work out why someone thinks or 
behaves the way they do. 
 Be able to imagine a few perspectives all at once, and work out how those 
different perspectives might interact.  
 Understand simple concepts of time – past, present and future. 
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Why this research is needed 
 
Children with Down syndrome are now expected to be included as fully as possible in 
mainstream schooling. This research will add to discussions about creating the most appropriate 
school curriculum for children with Down syndrome. If children with Down syndrome develop 
their Theory of Mind later or slower than typically developing children this may impact on the 
type of curriculum they need. 
We hope this research will begin to help teachers, practitioners and policy makers when thinking 
about what kind of curriculum children with Down syndrome need to help them succeed as 
learners. 
Alongside other research to do with how children with Down syndrome learn, such as the Down 
Syndrome Educational reading intervention work, this research will help to build up a picture of 
what types of learning activities could be best used for children with Down syndrome and when 
to introduce particular areas of learning.   
We hope this research will lead on to more studies about the development and learning of 
children with Down syndrome.  
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How you and your child could be involved 
For each age group we need about 10 children to be involved with the assessment tasks, which 
are detailed in the next section. 
The assessments will take place at different places for the different age groups, throughout the 
school year 2013/2014.  
Children will be accompanied by either a parent/carer or a teaching assistant, who will remain 
in the room but will not be involved in the tasks.  
 
Age Where it will take 
place 
What will happen How long it will 
take  
What  parents 
need to do  
2-3 
years  
Group Centre  
Or at your home 
Either: 
A recording will be 
made of the Early 
Development 
Group which your 
child attends, in 
which the tasks are 
performed.   
OR  
You can come to 
the Pamela Sunter 
Centre, or I can 
visit your home to 
work with your 
child on the tasks.  
The actual tasks 
will last no longer 
than 20 min. 
We will repeat the 
session 2 weeks 
later. 
Parents will be 
asked to complete 
a questionnaire 
about the child’s 
health and 
progress as well as 
a form about the 
child’s speech 
comprehension.  
4-5 
years 
Either at the Group  
Centre or in 
nursery/ 
school 
We will record 1 
session of the child 
playing with the 
researcher on 
some set tasks and 
1 session of 
vocabulary and 
working memory 
tasks. 
Each session will 
be about ½ an 
hour and there will 
be a break in the 
middle. We will 
repeat both 
sessions 2 weeks 
later. 
Parents will be 
asked to complete 
a questionnaire 
about the child’s 
health and 
progress as well as 
a form about the 
child’s speech 
comprehension.  
7-8 
years 
Either at the Group  
Centre or in 
school 
We will record 1 
session of the child 
working with the 
researcher on 
some set tasks and 
1 session of 
vocabulary and 
working memory 
tasks. 
Each session will 
be about ½ an 
hour and there will 
be a break in the 
middle. We will 
repeat both 
sessions 2 weeks 
later. 
Parents will be 
asked to complete 
a questionnaire 
about the child’s 
health and 
progress as well as 
a form about the 
child’s speech 
comprehension.  
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What the assessment tasks will be like 
We have designed a series of tasks which will show where the children are in terms of their 
development towards a Theory of Mind. We have tried to make the tasks enjoyable and playful 
and have kept in mind the learning strengths of children with Down syndrome. Instructions will 
be signed as well as spoken and the children’s responses will be noted however they are 
communicated. Please be aware that these tasks will not show your child’s overall 
development, they are designed for a specific purpose and to be carried out in specific ways; 
the descriptions below are just to give you a general feel of the tasks.  
Age 2-3 
The children will complete the tasks as part of their usual Early Development Group or at your 
home. The tasks that will be observed will be; 
a) The child pulling off a cloth/cup/box to reveal a toy hidden underneath. 
b) The child watching a toy being hidden outside the room and then indicating as to 
where it is. 
c) The child identifying his/her own image in a picture. 
d) The child remembering where a picture of his/her carer/parent is once it has been 
turned over. 
e) The child identifying the correct box containing an animal, given the choice of two. 
Age 4-5 
The children will be engaged in a 1:1 play session with the researcher. 
a) The first part of the session will look at how the child pretends and imagines 
something which isn’t there. We will play with some toys and then a ‘cheeky teddy’ 
puppet will come and spill imaginary milk on the floor or one of the other toys. I will 
ask the child to help clean it up.  
b) In the second part of the session we will be looking at how the child can pretend one 
object is something else. We will play with a teddy or doll and some other objects. For 
example: I will ask the child to put a hat on the teddy, but there will be no hat amongst 
the objects; they will have to find a different object to pretend is a hat. 
c) The third part of the session will be a language and working memory task. The child 
will be asked to point at pictures which will help us assess his or her level of language 
understanding.  
Age 7-8 
This group will have a 1:1 session with the researcher which will include: 
a) 3 versions of a task which requires children to imagine someone else’s point of view. 1 
version will be played out with puppets, 1 will be looking at a book and 1 will be a 
video sequence. The children will be asked a question about what one of the 
characters thinks.  
b) A ‘false contents’ task, where the child is shown a box which contains something 
different than what is pictured on it. We ask them about what other people might 
think was in the box. 
c) The last part of the session will be a language and working memory task. The child will 
be asked to point at pictures which will help us assess his or her level of language 
understanding.  
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If at any point your child wants to stop the assessment, becomes tired or unwilling to carry on, 
we will stop the assessment straight away. Older children will be given a ‘stop’ card to help them 
indicate that they do not want to carry on. Younger children will be watched carefully for signs 
that they are not happy to continue.  
What the assessments will tell us 
The assessments will give us a snapshot of development at three age time points. From our 
observations we will have information which will tell us how many tasks were passed in the 
assessments, how they were passed, or how they weren’t. This will be added together to give 
us group data so we can see how the group of children, as a whole, are developing. We will put 
our three sets of data, from the three age groups, together so we can show how the shape of 
development is similar or different to that of typically developing children.   
The assessments are not designed to give us detailed information about the development of 
each child, as this is not the purpose of the research. The assessments give a very small window 
into a very particular task at a particular moment in time. Because of this it would be unfair to 
draw conclusions about individual children’s overall development.  
How you will get feedback 
Feedback will happen in 2 ways: 
Six weeks after each round of assessments a short report will be produced about the age group 
we have looked at. This will include how the group of children performed on the tasks and some 
initial findings. All data will be anonymous and information will be general, not personal. No 
names will be used. This will be available for parents in paper form or to view online; the findings 
will be unpublished and so we ask that at this stage you do not share them.  
Ten weeks after each round of assessments I will arrange a feedback evening where I will give a 
broad outline of the information in the short report and answer any questions parents and 
carers may have on the group findings. 
 I will not be able to give individual feedback on your child as the assessments are not designed 
to provide individual developmental information and it would be unfair to use them in this way. 
As I am looking at the age groups as a whole I will not be able to report to you on your individual 
child.  
Data protection and ethical guidelines 
All information collected will be treated with the strictest confidence and in accordance to the 
University’s guidelines on data protection. 
Information about children, their families and their schools will be coded into untraceable codes, 
so that participants are only identified by this code, which will only be available to the main 
researcher. No names, images or information which could identify the child, the family or the 
school will be reproduced without explicit prior permission.  
 
The video recordings of your child’s activities made during this research will be used only for 
analysis and for illustration in conference presentations and lectures. No other use will be made 
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of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will be allowed access 
to the original recordings. 
 
You can withdraw from the study at any point up to September 2015. After this it will be very 
difficult to remove individual data from the study as it will already have been analysed and 
written into the results.  
There will be no negative impact on your decision to withdraw. You do not have to give a reason 
for withdrawing.  
This study is supervised by Dr Paula Clarke and Dr Mary Chambers at the University of Leeds.  
We are working to the University’s strict policies on data protection and ethical research which 
can be found here:  
http://researchsupport.leeds.ac.uk/index.php/academic_staff/good_practice/university_ethic
s_policies 
This research has been approved by the University’s Ethical Review Panel. Reference: AREA 12-
080 
All researchers on this project have a current and recent CRB check. 
This research is funded by the Frank Stell scholarship through the University of Leeds.  
About me 
I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Leeds and this research project is the focus of my 
studies. I hope it will have an impact on the way children with Down syndrome are educated 
and will lead on to lots more opportunities to develop the curriculum for children and young 
people with Down syndrome. After my PhD is finished I aim to continue researching and 
developing best educational practices for children with special needs.  
I have been working with children with special needs for many years; initially as a classroom 
assistant in a school for children with Autistic Spectrum Condition, then as a teacher and Head 
of English in secondary schools and more recently through teaching Early Development Groups 
at the Down syndrome Training and Support Service.  
I have a 3 ½ year old daughter who, amongst many other attributes, has Down syndrome.  
My contact details: 
Email: edled@leeds.ac.uk 
Phone: 07973513806 
 
Post: 
Lucy Dix - PGR student 
University of Leeds 
School of Education 
Hillary Place 
Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
 
Website: https://www.pdr.leeds.ac.uk/web.php?pg=edled 
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Consent Form 
Name of participant and name of 
parent/carer 
 
Participant’s parent/carer signature  
Date  
Name of lead researcher  Lucy Dix 
Signature  
Date (To be signed and dated in the presence of the 
participant). 
 
 
Consent form to take part in the research 
study: 
‘How does Theory of Mind develop in children 
with Down syndrome?’ 
 
Add your initials 
next to the 
statements you 
agree with 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information pack and letter 
dated April ‘13, explaining the above research project and I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
I understand that our participation is voluntary and that we are free to withdraw 
at any time without giving any reason and without there being any negative 
consequences. In addition, should I not wish to answer any particular question 
or questions, I am free to decline.  
Contact: Lucy Dix 07973 513806 
 
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to my 
anonymised responses. I understand that our names will not be linked with the 
research materials, and we will not be identified or identifiable in the report or 
reports that result from the research.   
I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential.  
 
I agree for the data collected from me and my child to be used in relevant future 
research and for our data to be held securely in a data archiving facility.  
This includes using video extracts for teaching and conferences/seminars. 
 
I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the lead 
researcher should my contact details change. 
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Child Participant Information Sheet 
If printed, this sheet will be held securely in a locked cabinet and no copies will be made. The 
information will be transferred to the secure Leeds University computer system and the file will 
be password protected. 
Please complete this form and return it to me at: edled@leeds.ac.uk or you can post it to: Lucy 
Dix - PGR student, University of Leeds, School of Education, Hillary Place, Leeds, LS2 9JT. Or leave 
it at the Pamela Sunter Centre.  If you would like speak to me, so I can take the information from 
you on the phone, or in person, please call me on 07973513806, and I will ring you back. 
First Name  Surname/family 
name 
 
    
Date of Birth  Male/Female  
     
What school or nursery 
does your child attend? 
(Or will attend from 
September 2013 if 
moving 
schools/nursery) 
 
   
Name of 
teacher/teaching 
assistant. 
 
 
Any medical conditions? 
Please include all 
conditions I need to know 
about, even if they are 
associated with Down 
syndrome. 
 
  
Anything else you would 
like me to know about 
your child (for example: 
finds music calming, 
dislikes bright colours, 
must stick to routines.) 
 
  
Name of main contact 
parent/carer 
 
  
I am happy for Lucy Dix to contact my child’s school or nursery. (Please sign below, a typed 
signature is fine). 
If you are finding it difficult to attach this to an email, you can just type the information into an 
email and send it to me that way, but please make sure you give me your agreement to 
contact your child’s school/nursery. 
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Appendix 2: Protocols 
Group 1 Protocol 
 
Group 1 – age 2-3 years 
Testing early precursors of Theory of Mind 
 
Assessment environment. 
Assessment to take place at school, home or at a group. 
Assessments will be held in a quiet space which is familiar to the child where possible.  
All sessions will be videoed. 
Present: the investigator, a parent, carer or teaching assistant.  
Timescale  
The tasks will take 15 minutes. 
Sessions repeated after a 14 day gap (or similar) 
During the Autumn teaching term Sept- Dec 2013 
Scoring 
Scored on pass/fail 
Also scored on how long it takes to complete the task and how many prompts are needed.  
For incorrect/fail answers, scoring includes codes to record how the child fails the task. 
Communication 
Children’s responses are through making physical choices; no other forms of expressive communication are needed to succeed in 
the tasks. 
Parents or TA’s will be present to clarify expressive communication if needed.  
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Tasks  Episodes  Prompts   Scores 
Task 1.  
Object permanence tasks 
 
Early evidence of developing theory of 
mind – knowing something exists when 
it is no longer visible.   
 
 
  
 
A. 1 box 
Show child ball. 
Say and sign ball. 
Hide ball under box. 
Sign and say ‘Where’s the ball?’ 
 
Prompt 1 after 5 seconds: 
Where’s the ball? 
Prompt 2 after 10 seconds: 
Name, where’s the ball? 
3 Finds object within 5 
seconds 
2 Finds object after 1 prompt 
within another 5 seconds  
B. 2 boxes choice 
Show child car. 
Say and sign car. 
Hide car under a box. 
Sign and say ‘Where’s the box?’ 
Prompt 1 after 5  
seconds: 
Where’s the car? 
Prompt 2 after 10 seconds: 
Name, where’s the car? 
3 Finds object after 2 prompts 
within another 5 seconds 
 
0 
 
Looks in incorrect place or 
doesn’t choose a box 
 
-1 
 
Removes box  but attention 
on box 
C. 2 boxes choice, visible 
displacement 
Show child dog. 
Say and sign dog. 
Hide dog under a box. 
Say ‘name, look’ to ensure 
attention.  
Move the dog from one box to 
the other.  
Sign and say ‘Where’s the dog? 
Prompt 1 after 5 seconds: 
Where’s the dog? 
Prompt 2 after 10 seconds: 
Name, where’s the dog? 
-2 Doesn’t find object – gaze 
averted/looks away 
-3 Distraction response - 
engages with researcher or 
carer off task 
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Tasks  Episodes  Prompts   Scores 
Task 2   
Reaction to a novel object 
Name. Look. 
Make bird make a noise 
 
Once bird has stopped look at 
bird and wait for sign or 
indication for ‘more’ or ‘again’ 
or ‘stop’ 
3 Looks at experimenter to start or 
stop the bird 
2 Looks to parents or carer to start 
or stop the bird 
1 Moves towards or away from 
object to start or stop 
 
0 
 
No change in behaviour or 
disengages 
 
Tasks  Episodes  Prompts   Scores 
Task 3  
Joint attention  
A. 
Rattle dolls to get attention.  
Once attention is on doll appear to 
struggle to take the top off. 
 Put doll down in between exp and 
child. 
 
Prompt 1, after 5 seconds 
Repeat action 
Prompt 2, after 10 seconds 
Repeat action 
3 responds within 5 seconds, 
attempts to pull apart 
2 responds after 1st prompt 
after a further 5 seconds 
1 responds after 2nd prompt 
after a further 5 seconds 
0 picks up dolls and 
rattles/plays but does not 
attempt to open 
-1 does not respond 
-2 gaze averted, looks away 
-3 distraction response - 
engages with researcher or 
carer off task 
 B. 
Shake tin to get attention 
Prompt 1, after 5 seconds 
Repeat action 
3 responds within 5 seconds, 
attempts to put in discs 
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Once attention is on the tin try to put 
discs in tin, but miss. Have 2 more 
attempts then put discs down in 
between exp and child. 
Prompt 2, after 10 seconds 
Repeat action 
2 responds after 1st prompt 
after a further 5 seconds 
1 responds after 2nd prompt 
after a further 5 seconds 
0 picks up tin/discs and 
rattles/plays but does not 
attempt to put in  
-1 does not respond 
-2 gaze averted, looks away 
-3 distraction response - 
engages with researcher or 
carer off task 
 C. 
Ensure child’s attention, by calling 
name if necessary. 
Point at picture of teddy. 
Look through the containers to find 
the teddy.  
Give up looking after 3 boxes. 
 
Prompt 1, after 5 seconds 
Repeat action 
Prompt 2, after 10 seconds 
Repeat action 
3 responds within 5 seconds, 
attempts to search 
2 responds after 1st prompt 
after a further 5 seconds 
1 responds after 2nd prompt 
after a further 5 seconds 
0 picks up boxes, but does not 
search  
-1 does not respond 
-2 gaze averted, looks away 
-3 distraction response - 
engages with researcher or 
carer off task 
Tasks  Episodes  Prompts  Scores 
Task 4 
Picture book – alternative 
perspectives task 
A.  Name, show me the duck? 
 
Prompt 1, after 5 seconds 
3 responds within 5 
seconds, turns book to 
show 
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Carer and child to look through the 
book together, reading/naming 
pictures. 
Child must be holding book. 
 When child turns to page with duck 
ask ‘Can I see the duck?’ 
or ‘Show me the duck’. 
 
If child has moved onto another 
page, ask for animal on that page. 
Name, show me the duck? 
Prompt 2, after 10 seconds 
Name, can I see  the duck? 
2 responds after 1st 
prompt after a further 5 
seconds 
1 responds after 2nd 
prompt after a further 5 
seconds 
0 points to picture in the 
book 
-1 does not respond 
-2 gaze averted, looks 
away 
-3 distraction response - 
engages with 
researcher or carer off 
task 
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Group 2 Protocol 
Group 2 – age 4-5 years 
 
Testing pretend play and symbolic functioning 
 
Assessment environment 
Assessments will take place either in schoo, at home or at a group, depending on parent preference.  
Assessments will take place in a separate room away from the main classroom if at school. 
Adults present – the researcher, if at school a TA or parent, if at home or group a parent/carer.  
All sessions will be videoed using a discrete digital camera. 
  
 
Timescales 
Summer  term – April/May  2014 
40 min sessions  
Repeated 2 weeks later.  
 
 
Scoring 
Children are scored on how long it takes to complete the task and how many prompts are needed.  
For incorrect/fail answers scoring includes codes to record how the child fails the task. 
 
 
Communication 
Children’s responses are through making physical choices; no other forms of expressive communication are needed to succeed in the tasks. 
Children will be given a STOP card to help them indicate if they need a break or wish to withdraw. 
Parents or TA’s will be present to clarify expressive communication if needed.  
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Task Notes Episode Prompts Scoring 
BPVS   n/a  As per BPVS 
instructions 
Transformations in 
pretend play. (Taken 
from Harris and 
Kavanaugh (1993) 
In the original trial no 
prompts were given and 
the scoring was only 
pass/fail. 
I have adapted the trial to 
ensure the children with 
Down syndrome are given 
the greatest chance to 
succeed by giving 2 
prompts to remind them 
of the task.  
The scoring is also adapted 
to consider how the 
children fail to engage with 
the task.  
Episode A.-The props are a teapot, cups 
and a cloth. Exp. and child play with 
props, making the cats a cup of tea. Exp. 
says “oh no, look, here comes the 
cheeky bird.” The experimenter makes 
the cheeky bird pour make-believe tea 
over the cat situated to the right of the 
child and says, "Oh dear! The cat is wet. 
Can you clean where the tea is?" The 
child is then given the cloth. 
Episode B.-The props are a cereal box, 
bowls, spoons and a brush. The 
experimenter makes Bird pour make-
believe cereal on the floor beside the 
cat to the right of the child and says, 
"Oh dear! The floor is all dirty! Can you 
clean it?" The child is then given the 
brush. 
Episode C.-The props are a tube of 
toothpaste (with the top on) and a 
cloth. The experimenter makes Bird 
squirt make-believe toothpaste onto 
the tail of the cat to the left of the child 
and says, "Oh dear! The cat is all dirty! 
Can you clean him?" The child is then 
given the tissue. 
Prompt 1: After 10 
seconds the question 
is repeated.  
Prompt 2: After a 
further 10 seconds the 
question is repeated 
with the addition of 
explicit reference to 
where or what needs 
cleaning: 
‘The cats head is wet! 
Can you dry the cat?’ 
‘The floor is all dirty 
here! Can you clean 
the floor?’ 
‘The cat’s tail is dirty! 
Can you clean the cat?’ 
‘The floor is all dirty 
here! Can you dry the 
floor?’ 
3 Correct response 
within 10 seconds 
2 Correct response after 
1st prompt 
1 Correct response after 
2nd prompt 
0 Incorrect response - 
cleans wrong area or 
wrong cat  
-
1 
No response – takes 
cleaning implement 
but does not clean 
-
2 
No response – does 
not engage with task 
or experimenter – 
averts gaze 
-
3 
Distraction response – 
engages with 
experimenter or carer 
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Episode D.-The props are an empty 
carton of milk and a sponge. The 
experimenter makes Bird pour make-
believe milk in front of the cat to the 
left of the child and says, "Oh dear! The 
floor is all wet! Can you dry it?" The 
child is then given the sponge. 
Teddy search task  Ensure child’s attention, by calling 
name if necessary. 
Point at picture of teddy. 
Look through the containers to find the 
teddy.  
Give up looking after 3 boxes. 
 
Prompt 1, after 5 
seconds 
Repeat action 
Prompt 2, after 10 
seconds 
Repeat action 
3 responds within 5 
seconds, attempts to 
search 
2 responds after 1st 
prompt after a further 
5 seconds 
1 responds after 2nd 
prompt after a further 
5 seconds 
0 picks up boxes, but 
does not search  
-
1 
does not respond 
-
2 
gaze averted, looks 
away 
-
3 
distraction response - 
engages with 
researcher or carer off 
task 
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Symbolic functioning. 
Taken from O'Toole 
and Chiat (2006) 
Minimal adult modelling is 
required in this task to 
ensure that the child is not 
just mimicking. 
Objects: ball, bricks, bowl, stick, 
shoebox  
 
Episode A: ball and bricks are put in 
front of child and teddy. Experimenter 
says, “Scarecrow really wants to eat an 
apple, can you give him an apple?’. 
Episode B: spoon and stick are put in 
front of child and Scarecrow. 
Experimenter brings out a sheet of 
paper and says, “Scarecrow wants to do 
some writing, can you find him a 
pencil?’. 
Episode C: bowl and ball are put in front 
of child and Scarecrow. Experimenter 
says, “Scarecrow’s head is really cold, 
can you put a hat on him?’. 
Episode D: bricks and shoebox are put 
in front of child and Scarecrow. 
Experimenter says, “Scarecrow’s feeling 
tired now. Can you put him to bed?’. 
Prompt 1: After 10 
seconds the question 
is repeated.  
Prompt 2: After a 
further 10 seconds the 
question is repeated 
with the addition of 
explicit reference to 
the object 
transformation. 
A: ‘What can we 
pretend is an apple?’ 
B: ‘What can we 
pretend is a pencil?’ 
C: ‘What can we 
pretend is a hat?’ 
D: ‘What can we 
pretend is a bed?’ 
3 Correct response 
within 10 seconds 
2 Correct response after 
1st prompt 
1 Correct response after 
2nd prompt 
0 Incorrect response – 
does not transform 
object 
-
1 
No response –  plays 
with objects but 
without reference to 
question 
-
2 
No response – does 
not engage with task 
or experimenter – 
averts gaze 
-
3 
Distraction response – 
engages with 
experimenter or carer 
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Group 3 Protocol 
Group 3 – age 6-9 years 
Testing the emergence of Theory of Mind through false belief 
 
Assessment environment. 
Assessments will take place either in school, at home or at a group, depending on parent preference.  
Assessments will take place in a separate room away from the main classroom if at school. 
Adults present – the researcher, if at school a TA or parent, if at The Centre a parent/carer.  
All sessions will be videoed using a discrete digital camera. 
Timescale  
Summer term February – July 2014 
1x 40 min session 
Repeated 2 weeks later.  
Scoring 
Children are scored on how long it takes to complete the task and how many prompts are needed.  
For incorrect/fail answers, scoring includes codes to record how the child fails the task. 
Communication 
Children’s responses are through making physical choices; no other forms of expressive communication are needed to succeed in the tasks. 
Parents or TA’s will be present to clarify expressive communication if needed.  
Stop card given to child to enable a rest or withdrawal from the task.  
Task Notes Episodes Prompts Scoring 
BPVS   n/a  As per BPVS 
instructions 
False belief  
task; original 
and modified 
versions. (False 
belief) 
All FB episodes are 
scored using the same 
criteria.  
FB 1. 
 
Ex. shows 2 dolls, introduces one as Dinah and the 
other as Maxi.  
Ex. shows that Dinah has a toy.  
After 10 seconds 
repeat the question 
“Where will Dinah 
look for the toy?” 
4
 
Correct response 
within 5 seconds 
3  Correct response 
within 10 
seconds 
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Ex. makes Dinah put her toy in a drawer and shows 
Dinah ‘going outside’. 
Ex. makes Maxi move the toy from the drawer to his 
box.  
Ex. makes Dinah re-enter and asks child 
‘Where did maxi hide the toy?’ 
‘Where did Dinah hide the toy?’ 
 ‘Where will Dinah look for the toy?’  
 
FB 2 
 
Ex and child read through a comic book which shows 
the same story as the Dinah/Maxi story above.  
The characters are changed to a brother and sister. 
The sister hides her favourite story book from her 
brother  who finds the book and then moves it. 
Children are asked  
‘Where did Maxi hide the book?’ 
‘Where did Dinah hide the book?’ 
‘Where will Dinah look for the book?’  
 
FB 3 
 
The experimenter and the participant work together 
to create a picture story of the Dinah/Maxi task using 
a tablet. 
The child directs the pictures to be taken and the ex. 
facilitates the use of technology. 
 
FB 4 
Repeat of episode 1.  
After a further 10 
seconds, draw 
attention to Dinah 
and the drawers (or 
equivalents in Ep 2+3) 
and repeat the 
question. “Where will 
Dinah look for the 
toy?” 
2 Correct response 
after 1st prompt 
1 Correct response 
after 2nd prompt 
0 Incorrect 
response 
-1 No response –  
plays with 
objects but does 
not answer 
question 
-2 No response – 
does not engage 
with task or 
experimenter – 
averts gaze 
-3 Distraction 
response – 
engages with 
experimenter or 
carer 
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Unexpected 
contents task.  
 UC 1 
Ex shows child a box which looks as though it contains 
crayons. 
“What do you think is inside?” 
Ex and child look inside to find socks instead of 
crayons. 
“What did you think was inside?” 
“Shall we trick ‘teacher/dad/mum’?” 
Ex and child work together to put socks inside the 
crayon packet.  
“What will ‘teacher/dad/mum’ think is inside the box?  
Ex and child show teacher/dad/mum box and play the 
‘trick’. 
 
 
 4 Correct 
response within 
5 seconds 
3  Correct 
response within 
10 seconds 
2 Correct 
response after 
1 prompt 
1 Correct 
response after 
2prompts 
0 Incorrect 
response 
-1 No response – 
playing with 
objects 
-2 No response – 
does not 
engage with 
task or 
experimenter 
-3 Distraction 
response – 
engages off 
task with 
experimenter 
or carer 
 
341 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Language questionnaires 
 
Group 1 
Dear Parent or Carer,  
Thank you for taking the time to be involved in this research. As part of developing our 
understanding of the development of children with Down syndrome, we would like to collect 
some information about what type of communication your child uses and how often you refer 
to certain ideas in your everyday talk. We’d be very grateful if you could take 5 minutes to fill in 
the boxes below. 
Child’s name  Date of birth  Your 
relationship 
to the child 
 
 
Does your child: 
Please tick under the appropriate box 
 
 never occasionally all the time  
point to show you something     
hold objects out for you to 
see or play with 
    
show distress when 
someone is upset 
    
 
 not yet in sign in sign and 
speech 
in speech 
put a noun (a naming word) 
and adjective (a describing 
word) together  
for example:  
blue ball 
teddy wet 
    
use the term ‘want’ without 
prompting 
    
ask for more without 
prompting 
    
 
 
Please turn over... 
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How often do you use the following words with your child? 
Please tick under the appropriate box 
 
target word examples Never Once a 
month 
Once a 
week 
Daily 
think ‘I think it’s here.’ 
 ‘Where do you think it goes?’ 
    
like ‘I really like this song.’ 
‘Do you like bananas?’ 
    
want ‘I want you to go in there.’ 
‘Do you want a drink?’ 
    
play ‘I’d like to play with this.’ 
‘What are you playing?’ 
    
know ‘I know where you’re hiding!’ 
‘Do you know whose house this is?’ 
    
remember ‘Hmm, I can’t remember that.’ 
‘Can you remember where it is?’ 
    
pretend ‘It’s ok, I’m just pretending to be sad!’ 
‘Can you pretend to be a mouse?’ 
    
tried ‘I’m so tired, is it bedtime yet?!’ 
‘Are you tired?’ 
    
worried ‘Is she worried she will be late for school?’     
sad ‘Why are you sad?’ 
‘I’m sad because I banged my toe.’ 
    
frightened ‘The little mouse was frightened of the snake’.      
 
We are interested in the views of parents on research into Down syndrome. Please use the space 
below to suggest areas you would like to see more research in: 
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Groups 2 + 3 
 
Dear Parent or Carer, 
Thank you for taking the time to be involved in this research. As part of developing our 
understanding of the development of children with Down syndrome, I would like to collect some 
information about how often your child uses certain words and how often you refer to certain 
ideas in your everyday talk. I’d be very grateful if you could take 5 minutes to fill in the boxes 
below.  
Child’s name  Child’s date 
of birth 
 Your 
relationship 
to the child 
 
 
Please tick the column which best fits the way your child uses the word 
Please bear in mind these word lists are for a wide age range of children.  
 does not yet 
understand 
understands signs/says in 
repetition or 
rote phrase 
signs/says 
out of 
context  
signs/says in 
context 
want       
gone      
love      
like      
play      
show      
wait      
are      
is      
be      
could      
can      
do      
don’t      
going      
try      
have      
choose      
pretend      
remember      
think      
      
mine      
his      
hers      
I      
it      
me      
my      
that      
this      
you      
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your      
he      
her      
myself      
us      
we      
they      
      
good      
bad (naughty)      
clever      
cross      
happy      
pretty      
tired      
wet      
angry      
excited      
disgusted      
frightened      
sad      
scared      
surprised      
worried      
      
again      
day      
later      
now      
today      
tomorrow      
not      
other      
same      
after      
before      
next      
once      
time      
yesterday      
different      
a bit      
a lot      
each      
every      
lots      
some      
because      
if      
then      
why      
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How often do you use the following terms with your child? 
Please tick under the appropriate box 
 
target 
word 
examples Never Once 
a 
mont
h 
Once 
a 
week 
Daily 
think ‘I think it’s here.’ 
 ‘Where do you think it goes?’ 
    
like ‘I really like this song.’ 
‘Do you like bananas?’ 
    
want ‘I want you to go in there.’ 
‘Do you want a drink?’ 
    
play ‘I’d like to play with this.’ 
‘What are you playing?’ 
    
know ‘I know where you’re hiding!’ 
‘Do you know whose house this is?’ 
    
remember ‘Hmm, I can’t remember that.’ 
‘Can you remember where it is?’ 
    
pretend ‘It’s ok, I’m just pretending to be sad!’ 
‘Can you pretend to be a mouse?’ 
    
tired ‘I’m so tired, is it bedtime yet?!’ 
‘Are you tired?’ 
    
worried ‘Is she worried she will be late for school?’     
sad ‘Why are you sad?’ 
‘I’m sad because I banged my toe.’ 
    
frightened ‘The little mouse was frightened of the 
snake’.  
    
 
I would welcome your comments on the way my research has been conducted. Parent and carer 
views are useful to have when writing up results. Please feel free to put any comments below, 
or in an email to me.  
 
 
I give my consent for these comments to be used anonymously ………………………………….(please 
sign)  
I would like to ask your child’s school about how they felt the assessments were carried out, 
whether they felt they were appropriate and how well they felt your child responded to them. I 
will send your child’s TA, who was present at testing, a questionnaire to fill out. I will use their 
responses to support my research at conferences and in papers I write. All comments will be 
made completely anonymous.  
I give my consent for Lucy Dix to contact the school for comments 
 ………………………………….(please sign)  
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Appendix 4: TA and parent feedback  
Group 2 
 
TA Questionnaire Group 2 
 
As part of my study I would like to collect some information and opinions from the Teaching 
Assistant/s who work with the children in my study. A number of teaching assistants who were 
present at the assessments made really interesting comments on the work I was doing and on 
the performance of the child in the assessments. Your comments will be really useful for me 
as I try to understand the nature of the performance of the child in context and will enable me 
to underpin my findings with examples from the people who work closely with the children in 
the study.  
 
Any comments you make will be made strictly anonymous, your name and the name of the 
child will be changed and any other identifiers will be changed or removed (for example 
reference to area, or the school).   This research has been approved by the University’s Ethical 
Review Panel. Reference: AREA 12-080 and we are working to the University’s strict policies 
on data protection and ethical research which can be found here:  
http://researchsupport.leeds.ac.uk/index.php/academic_staff/good_practice/university_ethics_p
olicies 
 
Thank you for your support, 
 
Lucy Dix 
 
This information will be used purely for analysis purposes so that I can link your comments 
with the child you work with. Your comments will remain completely anonymous and you 
and the child and school will never be identifiable in my reports. 
Your school: 
Your name (optional): 
 
The questions are here to guide you but are optional, please feel free to comment in any way 
you wish; all your comments will be useful. 
Your response to the use 
of a ‘stop’ card for the 
child. 
 
 
 
 
 
Your response to the 
use of the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scales (the 
picture cards which the 
child pointed to).  
 
 
 
 
 
How do you think the 
child responded to the 
BPVS?  
Knew more 
words than I 
expected 
Knew less words 
than I expected 
Got words 
wrong 
which I 
think 
Did not seem 
to enjoy the 
task  
See
me
d 
to 
enj
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he/she  
knows 
oy 
the 
tas
k 
Tick all  that apply      
Any further comments 
on this task: 
 
 
 
 
Your response to the 
cheeky bird/cleaning 
the cats task. 
 
 
 
How do you feel the 
child responded to the 
task? 
Got more 
questions 
right than I 
expected 
Got more 
questions wrong 
than I expected  
Performed 
as I 
expected 
Did not seem 
to enjoy the 
task 
See
me
d 
to 
enj
oy 
the 
tas
k 
Tick all  that apply      
Any further comments 
on this task: 
 
 
 
 
Your response to the 
imagination task – (the 
doll Alex). 
 
 
 
 
 
How do you feel the 
child responded to the 
imagination task? 
Got more 
questions 
right than I 
expected 
Got more 
questions wrong 
than I expected  
Performed 
as I 
expected 
Did not seem 
to enjoy the 
task 
See
me
d 
to 
enj
oy 
the 
tas
k 
Tick all that apply      
Any further comments 
on this task: 
 
 
 
Your response to the 
searching for the teddy 
task. 
 
 
 
How do you feel the 
child responded to the 
searching for the teddy 
task? 
Performed as I expected Did not seem to enjoy the 
task 
Seemed to 
enjoy the task 
Tick all that apply    
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Any further comments 
on this task: 
 
 
 
 
My study will be looking at how children's difficulties in Theory of Mind may impact on their 
access to the curriculum at primary school. Please use this box to add your comments about 
this:  
 
 
 
 Signed Print name Da
te 
I agree for my anonymised 
comments to be used by Lucy Dix as 
part of her research with the 
University of Leeds. I understand 
that this may be as part of her 
written work, publications and 
presentations.  
   
    
Please 
return 
by email 
or post.  
If you would like a paper copy of this questionnaire please email, phone or text me 
and I will post one out to you. 
Email:  edled@leeds.ac.uk 
Post:  
 
Lucy Dix 
PGR Student  
School of Education 
University of Leeds 
Hillary Place 
Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
 
 
Phone: 07973513806 
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Group 3 
TA Questionnaire Group 3 
As part of my study I would like to collect some information and opinions from the 
Teaching Assistant/s who work with the children in my study. A number of teaching 
assistants who were present at the assessments made really interesting comments on 
the work I was doing and on the performance of the child in the assessments. Your 
comments will be really useful for me as I try to understand the nature of the 
performance of the child in context and will enable me to underpin my findings with 
examples from the people who work closely with the children in the study.  
 
Any comments you make will be made strictly anonymous, your name and the name of 
the child will be changed and any other identifiers will be changed or removed (for 
example reference to area, or the school).   This research has been approved by the 
University’s Ethical Review Panel. Reference: AREA 12-080 and we are working to the 
University’s strict policies on data protection and ethical research which can be found 
here:  
http://researchsupport.leeds.ac.uk/index.php/academic_staff/good_practice/university_e
thics_policies 
 
Thank you for your support, 
 
Lucy Dix 
 
This information will be used purely for analysis purposes so that I can link your 
comments with the child you work with. Your comments will remain completely 
anonymous and you and the child and school will never be identifiable in my reports. 
Your school: 
Your name (optional): 
 
The questions are here to guide you but are optional, please feel free to comment in 
any way you wish; all your comments will be useful. 
Your response to 
the use of a ‘stop’ 
card for the child. 
 
 
 
Your response to 
the use of the 
British Picture 
Vocabulary 
Scales (the 
picture cards 
which the child 
pointed to).  
 
How do you think 
the child 
responded to the 
BPVS?  
Knew 
more 
words 
than I 
expecte
d 
Knew less words than 
I expected 
Got 
words 
wrong 
which I 
think 
he/she  
knows 
Did not seem 
to enjoy the 
task  
Seemed 
to enjoy 
the task 
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Tick all  that 
apply 
     
Any further 
comments on 
this task: 
 
 
 
 
Your response to 
the Dinah/Maxi 
story with dolls. 
 
 
 
How do you feel 
the child 
responded to the 
story? 
Got 
more 
questio
ns right 
than I 
expecte
d 
Got more questions 
wrong than I 
expected  
Performe
d as I 
expected 
Did not seem 
to enjoy the 
task 
Seemed 
to enjoy 
the task 
Tick all  that 
apply 
     
Any further 
comments on 
this task: 
 
 
 
 
Your response to 
the digit span 
task (pointing to 
a series of 
numbers on the 
number line) 
 
 
 
How do you feel 
the child 
responded to the 
digit span task? 
Got 
more 
questio
ns right 
than I 
expecte
d 
Got more questions 
wrong than I 
expected  
Performe
d as I 
expected 
Did not seem 
to enjoy the 
task 
Seemed 
to enjoy 
the task 
Tick all that 
apply 
     
Any further 
comments on 
this task: 
 
 
 
Your response to 
the Dinah/Maxi 
book task. 
 
 
 
How do you feel 
the child 
responded to the 
Dinah/Maxi book 
task? 
Got 
more 
questio
ns right 
than I 
expecte
d 
Got more questions 
wrong than I 
expected  
Performe
d as I 
expected 
Did not seem 
to enjoy the 
task 
Seemed 
to enjoy 
the task 
Tick all that 
apply 
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Any further 
comments on 
this task: 
 
 
 
Your response to 
the Dinah/Maxi 
ipad task. 
 
 
 
How do you feel 
the child 
responded to the 
Dinah/Maxi ipad 
task? 
Got 
more 
questio
ns right 
than I 
expecte
d 
Got more questions 
wrong than I 
expected  
Performe
d as I 
expected 
Did not seem 
to enjoy the 
task 
Seemed 
to enjoy 
the task 
Tick all that 
apply 
     
Any further 
comments on 
this task 
 
 
 
My study will be looking at how children's difficulties in Theory of Mind may impact on 
their access to the curriculum at primary school. Please use this box to add your 
comments about this:  
 
 
 
 Signed Print name Date 
I agree for my 
anonymised 
comments to be 
used by Lucy Dix as 
part of her research 
with the University 
of Leeds. I 
understand that this 
may be as part of her 
written work, 
publications and 
presentations.  
   
    
Please return by 
email or post.  
If you would like a paper copy of this questionnaire please email, 
phone or text me and I will post one out to you. 
Email:  edled@leeds.ac.uk 
Post:  
 
Lucy Dix 
PGR Student  
School of Education 
University of Leeds 
Hillary Place 
Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
 
 
Phone: 07973513806 
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Appendix 5: Digit span task  
 
Taken from : http://www.ppls.ed.ac.uk/psychology/people/sergio-della-sala 
Original list up to sequence of 10, reproduced here up to sequence of 6 
 
 Stage 1.   Determination of the Subject’s Digit Span 
Instructions to the Experimenter 
 
You should have in front of you a sheet headed Lists for Digit Span Determination.  You 
will see that lists are arranged in sets, those in each set being of the same length, the 
lists becoming progressively longer as you work down the page.  In each set, there are 
nine lists, but that is to allow for the possibility of interruptions.  The subject will receive 
only six lists for the actual determination of span.   
 
Say to the subject that you are going to read them lists of digits, and that they are to try 
to repeat the digits in the order in which they were read out.  If the subject seems 
unclear about what is required, go through an example, say, the list: 4, 7, 1.   Read the 
digits in an even tone, at approximately the rate of one digit per second.   
 
The subject should be tested on six lists, starting with length 2.  Read out the digits at 
the rate of one digit per second.  In the space provided, put a tick if the subject repeats 
the list correctly, and a cross if they do not.  If the subject gets at least five out of the six 
lists correct, proceed to the lists in the next set.  Continue this procedure until the 
subject gets two lists from the set wrong.  At the bottom of the page, enter the subject’s 
Digit Span as the maximum length of the lists of which the subject recalled at least 5/6 
correctly.   
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Lists for Digit Span Determination 
 
After each of the following lists, in the space provided, enter a tick () if the list is correctly 
recalled and a cross () if it is not.    At the bottom of the page, in the space provided, enter the 
subject’s Digit Span as the maximum length of the lists of which the subject recalled 5/6 
correctly.  Present only 6 lists to the subject.  
 
List Result 
( or ) 
List Result 
( or ) 
List Result 
( or ) 
For Span = 2      
83  54  27  
28  37  91  
68  96  87  
For Span = 3      
829  687  871  
132  356  251  
152  637  915  
For Span = 4      
6241  1372  5316  
2359  7392  4815  
7132  6539  1872  
For Span = 5      
84132  85293  79514  
62143  91635  82691  
97438  16592  75468  
For Span = 6      
587261  492617  148239  
261384  247681  423896  
632147  429735  641357  
 
 
Subject’s Digit Span =       
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Appendix 6: False Belief book 
 
Kindly designed and illustrated free of charge by Matt Feres http://www.ferres.co.uk/ 
Original book in full colour 
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Appendix 7: Case series study rationale 
whole of  group 1
Set 1 - failed all 
tasks
Interaction with 
task or exp.
No interaction with 
task or exp.
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosen
Set 2 - passed only 
object permanence 
tasks
Interaction with 
exp. or task
No interaction with 
task or exp.
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosen
Set 3 - passed OP 
tasks and joint 
attention tasks
Interaction with 
exp. or task
No interaction with 
task or exp.
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosen
Set 4  - passed all 
tasks
Interaction with 
exp. or task
No interaction with 
task or exp.
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosen
359 
 
 
 
 
whole of group 
2
Set 1 - failed all 
tasks
grouped by BPVS 
score
Interaction with 
task or exp.
No interaction 
with task or exp.
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosen
Set 2 - passed 
only pretend 
play tasks
grouped by BPVS 
score
Interaction with 
exp. or task
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosenNo interaction 
with task or exp
Set 3 - passed 
pretend play and 
intentions task
grouped by BPVS 
score
Interaction with 
exp. or task
No interaction 
with task or exp.
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosen
Set 4  - passed 
all tasks
grouped by BPVS 
score
Interaction with 
exp. or task
No interaction 
with task or exp.
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosen
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Whole of  group 
3
Set 1 - failed all 
FB tasks
grouped by BPVS 
score
Interaction with 
task or exp.
No interaction 
with task or exp.
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosen
Set 2 - passed 
some reality + 
memory q
grouped by BPVS 
score
Interaction with 
exp. or task
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosenNo interaction 
with task or exp
Set 3 - passed 
S/A task 1 time
grouped by BPVS 
score
Interaction with 
exp. or task
No interaction 
with task or exp.
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosen
Set 4  - passed 
S/A more than 1
grouped by BPVS 
score
Interaction with 
exp. or task
No interaction 
with task or exp.
comparison with 
other sets to get 
fair cross section
One case study 
chosen
361 
 
 
 
Data analysis plan 
Phase  One – pass/fail quantitative analysis – tasks T1 
Scoring - tasks Initial pass/fail marking 
on all tasks, all groups  
Send sample for 
agreement marking 
Re-mark – come to agreement  
Analysis Pass fail patterns by 
age – within group 
Pass fail patterns by 
task – within group 
Create timeline of ToM 
development – between group 
 
Scoring BPVS Raw score data     
 
Phase Two – qualitative analysis (T1) – Case series studies 
Gesture  In tasks In BPVS To 
experimenter 
To others in 
room  
Send sample for 
agreement marking 
Re-mark – come to agreement 
Pointing In tasks In BPVS   Send sample for 
agreement marking 
Re-mark – come to agreement 
Use of sign In tasks In BPVS To 
experimenter 
To others in 
room  
Send sample for 
agreement marking 
Re-mark – come to agreement 
Body language In tasks In BPVS To 
experimenter 
To others in 
room  
Send sample for 
agreement marking 
Re-mark – come to agreement 
Social interaction In tasks In BPVS To 
experimenter 
To others in 
room  
Send sample for 
agreement marking 
Re-mark – come to agreement 
Focus In tasks In BPVS On 
experimenter 
On others in 
room 
Send sample for 
agreement marking 
Re-mark – come to agreement 
Speech and speech 
sounds 
Intelligibl
e 
Unintelligible  In relation to 
task/bpvs 
Off task   Send sample for 
agreement marking 
Re-mark – come to agreement 
 
Exploring alternatives 
 
Map findings 
onto 
alternative 
theories 
Modular 
theories 
Simulation 
theories 
Theory 
theories 
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Appendix 8: Ethical approval 
 
 
Performance, Governance and Operations 
Research & Innovation Service 
Charles Thackrah Building 
101 Clarendon Road 
Leeds LS2 9LJ  Tel: 0113 343 4873 
Email: ResearchEthics@leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
Lucy Dix 
PhD student 
School of Education 
University of Leeds 
Leeds, LS2 9JT 
 
AREA Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
University of Leeds 
16 August 2016 
 
Dear Lucy 
 
Title of study: Moving on from mechanical learning; how Theory of Mind 
develops in children with Down syndrome. 
Ethics reference: AREA 12-080 
 
I am pleased to inform you that the above research application has been reviewed by the ESSL, 
Environment and LUBS (AREA) Faculty Research Ethics Committee and I can confirm a favourable 
ethical opinion as of the date of this letter. The following documentation was considered: 
 
Document    Version Date 
AREA 12-080 Ethical_review_Lucy_Dix_200740842_final.doc 1 13/03/13 
Appendix 1 Protocol #1 March 13.docx 1 13/03/13 
Appendix 2 Parent Information Pack .docx 1 13/03/13 
Appendix 3 parent questionnaire (pilot 2).docx 1 13/03/13 
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Committee members made the following comments about your application:  
 It is a complex area but your project is well thought through and carefully planned. You 
have given due consideration to all the issues. 
 
Please notify the committee if you intend to make any amendments to the original research as 
submitted at date of this approval, including changes to recruitment methodology. All changes 
must receive ethical approval prior to implementation. The amendment form is available at 
http://researchsupport.leeds.ac.uk/index.php/academic_staff/good_practice/managing_appr
oved_projects-1/applying_for_an_amendment-1.    
 
Please note: You are expected to keep a record of all your approved documentation, as well as 
documents such as sample consent forms, and other documents relating to the study. This 
should be kept in your study file, which should be readily available for audit purposes. You will 
be given a two week notice period if your project is to be audited. There is a checklist listing 
examples of documents to be kept which is available at  
http://researchsupport.leeds.ac.uk/index.php/academic_staff/good_practice/managing_appr
oved_projects-1/ethics_audits-1.  
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
Jennifer Blaikie 
Senior Research Ethics Administrator 
Research & Innovation Service 
On behalf of Dr Emma Cave 
Chair, AREA Faculty Research Ethics Committee 
 
CC: Student’s supervisor(s) 
 
